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ABSTRACT 
The proliferation of international courts and tribunals combined with the expansion of 
the areas and density of regulation of international law has given rise to a debate on 
the issue of fragmentation of international law. Within this context and as a possible 
response to this fear of fragmentation, the issue of interpretation with specific 
reference to Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties has 
come to the forefront.    
The overarching aim of the present thesis entitled ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’ is to provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the content and the function of Article 31(3)(c) both as a conventional and 
as a customary rule (i.e. as principle of systemic integration). To this end, the thesis 
adopts a two-pronged approach. In the first Part of this thesis the analysis is based on 
the text of the provision itself, both on its written and unwritten elements 
(intertemporal law considerations). This analysis demonstrates that a proper 
understanding of Article 31(3)(c) leads us to the adoption of the proximity criterion as 
the only appropriate in the application of Article 31(3)(c). 
Having concluded the textual analysis, the thesis then, in the second Part, 
considers Article 31(3)(c) from a different vantage point. It examines Article 31(3)(c) 
from the more general perspective of the system as a whole and analyses what the 
effects of more systemic considerations to the content of Article 31(3)(c) are. Within 
these parameters two issues arise: i) The principles of conflict resolution, which the 
thesis proves can be applied, in certain scenarios, in the interpretative process of 
Article 31(3)(c) and ii) more importantly the notion of interpretation of customary 
law. The relevant Chapter establishes that customary international law can be the 
object of interpretation and in such an interpretation Article 31(3)(c), as custom, plays 
a pivotal role. 
Through this approach, both from a textual and a systemic perspective, the 
thesis offers a new and complete understanding of Article 31(3)(c) in all its 
manifestations and  spheres of application. 
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This work reflects the law as it stood, to the best of the author’s knowledge, on 25 
January 2010. The discourse regarding the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT has 
appeared more extensively in ‘Debating the Ouroboros of International Law : the 
Drafting History of Article 31(3)(c)’, ICLR 9 (2007): 1-31; Similarly parts of the 
analysis on the CCFT v. US case will be appearing in ‘Canons of Treaty 
Interpretation: Selected Case Studies From the World Trade Organization and the 
American Free Trade Agreement’, in Issues of Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos 
Merkouris (eds.) (Leiden: BRILL/Martinus Nijhoff, forthcoming 2010) 
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 1
Prolegomena 
 
Plato, Republic, Book VII 
…Imagine human beings living in an underground den which is open towards the light; 
they have been there from childhood, having their necks and legs chained, and can only see 
into the den. At a distance there is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners a raised 
way, and a low wall is built along the way, like the screen over which marionette players 
show their puppets. Behind the wall appear moving figures, who hold in their hands various 
works of art, and among them images of men and animals, wood and stone, and some of the 
passers-by are talking and others silent. … [The captives] see only the shadows of the 
images which the fire throws on the wall of the den … Suppose now that you suddenly turn 
them round and make them look with pain and grief to themselves at the real images; … 
[a]nd suppose further, that they are dragged up a steep and rugged ascent into the presence 
of the sun himself …Some time will pass before they get the habit of perceiving at all; and 
at first they will be able to perceive only shadows and reflections in the water; then they 
will recognize the moon and the stars, and will at length behold the sun in his own proper 
place as he is. … the way upwards is the way to knowledge …1  
 
Plato’s Cave Metaphor can be easily transposed to the field of interpretation. This 
is made absolutely clear considering the etymological origins of the term 
interpretation in its original Greek form i.e. ‘hermineia’.2 ‘Hermineia’ comes 
from ‘Hermes’ i.e. the ancient Greek god, Mercury.3 Hermes, apart from being 
the messenger of gods, was also entrusted with the duty of making the will of the 
gods known to man. He functioned as an intermediary, revealing to mere mortals 
the true intentions of the gods. Consequently, the Greek term for interpretation 
reflects exactly that; the process of revealing the true meaning and/or the true 
intentions of the parties. It is only through this search that true knowledge can be 
obtained. 
The abovementioned search for the true intention of the parties is the 
common element shared by all later definitions,4 and was also identified in the 
                                                 
1 Plato, Republic, Book VII, 7.514a et seq. (Translation as it appears in: Plato, Republic (First World 
Library – Literary Society, 2008). 
2 It is from this that the term ‘hermeneutics’ is derived. 
3 Georgios Babiniotis, Λεξικό της Νέας Ελληνικής Γλώσσας – µε Σχόλια για τη Σωστή Χρήση των 
Λέξεων (Αθήνα: Κέντρο Λεξικολογίας ΕΠΕ, 1998), at 676. 
4 See for instance the definitions in Corpus Juris Secundum and Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law 
Dictionary, (St. Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2009, 9th ed.), at 894. (hereinafter, Black’s Law 
Dictionary). 
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International Court of Justice (ICJ) by Judge de Castro in the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf case.5 
Despite the fact that, within the context of international law, the issue of 
interpretation has been the subject of research from the very start,6 a quick glance 
at the writings of publicists will reveal that even today, the analysis of the process 
of interpretation still holds a prominent place in academic and judicial discourse. 
One would be hard pressed to find a case argued in an international tribunal, 
which did not in one way or another, deal with an issue of interpretation. This, of 
course, is a result of the inadequacy, or more precisely the ‘imperfect nature’ of 
language as a system for communicating ideas and notions.7 
More recently, however, the process of interpretation as codified within 
Articles 31 and 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties8 
(VCLT) came again to the forefront both in doctrine and in jurisprudence. 
However, it was not the entire process as such, which was the main focus, but a 
specific provision within Article 31. This provision was Article 31(3)(c) which 
goes: 
 
Article 31 
General rule of interpretation 
….3.There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
… (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 
 
This provision, which is customary international law,9 codifies the principle of 
systemic integration,10 which for some time had escaped closer scrutiny. To such a 
                                                 
5 Who held that: “It is a well-established principle that the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the 
true will of the parties” (emphasis added); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Judgment 
of 19 December 1978, ICJ Rep. 1978, 3 (hereinafter Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case), Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge de Castro, at 63, para. 4. 
6 Grotius, Vattel and Puffendorf, all dealt with interpretation extensively in their respective works. 
7 In more detail on this imperfect nature of language and efforts to minimize its effects, see Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London: Routledge Classics, 2005). 
8 1155 UNTS 331. 
9 see infra note 27,  where the various international courts and tribunals have unwaveringly held that 
Articles 31 and 32 are customary international law. Furthermore Judge Buergenthal considered Article 
31(3)(c) as being “sound and undisputed in principle as far as treaty interpretation is concerned”; Case 
Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment on 
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degree, in fact, that Thirlway claimed that he doubted “… whether this sub-paragraph 
will be of any assistance in the task of treaty interpretation”.11 Judge Weeramantry on 
his part, commenting on the vagueness of Article 31(3)(c) noted in the Gabčikovo-
Nagymaros Project case, that this provision “scarcely covers [the aspect of 
intertemporal law] with the degree of clarity requisite to so important a matter”.12 
However, in the recent decades there has been a “flowering of case-law”13 with 
respect to Article 31(3)(c). Several tribunals started basing their judicial reasoning on 
an application of Article 31(3)(c). 
This sudden interest in Article 31(3)(c) can be attributed to an accumulation of 
factors. The recent proliferation of international courts and tribunals,14 accompanied 
by the expansion and increasing density of areas regulated by international law, led to 
an increasing fear of fragmentation both at an institutional and a normative level. This 
fear of fragmentation was reflected by the fact that the 6th Committee delegated to the 
International Law Commission (ILC) the discussion on the issue of fragmentation and 
how it could be addressed. The ILC, in turn, established a Study Group to deal with 
the same matter.15 The Study Group eventually submitted a report finalised by Martti 
Koskenniemi.16 In that report, the Study Group examined a number of issues,17 
amongst which one can find Article 31(3)(c) as a possible response to the issue of 
fragmentation.18 
                                                                                                                                            
Preliminary Objections of 12 December 1996, ICJ Rep. 1996, 803, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Buergenthal, para. 22 (hereinafter Oil Platforms case). 
10 Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention’, ICLQ 54 (2005): 279; see also Combacau and Sur, who refer to a ‘Principe d’ 
Integration’;  Jean Combacau and Serge Sur, Droit International Public (Paris: Montchrestien, 2004), 
at 175. Also one of the first to write on the topic of Article 31(3)(c) was Duncan French, ‘Treaty 
Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’, ICLQ 55 (2006): 281. 
11 Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960 – 1989: Part 
Three’, BYIL 62 (1991): 3, at 58. 
12 Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 
September 1997, ICJ Rep. 1997, 7, Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry at 114. 
(hereinafter Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case),  
13 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at 251. 
14 See infra note 530. 
15 GAOR,57th Session, Supplement No. 10 (A/57/10), Chap. IX.A, paras. 492-4 and 511. 
16 Study Group of the International Law Commission, Report on Fragmentation of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law – Finalized  by Martti 
Koskenniemi (A/CN.4/L.682), 13 April 2006 (hereinafter ILC Study Group); It is interesting to note 
that in the title the Study Group used the term ‘diversification’, because it was felt that ‘fragmentation’ 
had negative connotations. 
17 Such as fragmentation as a phenomenon, self-contained regimes, conflict of norms, Article 103 UN 
Charter and jus cogens norms. 
18 See ILC Study Group, supra note 16, paras. 410-80. Around the same time a Commentary of the two 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties was published, which also dealt, amongst all the other 
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All the above considerations led the present author to the selection of the 
examination of Article 31(3)(c) as the topic for the present thesis. The title ‘Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’ has been 
intentionally worded in this way. As was mentioned supra, Article 31(3)(c) enshrines 
the principle of systemic integration i.e. the process “whereby international 
obligations are interpreted by reference to their normative environment”.19 However, 
as the ICJ stated in no unclear terms in the Nicaragua case, the fact that a customary 
rule has been codified in a convention does not lead to the disappearance of that rule. 
On the contrary, both conventional and customary rules continue to exist in parallel.20 
It is this reality that the title of the thesis aims to reflect. The subject of analysis is the 
principle of systemic integration both as a conventional (as enshrined in Article 
31(3)(c) of the VCLT) and as a customary rule.  
In tackling such a complex topic it is essential to identify the correct approach. 
The outline selected for the present thesis was influenced by the following 
considerations. Article 31(3)(c) and its customary equivalent i.e. the principle of 
systemic integration,21 offer the international judge the option of applying a systemic 
interpretation; this means an interpretation that takes into consideration the system in 
which the rule being interpreted functions. Article 31(3)(c), thus, is a provision that 
bridged the gap between rule and system. It is this antithesis and complementarity 
between rule and system – so characteristic of Article 31(3)(c) – that was selected as 
the most appropriate way to outline the function of the principle of systemic 
integration. Bearing this in mind, the ‘plan binaire’ was the most germane choice for 
the present thesis. A ‘plan binaire’ is a method of presentation of an academic thesis, 
which is based on an underlying antithesis and/or complementarity of the presented 
issues. It is structured in two parts, which highlight the above 
antithesis/complementarity. 
With these considerations in mind, the thesis is structured in two Parts, with 
each part consisting of two Chapters. The first Part focuses on the analysis of the rule 
                                                                                                                                            
issues of the law of treaties, with the Article 31(3)(c) provision; see  Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein 
(eds.), Conventions de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités; Commentaire Article par Article (Bruxelles : 
Bruylant, 2006). 
19 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 413. 
20 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of 
America), Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Rep. 1986, 14, paras. 176-8 (hereinafter Nicaragua case). 
21 From this point onward these terms will be used interchangeably. 
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itself. The starting point is the text of Article 31(3)(c) and what the examination of its 
terms can reveal with respect to the extent that the normative environment (‘system’) 
of an interpreted term can be taken into consideration in the interpretative process. 
Article 31(3)(c) is examined to determine the effect of the system during 
interpretation. 
In order to succeed in this, Part I is divided in two Chapters, the first of which 
focuses on the written elements of Article 31(3)(c). The various vague terms, of 
Article 31(3)(c) – such as ‘relevant’, ‘rules’, ‘applicable’ and ‘parties’ – are 
scrutinized in order to reveal their meaning. Since this is a process of interpretation, 
the process enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT is followed.22 The text, 
object and purpose, intention, travaux préparatoires and other supplementary means 
are all examined in order to reveal the meaning and scope of the text and its 
implications as to the effect of the ‘system’ within the process of interpretation. 
 Not all elements pertinent to the principle of systemic integration are 
explicitly mentioned within the text of Article 31(3)(c). It is these unwritten elements 
that the second Chapter considers. As will be demonstrated from an examination of 
the relevant travaux préparatoires references to intertemporal law were considered to 
be implicitly incorporated in Article 31(3)(c). Despite the fact that all proposals for an 
expressis verbis inclusion of intertemporal law in the text of Article 31(3)(c) rejected, 
any analysis on Article 31(3)(c) must address this issue. Consequently, Chapter II is 
devoted to an analysis of the issues that intertemporal law raises with respect to 
Article 31(3)(c). Although the Chapter seems to depart somewhat from the text of the 
provision (by examining elements not written into it), the provision still remains the 
starting point, albeit in a more indirect way, through reference to proposed drafts and 
the discussions within the ILC and the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties. 
Since Article 31(3)(c), as mentioned, is the point of convergence between 
norm and system, the present author will next examine if  the ‘system’ itself may not 
shed light into the proper function of Article 31(3)(c). Whereas Part I started from the 
text of the provision, Part II23 reverses the point of departure. Instead of starting from 
                                                 
22 The question of whether Articles 31 and 32 can be interpreted and what rules are the apposite ones 
for this interpretation will be addressed infra. 
23 using the conclusions already arrived at in Part I. 
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the wording of the text of Article 31(3)(c), Part II examines ‘systemic considerations’, 
i.e. considerations relating to the proper functioning of the system as a whole.  
 By examining the problems arising from the function of the system of 
international law new light is shed into previously unidentified aspects of Article 
31(3)(c). The starting point may be different, but the conclusions still reveal how 
Article 31(3)(c) should be applied. 
As in Chapters I and II, where there was a shift from ‘written’ to ‘unwritten’ 
elements of Article 31(3)(c), a similar approach has been used in Chapters III and IV 
of Part II. Chapter III analyzes a phenomenon common to all imperfect systems; 
conflict and in this context, ‘conflict of norms’. Considering that there is a 
‘presumption against conflict’24 and that interpretation logically precedes recognition 
of conflict,25 the Chapter examines whether the principles of conflict resolution, 
despite all their vagueness and problems, could be applied within the context of 
Article 31(3)(c). Chapter III, starting from a systemic issue i.e. normative conflict, 
eventually envisages scenarios where the principles of conflict resolution can be 
applied, with the appropriate modifications, within Article 31(3)(c). In this way, an 
examination of one of the fundamental problems of the system clarifies the principle 
of systemic integration. 
Chapter IV continues this process, scrutinising to an even higher degree 
intricacies of the system of international law. This Chapter questions our 
understanding of one of the sources of international law; custom. The question that is 
posed is whether customary international law can also be interpreted similarly to  
conventional rules. Both in doctrine and jurisprudence, the main emphasis seems to be 
placed on the creation and identification of customary international law. However, 
this Chapter goes on to prove that from a theoretical perspective there is nothing to 
prohibit the possibility of interpretation of customary law. This point is reinforced by 
international jurisprudence, where despite appearances there is a plethora of relevant 
statements. Having established that the system of international law allows for 
interpretation of customary law, the Chapter then examines what rules of 
interpretation are applicable in such a context and whether the principle of systemic 
                                                 
24 See in more detail infra Chapter III. 
25 Id. 
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integration26 can operate in such an interpretative process. In this manner, Chapter IV 
illuminates another aspect of customary Article 31(3)(c) and clarifies our 
understanding first and foremost of the scope of its application. 
Through these Chapters and by focusing on both a normative and a systemic 
approach to the issue at hand the present thesis offers a complete picture of Article 
31(3)(c) and the principle of systemic integration; it clarifies partially explored areas 
of their function and identifies completely new ones. 
In addressing the various theoretical and practical underpinnings of each 
Chapter the present author used extensively the jurisprudence of international courts 
and tribunals and attempted to include judgments that not only covered the entirety of 
regulatory framework of international law, but also showed a temporal continuity (i.e. 
judgments were not restricted to a specific period of time, but spanned from the early 
stages of international arbitration to the most recent case-law). A similar approach 
was followed with respect to research regarding doctrine. In this manner the author 
hopes to have offered a truly representative presentation of the current status of law. 
Finally, before proceeding three points need to be addressed that will clarify 
some finer points on which the following analysis has been based: 
i) What  interpretative rules apply when interpreting Article 31 of the VCLT?  
Since the main focus of this thesis is the examination of how Article 31(3)(c), both as 
custom and as a conventional rule, should be correctly interpreted, it is necessary to 
address the issue of what interpretative rules apply when interpreting Article 31 of the 
VCLT. That the rules of interpretation, as codified in the VCLT, should apply to 
themselves would seem to be the first choice. However, Article 4 of the VCLT which 
states that: 
 
Article 4 
Non-retroactivity of the present Convention 
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to 
which treaties would be subject under international law independently of the Convention, 
the Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into 
force of the present Convention with regard to such States (emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
26 Article 31(3)(c) as such i.e. as a conventional rule does not apply because the title of the VCLT itself 
specifies that it applies only with respect to treaties. 
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bars any such possibility. Consequently, the VCLT cannot be used, as such, to 
interpret any provision of the VCLT, including itself. This does not cause any major 
problems. Articles 31 and 32 have been repeatedly recognized as customary 
international law in international jurisprudence.27 In this manner, the rules of 
interpretations as they exist within the VCLT can be interpreted not through 
application of Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT as such, i.e. as conventional rules, but 
through application of their customary law equivalents. This point brings us to the 
next question. 
 
ii) Can Articles 31 and 32 have a different content from customary rules on 
interpretation?   
Since Article 31 of the VCLT can be interpreted only through the customary rules on 
interpretation, the question that arises is whether the conventional Article 31 and the 
customary Article 3128 can have different contents. In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ 
acknowledged the fact that even if a customary rule is codified in a treaty text, this 
does not mean that it ceases to exist, on the contrary “customary international law 
continues to exist alongside treaty law”,29which also implies that it can evolve and its 
content change. For that reason, it may be logical to wonder whether, after the 
codification of the customary rules on interpretation within Articles 31 and 32, the 
customary rules of interpretation have changed in content. The judicial practice would 
seem to indicate otherwise. In all the cases where the courts had to apply customary 
rules of interpretation they usually make a point of mentioning that Articles 31 and 32 
are customary international law.30 A further argument that proves this point is the 
application of Article 31(3)(c). In interpreting Article 31 of the VCLT, reference can 
be had to ‘all relevant rules of international law’. No rule could be more relevant than 
its own customary law equivalent. Conversely, in the interpretation of the customary 
                                                 
27 Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report adopted on 1 November 1996, WTO, 
WT/DS8,10,11/AB/R (Japan – Alcohol); Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 
Judgment of 12 November 1991, ICJ Rep. 1991,53; Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions 
between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain), Judgment of 15 February 1995, ICJ Rep. 1995, 18, 
para. 33; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, ICJ 
Rep. 1994, 6, para. 41; Oil Platforms case, para. 23. 
28 From this point onwards when the term ‘customary Article 31’ or any other similar variation is used, 
what is meant is the customary law equivalent of Article 31. 
29 Nicaragua case para. 176. 
30 See supra note 27 and the relevant case-law. 
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rules on interpretation31 no rule could be more relevant than the treaty codifying it. In 
this sense, Article 31(3)(c) and the principle of systemic integration ensure that with 
respect to the rules on interpretation, Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT have the same 
content as their customary law counterparts.  
 
iii) Can discussions within the ILC on the Law of Treaties be treated as preparatory 
work of the VCLT? 
In the following Chapters, a large part of the analysis will focus on the discussions 
that occurred within the ILC. Consequently, it needs to be established that the ILC 
documents and discussions are material that fall within the interpretative process as 
defined by Articles 31 and 32. Interestingly enough, that point was raised in the 
discussions on Article 32 within the ILC. The general consensus seemed to be that the 
ILC documents and discussions could be considered as travaux préparatoires.32 The 
main reason for this was that when the ILC prepared drafts of conventions, usually in 
the diplomatic conferences these drafts were used and the arguments presented in the 
ILC influenced to a great degree the direction of the discussions in these conferences. 
But even if they could not be categorized as preparatory work, the interpreter could 
have recourse to the ILC documents as ‘other supplementary means’. The list 
provided by Article 32 is not an exhaustive one as clearly indicated by the term 
‘including’, used in that Article. Due to the above, for the present analysis and in 
order to elucidate the meaning of Article 31(3)(c), recourse can be had to the 
discussions and the documents of the ILC as travaux préparatoires or at least as 
‘other supplementary means’.  
                                                 
31 The possibility of interpretation of customary law and the fact that reference to codification treaties, 
in that context, is a form of systemic interpretation will be analyzed extensively infra in Chapter IV. 
32 The Chairman, Tunkin, Rosenne and El-Erian, (A/CN.4/SR.873), in YILC (1966), Vol.I, Part II, at 
205-6, paras. 25, 27, 28 and 34 respectively. It is noteworthy, that Rosenne originally had expressed 
misgivings as to the characterization of the ILC documents as travaux préparatoires (Rosenne, 
(A/CN.4/SR.872), in YILC (1966), Vol.I, Part II, at 201. para. 35); however, in the 873rd meeting he 
changed his opinion and agreed with Mr. Tunkin that the ILC documents were travaux préparatoires 
of a second order (the first order being the travaux préparatoires of the specific Conference relating to 
the drafting of a Treaty; in the case of the VLCT this would be the Vienna Conference on the Law of 
Treaties).   
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Part I: Article 31(3)(c) and the Principle of Systemic 
Integration from a Normative Point of View 
 
Chapter I: The Elements of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the 
Principle of Systemic Integration 
 
The text of Article 31 (3)(c)will be the starting point of the analysis presented in this 
Chapter. The ordinary meaning of the words in their context will be examined in 
order to find if any interpretative solutions can be arrived at. These original findings 
will, then, be supplemented by a presentation of all the discussions and documents 
that led to the final adoption of the text of Article 31(3)(c) as it stands today. Finally, 
the pre-VCLT jurisprudence will be used as a further ‘supplementary means’ to 
‘confirm’ and/or ‘determine’33 the meaning of any element of Article 31(3)(c) which 
has remained ambiguous. As mentioned supra34 such an application of Articles 31 
and 32 to interpret themselves is permitted with the following proviso. Articles 31 and 
32, do not apply as such i.e. as conventional rules, due to the temporal and self-
referential restrictions imposed on the VCLT by virtue of its own Article 4. 
Consequently, only customary rules on interpretation can apply in order to determine 
the content of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. Nevertheless, since it is commonly 
accepted that Articles 31 and 32 are customary international law,35 the content of 
customary Articles 31 and 32 and conventional Articles 31 and 32 coincides.  
A further point that needs to be addressed is whether this process can be 
applied in order to identify the content of the principle of systemic integration as such, 
i.e. as custom. This touches upon the subject of interpretation of customary norms that 
will be analyzed more extensively infra in Chapter IV. However, in the present 
context, the analysis is sufficient for the identification of the content of the customary 
law ‘principle of systemic integration’, since the material presented e.g. ILC 
discussions, drafts, travaux préparatoires and relevant international jurisprudence are 
                                                 
33 The two functions of Article 32 of the VCLT. 
34 In ‘Prolegomena’. 
35 See relevant case-law cited supra in ‘Prolegomena’. 
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nothing but various manifestations of practice and opinio juris, which evidence the 
existence and content of the relevant customary norm. In conclusion, by following 
this line of analysis the content of Article 31(3)(c), both qua conventional rule and 
qua custom  (as ‘principle of systemic integration’) can be revealed. 
 
I. Introduction 
The antecedents of Article 31(3)(c) can be found as early as Grotius and Vattel. In the 
writings of Grotius one can find the first mention of recourse to the law of nations as a 
rule of interpretation,36 whereas in the famous The Law of Nations Vattel suggests that 
if somebody has expressed himself in an obscure or equivocal manner  
 
[w]e ought to interpret his obscure of vague expressions, in such a manner, that they may 
agree with those terms that are clear and without ambiguity, which he has used elsewhere, 
either in the same treaty, or in some other of the like kind.37  
 
Essentially, the writings of these two scholars cover ab initio the debate that would 
later ensue with respect as to which rules fall within Article 31(3)(c). Vattel seems to 
suggest a more expansive approach, whereas Grotius focuses on the general principles 
of international law, without taking any position on whether other rules or treaties 
could be used for interpretative purposes. 
The focus of attention in the following decades shifted more to other aspects 
of interpretation, such as the existence or not of rules of interpretation and the 
existence of a hierarchy of interpretative rules. This is evidenced by the fact that in a 
series of researches, codes and discussions very little mention, if any at all, was made 
                                                 
36  
I shall not, however, admit the rule, …, that the contracts of kings and peoples ought to be 
interpreted according to Roman law so far as possible, unless it is apparent that among certain 
peoples the body of civil law has been received as the law of nations in respect to the matters which 
concern the law of nations (emphasis added) 
 
Hugo Grotius (translated and annotated by Clement Barksdale), De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Illustrious 
Hugo Grotius of the Law of Warre and Peace with Annotations. III Parts and Memorials of the 
Author’s Life and Death) (London: printed by T. Warren, for William Lee, and are to be sold at his 
shop at the signe of the Turks-head in Fleet-Street, 1654), Book II, Chapter XVI, para. XXXI (entitled: 
the contracts of kings are not to be interpreted according to Roman law) 
37 Emerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles on the Law of Nature Applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, (London : G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1793), Book II, Chapter 
XVII, para. 284. 
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with respect to the elements that constitute Article 31(3)(c). No mention at all is to be 
found in David Dudley Field’s Draft Code of 187638, in Bluntschli’s Draft Code39, in 
the Draft of the International Commission of American Jurists of 192740 and in the 
Convention on Treaties of 1928.41 Some minor references exist in Fiore’s Draft Code 
of 1918,42 in The Interpretation of Treaties of 193343 and finally, in the Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1935, prepared by the Harvard Research on the 
Law of Treaties44. 
However, it was only in the 1950s that the international community decided to 
turn its full attention to the issue of interpretation and summon all its available 
resources to tackle the intricacies inherent to it. The debate over the finer points of 
legal interpretation was held, mainly, in three fora: The Institut de Droit 
International, the International Law Commission and of course, the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of Treaties. It is only through an examination and analysis of 
the arguments put forward in these fora, that one can start unveiling the meaning of 
the intentionally vague Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, nevertheless, let us examine 
first,45 if the text of Article 31(3)(c) and its context can shed some light on its exact 
scope.  
 
                                                 
38 ‘Appendix 2: David Dudley Field’s Draft Code’, AJIL 29 (1935): 1207-8. 
39  ‘Appendix 3: Bluntschli’s Draft Code’, AJIL 29 (1935): 1208-12. 
40 Submitted in Rio de Janeiro in 1927; ‘Appendix 5: Draft of the International Commission of 
American Jurists’, AJIL 29 (1935): 1222-4.  
41 Adopted by the Sixth International Conference of American States at Havana, February 20, 1928, 
‘Appendix 1: Convention on Treaties’, AJIL 29 (1935): 1205-7. 
42 “[a]mbiguity may be eliminated by referring to stipulations of another treaty relating to analogous 
matters between the same parties”, in ‘Appendix 4: Fiore’s Draft Code’, AJIL 29 (1935): 1212, at 1219, 
para. 816. 
43 Submitted by the Seventh International Conference of American States in 1933 and the relevant part 
of which stated in Article 4 that  
 
[i]n case the real will of the parties cannot be determined, it will be understood that the parties have 
wished to adjust their stipulations in accordance with the established rules of International Law 
 
in ‘Appendix 7: The Interpretation of Treaties’, AJIL 29 (1935): 1225, at 1226, Article 4. 
44 Article 19 (a) went as follows: “… and  the conditions prevailing a the time interpretation is being 
made, are to be considered in connection with the general purpose which the treaty is intended”, in 
‘Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’, AJIL 29 (1935): 657, at 661, Article 19. 
45 In true Article 31 VCLT fashion. 
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II. Ordinary Meaning and Context of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT: An Article 
31 – based Interpretation 
Even from a cursory reading of the text of Article 31(3)(c) it is evident that it is far 
from clear.46 Its function and scope of application rests on the understanding of 
certain specific terms. These terms would be the following:  
i) ‘rules’  
ii) ‘relevant’,  
iii) ‘applicable’ and  
iv) ‘parties’.  
The corresponding questions would then be: ‘Which provisions are to be 
considered ‘rules’ under Article 31(3)(c)?’, ‘which rules are to be considered relevant 
and how is this relevancy determined?’, ‘which rules are considered as ‘applicable’’ 
and finally ‘what parties are meant: Parties to the dispute or parties to the treaty being 
interpreted?’. This Section will now examine if the ordinary meaning of any of these 
words, alone or in combination with the context can offer a definitive solution as to 
the exact meaning of these terms.  
 
A. ‘Rules of International Law’ 
International courts and tribunals when determining the ordinary meaning of a term 
constantly rely on definitions contained in various dictionaries, both legal and non-
legal.47 According to the Compact Oxford English Dictionary rule is “rule …1 a 
                                                 
46 The Vattelian axiom in claris non fit interpretatio, thus, does not apply. Although it has to be noted 
that the present author is in agreement with the critique exercised against this axiom within the ILC. 
The classification of a term as ‘clear’ is by itself a product of interpretation. Consequently, no term is a 
priori clear. This renders the aforementioned axiom nothing more than an “obscurantist tautology”; see 
Comments of Myres S. McDougal, of the United States Delegation to the Committee of the Whole of 
the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, in United Nations, United Nations Vienna Conference 
on the Law of Treaties, First Session, Vienna, 26 March – 24 May 1968,  Official Records (New York, 
NY: United Nations, 1969), at 167, para.38 (hereinafter Vienna Conference I). 
47 See for instance EC – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, (United 
States of America, Canada & Argentina v. European Communities), Panel Report adopted on 21 
November 2006, WTO, WT/DS291R, WT/DS292R, WT/DS293R, paras. 4.163 et seq.; United States – 
Safeguard Measures on Import of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New Zealand and 
Australia, Panel Report adopted on 16 May 2001, WTO, WT/DS177/R & WT/DS178/R, para. 7.21 et 
seq.;  
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regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular sphere.”48 
However, since the term is employed within a specialized field, that of law, a legal 
definition should also be considered.49 Black’s Law Dictionary defines rule as “… 1. 
[g]enerally, an established and authoritative standard or principle; a general norm 
mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of situation.”50  
Based on the above definitions, the term ‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c) refers to 
binding rules of international law, emanating from an accepted source of international 
law, i.e. treaties, custom and/or general principles of law, recognized by civilized 
nations. This all-inclusive approach to the term ‘rules’ finds support in doctrine.51 
There are very few authors who have deviated from this position. Schwarzenberger, 
for instance, argues that the term ‘rules of international law’ does not cover 
international agreements, based on the assumption that these are already incorporated 
in Article 31(3)(a).52 Similarly Sinclair, excludes from the scope of the term ‘relevant 
rules’ the general principles of law,53 a position though, which does not seem to find 
support either in doctrine or international jurisprudence.  
Finally, there are those who seem to opt for an even more extensive   
interpretation of the term ‘rules’. Gardiner seems to imply that based on Article 38 of 
                                                 
48 Oxford Dictionaries, Compact Oxford English Dictionary (Oxford: OUP, 2008), accessible at: 
www.askoxford.com (last accessed on 25 January 2010). 
49 A manifestation of such concerns can be found in Article 31(4) of the VCLT. 
50 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 4, at 1446. 
51 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 426; McLachlan, supra note 10, at 290; Joost Pauwelyn, 
Conflict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules of International 
Law (Cambridge: CUP: 2003), at 254; Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A 
Study of their Interactions and Interrelations with Special Consideration of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), at 268; Gabrielle Marceau, 
‘Conflict of Norms and Conflict of Jurisdictions: The Relationship between the WTO Agreement and 
MEAs and Other Treaties’, JWT 35 (2001): 1081, at 1087; Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation 
(Oxford: OUP, 2008), at 260-3; Abi-Saab suggests that the term includes a fortiori the rules of general 
international law but it “does not provide the criteria (or the circumstances) warranting such reference”; 
Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Appellate Body and Treaty Interpretation’, in The WTO at Ten: The 
Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System, Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes 
(eds.) (Cambridge: CUP, 2006), 453, at 463. There are very few authors that would exclude any 
category of rules from Article 31(3)(c).  
52 Georg Schwarzenberger, ‘Myths and Realities of Treaty Interpretation: Article 27-29 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties’, Current Legal Problems 22 (1969): 205-27, at 220; However, this 
construction by Schwarzenberger takes into consideration only treaties that are posterior to the treaty 
being interpreted. But not all ‘relevant rules’ are necessarily posterior to the agreement; not all are 
‘subsequent’ as Article 31(3)(a) requires. Actually, as it will be demonstrated infra, in the majority of 
cases where Article 31(3)(c) has been applied it is the other way around. Anterior treaties are the main 
point of reference. Consequently, ‘rules of international law’ can and does cover international 
agreements. Furthermore, the notion of ‘parties’ of Article 31(3)(a) may have a different meaning than 
that of Article 31(3)(c). 
53 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Manchester: MUP, 1984), at 139.  
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the ICJ Statute and since courts and tribunals have used that provision in order to 
identify the content of the term ‘rules of international law’,54 there might be scope to 
argue that judicial decisions and teachings of the most highly qualified publicists, as 
long as they assist in the identification of rules, could be used through the process 
envisaged by Article 31(3)(c).55  
However, and irrespective of the question of whether the sources enumerated 
in Article 38 are a numerus clausus,56 the preponderant opinion in doctrine is that 
judicial decisions and the writings of publicists do not create norms but evidence 
them; they are material ‘sources’ rather than ‘formal’ ones.57 Considering them as 
falling under Article 31(3)(c) is more of a lex ferenda than a lex lata. Consequently, 
their proper place is in Article 32 of the VCLT, as ‘other supplementary means’, 
rather than Article 31(3)(c).58 
In conclusion, the ‘ordinary meaning’ of the term ‘rules’ seems to indicate all 
rules irrespective of their source. 
 
B. ‘Relevant Rules’ 
The next problematic term is ‘relevant’. Once again, beginning the analysis from the 
available definitions: “relevant • adjective closely connected or appropriate to the 
matter in hand”59 and  
 
                                                 
54 Gölder v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 February 1975, 1 EHRR 524, para. 35 (hereinafter 
Gölder v. UK); In the Matter of an Arbitration under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement between Pope and Talbot Inc. and Government of Canada, Award in respect of 
Damages of 31 May 2002, para. 46 (hereinafter Pope and Talbot v. Canada), accessible at: 
http://www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeAwardOnDamages.pdf (last accessed on 25 
January 2010). 
55 Gardiner, supra note 13, at 268. 
56 See Lady Hazel Fox, ‘Time, History and Sources of Law Peremptory Norms: Is There a Need for 
New Sources of International Law?’, in Time, History and International Law, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
Matthew Craven and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.) (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 119. 
57 Schwarzenberger infra note 534; see, however, Fitzmaurice, who argues that these sources are of 
much higher value than they are given credit for; Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the 
Formal Sources of International Law’, in Symbolae Verzijl : présentées au Professeur J. H. Verzijl à l’ 
Occasion de son LXX-ième Anniversaire, Jan H. Verzijl and Frederik M. van Asbeck (eds.) (The 
Hague : Nijhoff, 1958), 153 
58 See also infra in Chapter IV the analysis of case-law (e.g. CCFT v. US case) which has explicitly 
categorized decisions of international courts and tribunals as means of interpretations falling under 
Article 32.  
59 Oxford Dictionaries, supra note 48. 
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[l]ogically connected and tending to prove or disprove a matter in issue; having 
appreciable probative value – that is, rationally tending to persuade people of the 
probability or possibility of some alleged fact60 
 
and that  
 
[t]he word ‘relevant’ means that any two facts to which it is applied are so related to each 
other according to the common course of events one either taken by itself or in connection 
with other facts proves or renders probable the past, present, or future existence or non-
existence of the other.61 
 
All the above definitions share the element of close connection. In search of how this 
connection can be established, most authors seem to agree that the most indisputable 
understanding is that the term ‘relevant’ refers to rules “touching on the same subject 
matter as the treaty provision or provisions being interpreted or which in any way 
affect that interpretation”.62 
Despite the above, the term remains quite unclear. For instance, the degree of 
identity of the ‘subject-matters’ of the treaty being interpreted and the rule being 
referred to via Article 31(3)(c) is still unclear63 and not analyzed in doctrine. 
Consequently, the ‘same subject-matter’ understanding of the term ‘relevant’ seems to 
be only one of the possible ways to identify relevancy.64 
 
C. ‘Applicable Rules’ 
Despite the scrutiny under which Article 31(3)(c)  has been put, an analysis of the 
term ‘applicable’ in doctrine is almost non-existent. 65 This may be partially attributed 
                                                 
60 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 4, at 1404. 
61 James F. Stephen, A Digest of the Law of Evidence 2 (London: MacMillan, 1881, 4th ed.). 
62 Gardiner, supra note 13, at 260; similarly see Mark E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2009), at 433; Heen-Jüri Uibopuu, 
‘Interpretation of Treaties in the Light of International Law: Art. 31, para. 3(c) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties’, AAAA 40 (1970): 1-42, at 4; Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation 
of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), at 178. 
63 For instance in Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), 
Judgment of 4 June 2008, ICJ Rep. 2008, 1, para. 112, (hereinafter Certain Questions of Mutual 
Assistance in Criminal Matters case) the Court seems to have accepted that as to what Article 31(3)(c) 
pertains complete identity of subject-matter is not an essential requirement. Even a partial identity is 
sufficient. See in more detail the judicial reasoning at paras. 105-14. 
64 See in more detail infra the ‘proximity criterion’ analysis. 
65 Gardiner mentions it in passim; Gardiner, supra note 13, at 260 et seq. 
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to the fact that even the definitions of the term, i.e. “applicable • adjective relevant or 
appropriate”66, “apply, vb. … 3. To put to use with a particular subject matter”,67 
seem to connect this term with another one preceding it: ‘relevant’. This would seem 
a somewhat tautological self-reference, which is what probably prompted Villiger to 
suggest that the ordinary meaning of the term ‘applicable’ excludes non-binding rules 
from the scope of Article 31(3)(c).68 
 
D. ‘Parties’ 
Finally, the term which has sparked a fiery debate with respect to the scope of Article 
31(3)(c) is the term ‘parties’. According to the available dictionary definitions a 
‘party’ should be understood as “party • noun … 4. a person or group forming one 
side in an agreement or dispute”69  or “party. … 1. One who takes part in a 
transaction …2. One by or against whom a lawsuit is brought”.70 What is immediately 
striking about these two definitions is that they reflect the overall controversy over the 
same term in Article 31(3)(c). Both definitions identify party as either a party to an 
agreement/legal transaction, i.e in our context a treaty, or as a party to a legal dispute. 
Consequently, the ordinary meaning of the term, can offer no assistance in identifying 
its intended meaning.71 
                                                 
66 Oxford Dictionaries, supra note 48. 
67 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 4, at 116. 
68 Villiger, supra note 62, at 433 ; However, as will be shown infra international jurisprudence has not 
always followed this interpretation. See Dispute Concerning Access to Information under Article 9 of 
the OSPAR Convention (Ireland v. united Kingdom), Award of 2 July 2003, PCA, (hereinafter OSPAR 
Arbitration), Dissenting Opinion of Judge Griffith QC, paras. 1 et seq. accessible at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/OSPAR%20Award.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 2010); United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Appellate Body Report adopted on 6 November 
1998, WTO, WT/DS58/AB/R (hereinafter US-Shrimp (AB)). 
69 Oxford Dictionaries, supra note 48. 
70 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 4, at 1231-2. 
71 Authors who have argued in favour of interpreting the term as ‘parties to the treaty’ include: Mustafa 
K. Yasseen, ‘L’Interprétation des Traités d’après la Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des  Traités’, 
RCADI 151 (1976/III) : 1, at 63 ; Ulf Linderfalk, ‘Who are the ‘Parties’?: Article 31 Paragraph 3 (c) of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of Systemic Integration’ Revisited’, NILR 55 (2008): 
343, at 343 et seq.; Linderfalk, supra note 62, at 178; Philippe Sands, ‘Sustainable Development: 
Treaty, Custom, and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, in International Law and Sustainable 
Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges, Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds.) 
(Oxford: OUP, 1999), 39, at 57; authors who have adopted the more expansive interpretation of 
‘parties to the dispute’ include: Marceau, supra note 51, at 1087; David Palmeter and Petros Mavroidis, 
‘The WTO Legal System: System of Law’, AJIL 92 (1998): 398, at 411 and Panos Merkouris, 
‘Debating the Ouroboros of International Law : the Drafting History of Article 31(3)(c)’, ICLR 9 
(2007): 1-31. 
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To circumvent this ambiguity, one can also examine the context of Article 
31(3)(c). Article 2(1)(g) of the VCLT defines the term ‘party’ as “a State which has 
consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force”. However, 
this does not mean ipso facto that the term should be understood as meaning only 
‘parties to the interpreted treaty’. For instance, throughout the VCLT when the 
drafters wanted to stress that all the parties to a treaty should partake in a specific 
action or obligation, they usually did so explicitly.72 Furthermore, in Article 66(a) of 
the VCLT  the term ‘parties’ means ‘parties to the dispute’.73 Additionally, the 
immediate context of Article 31(3)(c), i.e. the provisions of Article 31, uses the term 
‘party’ in a variety of ways and with a certain degree of flexibility. Whereas the term 
‘parties’ in Article 31(3)(a) may not raise definitional problems when contrasted to 
the definition of Article 2(1)(g), the same cannot be said for the term as used in 
Article 31(2)(a) and (b). In those provisions, the term ‘parties’ is being used with 
respect to acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty. However, unless a State is bound 
upon its own signature,74 it cannot be considered as a ‘party’ as defined in Article 
2(1)(g). Consequently, in provisions 31(2)(a) and (b) of the VCLT the term ‘parties’ 
is not used stricto sensu, but lato sensu; in a more flexible manner. To add insult to 
injury, and to prove beyond a shred of a doubt that the ordinary meaning and the 
context of Article 31(3)(c) cannot assist in the search for the true meaning of Article 
31(3)(c), one need not go further than the fact that academics, using the same 
aforementioned provisions and the same contextual framework (the VCLT) end up 
with completely contradictory results.75  
Finally, as McLachlan very concisely points out, the term ‘parties’ of Article 
31(3)(c) can actually be construed in four different ways:  
i) that all parties to the interpreted treaty should be parties to the 
treaty relied upon via Article 31(3)(c)  
                                                 
72 See for instance Articles 15(c), 20(2), 30(3), 57(b), 59(1) where the term “all the parties” is being 
used. 
73 Article 66(a) of the VCLT. 
74 Or unless those acts take place after ratification and entry into force of the treaty. 
75 See on the one hand, Linderfalk who argues that the term ‘parties’ should be interpreted restrictively, 
and on the other hand Marceau, Palmeter and Mavroidis who claim that the same provisions clearly 
demonstrate that the term ‘parties’ should be understood as ‘parties to the dispute’; Linderfalk, supra 
note 71, 349 et seq.; and contra Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’, 
EJIL 13 (2002): 753, at 782; Palmeter and Mavroidis, supra note 71, 398 et seq.; see also Gardiner, 
who, however, does not take a stand on the issue; Gardiner, supra note 13, 263-5 and 269-75. 
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ii) that all parties to the dispute should be parties to the other treaty, 
iii) that if a treaty is not in force between all members of the treaty 
under interpretation, it can be considered under Article 31(3)(c) only if the 
rule contained therein is customary international law and 
iv) that complete identity of parties is not required as long as the 
treaty relied upon, through Article 31(3)(c), can be said to express the 
common intentions or at least a common understanding of all the parties.76   
Despite the fact that all these interpretations have their drawbacks,77  it is the 
last option that McLachlan, Pauwelyn and Young seem to opt for, based on the 
ambiguity of the term as such, the object and purpose of the rules on interpretation 
and relevant jurisprudence.78 The fact, however, remains that an Article 31-based 
interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) does not lead to any concrete results as to the term 
‘parties’.  
 
                                                 
76 McLachlan, supra note 10, at 314-5. 
77 Isabelle van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford: OUP, 2009), at 
372, FN 75. 
78 McLachlan, supra note 10, at 315; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 257-63; Margaret A. Young, ‘The 
WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the Biotech Case’, ICLQ 56 
(2007): 907, at 914-8. 
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III. Preparatory Work of the VCLT and pre-ILC Documents as other 
Supplementary Means: An Article 32 – based Interpretation 
The analysis in the previous Section confirmed that the wording of Article 31(3)(c) is 
so vague, that it can offer very little assistance in determining its exact content. As 
Judge Weeramantry noted in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros case, the provision “scarcely 
covers this aspect with the degree of clarity requisite to so important a matter”.79 For 
this reason and in order to either confirm the preliminary findings or determine the 
content of the still mercurial areas of Article 31(3)(c), the preparatory work of the 
VCLT alongside some pre-ILC documents will be scrutinized.80   
 
A. The Discussions within the Institut de Droit International 
The fact that the Institut de Droit International devoted four sessions81 to discussing 
the problematic aspects of legal interpretation, is the most solid proof that the 
international community was aware of its complexity.82 The debate focused mainly on 
the following issues: whether there is a possibility and usefulness in drafting rules of 
interpretation; what should be the hierarchy between them; which should be given 
priority, the search for the intention of the parties or the text and the ever-existing 
apple of Discord, the use of the travaux préparatoires in the interpretative process. 
This, of course does not mean that other issues were not considered as well, 
but they were not given the same amount of scrutiny.83 Still, in the discussions within 
the Institut de Droit International, one can find the first indications of what would 
later become Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. 
                                                 
79 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, at 114. 
80 As mentioned supra in ‘Prolegomena’ the documents of the ILC are to be considered as travaux 
préparatoires for the purposes of interpreting the VCLT alongside with the documents of the Vienna 
Conferences on the Law of Treaties. The pre-ILC documents, although not falling under the notion of 
travaux préparatoires, nevertheless are to be examined because:  
i) they reveal a logical process of evolution of the various notions pertinent to the 
understanding of Article 31(3)(c) and  
ii) they themselves functioned as a springboard for the various discussions within the ambit 
of the ILC. 
For these reasons, and also bearing in mind that the term ‘other supplementary means’ of Article 32 
was intentionally left undefined, the pre-ILC documents are ‘other supplementary means’ to be taken 
into consideration when interpreting Article 31(3)(c).  
81 Spanning over a period of six years. 
82 The sessions were the following: Bath Session, 1950, Sienna Session, 1952, Aix-en-Provence 
Session, 1954 and finally, Grenada Session, 1956. 
83 For instance there was little debate on the issue of intertemporality, that would later on dominate the 
discussions in the ILC. 
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1. Article 31(3)(c): The first Stages of Identification    
Characteristic of the early efforts of identifying rules of interpretation is the fact that 
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, in his Report for the Institut de Droit International during the 
Bath Session, makes absolutely no reference whatsoever to either interpretation based 
on the ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ or to interpretation with reference to general principles of international law.84 
No direct reference, let alone indirect mention, is made to any such notion. Therefore, 
we can only infer, through the various comments of the members of the Institut, what 
was later to become Article 31(3)(c). 
It was only during the closing stages of the debate, in the section reserved for 
observations to Lauterpacht’s Report, that Verdross raised for the very first time the 
issue. Verdross made reference to a fundamental, according to him, rule of 
interpretation; namely that any treaty provision should be interpreted “under the light 
of general international law”.85,86 This principle, according to Verdross, was not 
merely an academic fiction but was supported jurisprudentially by the case-law of the 
PCIJ.87  
Verdross’ contribution to the clarification of the rules of interpretation did not 
stop at the enunciation of this principle. On the contrary, he went on to identify two 
further principles that albeit distinct, existed in a complementary relationship to the 
first one. According to Verdross interpretation must also be based on the ‘general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations’, a rule incorporated in Article 
38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute and second, that the two previous rules unveil a third one; 
in the process of finding the true meaning of a treaty it is sometimes necessary to have 
                                                 
84 In a report that spans 69 pages and covers almost all major interpretative theories, no reference to 
this issue is to be found; see Herch Lauterpacht, ‘De l’ Interprétation des Traités’, Annuaire de l’ 
Institut de Droit International (1950): Session de Bath, Tome I, 366-434. 
85 Comments by Alfred von Verdross, in Institut de Droit International, ‘De l’ Interprétation des 
Traités’, Annuaire de l’ Institut de Droit International (1950), : Session de Bath, Tome I, at 455. 
86 The fact, that it was Verdross, that brought forth this issue, should probably not come as a complete 
surprise, bearing in mind that already in 1935 he had delivered a course in the Hague Academy of 
International Law on that subject, see Alfred von Verdross, ‘Les Principes Généraux du Droit dans la 
Jurisprudence Internationale’, RCADI 52 (1935/II): 191-251. 
87 Case Concerning Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, (Germany v. Poland), Judgment 
on Merits of 25 May 1926, PCJI Series A, No.7, 3, at 22 (hereinafter German Interest in Upper Silesia 
case); Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v. Poland), Judgment on Jurisdiction of 26 
July 1927, PCIJ Series A, No.9, 3, at 27 (hereinafter Chorzów Factory case). 
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recourse to “the principles underlying the matter to which the text refers”.88 It is this 
last principle that seems to be closer to Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT but, alas, it is 
this very proposition that was least discussed within the ambit of the Institut de Droit 
International. 
These concise remarks by Verdross, although solitary,89 remained the subject-
matter of the discussions of the Institut de Droit International. They instigated a 
heated debate that lasted up to the very end of the Institut’s deliberations.  
One of the most interesting analogies that were made in this context belongs to 
Max Huber. In 1951, while elaborating his understanding of the judicial interpretative 
process, Huber came to the conclusion that the search for the “true intention of the 
parties”, is reached through a process similar to “concentric circles”.90 Judge Huber, 
evidently, set the ‘intention of the parties’ at the very center of the interpretative 
process91 and linked it to Article 31(3)(c) in the following way. The judge strives to 
find the intention of the parties, first in the closest ‘concentric circle’ of the contested 
clauses, then in the further ‘circle’ of the context of the treaty, then in the general 
principles of international law and finally in the general principles of law recognized 
by the civilized nations.  
Two points need to be raised here; first, although Huber through this 
construction seems to be tacitly accepting a hierarchical value of the different rules of 
interpretation, he nevertheless considered reference to the general principles of 
international law as a sine qua non ‘concentric circle’, of which the judicial 
interpretative enquiry must consist. The second point to be made is that his 
‘concentric circles’ encompass only two out of the three rules identified by Verdross. 
The “principles underlying the matter to which the text refers” are completely left out. 
In this respect, Huber seems to have adopted a conservative approach as to what other 
norms the interpreter can resort to and furthermore, to have not given due 
consideration to the principle which would become the founding stone of what is now 
known as the New Haven approach.  
                                                 
88 Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the River Oder (UK, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Germany & Sweden v. Poland), Judgment of 10 September 1929, PCIJ 
Series A, No. 23, 3, at 26 (hereinafter River Oder case); and von Verdross, in Institut de droit 
International, supra note 85, at 456.  
89 No one else up to this point had touched upon this subject. 
90 Comments by Max Huber, in Institut de Droit Internaitonal, ‘De l’ Interprétation des Traités’, 
Annuaire de l’ Institut de Droit International (1952): session de Sienne, Tome I, at 215. 
91 An approach, from which the ILC later deviated by setting in the center the text itself, see infra. 
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The aforementioned led Lauterpacht to consider the possibility of adjoining a 
Resolution No.7 to the other Resolutions of the Institut regarding interpretation of 
treaties. It is evident, though, both by Lauterpacht’s own statements and the way that 
the draft Resolution was formulated92 that there was major uncertainty as to the exact 
meaning of the terms used and the gravitas of the rule itself. Lauterpacht, hesitantly, 
attempted to clarify Verdross’s ‘general international law’, as meaning customary 
international law93, whereas the Resolution94 was formulated both in a mandatory as 
well as a widely discretionary way.95 This is further evidenced by the fact that 
Lauterpacht stated his reservations expressis verbis; according to his opinion an 
article referring to these principles of international law, was far from indispensable.96 
The members of the Institut seemed to be unsure of the necessity of incorporating 
such a rule.97  During the Sienna Session the scales seemed to be tipping against the 
retention of this amendment.  
The criticism seemed to focus on two issues;  
• redundancy, and  
• bar to progressive development of international law.  
As to the first point, Rousseau stated that the article referring to ‘general 
principles of international law’98 was a rule barren of any effectiveness; a fact which 
made it more dangerous even than the rules of ‘acte clair’ and contra preferentem, 
that had already been discarded with.99 Similarly, Guggenheim criticized the reference 
to ‘principles of international law’ as a tautology, since it was the very Resolutions of 
the Institut that strove to define the principles of international law on the matter.100 
However, this criticism does not seem to differentiate between ‘procedural’ and 
‘substantive’ principles of international law. Rules of interpretation fall under the first 
                                                 
92 Hersch Lauterpacht, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 90, at 217. 
93 This in hindsight would have been a much more progressive line than the one finally adopted by the 
majority of the members of the Institut. 
94 Via the common practice of using brackets, connoting the possible variations of a certain term or 
expression. 
95 The two formulas are the following: “…must be interpreted” and “It is permissible to interpret”. 
96 Hersch Lauterpacht, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 90,. at 365. 
97 From what one can gather from the dicta of the people that took the floor in the ensuing discussions, 
in the sessions from 1952 to 1956. 
98 Again here we note, that the term used is ‘general principles’, not ‘customary international law’, nor 
‘general international law’. 
99 Rousseau, in Institut de Droit International, ‘De l’ Interprétation des Traités’, Annuaire de l’ Institut 
de Droit International, (1952): Session de Sienne, Tome II, at 378. 
100 Guggenheim, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 99, at 384 and 404-5. 
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category. However, the ‘procedural’ principle of interpretation according to which 
interpretation must be based on the general principles of international law, 
encompasses both categories, ‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ principles. Consequently, 
it is a far cry from being a tautology.  
Rolin considered that the notion of ‘principles of international law’ was 
incorporated within the term ‘natural meaning [of the words]’101 and no specific need 
existed for an explicit enunciation102, whereas Basdevant, fearing the ambiguity of the 
terms in question, opted for abandoning any reference to ‘principles of international 
law’.103  
On the other hand, apart from Verdross, who evidently stood by his proposal 
only the Drafting Committee had expressed, at least initially, the opinion that 
interpretation must happen “with a background dominated by the principles of 
customary international law” (emphasis added).104 However, a shift occurred during 
the last meeting on the issue of interpretation during the Sienna Session. Members of 
the Institut that had previously advocated against the inclusion of any reference to 
‘principles of international law’ completely changed their original position.105  
 
2. Shifting from Tentativeness to Acceptance 
In the Grenada Session, a change of Rapporteurs106 coincided with a marked shift in 
the stance of the members of the Institut with regards to the inclusion or not of a rule 
making reference to the ‘general principles of international law’. The final form of the 
articles proposed by Lauterpacht, had incorporated the ‘general principles of 
                                                 
101 Rolin, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 99, at 386. 
102 Similarly Sir McNair considered this reference as, purely and simply, redundant, Sir Arnold 
McNair,  in Institut de Droit International, supra note 99, at 404. 
103 Basdevant, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 99, at 387; Kaeckenbeeck, was also of the 
opinion that no reference to general principles should be made, albeit for different reasons. Drawing 
from his experience as President of the Arbitral Tribunal for High Silesia, he stated that these principles 
were commonly used by the parties to put a break to progressive interpretations of the clauses in 
question. See Kaeckenbeeck, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 99, at 385; However, it is 
exactly this need for unification and progressiveness that 31(3)(c), is nowadays called upon to address.  
104 Institut de Droit International, supra note 99, at 384. 
105 Both Lauterpacht and Basdevant, submitted that although this rule did not seem to offer much to the 
project, it nevertheless was not completely without merit and therefore should be retained, Hersch 
Lauterpacht & Basdevant, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 99, at 405; According to 
Basdevant one cannot compartmentalize in abstracto the juridical environment in which the treaty 
finds itself placed, and that environment is formed by the rules of law, part of which form the general 
principles of international law, Basdevant, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 99, at 405. 
106 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice substituted Hersch Lauterpacht. 
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international law’, in the second sentence of the first article107 being preceded only by 
the ‘natural meaning’.108 This incorporation, at such a high level, among the proposed 
rules of interpretation, especially taken into consideration the objection to its very 
incorporation expressed in the Sienna Session, is very interesting109.  
Following this line, several members of the Institut not only applauded this 
solution, but actually proposed that the ‘general principles of international law’ are of 
such fundamental importance that they should be the first to be mentioned in the first 
article,110 a proposition that found the Rapporteur, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in 
complete agreement.111  
This proposal for a re-ordering of the paragraphs met with some objections; 
the main arguments were, firstly, that the normal process was to study the text itself 
and its context and only afterwards to refer to the general principles,112 the other way 
round seemed to lack practicality; and secondly, that this reversal of order, would be 
detrimental to the accepted hierarchy113; first reference to the text and then to the 
other elements of treaty interpretation.   
As a result of the discussion Fitzmaurice drafted a new set of articles, which, 
however, made absolutely no reference to the ‘general principles of international 
law’.114 Essentially, the discussions had led to a circular motion. From no mention in 
the beginning, up until Verdross’ suggestion, to a tentative acceptance, to a more 
general acceptance, to once again, no mention at all.  
Explaining the reasons behind his choice, Fitzmaurice argued that the 
incorporation of the ‘general principles of international law’, had resulted in such a 
heated debate and a divide within the members of the Institut that he considered it 
more prudent to simply eradicate any related reference115; all the more because  
                                                 
107 Alongside ‘context’ and ‘good faith’. 
108 Hersch Lauterpacht, in Institut de Droit International, ‘De  l’ Interprétation des Traités’, Annuaire de 
l’ Institut de Droit International (1954): Session de Aix-en-Provence, Tome I, at 225. 
109 And probably attributable to the opinions of the Rapporteur himself. 
110 Jessup and Liang, in Institut de Droit International, ‘De  l’ Interprétation des Traités’, Annuaire de l’ 
Institut de Droit International (1956): Session de Grenade, at 330-1 and 332 respectively. 
111 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 110, at 332. 
112 Badawi, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 110, at 333. 
113 Basdevant, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 110, at 336. However, Basdevant was in 
agreement that a reference to “general principles of international law” should exist, an opinion he had 
already expressed in the Sienna Session, see supra notes 103 and 105 and accompanying text. 
114 Nor for that matter to ‘good faith’, see Institut de Droit International, supra note 110, at 337-8. 
115 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 110, at 338. 
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it does not serve any purpose to mention [them]. The interpretation of treaties depends 
itself on international law, and thus on the [general] principles that form its base.116, 117 
 
This reasoning echoes the principle of systemic integration and essentially, advocates 
the unity of the system of international law. This moving back and forth, as to 
whether any reference should be made to the ‘general principles of international law’, 
is highly demonstrative of the awkwardness that all the members of the Institut, 
especially the Rapporteurs, felt. On the one hand, such a reference might reflect the 
true status of the interpretative process, on the other, there were fears that it might be 
redundant or even worse too rigid, too inflexible to cope with the tides and ebbs that 
are characteristic of the art of legal interpretation. 
However, at this point the members of the Institut seemed to have reached a 
consensus as to the existence of such a rule, albeit finding it perhaps unnecessary or 
extremely cumbersome to put it down in black letter law. This change is evident by 
the fact that the eradication, proposed by Fitzmaurice, raised several voices of dissent 
and absolutely not one supporting it expressis verbis.118, 119 
This resulted in a final redrafting of the first article that mentioned the 
“general principles of international law” at the end of the first paragraph. This 
formulation, somewhat reminiscent of Huber’s ‘concentric circles’ construction, 
benefits from a lack of an explicit acknowledgment of hierarchy. When put to vote, 44 
voted in favour, 1 against and 1 abstained. 
                                                 
116 Id. 
117 A similar idea albeit in a more simplified form had been expressed by Rolin in the Sienna Session, 
see supra note 100. 
118 Jenks, Jessup, Hambro, van Asbeck and Basdevant took the floor to argue that the wording ‘general 
principles of international law’ should be retained in the text of the final Resolution of the Institut; 
Jenks, Jessup, Hambro, van Asbeck & Basdevant, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 110, at 
341, 342, 343, 343 and 344 respectively. 
119 Of special importance are the remarks of van Asbeck and Basdevant; the first acknowledged that the 
lack of “unity of vision and conception within the international community” might dictate the 
importance of relying on the text, but that should not mean ipso facto that all other principles of 
interpretation should be discarded, especially the “general principles of international law”. However, 
this lack of unity might be reversing itself in an international community aware of the pitfalls of 
fragmentation, and that might in some way explain the rise of the use of Article 31(3)(c) by 
international judicial bodies; the second, Basdevant, identified the potential importance of these 
principles by reference to Lauterpacht’s example of ‘territory’ as a ‘generic term’, during the Siena 
Session. 
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Looking back through these debates, what is striking is that setting the 
‘general principles of international law’ within the corpus of interpretative rules was 
far from easy. But this does not amount to saying that there was ever a debate on 
whether the ‘general principles of international law’ were truly a part of the 
interpretative process. If one looks closely at the raised objections, one will find 
arguments such as tautology120, or that these principles are already incorporated in 
other terms existing within the proposed articles121 that they are so vague that might 
become abused or raise dangers in the interpretative quest of the judges122 or that their 
inclusion in the rules was merely redundant.123 No one at any point argued that these 
principles do not form part of the interpretative process. It is clear, thus, that at least 
“the general principles of international law” form an essential part of the canons of 
interpretation.  
However, it is regrettable, that the Institut, felt probably itself not ready to 
tackle the third of the rules that Verdross had originally proposed and the PCIJ had 
adopted in the River Oder Case, i.e. “principles underlying the matter to which the 
text refers”.124  
 
B. The Debate Continues within the ILC 
The debate within the ambits of the Institut de Droit International and the 
accompanying Resolution, were, however, neither the final solution to the difficult 
issue of interpretation nor a generally accepted consensus as to the rules;125 it was 
merely one, in a series, of stepping stones that would eventually lead to Articles 31-32 
of the VCLT. 
The fact that the Institut de Droit International was one of the first to tackle 
the issue of interpretation, should not lead us to the unfounded conclusion that its 
members were the first to realize the importance of this issue for the international 
legal system as a whole. The ILC during its first session in 1949, even before the 
                                                 
120 Guggenheim, supra note 100. 
121 Rolin, supra note 101. 
122 Rousseau and Kaeckenbeeck, supra notes 99 and 103, respectively. 
123 Lord McNair, supra note 102.  
124 Supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
125 Even this issue was debated i.e. whether one should talk about rules or of principles of international 
law, the former being of a more rigid character the latter of a more normative and ergo of a more 
flexible nature; for a more detailed analysis of this debate see supra. 
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relevant sessions of the Institut de Droit International,126 had already selected the 
issue of Law of Treaties as one suitable for codification. However, not until 1964 did 
the ILC reach the stage of tackling the issue of interpretation127 and then again only 
after Sir Humphrey Waldock’s second Report on the Law of Treaties128.  
 
1. From ‘Principles’ to ‘Rules’ 
With the members of the Institut having reached a consensus that general principles of 
international law are contained within what would become Article 31(3)(c), the ILC 
did not rehash these discussions, but using them as a springboard, focused on the 
remaining unresolved issues. The ILC debated whether interpretation should take into 
account a wider array of norms and rules of the international system and not be solely 
restricted to this small and dangerously vague category of general principles. 
                                                 
126 In Bath, Sienna, Aix-en-Provence and Grenada respectively. 
127 Mr. Brierly was appointed as the first Special Rapporteur. In 1950 Brierly submitted his first report. 
It was a general consideration of a proposed work on the law of treaties. (J. Brierly, Report on the Law 
of Treaties (A/CN.4/23) in YILC (1950), Vol. II, at 222 et seq.) At this point the Commission expressed 
its will for the issue of treaties to which international organizations are parties, to be tackled as well 
(see ILC, Report of the International Law Commission covering its Second Session, 5 June - 29 July 
1950 (A/1316) in YILC (1950), Vol. II: 364, paras.161-2). However, this issue was to be dealt with a 
few decades later and would form the basis of VCLT-II. It was considered more productive to focus 
mainly, at this point, on treaties concluded between States (see ILC, Report of the International Law 
Commission covering its Third Session, 16 May – 27 July 1951 (A/1858) in YILC (1951), Vol. II:123, 
at 136). In 1952 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht was appointed Special Rapporteur, and remained in that post 
until 1954. By 1954 Lauterpacht was unable to continue his work in that function due to his 
appointment as judge in the ICJ and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice was elected to continue his work as Special 
Rapporteur. From 1956 to 1960 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice presented five reports on several aspects of the 
law of treaties; none of these, unfortunately, dealt with the issue of interpretation (see Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, First Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/101) in YILC (1956), Vol. II, at 104 et seq.; 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Second Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/107) in YILC (1957), Vol. II, at 
16 et seq.; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Third Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/115) in YILC (1958), 
Vol. II, at 20 et seq.; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Fourth Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/120) in 
YILC (1959), Vol. II, at 37 et seq.; Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Fifth Report on the Law of Treaties 
(A/CN.4/130) in YILC (1960), Vol. II, at 69 et seq.). What is evident from these reports is that Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice, although building on the conclusions of his predecessors, tackled the issue de 
novo, and framed the proposed drafts “in the form of an expository code rather than of a convention” 
(see ILC, Report of the International Law Commission covering the Work of its Fourteenth Session, 24 
April-29 June 1962 (A/5209), in YILC (1962), Vol. II: 157, at 159). This was the approach that Sir 
Fitzmaurice had opted for during the discussions within the Institut de Droit International. In 1961 due 
to Sir Fitzmaurice’s appointment to the ICJ, Sir Humphrey Waldock, was elected to continue his work. 
At the same time, a shift occurred, by which the ILC decided that it should abandon its approach on the 
law of treaties, in the form of a code and rather focus on proposing articles in the form of a convention; 
see GAOR, 16th Session, Supplement No.9, (A/4843), para. 39, contra see Fitzmaurice, First Report on 
the Law of Treaties, at 107. 
128 Sir Humphrey Waldock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/167 and Add.1-3), in YILC 
(1964), Vol. II: 5, at 8-10 and 52-62. 
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Waldock submitted a version of Article 31(3)(c) (then Draft Article 70) which 
read as follows: “1.(b) in the light of the rules of international law [in force at the 
time of its conclusion]”.129 The point that stole the spotlight was the use of the term 
‘rules’ in lieu of ‘principles’, a substitution that prompted a multitude of reactions. 
Some members of the ILC considered that the term ‘rules’ was either completely 
erroneous, since not all rules, but only the “basic principles of international law which 
had a bearing on the treaty, were applicable in its interpretation”130 or outright too 
general, since such a term would encompass treaty-based rules, which consisted the 
vast majority of internationally binding rules.131  
Another group, however, considered this term advantageous compared to 
‘principles’ for exactly the same reasons. In interpreting a treaty provision, the 
interpreter should bear in mind, not only the principles but all the relevant rules, be 
they of treaty or customary nature. Treaties were not created in a legal vacuum and 
the totality of these rules provided the necessary contextual background for the 
interpretative process.132 Separate mention needs to be made to Mr. de Luna, who was 
the first to touch upon the subtlety of the term ‘general’ and its links to regional 
custom. According to him, this term should not be included since it would not make 
allowance for rules of a regional nature.133 
The discussions on the articles on the law of treaties were resumed by the ILC 
in 1966; however, in the meantime, the Governments were asked to submit their 
comments. The US and Israeli Governments agreed that the reference to ‘rules of 
international law’ should be maintained, however, the US was of the opinion that the 
                                                 
129 Sir Humphrey Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 309. 
130 Tunkin, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol.I, at 310. 
131 The Chairman & Verdross, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 310 and 312. Mr. Verdross 
reinforced this argument by referring both to the formula used by the Institut de Droit International 
(although prominent members of the ILC had agreed at this point that the wording selected by the 
Institut de Droit International was weak at best, and its adoption would be tantamount to an admission 
by the ILC that it was unable to form an opinion on the point; see the Chairman, Sir Humphrey 
Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 312) as well as to international jurisprudence 
(see the relevant examples that the same person had raised in the discussions in the Institut de Droit 
International, supra notes 85-8). 
132  Sir Humphrey Waldock, Yasseen and Tabibi, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol.I, at 310 and 
312. 
133 Mr. de Luna, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 310. This opinion found, in the 
subsequent meeting strong support from Sir Humphrey Waldock and Mr. Yasseen, (A/CN.4/SR.770), 
in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 316. Opposing arguments, promulgating the notion of ‘general principles’ 
were raised by Verdross and Bartos, (A/CN.4/SR.770), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 316. 
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term ‘general’ would create confusion, and thus, should be deleted134, whereas Israel 
suggested that not only should it be made clear that ‘rules of international law’ 
referred to substantive rules, including the rules of interpretation, but also that the 
order of the provisions of Article 31 VCLT (then Draft Article 69(1)(a) & (b))135 
should be reversed, thus giving primacy to the ‘rules of international law’.136 The 
Netherlands, on the other hand, considered the reference to the ‘rules of international 
law’ as of secondary importance and preferred the deletion of that sub-paragraph.137 
 
2.  In dubio pro ambage138 
When the ILC resumed discussing the issue of interpretation, Waldock, having taken 
into consideration the comments of the Governments and of the Sixth Committee, 
submitted a redrafted version of Article 31 (then Draft Article 69), which read as 
follows: “1. A treaty shall be interpreted ….in the light of….(b) the rules of 
international law”.139 What is striking in this new version of Article 31(3)(c) is that it 
reflects the notable shift that had occurred from the initial drafts and discussions that 
only referred to either ‘principles’ or ‘general rules of international law’.140  
This draft by Waldock, contained only necessary formulations   in order to 
achieve a common ground for consensus, but even in this condensed form, it managed 
to reflect the change in the stance of the ILC members and the Governments. 
Although necessary from a practical point of view, it was exactly this vagueness that 
was criticized by certain members of the ILC,141 and some went even so far as 
                                                 
134 US, in ILC, ANNEX: Comments by Governments on Parts I, II and III of the Draft Articles on the 
Law of Treaties Drawn up by the Commission at its Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Sixteenth Sessions, 
(A/6309/Rev.l), in YILC (1966), Vol. II: 279, at 359. 
135 ILC Draft 1964:  
 
Article 69 (General Rule of Interpretation): 1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to each term: (a) In the context of the treaty and in 
the light of its objects and purposes; and (b) In the light of the rules of general international law in 
force at the time of its conclusion 
. 
136 Israel, supra note 134, at 300-1. 
137 The Netherlands, ibid., at 322-3. 
138 This is the author’s paraphrasing of a principle of Criminal Law, the in dubio pro reo principle, 
which means “in case of doubt favour the accused”. Bearing that in mind, the title translates to: in case 
of doubt favour vagueness. 
139 Sir Humphrey Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.869), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 184. 
140 Or ‘rules of general international law’ for that matter. 
141 Briggs, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 187; Reuter, who considered that the 
“attempt at simplification had perhaps been pushed rather far”, and initially suggested moving sub-
paragraph (b) to the end of the Article (a transfer, supported by Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
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suggesting the deletion of the whole sub-paragraph, since not only did it cause more 
problems than it solved142 but also because, as they considered, it was an unnecessary 
self-reference.143 
Such suggestions were, nevertheless, not given serious consideration; a fact 
which seems to indicate that the reference to international law in the process of 
interpretation had gained almost uniform acceptance within the ILC and was 
considered non-expendable,144 offering the advantage of the terms being given a 
“univocal” and not a “multivocal” meaning.145   
Hence, the greater part of the debate focused on clarifying what was to be 
encompassed by the term ‘rules’. Most members agreed that sub-paragraph (b) 
included regional rules,146 although there was the opinion that this should be restricted 
to regional rules of a customary nature.147 To this restriction, both the Chairman and 
the Special Rapporteur were opposed, as they felt that ‘rules’ should incorporate not 
only principles of international law and general custom, but also regional custom and 
rules that were treaty-based.148 
As a result of this, the Drafting Committee proposed the following text: 
“[Article 69(3)(c)] any relevant rules of international law applicable between the 
parties”.149 This sub-paragraph was finally adopted by 13 votes to none, with 3 
abstentions150 and without an amendment.151  
                                                                                                                                            
(A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 190), although eventually he reconsidered his 
position on the subject for reasons mentioned infra, Reuter, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, 
Part II, at 188 and  (A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 195. 
142 Tunkin, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 190. 
143 Mr. Briggs, considered that the “rules” were to be understood as rules of interpretation, thus 
rendering the provision completely unnecessary, Briggs, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, 
Part II, at 187; contra Mr. El-Erian submitted that the scope of the relevant provision was not confined 
to rules of interpretation but extended also to substantive rules, El-Erian, (A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC, 
(1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 196. 
144 Jiménez de Aréchaga, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol.II, Part II, at 190; the Chairman, 
(A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 197. 
145 de Luna, (A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 194; thus promoting the notion of 
unity. 
146 Castrén, Tunkin , Jiménez de Aréchaga and Amado, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC  (1966), Vol. II, Part 
II, at 188, 190, 190 and 191 respectively.  
147 Verdross, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 191. 
148 The Chairman, (A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 197; Sir Humphrey Waldock, 
(A/CN.4/SR.872), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 199. 
149 (A/CN.4/SR.883), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 267, para. 90. 
150 (A/CN.4/SR.884), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 270, para. 30. 
151 (A/CN.4/SR.893), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 329, para. 34. 
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Essentially, the ILC faced the same problems as in the earlier sessions. 
However, instead of delegating the finding of answers to later sessions, this time the 
ILC had to reach an agreement on a Draft Article. Faced with this, it adopted the 
following response: Vagueness through the adoption of the wording ‘rules of 
international law’. This term was preferred as being vague enough to satisfy everyone, 
from those wishing the most expansive interpretation to those advocating the most 
restrictive one.152 However, it must be noted that this response did not actually break 
the cycle, it merely postponed its recurrence. 
 
C. Sixth Committee and the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties  
1. The Sixth Committee 
The debate moved, next, to the Sixth Committee that was called to discuss the 
adopted Draft Articles and decide on the feasibility of a Conference on the Law of 
Treaties. With regards to the reference to sub-paragraph (3)(c), the comments of the 
Governments followed pretty much in the footsteps of the members of the ILC. The 
most interesting point is that they considered that the ‘rules of international law’ 
should have been mentioned in the first paragraph and not ostracized to the third 
one.153 
 
2. Coming full Circle – The Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties 
The final stage of the debate took place in the Conference on the Law of Treaties. 
Although the debate was monopolized, as to interpretation, on other issues such as 
hierarchy and travaux préparatoires, there were, nevertheless, some points raised 
with regards to Article 31(3)(c) (then Article 27(3)(c) of the ILC Draft). The 
delegation of Czechoslovakia, firstly reiterated the criticism of the Sixth Committee 
as to the transfer of the ‘rules of international law’ to paragraph 3.  
The most important issue, however, was raised by the Federal Republic of 
Germany, which submitted an amendment.154 This amendment, essentially proposed 
                                                 
152 See analysis of relevant debate supra. 
153 Ukraine & Byelorussia, (A/CN.6/22/SR.978), paras. 18-9 and  (A/CN.6/21/SR.908), para. 14 
respectively. 
154 Which eventually was not put to vote due to a procedural obstacle. 
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the addition of a further sub-paragraph (d) that would have gone as follows: “(d) any 
relevant international obligation of one or more of the parties”.155 The reason for this 
amendment, according to the German delegation, was that they felt that if Article 
31(3)(c) referred only to general international law, then it was too restrictive. It 
seemed to the German delegation logical that treaty obligations, which each one of the 
parties had undertaken with respect to other third States, should also be taken into 
consideration, in order to avoid conflicting obligations.156 Of course this amendment 
was not aimed to cover cases of genuine conflict, but cases where a conflict of 
obligations could be avoided through an effective interpretation that would safeguard 
the coherency of the legal order and not cause “unwarranted harm to at least one of 
the parties”.157 This amendment proposal touched upon the final aspect of 31(3)(c) 
that had not been raised during the previous discussions, i.e. which treaties could be 
taken into consideration, treaties that both parties were parties to, treaties that at least 
one party was a member of, or treaties to which all parties of the treaty in question 
were parties to?158 The German delegation seemed to opt for the most extensive 
approach. Linderfalk suggests, the fact that this amendment did not find its way into 
the text of the VCLT can be construed as tacit recognition that no state agreed with 
Germany on this issue.159 
However, taking into consideration the reason why the German delegation 
submitted this amendment proposal, i.e. to allow for Article 31(3)(c) to reach its full 
potential, if the term ‘rules’ was to be understood as referring only to customary law, 
demonstrates that a different understanding of the non-incorporation of the German 
amendment may be more appropriate. 
Since, as was demonstrated supra, there was substantial support behind the 
notion that the term ‘rules’ applied to conventional rules as well, the German 
amendment would already be included in Article 31(3)(c), so there was no need for an 
additional provision. This was actually the point of the Kenyan Representative’s 
                                                 
155 Federal Republic of Germany, (A/CONF/39/C.1/L.214) 
156 Federal Republic of Germany, in Vienna Conference I, supra note 46, at 172, para.10. 
157 Ibid., paras.11-2. 
158 This question would be raised several years later in a WTO Dispute Panel, and the solution opted 
for would be the last one, see EC – Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech 
Products, (United States of America, Canada & Argentina v. European Communities), Panel Report 
adopted on 21 November 2006, WTO, WT/DS291R, WT/DS292R, WT/DS293R, paras. 7.68-7.70 
(hereinafter EC-Biotech case).  
159 Lindefalk, supra note 71, at 361.  
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response to the German amendment. He felt that it was unnecessary, since it was 
already part and parcel of Article 31(3)(c).160 Furthermore, the amendment was never 
put to vote161 due to a procedural technicality.162 Bearing all these in mind, the fact 
that Germany did not pursue this issue is probably more a result of considering the 
amendment as already incorporated in the existing Article 31(3)(c), which was the 
opinion shared by Kenya as well. Consequently, it is actually the lack of any 
objection, at least on a preliminary level, as to the substance of this amendment that 
might be critical in ascertaining the true meaning of Article 31(3)(c). The fact that no 
one objected immediately to the German amendment may indicate that they shared 
the same opinion as that of the Kenyan delegate. 
In the end, the text of Article 31 remained unchanged and was adopted without 
any objections. 
 
D. Conclusions and Summary 
Having completed the examination of how Article 31(3)(c) evolved through the 
discussions in the three main fora, it is clear that this provision was existent from the 
very start, even as back as Grotius and Vattel, albeit in various forms and debated at 
various levels of intensity. Such a clarity was, unfortunately, lacking in the exact 
scope of Article 31(3)(c). Several issues, such as intertemporal law163 or the notion of 
‘parties’ were left intentionally vague to allow the reaching of an agreement and 
avoiding simultaneously putting at risk the very existence of the provision. A lot of 
the discussions seemed to be trapped in a vicious circle, coming back to the same 
issues again and again. However, the incorporation of a provision such as Article 
31(3)(c) was considered essential. It is true that certain of the participants in the three 
main fora examined, felt that the essence of Article 31(3)(c) was incorporated in 
several other provisions164 and in notions such as good faith, permeating the totality of 
the system and providing a sense of systemic integration and unity. Nevertheless, the 
                                                 
160 Vienna Conference I, supra note 46, at 181, para. 31. 
161 Despite the fact that representative of the Soviet Union considered that the German amendment 
raised an issue of substance; Vienna Conference I, supra note 46, at 185, para. 80. 
162 Ibid., at 185, para. 81. 
163 See infra Chapter II. 
164 Including the already agreed provisions on interpretation. 
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clear majority felt that this role should be given a black letter expression within the 
VCLT. 
It is true that it cannot be argued that a general agreement existed ab initio as 
to what the term ‘rules’ meant. Eventually, however, the understanding seemed to be 
that this term covered, not only general principles and customary international law but 
also conventional rules.165 Unfortunately, during the travaux préparatoires very little 
attention, if any, was paid to the remaining terms of Article 31(3)(c): ‘relevant’, 
‘applicable’ and ‘parties’. Only with respect to the latter and at the very last minute 
did the issue come to the forefront with the amendment proposed by the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The implications of this amendment, as they were analyzed 
supra, seem to point towards an expansive interpretation of the term ‘parties’, but this 
will have to be substantiated further infra in the next Section. 
As a last point, it is interesting to highlight, that with the last amendment that 
was proposed by Germany regarding Article 31(3)(c), the debate on this provision 
came full circle and returned to the original arguments of Vattel and Grotius. By 
advocating in favour of an extensive interpretation that would be effective, avoid 
conflict of norms and would not cause “unwarranted harm to the parties”, the German 
amendment echoed Vattel’s construction of extensive and restrictive interpretation 
based on the distinction of things favourable and odious.166  In cases of doubt, Vattel 
had suggested that equity should be the guide, and an extensive interpretation should 
be opted if it relates to things favourable, such as things that “tend to the common 
advantage” of the contracting parties or are “useful and salutary to human society”.167 
 
                                                 
165 As to the latter, although the general consensus seemed to be that they were included, no unanimity 
existed; this is implicitly reflected also in the German amendment which was premised on the 
hypothesis that some States might argue that Article 31(3)(c) referred only to customary international 
law; see supra analysis.   
166 Vattel, supra note 37, paras.290 et seq., pp.238 et seq. 
167 Ibid., paras.300-2. 
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IV. Jurisprudence (‘other Supplementary Means of Interpretation’) as 
‘Determinative’ of the Content of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT: The ‘Proximity 
Criterion’ Revealed 
The previous analysis illustrated the controversy and vagueness surrounding the 
various terms of Article 31(3)(c). Whereas, with respect to certain problematic terms, 
the analysis of the text complemented by an examination of the apposite travaux 
préparatoires assisted in revealing the meaning intended (as, for instance, with 
respect to the term ‘rules’), this was not the case with the remaining terms of Article 
31(3)(c). For this reason and for the purposes of the present thesis, it was considered 
that recourse to ‘other supplementary means’ was in order. Reference to judicial 
decisions of the same or other international courts and tribunals is commonplace in 
international jurisprudence. It has also been explicitly categorized, in some recent 
cases such as the CCFT v. US and the EC – Chicken Classification cases,168 as falling 
under Article 32 of the VCLT. 
Based on these considerations, both recent and pre-VCLT jurisprudence will 
be examined to see if they can offer any insight as to the interpretative process 
enshrined in Article 31(3)(c). 
 
A. Recent Jurisprudence Confirming or Determining Article 31(3)(c) 
Recent jurisprudence seems to confirm the preliminary findings as to what the term 
‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c) includes. For instance the WTO Panel in the EC-Biotech 
case explicitly recognized that the term ‘rules of international law’ encompasses: “(i) 
international conventions (treaties), (ii) international custom (customary international 
law), and (iii) the recognized general principles of law”.169 Various other courts and 
                                                 
168 These cases will be analyzed in more detail infra in Chapter IV.  
169 EC-Biotech case, para. 7.67; although the Panel felt that the inclusion of ‘general principles’ may 
not be as straightforward as it seems, nevertheless in the end and persuaded by the relevant US-Shrimp 
dicta, it held that such principles also fell within Article 31(3)(c); Id..; this all-inclusive understanding 
of the term ‘rules’ seems to have been also implicitly held by the Appellate Body in European 
Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, Appellate Body Report 
adopted on 27 September 2005, WTO, WT/DS269/AB/R and WT/DS286/AB/R, para. 199 (hereinafter 
EC-Chicken Classification (AB)); and in Pope and Talbot v. Canada, para. 46. 
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tribunals have also recognized each and every one of these possibilities in their 
relevant jurisprudence.170 
The discussion is less clear as one moves away from ‘rules’. With respect to 
the term ‘parties’ the EC – Biotech has been consistently cited as having adopted a 
restrictive interpretation i.e. that all parties to the interpreted treaty must be parties to 
the treaty referred to. It is true, that in that case the Panel adopted that solution, as can 
be seen from the relevant passage of the judgment: 
 
This understanding of the term ‘the parties’ leads logically to the view that the rules of 
international law to be taken into account in interpreting the WTO agreements at issue in 
this dispute are those which are applicable in the relations between the WTO Members.171 
 
However, what is not as clear is whether the Panel held that this should always be the 
interpretation of Article 31(3)(c). The Panel’s choice of words seems to leave open 
the possibility that a more expansive interpretation, in a different context, may be 
permissible: 
                                                 
170 i) General Principles of Law, recognized by civilized nations, have been recognized as falling within 
the ‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c) in: Golder v. UK, para. 35; where the ECtHR held that:  
 
The principle whereby a civil claim must be capable of being submitted to a judge ranks as one of the 
universally ‘recognised’ fundamental principles of law; the same is true of the principle of 
international law which forbids the denial of justice. Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) must be read in the 
light of these principles. 
 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Judgment of 4 February 2005, 41 EHRR 494, para. 111; a pre-
VCLT case that recognizes this is the Georges Pinson case (France v. United Mexican States), Award 
of 13 April 1928, RIAA 5 (1952): 327, at 422, para. 50(4) (hereinafter Georges Pinson case); where the 
court held that a treaty must be deemed “to refer to such principles for all questions which it does not 
itself resolve expressly and in a different way” (translation). 
ii) Customary International Law as falling within the ‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c) has been recognized in: 
Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, 34 EHRR 11, paras. 55-6; Fogarty v. 
United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, 34 EHRR 12, paras. 36-7;  McElhinney v. Ireland, 
Judgment of 21 November 2001,  34 EHRR 13, paras 36-7; In the above three cases the rules on state 
immunity as customary international law were considered as ‘relevant’; and Arbitration Regarding the 
Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway (Belgium v. the Netherlands), Award of 24 May 2005, PCA, para. 
58 (hereinafter Iron Rhine Arbitration); accessible at: http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/BE-
NL%20Award%20corrected%20200905.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 2010). 
iii) Treaties as falling within the ‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c) has been recognized in: Certain Questions 
of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters case, paras. 112-3.; Selmouni v. France, Judgment of 28 July 
1999, 29 EHRR 403, paras. 97-8; In the Selmouni case the ECtHR referred to the 1984 UN Convention 
against Torture to interpret Article 3 of the ECHR; Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, Award of 29 March 
1983, Iran-USCTR 2 (1983/I): 157, at 161; Case No. A/18, Award of 6 April 1984, Iran-USCTR 5 
(1984/I): 251, at 260; Grimm v. Iran, Award of 18 February 1983, Iran-USCTR 2 (1983/I): 78, 
Dissenting Opinion of Howard M. Holtzmann, at 82; these cases of the Iran-USCT are cited in 
McLachlan, supra note 10, at 293-4 and FNs 62-4. 
171 EC-Biotech case, para. 7.68. 
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Before applying our interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) to the present case, it is important to 
note that the present case is not one in which relevant rules of international law are 
applicable in the relations between all parties to the dispute, but not between all WTO 
Members, and in which all parties to the dispute argue that a multilateral WTO agreement 
should be interpreted in the light of these other rules of international law. Therefore, we 
need not, and do not, take a position on whether in such a situation we would be entitled to 
take the relevant other rules of international law into account.172 
 
A possibility which is reinforced by the fact that the disputing parties, seem to have 
also adopted the more flexible interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) in their 
submissions.173 Such an expansive interpretation of the term ‘parties’ seems to have 
been the case in US-Shrimp. There the Appellate Body in interpreting the term 
‘exhaustible natural resources’, took into consideration similarly worded provisions in 
other treaties such as: the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)174 the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)175 and the 1979 
Bonn Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals.176 The 
important point is that not only all WTO members were not parties to these 
conventions, but not even all the parties to the dispute.177 
As to the terms ‘relevant’ and ‘applicable’, very little has been stated expressis 
verbis. However, after the examination of the pre-VCLT jurisprudence, the 
aforementioned cases will be reappraised as to the criteria, or more precisely the 
criterion,178 of relevancy they apply. However, as a preliminary comment, with 
respect to the term ‘applicable’ which as mentioned supra has been identified by 
Villiger as referring only to binding rules,179 two recent cases seem to cast this claim 
in doubt. In his Dissenting Opinion in the OSPAR Arbitration, Judge Griffith 
                                                 
172 Ibid., para. 7.72; this understanding of the EC-Biotech case has been adopted by: Marisa Martin, 
‘Trade Law Implications of Restricting Participation in the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme’, Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 19 (2007): 437-74, at 471; Freya 
Baetens, ‘Muddling the Waters of Treaty Interpretation: Relevant Rules of International Law in the 
Mox Plant, OSPAR Arbitration and EC-Biotech Case’, Nordic Journal of International Law 77 (2008): 
197-216. 
173 Young, supra note 78, at 915 and FN 50. 
174 21 ILM 1261. 
175 31 ILM 818. 
176 19 ILM 15. 
177 US-Shrimp (AB), para. 130 and FNs 110-3. 
178 As will be proven infra there is one single criterion of relevancy, the ‘proximity criterion’ with 
various manifestations. 
179 Villiger, supra note 62, at 433; an opinion that seems to find support in the OSPAR Arbitration, 
paras. 99-105, where the court considered that a principle invoked by the parties was still in statu 
nascendi and had not yet attained customary law status. 
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considered as relevant rules which were not binding yet on the disputing parties. He 
based this on the intentions of the parties as they manifested through the fact that they 
were signatories to the 1999 Aarhus Convention.180 Similarly, in the Southern Bluefin 
Tuna cases, Judge Treves considered relevant, for interpretative purposes, the 1995 
Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement, despite the fact that it had neither entered into 
force nor was ratified by the disputing parties.181 
 
B. An Analysis of the pre-VCLT Jurisprudence on Interpreting by Reference to 
other rules of International Law - – The Legal Genealogy of Article 31(3)(c) 
As shown supra, in recent years, a “flowering of case-law”182 pertaining to Article 
31(3)(c) has taken place. However, such case-law is post-VCLT and consequently 
cannot be the practical foundation of the emergence of the principle of systemic 
integration and its incorporation within the VCLT. Faced with this dilemma, two 
logical options present themselves; either the drafters of the VCLT created this 
principle from thin air, taking the ILC’s mandate of “progressive development of 
international law” to its absolute extremity or there has been case-law, albeit of not 
such a distilled and crystallized form, which prompted the drafting of Article 31(3)(c) 
and which so far has been neglected and ill-identified.  
Since it is only the second position that can be proven or disproved with any 
degree of certainty it is to that latter one that the following analysis will focus. 
 
1. Interpretation by Reference to other Treaties – An Interpretative Renvoi 
In most cases brought before international courts and tribunals, prior to the VCLT, the 
interpretative tools used and rules applied are pretty straight-forward and their 
corollary within Article 31 and 32 of the VCLT are easily identifiable, e.g. textual 
interpretation, drafter’s intention, object and purpose, travaux préparatoires.183 
                                                 
180 OSPAR Arbitration, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Griffith, paras. 7-19. 
181 Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, Provisional Measures (New Zealand and Australia v. Japan), Order of 
27 August 1999, ITLOS, Separate Opinion of Judge Treves, para. 10 (hereinafter Southern Bluefin 
Tuna cases) accessible at: www.itlos.org (last accessed on 25 January 2010). 
182 Gardiner, supra note 13, at 251. 
183 even rules and principles which did not find their way as such in the text of the VCLT articles, like 
the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat (effective interpretation), restrictive interpretation and so 
on, were nevertheless the object of debate throughout the entire process from the Harvard Research, 
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Nevertheless, there is one specific category of cases, the categorization of which has 
left academics and practitioners alike at a state of awkwardness. These are the cases 
where the relevant international court or tribunal interpreted a provision of a treaty by 
reference not to an aspect of itself, be it text, intention, object or travaux 
préparatoires; but to an extrinsic source, i.e. other treaties.184 Essentially, the courts 
use other relevant treaties185 to shed light in obscure and/or dubious provisions of a 
treaty. 
As will be proven in the ensuing analysis, there is surely no scarcity in 
relevant jurisprudence, yet it strikes one as odd that in the major works on treaty law 
and treaty interpretation, this interpretative tool seems to have been neglected, let 
alone categorized within an existing framework of interpretative rules.186 Those 
authors that do attempt such a categorization, file this interpretative method alongside 
their analysis of travaux préparatoires,187 although most do not fail to recognize that 
the former cannot be identified with the latter.188 This seems to indicate that the 
position held for this subject is that they fall in the broader category of supplementary 
means of interpretation.189 This is reinforced by the fact that the term ‘historical 
interpretation’ is sometimes employed to allude to this modus of interpretation.190  
                                                                                                                                            
through the Institut de Droit International up to the ILC and the Vienna Conference, and certain 
aspects of them are mirrored in specific manifestations of the prevailing rule of interpretation. 
184 Of course there have been cases where the court applied customary international law and general 
principles; see for instance the Georges Pinson case, at 422. However, as the previous analysis has 
demonstrated, reference to customary international law and general principles does not raise many 
issues. On the contrary, reference to anterior or posterior treaties can provide some useful insight as to 
the true nature of the process of Article 31(3)(c) and the way that each of its problematic terms should 
be understood. For these reasons, the focus of the following Sections will be pre-VCLT cases where 
the relevant court, during the interpretative process, referred to treaties other than the one interpreted.  
185 what constitutes a ‘relevant’ treaty and what criteria are used to determine this will be the object of 
the following analysis.  
186 See Arnold D. McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961); see also van Damme 
who makes an in passim reference to the topic but without going into an extensive analysis; Isabelle 
van Damme, ‘What Role is there for Regional International Law in the Interpretation of the WTO 
Agreements?’, in Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO Legal System, Lorando Bartels and 
Federico Ortino (eds.) (Oxford: OUP, 2006), 553, at 569-71. 
187 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Les Travaux Préparatoires et l’ Intérpretation des Traités’, RCADI 48 
(1934/II): 709-817; John H. Spencer, L’ Interpretation des Traites par les Travaux Preparatoires 
(Paris : Les Editions Internationales, 1934). 
188 Lauterpacht, supra note 187; Spencer, supra note 187, at 71 et seq., especially at 101-3. 
189 The following authors tackle one aspect of the issue: Interpretation by reference to in pari materia 
treaties i.e. treaties that have the same subject-matter with the treaty being interpreted. This method of 
interpretation they consider to fall under Article 32 VCLT.  See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law 
and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 2007, 2nd edition), at 248; Linderfalk, supra note 71, at 355; 
Linderfalk, supra note 62, at 255-9; György Haraszti, Some Fundamental problems of the Law of 
Treaties (Budapest: Akadémia Kiadó, 1973), at 148; a counterargument to this, however, is that even in 
the ILC no mention of this method was done in connection to travaux préparatoires. Berman, 
analysing the Oil Platforms case argues that the reference to other treaties cannot be considered as 
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The validity of such an equation will be analyzed infra, however, at this point 
and prior to having reached any conclusions, it seems premature to use this term to 
describe the interpretative process of reference to other treaties. However, a term has 
to be adopted in order to facilitate, if not anything else, at least linguistically, the 
following analysis. In Private International Law, when a case arises that is 
characterized by foreign elements, it is sometimes difficult to determine which legal 
system and set of rules, which lex, should be applied. Each system has a set of rules to 
resolve such question. Usually depending on the nature and plurality of these foreign 
elements, this question is re-addressed to another legal system. This is called a renvoi. 
Essentially, it is a referral of the problem of a legal classification from one legal 
system to another. Depending on the legal system which is called to resolve the issue, 
the recipient of this renvoi can be the lex fori191, the lex loci delicti192 and so on. This 
process bears more than a resemblance to the interpretative method in question. In the 
case at hand, we have a referral of legal interpretation from the context of one treaty 
to that of another one. Consequently, the term that will be used to describe this 
process will be ‘interpretative renvoi’. And as the Private International Law renvoi is 
not arbitrary, but stems from the evaluation of certain criteria, similarly, the following 
Sections will focus193 on identifying the criteria on which the selection of the 
appropriate treaty is based. 
 
2. Case-law Relating to Interpretative Renvoi.  
As was mentioned supra, there is quite an extensive jurisprudence predating the 
VCLT that makes reference to this method of interpretative renvoi. This is not to say 
                                                                                                                                            
‘context’ within Article 31(3)(c). According to him, it is more of a supplementary means of 
interpretation; Frank Berman, ‘Treaty ‘Interpretation’ in a Judicial Context’, Yale Journal of 
International Law 29 (2004): 315-22, at 317-22.  However, 31(3)(c) is not context stricto sensu since 
the wording of Article 31(3) goes as follows: “There shall be taken into account, together with the 
context…” (emphasis added). Furthermore, it is very interesting to note that Verzijl, when analyzing 
the various methods of interpretation refers to in pari materia interpretation. He does not categorize 
this method of interpretation as falling under Article 32 or 31 for that matter. On the contrary, he 
actually, analyzes it in a category which he names “systematic interpretation” (in Chapter IV it will be 
shown why the term ‘systemic’ is more appropriate than ‘systematic’). In the same category one can 
find the context of the treaty, the preamble but also other judicial decisions. In this sense it is not quite 
clear whether Verzilj considered such a method of interpretation as falling under Article 31 or 32. 
However, the wording selected i.e. ‘systematic’ is a nod towards Article 31(3)(c); see Jan H.W. Verzijl, 
International Law in a Historical Perspective: Vol. VI (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1973), at 324. 
190 Lauterpacht, supra note 187; Spencer, supra note 187, at 71 et seq. 
191 The law of the place where the case has arisen. 
192 The law of the place where the act was committed. 
193 Apart from the legal classification of this method as mentioned supra. 
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that in all cases the international courts and tribunals agreed on the applicable criteria, 
let alone accepted this method. Striking is also the fact that, in many instances, the 
courts use the method without substantiating or mentioning its theoretical194 basis and 
in other cases as an elusive notion withstanding any attempt of categorization. It is 
treated as a part of treaty interpretation, but at the same time, as a method that is 
uncertain and indeterminate in which area it falls. Having said that, all cases are 
pertinent in the sense that each allows a fragmented view of the larger picture; each 
offers instructive lessons and insight to this interpretative tool and all taken together 
illuminate and clarify the true nature of the referral to other treaties. 
 
2.1. Cases where the Recourse to Anterior Treaties was Rejected 
It would be too presumptuous to think that the totality of the international 
jurisprudence accepts ipso facto the recourse to other treaties as a valid interpretative 
tool. For this reason the ensuing analysis will have as a starting point the synoptic 
presentation of the main decisions where although one or more of the parties to the 
dispute argued that the court should consider treaties other than the ones in question, 
the court, nevertheless, rejected such recourse. Despite this rejection, conclusions can 
be arrived at, as to what the relevant court considered as lacking and which rendered a 
treaty ‘non-relevant’ for interpretative purposes. 
In the River Oder case the PCIJ declined to consider several other preceding 
treaties that according to the parties could give a better insight as to the correct 
interpretation of Article 331 of the Treaty of Versailles. 
 
Besides the arguments already considered, the Parties submitted several others during the 
written and oral proceedings drawn from certain provisions of the Peace Treaties 
concerning other rivers, in particular the Moselle and the Danube, and from the 
proceedings for the establishment of the definitive Statute of the latter river. The Court, 
being of the opinion that these arguments, drawn from independent provisions and 
diplomatic negotiations, cannot modify the conclusion which it has reached by means of a 
direct interpretation of the provisions applicable in the particular case, does not think it 
necessary to deal with these arguments.195 
 
                                                 
194 Or at least practical. 
195 River Oder case, at 30. 
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What is impressive in this statement196 is that the Court considers that reference to 
treaties dealing with analogous issues, is inferior to a clearly textual approach. 
Similarly, the PCIJ in two more cases seemed reluctant to accept recourse to 
anterior treaties. In the ILO Advisory Opinion,197 the Court made absolutely no reference 
to the Convention of Berne, despite the fact that the French Government in its pleadings 
had made use of the said convention in order to interpret the terms ‘labour’ and ‘workers’, 
which were used in Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles.198 
In the Eastern Bank Ltd. v. the Turkish Government case, it is interesting to 
note the way with which the arbitral court dispensed with the appellant’s claim for 
compensation. The argument put forward was based on an interpretation of article 25 
of the Treaty of Lausanne through an analogy with article 297(h) of the Treaty of 
Versailles. The Court, however, rejected this on the grounds that such an 
interpretation by analogy cannot be justified, unless “to the extent that there is a 
conformity or analogy between the provisions of the two treaties”.199,200 In essence, 
the tribunal considered that in order for another treaty to be relevant for interpretative 
purposes, some sort of identity or at least proximity had to exist between the treaties. 
However, the tribunal ended the discussion there without going into further detail as 
to how such proximity was to be identified. 
Finally, in the Ungarische Erdgas A.G contre Etat Roumain case the issue was 
the nationality of a company. The Romanian State contested the Hungarian nationality 
of the Company. The relevant provision was Article 250 of the Treaty of Trianon, 
which Romania interpreted by means of analogy through the criterion established in 
Article 297 of the Treaty of Versailles. In order to reinforce this argument, Romania 
submitted to the Court the fact that Articles 232 of the Treaty of Trianon and 297 of 
                                                 
196 and to which we shall return infra 
197 Competence of the International Labour Organization in regard to International Regulation of the 
Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture, Advisory Opinion of 12 August  1922,  PCIJ Series 
B, No.2, 9 (hereinafter ILO Advisory Opinion). 
198 Acts and Documents Relating to Judgments and Advisory Opinions Given by the Court: Speeches 
Made and Read before the Court, Part II, reproduced in PCIJ Series C, No.1., 35, at 185; similarly in 
Owners of S.S. Seaham Harbour v. The German Government, the tribunal rejected taking into 
consideration other treaties without, however, offering any reason; see Owners of S.S. Seaham Harbour 
v. The German Government (UK v. Germany), Award of 7 February 1924), Tribunaux Arbitraux 
Mixtes 4 (1925): 29, at 29-30. 
199 Eastern Bank Ltd. v. the Turkish Government (Turkey v. UK), Award of 28 December 1927, 
Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 8 (1929): 188, at 192. 
200 In this dictum one could also read an implicit requirement in the sense that what is required is not 
merely an analogy of the subject-matter of the treaties but an analogy of the provisions themselves 
(hereinafter Eastern Bank Ltd case). 
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the Treaty of Versailles were identical Consequently, according to Romania, Article 
250 of the Treaty of Trianon should be interpreted in the light of Article 297 of the 
Treaty of Versailles.201 
The response of the Court is instructive. Firstly, it re-affirmed that the 
similitude of two provisions in two different treaties cannot ipso facto justify the 
application by analogy of all the provisions of the one to the other.202,203 Furthermore, 
when addressing the issue of possible conflict between the aforementioned provisions, 
it stated that no such issue204 could arise for two more reasons:  
i) the Treaty of Trianon was negotiated in an era posterior to that 
of the Treaty of Versailles and in a completely different historical context, 
which follows that it addressed different objects and purposes205 and  
ii) the Treaty Parties were not identical206 
Summing up the court’s position, it acknowledged that a similarity in the 
wording of different treaties was an important factor in determining relevancy, but it 
was neither the only one nor the most decisive one. Other considerations had to be 
factored in as well i.e. temporal proximity, identity or at least proximity of the 
subject-matter and identity or partial overlap of the parties to the treaties in 
consideration.  
Apart from the lessons that can be gained from the dicta of all these cases,207 it 
is prudent at this point to underline that at least in two of them,208 despite the fact that 
the relevant courts rejected in their particular cases the recourse to anterior treaties, 
they were, nevertheless, open to such an idea as long as in one form or another certain 
criteria were met. One of them being the similitude of provisions, but by itself this is 
not enough; the Ungarische Erdgas case supplements this criterion with proximity not 
                                                 
201 Ungarische Erdgas A G contre Etat Roumain (Romania v. Hungary), Award of 8 July 1929, 
Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 9 (1930): 448 et seq. (hereinafter Ungarische Erdgas case). 
202 Ungarische Erdgas case, at 454. 
203 At this point the decision seems to echo the Eastern Bank Ltd. case in the sense that what is required 
is not an abstract similarity of two treaties or of two irrelevant provisions but of the provisions at hand; 
however, it seems to go a step further by introducing some other elements of consideration for allowing 
such an interpretative renvoi.  
204 And by association no issue of interpretation by analogy. 
205 This argument is an intricate weave of both the temporal and subject-matter (teleological) 
manifestations of the proximity criterion, see infra. 
206 Ungarische Erdgas case, at 454. 
207 which will be analyzed infra  
208 Eastern Bank Ltd case and Ungarische Erdgas case. 
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merely of a temporal nature but also of the subject-matter of regulation, and of 
identity of contracting Parties.  
 
2.2. Interpretative Renvoi Vindicated in Case-Law: A Daedalus’ Maze 
2.2.1 Application of Interpretative Renvoi not Accompanied by any Legal 
Justification 
In the clear majority of the cases, however, the tribunals had recourse to interpretative 
renvoi. This by no means simplifies the analytical procedure. On the contrary, it 
complicates it, since not all courts have followed a uniform approach and even in the 
case-law of one singular court the practice seems to vary. 
In the Advisory Opinion on Polish Nationals in Danzig, the PCIJ had to 
elucidate the relationship between the Convention of Paris of 9 November 1920, 
between Poland and Danzig and the 1919 Treaty of Versailles. The Court concluded 
that  
 
[a]s between Danzig and Poland, the Convention of Paris is the instrument which is 
directly binding on Danzig; but in case of doubt as to the meaning of its provisions, 
recourse may be had to the Treaty of Versailles, not for the purpose of discarding the terms 
of the Convention, but with a view to elucidating their meaning.209, 210, 211 
 
In the Case of Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools) the PCIJ was 
called to interpret a German-Polish Convention relating to Upper Silesia of May 15th 
1922. Nevertheless, the Court found itself, while interpreting Article 131 of the said 
                                                 
209 Treatment of Polish Nationals and other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig 
Territory, Advisory Opinion of 4 February 1932, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 44, 4, at 32 (hereinafter Polish 
Nationals in Danzig Advisory Opinion). 
210 It is interesting, however, to note that in the exactly following page the Court seems to go back on 
its previous conclusion by saying that  
 
The conclusion of the Convention does not in any way impair the legal value of Article 104 of the 
Treaty as an authentic expression of the mandate conferred on the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers and of the objects of the Convention; from this point of view and to this extent, the article is 
enforceable in respect of the Free City.  
 
Ibid., at 33. 
211 However, an argument could be made that this is not a pure case of reference to other treaties but 
falls more under the auspices of Article 31(2)(b) of the VCLT, on the premise, of course, that the 
remaining Contracting Parties to the Treaty of Versailles had given their consent. 
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Convention, making cross-references to several other articles of that Convention.212 
The conduct of the Court up to this point is, from an interpretative point of view, 
absolute text-book. However, the Court then moves on to examine another treaty; one 
concluded between Poland and the Free City of Danzig on October 24, 1921, i.e. one 
month before the negotiations between Poland and Germany, relating to Upper 
Silesia, started.213  The critical point is that only Poland was a party to both these 
treaties, yet the Court dispenses with the pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt rule by 
applying the interpretative renvoi. 
Another example is offered by the British Clearing Office v. the Hungarian 
Clearing Office adjudicated by the Anglo-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal. 
Hungary wished to limit the amount of reparations it ought to pay. According to a 
decision of the Reparations Commission concerning the Treaty of Trianon the quota 
to be paid by Hungary was 28.652%, a quota, which after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Trianon would be reduced to either 45.733% of the said quota or 13.1034% 
of the total. Hungary was claiming that its obligation should be limited to these last 
percentages, even prior to the entry into force of the Trianon Treaty.214 In order to 
respond to and eventually reject this Hungarian claim, the Arbitral Court invoked the 
relevant article of the Treaty of Saint-Germain.215 
 
2.2.2. Pre-VCLT Jurisprudence Revealing various Forms of Proximity as 
Factors of Determining ‘relevancy’ 
Unlike in the previous case, the tribunals in the following judgments were not merely 
satisfied in applying interpretative renvoi without any justification. On the contrary, 
the relevant passages of their judgments drags into the light the variety of criteria that 
they have used in order to substantiate the reference to anterior or posterior treaties 
and why they are relevant in the case at hand. 
In the case of the Aerial Agreement between the United States of America and 
Italy the dispute arose from the interpretation of an Aerial Agreement between the 
                                                 
212 This practice is clearly in accordance with Article 31(1) of the VCLT within the meaning of the 
term ‘context’ and is also referred to by Vattel in the quote, mentioned earlier, which combines 
reference to the context of the treaty itself as well as to other treaties, see supra note 37. 
213 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Minority Schools), (Germany v.. Poland), Judgment of 26 
April 1928, PCIJ Series A, No. 15, 3, at 40 (hereinafter Minorities in Upper Silesia case). 
214 Spencer, supra note 187, at 76. 
215 Id. 
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aforementioned States. Another similar treaty, the Bermuda Agreement, had acted as 
the model upon which the US-Italian Agreement was based.216 However, the critical 
point was that Italy was not a party to the Bermuda Agreement. The Court refused to 
take into consideration the travaux préparatoires of the Bermuda Agreement, basing 
its negation on the fact that Italy had not officially participated in the negotiations for 
the Bermuda Agreement.217 Up to this point this seems to be in complete conformity 
with the mainstream theory regarding use of travaux préparatoires with respect to 
third parties.218  The pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle is satisfied and no 
other result would be obtained by the application of the criteria of publication and 
accessibility, for the simple fact that Italy had at no point ratified or acceded to the 
Bermuda Agreement. Were the court to have halted its reasoning at this point, this 
case would present no major importance for our analysis. However, the arbitral Court 
goes on to take into consideration the totality of the regime established by the 
Bermuda Agreement.219 The reason it gives for using the Bermuda Agreement as an 
indispensable tool in its interpretation of the US-Italy Aerial Agreement is two-
pronged: 
i) the Italian government knew the regime established by the 
Bermuda Agreement very well and 
ii) it knew that it would serve as a founding stone for the Aerial 
Agreement between itself and the U.S.220 
Essentially, the Court establishes two tests for allowing itself to use anterior 
treaties. Firstly, that there is familiarity with the treaty used, irrespective of whether 
one of the Parties to the dispute was not a Party to the said treaty. The second basis 
that the Court puts forward is that of knowledge that the Bermuda Agreement would 
                                                 
216 On the fact that treaties may serve as models for drafting purposes see Paul Reuter, ‘Solidarité et 
Divisabilité des Engagements Conventionels’, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity : Essays in 
Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds.) (Dordrecht : Nijhoff, 1989), 623, 
at 627 ; who states that : “Il est bien connu que les traités bien redigés servent de modèle même pour 
des traités conclus par d’ autres Etats”. 
217 Air Transport Arbitration (US v. Italy), Award of 17 July 1965, 45 ILR 393, at 414-8 (hereinafter 
US-Italy Air Transport Arbitration). 
218 See Panos Merkouris, ‘‘Third Party’ Considerations and ‘Corrective Interpretation’ in the 
Interpretative Use of Travaux Préparatoires: – Is it Fahrenheit 451 for Preparatory Work?’, in Issues of 
Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds.) (Leiden: BRILL/Martinus Nijhoff, forthcoming 2010). 
219 And by the same token opening, indirectly, the floodgates for taking into consideration the travaux 
préparatoires that it had just earlier rejected. 
220 US-Italy Air Transport Arbitration, at 414-8. 
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be the basis of the US-Italy Agreement. This simple statement is in reality a multi-
layered legal argument. The essence of this argument is intention of the parties and 
proximity221 between treaties. The fact that Italy was aware of the Bermuda 
Agreement functioning as the blueprint for its own Aerial Agreement, is a clear 
indication that the intention of the parties was heavily influenced by the former 
Agreement and thus, it should be taken into consideration in the court’s interpretation 
of the US-Italy Agreement. On the other hand, the Court seems to feel that this is not 
enough but that proximity between the treaties must also exist. The Court is, perhaps 
intentionally, vague on this point. Nevertheless, it seems that the proximity which 
most influenced the Court’s decision is not merely a temporal one, but also one 
relating to subject-matter, object and purpose. All these are indications of the 
intention that the posterior treaty reflects. Consequently, temporal proximity alone 
does not suffice. Two treaties may follow one immediately after the other; yet have 
absolutely no other links or even contradicting objects. The same applies to proximity 
as to subject-matter. Two treaties may have the same subject-matter, yet so much time 
has elapsed that the intention of the parties does not coincide any more. The greater 
the lapse of time separating the two treaties the less evident is the continuity of 
intention. It is, therefore, the balancing of all these forms of proximity, which yields 
the best result in identifying party-intention. 
In this reasoning, what is striking is the clear absence of any consideration 
about the legal validity of the use of an anterior treaty, which a party of the treaty 
being interpreted has not signed, ratified or acceded. Italy for instance, was not a party 
to the Bermuda Agreement. The court seems satisfied that at least one of the parties, 
the US, was party to both of these treaties.  
Another important case is the Japanese House Tax case. In that instance, the 
PCA came to a resolution of the dispute brought to it by treating three international 
treaties, signed by Japan with Great Britain222, Germany223 and France224 respectively, 
as almost one and the same treaty. 
The dispute at hand had arisen from the following facts. Japan had agreed to 
set aside, for perpetual lease to individuals or subjects of foreign nations, certain 
                                                 
221 Not only temporal but also proximity relating to the subject-matter, object and purpose. 
222 On 16 July 1894. 
223 On 4 April 1896. 
224 On 4 August 1896. 
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pieces of land at various treaty ports. Furthermore, Japan agreed not to impose any 
further conditions on these lands. This meant that no taxes or charges225 could be 
imposed on such lands. The point in dispute, however, was whether this arrangement 
also covered houses and other buildings or improvements to the land. 
The Court held that there existed no reason why such improvements should be 
exempt. The critical point in the juridical reasoning was that despite the differences in 
phraseology, the Court held that the provisions of all three treaties should be 
interpreted as being pretty much the same thing. This predisposition is self-evident in 
the way the Court interprets the 1896 Treaty between Germany and Japan. The 
aforementioned treaty lacked certain protective exceptions, which were incorporated 
in the 1894 Treaty between Japan and Great Britain. The Court attached absolutely no 
significance to this differentiation and easily dispensed with it through the following 
dictum: “... and it cannot be presumed that the German Government intended to 
renounce the advantages allowed in favour of Great Britain by the new treaty”.226  
At first glance this dictum seems to be in conformity with the standard form of 
interpretative process; the reference to the ‘intention’ of Germany is reflective of one 
of the three main schools of interpretation and incorporated in Article 31 of the 
VCLT. However, the intention of Germany is based not on actions or omissions of 
Germany itself but on the provisions of a completely different treaty, between Japan 
and Great Britain, to which Germany was not a party and that was signed 2 years 
earlier than the Germano-Japanese treaty. It is, thus, the reference to an anterior 
treaty, of both temporal and subject-matter proximity that is the decisive criterion.227  
The references to various forms of proximity in determining the relevancy of a 
treaty in the interpretative process were continued in the Muscat Dhows case. In that 
case, the PCA was called to interpret the term ‘protected’, which was employed in the 
General Act of the Brussels Conference, of 2 July 1890. In order to do this, the Court 
                                                 
225 Other than those clearly specified in the leases. 
226 Japanese House Tax (France, Germany and Great Britain v. Japan), Award of 22 May 1905, PCA,  
reproduced in James B. Scott (ed.), The Hague Court Reports (New York: OUP, 1916), at 84 
(hereinafter Japanese House Tax case); accessible at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/Japanese%20House%20Tax%20English%20Sentence.pdf (last accessed on 25 
January 2010). 
227 Another notable element is that the court seems to qualify the reference to an anterior treaty as of 
primordial importance and delegates a secondary function to another interpretative tool, the principle 
‘ut res magis valeat quam pereat’. The Court mentions only as a reinforcing argument the fact that any 
different interpretation would be in clear contradiction (and would, thus, render useless) the clause 
assuring a most-favored nation treatment to Germany.  
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reasoned not only that the term in question had been the subject of restrictions, but 
also that the definition of the term given by the treaty of 1863228 and the Madrid 
Convention of 30 July 1880, limited this term to only four categories. From these 
treaties, the Court deciphered a common intention of the Powers to renounce the 
creation of categories of ‘protected persons’ in the oriental States, which by analogy 
included Turkey and Morocco.229 
What is of interest is that whereas in the previous cases, the treaties referred to 
seemed to be temporally quite close to the treaty being interpreted, in this case the 
element of temporal proximity starts being stretched to numbers that surpass a mere 
decade. The treaty to be interpreted was concluded in 1890, whereas the treaties taken 
into consideration spanned from 1863 to 1880. This means that a period of 27 years 
had elapsed between the most antecedent treaty and the treaty in question.  
A further extension of the maximum amount of time permitted for allowing 
recourse to an anterior treaty is offered in the Arone Kahane successor v. Francesco 
Parisi and the Austrian State. In this case, the tribunal used the Treaty of Berlin of 
1879 to interpret the Treaty of Saint-Germain. These two treaties were separated by a  
time-gap of approximately 40 years.230 Of course, this relative slack in the temporal 
proximity criterion is compensated by the fact that all the parties to the Treaty of Saint 
Germain were equally Signatories to the Treaty of Berlin. Once again, various forms 
of proximity seem to be taken into consideration. In a form of balancing act, the 
shortcomings of one form of proximity231 is compensated by the application of 
another form of proximity, that of shared parties.232  What is of the utmost importance 
is that in this case, the court attached great significance to this interpretative method. 
It was not merely a supplementary means of re-affirming a previously arrived 
conclusion; on the contrary, it was of primordial importance in the interpretative 
process.233  
The prevalence of considerations of proximity, especially with respect to the 
subject-matter of regulation, is conspicuous in the Anglo Ottoman Tobacco Co. Ltd, v. 
                                                 
228 Between France and Morocco. 
229 Muscat Dhows case (France v. UK), Award of 8 August 1905, RIAA 11 (1961): 83-100.  
230 Arone Kahane successor v. Francesco Parisi and the Austrian State (Romania v. Austria), Award of 
19 March 1929, Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 8 (1929): 943, at 960 (hereinafter Arone Kahane case). 
231 In this case temporal proximity. 
232 In the present case there was not merely proximity between the parties to the treaties, but actual 
identity. 
233 Spencer, supra note 187, at 76. 
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the Bulgarian Government case. In rejecting a damages claim against the Bulgarian 
Government, the Anglo-Bulgarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal referred to the 
jurisprudence of the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals relative to similar matters with respect 
to the Treaty of Versailles.234 Although it acknowledged that these cases were based 
on an interpretation of the Treaty of Versailles, it then went on to reject this 
consideration as immaterial since it  
 
did not think, with respect to this matter, that there is reason to distinguish between the 
interpretation of the essential provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly and the corresponding 
stipulations of the Treaty of Versailles.235 
  
In the Case Compagnie d’ Electricité de la Ville de Varsovie the arbitrator interpreted 
the Franco-Polish Convention of 6 February 1922 by reference to the Treaty of 
Versailles.236 The issue in that particular dispute was whether the arbitration 
envisaged in articles 5 and 11 of the Franco-Polish Convention of 6 February 1922 
was the same as that of article 16 of the same Convention. The arbitrator in that case 
relied heavily on considerations of similarity of the provisions and the goals aspired to 
between the Convention at hand and the Treaty of Versailles. In fact, the arbiter goes 
as far as to claim that “one is stunned by the near identity between the main and 
relevant texts and provisions”237 and that the “Convention of 6 February 1922 can be 
considered, as to what pertains to the present matter, as a partial reproduction of Part 
X of the Treaty of Versailles”.238 
However, it has to be mentioned that serious criticisms have been raised with 
respect to the chain of thought followed in the aforementioned arbitration. It is true 
that certain provisions were almost identical, such as the ones mentioned by the 
arbitrator himself e.g. Article 11(b)(2) of the Convention and Article 299(b) of the 
                                                 
234 Anglo Ottoman Tobacco Co. Ltd, v. the Bulgarian Government (UK v. Bulgaria), Judgment of 14 
October 1924, Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 4 (1925): 671, at 672-3. (hereinafter Anglo Ottoman 
Tobacco case). 
235 Id.  
236 Affaire de la Compagnie d’ Electricité de la Ville de Varsovie (France v. Poland), Award on 
Jurisdiction of 30 November 1929, RIAA 3 (1949): 1669-78 (hereinafter Warsaw Electricity Company 
case).  
237 Author’s translation; tha authentic text goes as follows: “… on est frappé par la presque identité 
entre les texts des dispositions principales y relatives ”, Warsaw Electricity Company case, at 1675. 
238 Author’s translation; tha authentic text goes as follows: “… la Convention du 6 février 1922, peut 
être considérée, quant à la présente matière, comme une reproduction partielle de la Partie X du Traité 
de Versailles ”, Warsaw Electricity Company case, at 1675. 
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Treaty of Versailles. Nevertheless, despite the similarities, it has been argued that it is 
exactly these discrepancies that were intentional in order to clearly disassociate the 
procedure of the Convention with that of the Treaty.239 For instance, Article 299(b)(2) 
of the Treaty of Versailles reads as follows: “the Mixed Arbitral Tribunal established 
according to Section VI shall grant the damaged party an equitable compensation”. 
Whereas the relevant provision of Article 11(b)(2) of the Franco-Polish Convention 
reads as follows: “an equitable compensation shall be granted to the damaged party by 
an arbitrator chosen following an agreement between the High Contracting Parties” 
(emphasis added). Notwithstanding the variety of opinions on the fallacies or not of 
this decision, the crucial point is that all of them converge to the same point; the 
importance of the similitude or linguistic proximity of the relevant provisions, as a 
method of identifying whether a treaty can be used for the purposes of an 
interpretative renvoi.  
Up to this point, the cases analyzed had the common characteristic of anterior 
treaties being used in order to prove whether a certain meaning existed. In the 
Advisory Opinion on Access to, or Anchorage in, the Port of Danzig, of Polish War 
Vessels the PCIJ, once again, used other treaties as an interpretative tool. However, 
the allusion to other treaties in the case in question has an interesting twist. Whereas 
in the aforementioned cases the anterior treaties were invoked to clarify the meaning 
of a certain provision, in the present case the PCIJ in order to interpret the term ‘port 
d’ attache’ used in the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention and the 1910 Brussels 
Convention on Collisions240 in an exclusionary manner. Both the intrinsic and 
extrinsic materials relevant to the 1920 Paris Treaty between Danzig and Poland seem 
to show that  
 
the words ‘port d’attache’ were never used in their technical meaning either in the sense in 
which they are used in conventions relating to fishing vessels or merchant ships, such as 
the North Sea Fisheries Convention, 1882, or the Brussels Convention on Collisions of 
1910.241 
 
                                                 
239 Spencer, supra note 187, at 76. 
240 A temporal gap of 38 and 10 years respectively. 
241 Access to, or Anchorage in, the Port of Danzig, of Polish War Vessels, Advisory Opinion of 11 
December 1931, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 43, 127, at 141 (hereinafter Access to Port of Danzig Advisory 
Opinion).  
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The treaties are thus, not used to identify or confirm the meaning of a term, but rather 
in a sense of a quasi-mathematical interpretation ‘through a process of elimination’. It 
is probably for this reason that the Court does not feel itself obliged to establish the 
criteria of proximity242 or of common parties to all the treaties.243 It seems that the 
Court felt that since the treaties are not a basis of a ‘positive’ interpretation but merely 
one stage of an ‘exclusory’ or ‘negative’ interpretation, the burden of proof regarding 
the evidentiary value of this material is greatly alleviated if not completely eradicated. 
A final point that needs to be examined is the interpretation based not merely 
on anterior treaties but on the travaux préparatoires of anterior treaties. In the cases 
Schreiber et Cie contre État tchéchoslovaque and Maison Herman Wilhelm et Cie 
contre État tchéchoslovaque the issue was one of indemnity for companies situated in 
Hungarian territory. According to Article 250 of the Treaty of Trianon there were 
certain exceptions for companies situated on the territories of the ancient Austro-
Hungarian Empire. The question was whether these territories referred only to the 
territories that had been transferred and not those that remained Hungarian. The Court 
found in favour of this interpretation in the following way. It tried to interpret Article 
250 of the Treaty of Trianon by reference to Article 267 of the Treaty of Saint-
Germain, of which it was an almost literal reproduction. However, this method proved 
fruitless as Article 267 was vague itself. Consequently, the Court referred to the 
travaux préparatoires of the Treaty of Saint-Germain and then applied the resulting 
interpretation to the Treaty of Trianon as well.244 
The PCIJ, as well, lends support to this practice. In the Case Concerning the 
Payment of various Serbian Loans issued in France the PCIJ, instead of restricting 
itself to the preliminary documents referring to each and every loan, opted for taking 
them as one unity. In essence, the Court drew conclusions from similar provisions and 
terms used not only in the texts of the loan agreements themselves,s but also in their 
                                                 
242 The North Sea Fisheries Convention is set 38 years apart from the 1920 Paris Treaty; as for subject-
matter proximity the court makes absolutely no allusion. For all that we know the selection of these 
treaties as reference points was simply because they had made use of the term in question i.e. “port d’ 
attache” in their provisions. 
243 The Court makes no reference. 
244 Schreiber et Cie contre État tchéchoslovaque (Hungary v. Czechoslovakia), Award of 29 July 1927 
Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 7 (1928) : 897, at 900 (hereinafter Schreiber case); Maison Herman 
Wilhelm et Cie contre État tchéchoslovaque (Hungary v. Czechoslovakia), Award of 20 July 
1929,Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 9 (1930) : 583,  at 586-7 (hereinafter Herman Wilhelm case). 
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travaux préparatoires.245 What this means is that the preparatory documents of one 
loan agreement were used to make deductive inferences with respect to the 
interpretation of other loan agreements. 
The criteria used in the aforementioned case-law vary not only in substance 
but in their degree of influence. In some cases, an identity, or at least high level of 
similarity between the relevant provisions, was required246; in others it was the 
subject-matter of regulation which was the main factor of consideration.247 The 
amount of time separating the treaties in question was also taken into account, but 
never as a factor of decisive importance;248 the same applied to the total or partial 
overlap of the parties both to the dispute and to the treaties in question.249 Although 
there was a degree of dependency that each court showed to each and every one of 
these criteria a preliminary general conclusion might be that rarely, if ever, was any of 
these criteria the sole element of consideration, but always a combination of two or 
more of them250 and in a complementary relationship. The shortcomings of one 
element could be compensated through the cumulative application of another.251  
In this context the Employment of Women during the Night Advisory Opinion 
must be mentioned. In that case, the PCIJ refused to take into consideration the 1913 
Convention of Berne for the interpretation of the 1919 Convention of Washington 
because:  
 
[t]he text of the [Washington] Convention as adopted made no reference to the Berne 
Convention…The Washington Convention cannot therefore be said, by reason of the work 
on which the 1919 Conference was engaged, to be so intimately linked with the Berne 
Convention as to require that the terms of the Washington Convention should bear the 
same meaning as the terms of the Berne Convention.252 
  
                                                 
245 Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (France v. Serbia), 
Judgment of 12 July 1929, PCIJ Series A, No. 20, 3, at 30-2 (hereinafter Serbian Loans case). 
246 Warsaw Electricity Company case, at 1675; Schreiber case, at 900; and Herman Wilhelm case, at 
586-7. 
247 Serbian Loans case, at 30-2; Japanese House Tax case. 
248 Access to Port of Danzig Advisory Opinion, at 141 et seq.; Arone Kahane case, at 960 et seq. 
249 Minorities in Upper Silesia case, at 40; US-Italy Air Transport Arbitration, at 414-8; Polish 
Nationals in Danzig Advisory Opinion, at 32 et seq. 
250 Japanese House Tax case; US-Italy Air Transport Arbitration, at 414-8; Arone Kahane case, at 960 
et seq. 
251 Japanese House Tax case; Arone Kahane case, at 960 et seq. 
252 Interpretation of the Convention of 1919 concerning Employment of Women during the Night, 
Advisory Opinion of 15 November 1932, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 50, 364, at 377 (hereinafter 
Employment of Women during the  Night Advisory Opinion). 
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Thus, the PCIJ seems to have upheld a different standard than what has been 
witnessed in the above jurisprudence. The fact that the Berne Convention was not 
explicitly mentioned in its Washington counterpart can be interpreted in one of the 
following ways; either this requirement is of a higher value than those identified 
supra, or reference is a form of proving proximity. Although the latter would serve 
the construction we have made so far, it is logically fallacious. If direct reference were 
a form of proximity, lack of which barred even a prima facie consideration of other 
treaties, this would mean that in essence it would be the only form of proximity that a 
court should check. In such a case, the other forms of proximity that have been 
invoked in all the aforementioned cases, such as temporal proximity and subject-
matter proximity, would be rendered useless and of merely ornamental value. Mutatis 
mutandis, the same result would occur even for the other requirement of shared 
parties. If a treaty A was directly mentioned in the text of another treaty B, then 
renvoi to treaty A would be covered by the intention of the parties to have such a 
renvoi253. On the other hand, if no direct reference was made, there would be no 
possibility of further research since the lack of direct reference in treaty B would ipso 
facto bar the quest for any other indications of an intention of renvoi. Consequently, 
the stance adopted by the PCIJ in the Employment of Women during the Night 
Advisory Opinion leads to an argumentum ad absurdum, since it would lead to the 
existence of only one criterion, that of direct reference, a criterion which can scarcely 
be suggested to be supported by international jurisprudence.254,255  
One must distinguish between Article 31(3)(c) interpretation, which is based 
on extraneous rules, and interpretation using ‘rules of international law’ that are, 
however, already incorporated in the interpreted treaty. A classical example of this is 
the Canada – Pharmaceuticals case, where the Panel in interpreting Article 30 of the 
                                                 
253 Since the renvoi is incorporated in the text, it is logical that there is no need to search any further for 
indications of an intention for such a renvoi. 
254 This position of the PCIJ seems also to be self-contradictory, as in the Access to Port of Danzig 
Advisory Opinion the same Court adopted a very liberal approach (compared to the one indicated by 
the majority of the jurisprudence) and made use of other treaties without any direct reference existing 
in the 1920 Paris Convention. For an analysis of the reasons for this stance, see supra. So in a matter of 
only one year the Court has gone from one extreme (that of expansive interpretation) to the other (that 
of a very restrictive interpretation). 
255 Furthermore, it should be noted that Judge Anzilloti in his Dissenting Opinion felt that the Court 
erred in not taking into consideration the meaning of the terms in question as used by other treaties that 
shared with the Washington Convention not only subject-matter proximity but also temporal proximity. 
In this spirit he made a special reference to the Berne Convention, which also had the added 
characteristic of sharing with the Washington Convention many of the Signatory Parties. 
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TRIPS Agreement256 referred to Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention.257,258 However, 
the Berne Convention is already incorporated in the TRIPS Agreement by virtue of 
Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement259,260 Based on the above considerations, the 
Employment of Women during the Night Advisory Opinion does not fall within the 
scope of our analysis i.e. Article 31(3)(c) and its requirement for a direct reference 
and incorporation does not affect the validity of the relevancy-requirements that the 
rest of the jurisprudence has revealed. 
 
2.2.3. Atypical Cases of Interpretative Renvoi 
In the previous analysis, the relevant case-law accepting or rejecting reference to 
anterior treaties was presented. However, some cases cannot fall within such a simple 
categorization. They are too atypical. At the same time, they are also very typical and 
characteristic of the main problematic areas of interpretative renvoi adding, in some 
cases, further twists; the most notorious being, reversing the usual understanding of 
the interpretative time-line. They allow for recourse not merely to anterior treaties but 
to posterior ones as well. 
The first case to be examined is more of a missed opportunity, if nothing else. 
The Advisory Opinion of the PCIJ regarding the Jurisdiction of the European 
Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila is a bit of a conundrum. The 
issue here was that of the interpretation of Article 6 of the Definitive Statute. During 
the Danube Conference, the delegates of the Commission261 were allegedly called to 
draft a document, later on named “Interpretative Protocol”, in order to clarify the 
Commission’s position on the interpretation to be placed on Article 6 of the Definitive 
Statute. 
                                                 
256 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), 33 
ILM 1197. 
257 1971 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 1161 UNTS 30. 
258 Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, Panel Report adopted on 7 April 2000, 
WTO, WT/DS114/R, para. 7.29 (hereinafter Canada-Pharmaceuticals (PR)). 
259 “Members shall comply with Articles 1 through 21 of the Berne Convention”. More extensively on 
the Canada-Pharmaceuticals case and the interpretative issues it raised see Susy Frankel, ‘WTO 
Application of the ‘Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law’ to Intellectual 
Property’, Virginia Journal of International Law 46 (2006): 365-431, at 394-406. 
260 In support see French, who considers this as a method of incorporation of extraneous rules, which is 
separate and distinguishable from Article 31(3)(c); French, supra note 10, at 292-5. 
261 From Great Britain, France, Italy and Romania and who had been invited in a clearly advisory 
capacity. 
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However, the Court rejected that the Interpretative Protocol bears any major 
significance in the case at hand on several grounds: 
i) according to the Court the Interpretative Protocol was  
 
not an international agreement between the Parties to the Definitive Statute; it is not 
annexed thereto, whilst many interpretations of the articles of the Statute were inserted in 
the Final Protocol, which has the same validity and duration as the Convention to which it 
refers. The Interpretative Protocol is not even mentioned in the Statute, which Roumania 
signed without any reservations, and can in no sense be considered as a part of it262  
 
Consequently, the Court in essence rejected that the Interpretative Protocol forms 
a res unum with the rest of the Statute and thus did not fall under Article 31(2) of 
the VCLT. Neither did it fall under Article 31(2)(a) or (b) as it was not signed by 
all Parties nor was it accepted by all Parties as an instrument relating to the treaty. 
 
ii) The Court also rejected the notion that the Interpretative Protocol was a 
decision of the European Commission, which modified the terms of the Definitive 
Statute.263  
Based on the above, the Court felt itself being left with only one option. It considered 
the Interpretative Protocol as part of the preparatory work.264  However, one option 
seems to have been left unexplored. Since the interpretative Protocol was signed by 
people representing the European Commission and since the Court felt that this was 
not the Commission decision, nothing prevented the Interpretative Protocol from 
being considered as a treaty between States preceding the Definitive Statute and 
which should be taken into consideration for the interpretation of Article 6. This 
document satisfied not only the requirements for treaty-making capacity set by the 
VCLT, but also fell easily under Art. 31(3)(c) of the VCLT.265  
                                                 
262 Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the Danube between Galatz and Braila, Advisory 
Opinion of 8 December 1927, PCIJ Series B, No. 14, 3, at 34 (hereinafter Jurisdiction of the Danube 
Commission Advisory Opinion) 
263 Id 
264 Ibid., at 34-5. 
265 A similar omission seems to exist with respect to an examination of Art. 31(4) of the VCLT but 
such an examination was left out probably because it would raise the issue of the possibility of a 
‘special meaning’ applicable to only a fraction of the parties – a sort of ‘regional special meaning’. 
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Perhaps, for the purposes of the examination of interpretative renvoi, the 
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case is the most characteristic in its richness and 
complexity. In that case the PCA juggled all the possible manifestations of 
interpretation by reference to other treaties.  
Firstly, while initially rejecting a US claim, on the basis of it not having any 
foundation of the 1818 Convention, which was being the object of interpretation, it 
then made a volte-face and accepted it on historical considerations.266 
 
While therefore unable to concede the claim of the United States as based on the Treaty, 
this Tribunal considers that such claim has been and is to some extent, conceded in the 
relations now existing between the two Parties. Whatever may have been the situation 
under the Treaty of 1818 standing alone, the exercise of the right of regulation inherent in 
Great Britain has been, and is, limited by the repeated recognition of the obligations 
already referred to, by the limitations and liabilities accepted in the Special Agreement, by 
the unequivocal position assumed by Great Britain in the presentation of its case before 
this Tribunal, and by the consequent view of this Tribunal that it would be consistent with 
all the circumstances, as revealed by this record, as to the duty of Great Britain, that she 
should submit the reasonableness of any future regulation to such an impartial arbitral 
test267 
 
The importance of this statement lies in the fact that the historical interpretation is 
being given priority over the text itself of the Treaty.268  
Additionally, the Court made use of anterior treaties, but did not restrict itself 
to treaties signed by both the US and Great Britain like the 1974 Jay Treaty but also 
used treaties ratified only by Great Britain dating as back as 1686 and 1713, i.e. a 
temporal gap of 132 and 105 years respectively.269 However, this reference was made 
conditional upon the fact that the latter treaties aimed to regulate the same matters and 
had the same objects as the treaty being interpreted.270 
The reference to the Jay Treaty is topical for one more reason. The analysis so 
far has shown that an interpretation by reference to anterior treaties usually entails 
that a dubious term, provision, or obligation is clarified through a similar one to be 
found in other treaties. The least common denominator in all of the above is the 
                                                 
266 Including amongst others, anterior treaties. 
267 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain v. United States of America), Award of 7 
September 1910, RIAA 11 (1961): 167-226, at 188 (hereinafter North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case) 
268 This as will be analyzed infra is reinforced by other dicta in the decision as well as the Dissenting 
opinion of Judge Drago. 
269 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, at 197. 
270 Ibid., at 187. 
 59
existence of an in scripto proof.  However, the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, 
once more, breaks from tradition by giving creed not merely to a specific provision of 
an anterior treaty but to the absence of it. To be more specific, the US argued that 
despite the fact that the Treaty of 1818 contained no specific provision exempting the 
inhabitants of the US from the relevant regulation, such an absence should be 
understood as inferring such an exemption.271 The Court, however, stated that it could 
not find in favour of this argument as “although such subjection was clearly 
contemplated by the Parties” it, nevertheless, failed to find its way within not only the 
Treaty of 1818 but also the Jay Treaty of 1794.272 In essence, the Court interpreted the 
absence of a specific regulation in the 1818 Treaty by reference to a similar absence 
in the Jay Treaty of 1794. It seems that the Court felt that the interpretative renvoi had 
application not only to cases of expressis verbis provisions, but also in sub silentio 
ones.273 
However, not all treaties brought forward by the disputing parties were 
accepted as relevant for the interpretative process.  For instance, the PCA refused to 
consider the 1783 Treaty. However, the reasoning that the Court offers for this 
rejection is extremely pertinent to the present analysis. The Court rejected recourse to 
the 1783 Treaty because “the Treaty of 1818 was in different terms, and very different in 
extent, from that of 1783, and was made for different considerations”.274, 275 What the 
Court clarified with this dictum was that its rejection was based on a lack of proximity 
between the two treaties both on a linguistic level, as well as on a subject-matter one. 
Bearing this in mind, it strikes one as extremely inconsistent that the same 
court a little further on, when addressing the interpretation of the terms “liberty to 
fish” of the 1818 Treaty, had absolutely no hesitation in using the very same Treaty of 
1783 it previously rejected;  
 
                                                 
271 Ibid., at 184. 
272 Ibid., at 185. 
273 For a two-pronged critique of this stance of the Court, one being that the Treaties of 1818 and 1794 
did not share the same subject-matter of regulation and the other being that interpretative reasoning 
cannot stem solely from silence, see Spencer, supra note 187, at 89-101. 
274 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, at 184. 
275 However, Spencer strongly disagrees with this finding of the Court, as a close examination of the 
relevant articles shows a striking similarity not only with respect to words and phrases but also as to 
what concerns the object of regulation; Spencer, supra note 187, at 94. 
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Because the term ‘liberty to fish’ was used in the renunciatory clause of the Treaty of 1818 
because the same term had been previously used in the Treaty of 1783 which gave the 
liberty; and it was proper to use in the renunciation clause the same term that was used in 
the grant with respect to the object of the grant.276 
 
This referral to the Treaty of 1783 was repeated a second time just a few paragraphs 
later when the Court found that  
 
[b]ecause the practical distinction for the purpose of this fishery between coasts and bays 
and the exceptional conditions pertaining to the latter has been shown from the 
correspondence and the documents in evidence, especially the Treaty of 1783, to have been 
in all probability present to the minds of the negotiators of the Treaty of 1818” (emphasis 
added).277  
 
It would appear that there is no easy way to resolve these apparently paradoxical 
findings of the Court. In one and the same case, reference to the 1783 Treaty was 
found to be both permissible and non-permissible. Despite this contradiction, 
however, the main point should not elude us. The final outcome may be 
fundamentally different, but the method of decision-making and the weight accorded 
to certain criteria were omnipresent in all of them. These were: i) subject-matter 
proximity and ii) linguistic similarity. It has to be noted, as well, that the Court when 
interpreting the term ‘bays’ took into account treaties that had been signed and ratified by 
only one of the parties to the dispute, Great Britain.278  
Perhaps the most interesting point of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case 
was that the Court broke the temporal tradition within the framework of interpretative 
reference to other treaties. Up to this point only anterior treaties had been the subject 
of examination. The Court dispensed with this restriction and in interpreting the term 
‘in common’ found that  
                                                 
276 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, at 195-6. 
277 Ibid., at 198. 
278 so for instance the Court mentioned that  
 
[c]onsidering, moreover, that in treaties with France, with the North German Confederation and the 
German Empire and likewise in the North Sea Convention, Great Britain has adopted for similar 
cases the rule that only bays of ten miles width should be considered as those wherein the fishing is 
reserved to nationals… [a]nd that though these circumstances are not sufficient to constitute this a 
principle of international law, it seems reasonable to propose this rule with certain exceptions, all the 
more that this rule with such exceptions has already formed the basis of an agreement between the 
two Powers 
 
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, at 199. 
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[b]ecause the words ‘in common’ occur in the same connection in the Treaty of 1818 as in 
the Treaties of 1854 and 1871. It will certainly not be suggested that in these Treaties of 
1854 and 1871 the American negotiators meant by inserting the words ‘in common’ to 
imply that without these words American citizens would be precluded from the right to 
fish on their own coasts and that, on American shores, British subjects should have an 
exclusive privilege.279 
 
Another posterior treaty was used in order to interpret not only one but, in essence, 
two treaties. The United States contended that  
 
the French right of fishery under the treaty of 1713 designated also as a liberty, was never 
subjected to regulation by Great Britain, and therefore the inference is warranted that the 
American liberties of fishery are similarly exempted.280  
 
The Court, however, found that the 1713 Treaty could not be relied on, amongst 
others, due to the fact that the terms employed varied significantly.281 This was further 
reinforced by the fact that “this distinction [between the French and American right] 
is maintained in the Treaty with France of 1904, concluded at a date when the 
American claim was approaching its present stage”.282 The Court, in essence, used the 
1904 Treaty to interpret not only the 1713 Treaty, which had been signed by identical 
Parties on a similar subject,283 but also by association the 1818 Treaty of which only 
one was Party common to both these Treaties. 
The PCA may have been a pioneer in this respect, of referring both to 
posterior and anterior treaties, but its practice was not a solitary one. In two cases, the 
Wilhelm Schumaker v. Etat Allemand et l’ Etat Serbe-Croate-Slovène case and the 
Dame Scheuhs v. l’ Etat Serbe-Croate-Slovène case, the Mixed Germano-Yugoslav 
Arbitral Tribunal interpreted the expression ‘new State’ of article 297 of the Treaty of 
Versailles by reference to the posterior Treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon.284 
Similarly, the same Tribunal, in another case, interpreted a provision of the 
                                                 
279 Ibid., at 184. 
280 Ibid., at 180. 
281 Once, again, a reference to the requirement of glossological proximity. 
282 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, at 181. 
283 Two of the elements, but notice the colossal time-gap between them, 291 years. 
284 Wilhelm Schumaker v. Etat Allemand et l’ Etat Serbe-Croate-Slovène (Germany v. Yugoslavia), 
Award of 1 October 1922, Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 2 (1923): 602, at 608 (hereinafter Schumaker 
case); Dame Scheuhs v. l’ Etat Serbe-Croate-Slovène (Germany v. Yugoslavia), Award of 3 October 
1922, Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 2 (1923): 677, at 680 (hereinafter Dame Scheuhs case). 
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aforementioned Treaty of Versailles regarding access to the Yugoslavian nationality 
by once again referring to the later Treaties of Saint-Germain and Trianon.285 
 
C. Interpretative Renvoi and Article 32 of the VCLT 
The entire case-law analyzed begs the question of whether the obstacle of 
categorizing interpretative renvoi can be overcome. Interpretation is not a process that 
can be compartmentalized in clearly defined logical steps. The interaction and cross-
fertilization between elements and schools of interpretation are nowhere more evident 
than in interpretation. It should come as no surprise then that Lord McNair admitted 
that the “there is no part of the law of treaties which the text-writer approaches with 
more trepidation than the question of interpretation”286. 
Three are the main arguments that would support a categorization of the 
interpretative method of recourse to other treaties within the framework of Article 32 
of the VCLT: 
i) that no other categorization is more suitable to the 
idiosyncrasies of interpretative renvoi, 
ii) that interpretative renvoi and travaux préparatoires share the 
common problem and solution of application to third parties and 
iii) that recourse to other treaties is used only in a supplementary 
fashion. 
The first point will be analyzed in the next Section, so the remaining two will be the 
focus of the present analysis.  
To reply to the question, of whether interpretative renvoi responds to ‘third 
party’ considerations in a similar fashion as the travaux préparatoires do, an 
understanding of the latter is necessary. 
The use of travaux préparatoires with respect to third parties287 has been an 
issue of controversy from the very start. This problem is closely linked to the 
                                                 
285 Marchinenfabrik u Mühlenbauaustalt v. Gabriel Radic (Germany v. Yugoslavia), Award of 29 
September 1922, Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 2 (1923):653, at 655 et seq. (hereinafter Gabriel Radic 
case). 
286 McNair, supra note 186, at 364. 
287 I.e. when a Party to a treaty to be interpreted had not participated in the travaux préparatoires. 
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principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt. Based on the consent-based structure of 
the international community, this principle would seem to be self-evident. The 
problems, however, begin when one tries to transpose this principle to travaux 
préparatoires. 
The most famous case, which has lent support to not considering the travaux 
préparatoires when one of the litigant parties had not participated in them, is the 
River Oder case. In that case, the PCIJ considered as inadmissible and did not take 
into consideration the minutes of the Commission of the Peace Conference in Paris.288 
Similar considerations were reiterated in the Young Loan Arbitration289 and 
acknowledged by several academics.290 
However, it is the opposing side which seems to be supported by the majority 
of the jurisprudence. Of course, no one suggests that all the preparatory documents be 
allowed, irrespective of participation or not. Certain criteria have been proposed; 
essentially that the travaux préparatoires have been published and/or that they are 
generally accessible.291 These criteria have been more or less applied by the 
international courts to such an extent292 that the River Oder precedent seems to have 
been reduced to merely a historical curiosity. 
                                                 
288 This Commission prepared the articles of the Treaty of Versailles, which established the 
Commission of the River Oder. 
289 Young Loan Arbitration (Belgium, France, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States of 
America v. Germany), Award of 16 May 1980, 59 ILR 494, at 544-5 (hereinafter Young Loan 
Arbitration). 
290 Sinclair, supra note 53, at 142-4; McNair, supra note 186, at 420-1; the issue was also raised by the 
Yugoslav Government in their Comments to the draft Articles of the VCLT. 
291 Comments by Lord McNair, in  Institut de Droit International, supra note 85, at 450-2; these criteria 
have also been adopted by Professors Stone, Schwarzenberger and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, see Brijesh 
N. Mehrisch, ‘Travaux préparatoires  as an Element in the Interpretation of Treaties’, Indian Journal 
of International Law 11 (1971): 39-88, at 43; in the case of the WTO the criterion of accessibility 
seems to apply even after accession but prior to the dispute coming before a Court; the reason for this is 
that in such an event the State would have the chance to either leave the WTO or at least make a 
declaration clarifying its position; Michael Lennard, ‘Navigating by the Stars: Interpreting the WTO 
Agreements’, Journal of International Economic Law 5 (2002): 17, at 49; in more detail see Merkouris, 
supra note 218. 
292 United States – Transitional Safeguard Measure on Combed Cotton Yarn from Pakistan, Appellate 
Body Report adopted on 5 November 2001, WTO, WT/DS192/AB/R, paras.78-9 (hereinafter US-
Cotton Yarn (AB)); In the US – Lamb Safeguards case the Panel focused solely on the fact that the 
documents referred to were numbered but did not address the issue of accessibility of these documents; 
United States – Safeguard Measures on Import of Fresh, Chilled or Frozen Lamb Meat from New 
Zealand and Australia, Panel Report adopted on 16 May 2001, WTO, WT/DS177/R & WT/DS178/R, 
para. 7.110 et seq. (hereinafter US–Lamb Safeguards (PR)); in the US – Shrimp case the Appellate 
Body relied on the travaux préparatoires of the International Trade Organization and the Havana 
Charter; US-Shrimp (AB), paras.152-7; The problem with this is that although these documents are 
numbered documents, nevertheless their accessibility is severely restricted; only certain governments, 
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The question that naturally arises is what the connection between this debate 
on the use of travaux préparatoires vis-à-vis third parties and the issue of judicial 
recourse to treaties other than the one being interpreted is. The case of the Aerial 
Agreement between the United States of America and Italy illuminates this nexus in 
the most lucid manner. As mentioned supra, that case established two tests for 
allowing use of anterior treaties; one of them being familiarity with the treaty used, 
regardless of whether one of the parties to the dispute was not a party to the said 
treaty. This test echoes the criterion for publication and accessibility for use of 
travaux préparatoires regarding third parties. It is this point that shows the common 
denominator in both cases;293 the actual or presumed knowledge of the travaux 
préparatoires or of the anterior treaty, respectively. 
Although this case highlights the similarities between recourse to anterior 
treaties and travaux préparatoires, it is, nevertheless, an exception to the vast number 
of other cases where treaties were resorted to despite the fact that a party to the 
dispute was not a signatory party thereto and without any requirement or research 
being made into the issue of whether the element of ‘familiarity’ exists.294  
Finally, the third point touches upon the very nature of the function of 
interpretative renvoi; whether it is ‘supplementary’ as within the limits of Article 32. 
The Court in the Jurisdiction of the Danube Commission Advisory Opinion treated the 
Interpretative Protocol as travaux préparatoires.295 Nevertheless, as mentioned in the 
relevant part, this fact alone cannot ipso facto lead us to an equation of the 
interpretative renvoi with the travaux préparatoires. Even more so, since the Court 
failed to even cursorily deal with the possibility of the Interpretative Protocol being 
indeed a treaty and falling within the ambit of Article 31(3)(c). 
The River Oder case gives indeed the text primacy over reference to other 
treaties, but this is consistent with the approach of international courts to accord 
temporal primacy to the text and does not by itself delegate to interpretative renvoi a 
role of a supplementary means of interpretation. In a similar fashion one can 
understand the dictum of the Advisory Opinion on Polish Nationals in Danzig. The 
                                                                                                                                            
researchers in Geneva and a few libraries would hold copies of these documents and in most cases in 
microfiche; see Lennard, supra note 291, at 51. 
293 I.e. use of travaux préparatoires with respect to third parties on the one hand, and use of anterior 
treaties (even when one of the litigant parties is not a Party to them) on the other. 
294 See supra analysis on Japanese House Tax case and Minorities in Upper Silesia case. 
295 Jurisdiction of Danube Commission Advisory Opinion, at 34-5. 
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fact that recourse to anterior treaties cannot be used to discard the meaning of the text, 
but only to ‘elucidate’ it296 is not a function reserved only for supplementary means of 
interpretation but for each and every interpretative tool. Since the text is the starting 
point, the goal is to elucidate that exact meaning.297 Consequently, none of the 
aforementioned cases brings any serious argument in favour of categorizing 
interpretative renvoi as a supplementary means, whereas on the other hand there are a 
number of cases that indicate that this interpretative method is far from supplementary 
or secondary in function.298 
A final interesting point299 that needs to be mentioned is that in the series of 
Articles in the BYIL on ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice’, 
starting with Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and continuing with Hugh Thirlway, reference to 
other treaties is analyzed under the Section ‘Ancillary and Other Interpretative 
Findings’, where one does not find an analysis of Article 32 but an analysis of Article 
31(3)(c).  
 
D. Bridging a Non-existent Gap: Interpretative Renvoi and Article 31(3)(c)  
Equating the recourse to other treaties in the interpretative process with the 
supplementary means of Article 32 of the VCLT leaves something to be desired. The 
issue is whether a more suitable candidate can be found. Before a response to this 
query can be given with any degree of authority, one thing needs to be further 
established; what are essentially the criteria of selection of the relevant treaties in this 
process. If and only if these can be identified, will it be possible to reveal similarities 
and links with other established tools of treaty interpretation.   
On a legal theory level, one of the first references to this kind of interpretative 
process can be found in Vattel. In his monograph The Law of Nations, when sketching 
                                                 
296 Polish Nationals in Danzig Advisory Opinion, at 32. 
297 such ‘corrective interpretation’, by Article 32 no less, has been suggested by Judge Schwebel in: 
Stephen Schwebel, ‘May Preparatory Work be Used to Correct rather than Confirm the ‘Clear’ 
Meaning of a Treaty Provision?’, in Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, 
Jerzy Makarczyk, Krzysztof Skubiszewski (eds.) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 541-7, 
but so far does not seem to be supported by international jurisprudence.  
298 See for instance the Arone Kahane case, at 960 et seq. where ‘interpretative renvoi’ was considered 
on an equal footing as textual interpretation. 
299 Which supports the contention that reference to other treaties does not fall under Article 32 but 
under Article 31(3)(c). 
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the main tools of the judicial interpretative process, Vattel suggests that when called 
to interpret a term that has been expressed in an obscure or equivocal manner  
 
[w]e ought to interpret his [the author’s] obscure or vague expressions, in such a manner, 
that they may agree with those terms that are clear and without ambiguity, which he has 
used elsewhere, either in the same treaty, or in some other of the like kind.300  
 
He later on goes to state that  
 
as two articles of the same treaty, can be relative one to another, two different treaties can 
have the same relationship, and in such a case also one treaty explains the other.301  
 
This interpretative tool has been acknowledged302 in doctrine.303 Various criteria have 
been proposed as to what makes an anterior304 treaty an important niche in the 
interpretative process. Marqués de Olivart sets the threshold extremely high, by 
supporting the view that for interpretative purposes only treaties that have been signed 
and ratified by the same States can serve by analogy.305 This approach seems 
extremely rigid and not supported by the relevant jurisprudence.  
Stockton on the other hand, adopts a more liberal approach by arguing that  
 
one can refer to terms employed in anterior Treaties concluded between the same parties, 
or between on of the parties and a third party, with the aim to look for the relevant 
principle or to elucidate the meaning of a phrase or stipulation.306 
                                                 
300 Vattel, supra note 37, at B.II, Ch.XVII, para. 284. 
301  Ibid., para. 286. 
302 Although not set in a clearly defined theoretical framework. 
303 Spencer, supra note 187, at 72; Spencer cites Phillimore as stating that this is an interpretative tool 
from which one can, generally, deduce with impartiality and certainty the intention of the contracting 
parties; Stockton moves along similar lines, but instead of characterizing  this recourse as a source, he 
categorizes it in the notion of ‘generally recognized principles of international law’. For more recent 
approaches to the issue see infra analysis. 
304 Or even posterior in some cases. 
305 Ramon de Dalman y Olivart, Marqués de Olivart, Tratado de Derecho Internacional Público : Vol.I 
(Madrid, 1903), at 412. 
306 Author’s translation based on the text cited in Spencer, which goes as follows:  
 
On peut s’en rapporter aux  termes employès dans des Traités antérieurs intervenes entre les memes 
parties, ou entre l’une d’elles et une tierce partie, afin de recherché le principe don’t il s’agit ou pour 
élucider le sens d’une phrase ou d’une stipulation,  
 
Spencer, supra note 187, at 85, citing Stockton. 
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Finally, there are the even more liberal approaches, like the one suggested by Fiore, 
who proposed that what is of essence, is that only what has been stipulated in another 
Treaty is relative and on an analogous subject-matter.307 
The issue now is to see to what degree the relevant jurisprudence, adheres to 
any of the above theoretical proposals. The case-law analyzed supra reveals that four 
are the main elements of consideration with respect to recourse to other treaties that 
arise from the relevant jurisprudence: 
i) Terminological identity or similitude 
ii) Identity or relevancy of the subject-matter of regulation 
iii)  Complete or partial overlap of Signatory Parties with the 
parties to the dispute308 
iv) Temporal Proximity 
Each of these elements taken in tandem with one or more of the other elements 
appears always when recourse to other, anterior or posterior, treaties is contemplated 
by an international court or tribunal. However, to stop at this point and to declare that 
there are four criteria would leave us short of identifying the true nature of the issue 
and of responding accordingly to the question of what sort of interpretative tool the 
interpretative renvoi is. 
Let it be noted that the key-word in element (i) and (ii) is identity and let us 
also recall that the arbiter in the Warsaw Electricity Company case was stunned by the 
“near identity”, (“presque identité”) of certain provisions.309 The same notion of 
‘identity’ and ‘near identity’ is the crux of point (iii) and in a more generic way of 
point (iv) as well. The difference between similarity and identity is just a matter of 
degree. The more similar a treaty is with another, the closer they are to being 
identical. However, the term ‘identity’, by describing a specific status is unable to 
express this variation in degrees of similarity.  
                                                 
307 Spencer, supra note 187, at 85, citing Pasquale Fiore, Il Nuovo Diritto Internazionale Pubblico, 
(Milano,1865), at 816. 
308 In the majority of cases the critical parties were those that were parties to the dispute, not all the 
parties of the treaties in consideration. 
309 Warsaw Electricity Company case, at 1675. 
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A different term is therefore needed. One that is more flexible and generic. 
Such a term is already incorporated, either explicitly or implicitly, in the description 
of all the four elements mentioned above. That term, the connecting criterion of all 
four elements, is the notion of proximity. Identity is merely the one end of the term 
proximity, which can cover the whole range of possible variations of similitude, 
relevancy, overlap and temporality. In essence, all the four elements are merely 
separate but inter-reactive manifestations of one and the same criterion: the proximity 
criterion. In that sense, we have terminological proximity, subject-matter proximity, 
shared signatory parties (or ‘actor’ proximity) and temporal proximity. 
 
DIAGRAM 1(a)
b) Subject-Matter Proximitya) Terminological Proximity
c) Shared Signatory Parties Proximity d) Temporal Proximity
 
Diagram 1(a): Schematic Representation of the “Proximity Criterion” Thesis 
 
In simpler terms, what the international court or tribunal is called to do in such 
cases is to examine how close/‘proximate’ the ‘relevant rule’ invoked by one of the 
parties under Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT is to the treaty (or provision) being 
interpreted. In order to identify this proximity, the judges focus on four simple 
questions: i) HOW – How are the relevant provisions set out from the point of view of 
terms and language used? ii) WHAT – What do they regulate? iii) WHO – Who has 
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signed (or is bound) by the relevant treaties or customary law? and iv) WHEN – 
When did the treaties and/or customary law come into existence?     
 
DIAGRAM 1(b)
 
Diagram 1(b): The Four Questions that are Asked in Determining ‘Proximity’ 
 
Based on these questions what is sought is to identify how ‘proximate’ the 
treaty being interpreted and the ‘relevant rule’, invoked under Article 31(3)(c), are.  
Firstly, the judge examines the provision being interpreted and poses the four 
aforementioned questions. Having done that, he turns his attention to the ‘relevant 
rule’ being invoked under Article 31(3)(c). In order to determine whether this latter 
rule is truly a relevant one, for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c), he poses the same 
questions to this rule and examines how close (‘proximate’) the answers are to those 
of the provision being interpreted.  
 Let us consider that the treaty/provision being interpreted is depicted by the 
object of Diagram 1(b). The four parts of that pie represent the answers to the four 
questions posed. The ‘relevant rule’ invoked is then superimposed on this object, as 
shown in the following Diagram: 
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Diagram 2(a)
WHAT
(Treaty B)
WHAT
(Treaty A)
HOW
(Treaty B)
HOW
(Treaty A)
WHO
(Treaty B)
WHO
(Treaty A)
WHEN
(Treaty A)
WHEN
(Treaty B)
Treaty/Provision being interpreted 
(hereinafter TREATY A)
Treaty/Provision examined as 
"relevant" under Art. 31(3)(c)
(hereinafter TREATY B)
HOW WHAT WHEN WHO  
HOW WHAT WHEN WHO
 
 Diagram 2(a): How the ‘Proximity Criterion’ Works 
 
The more similar the replies to the questions, i.e. the greater the apposite 
proximity, the greater the area that Treaty B will cover in each quadrant (in the above 
diagram, ‘Treaty B’ can be a treaty, a custom or a general principle of international 
law – the term ‘Treaty B’ has been used in order to highlight the juxtaposition with 
Treaty A). The greater the total area that Treaty B covers, the greater its relevancy for 
the purposes of Article 31(3)(c). On the contrary, the greater the difference between 
the replies to the question, the closer the area is to the centre of the pie and the less 
‘proximate’ the two treaties in question are. 
Furthermore, as shown in Diagram 1(a), the four elements that international 
courts and tribunals examine in determining ‘relevancy’ are merely manifestations of 
one overarching criterion: the ‘proximity criterion’. This reasoning is not the result of 
a wish for simplification nor is it of mere theoretical value. Four different and 
distinguishable criteria would require a further elaboration of the reasons of their 
interaction and of the way that one compensates for the shortcomings of the other. On 
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the contrary, the construction based on one simple criterion with different 
manifestations, is much more coherent in explaining this interrelationship. Since all 
four elements are merely manifestations of the same criterion it is only natural that all 
will be part and parcel of the consideration by the relevant court when deciding to 
resort to interpretative renvoi or not. The more one element tends to ‘identity’, the 
lesser the level of ‘proximity’ that will be required from the other elements. The 
process is reminiscent of the principle of physics, according to which water poured in 
interconnected bottles will always find a position of balance amongst them. 
A jurisprudential demonstration of this has already been given supra in the 
relevant case-law,310 But an example may clarify the manner in which the ‘proximity 
criterion’ can account for the variety of solutions adopted in international case-law. 
For instance, in the Warsaw Electricity Company case the Arbitral Tribunal 
considered provisions of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles as ‘relevant’ for interpreting a 
1922 Franco-Polish Convention. If one applies the aforementioned process of the 
proximity criterion it is evident that: i) the two treaties in question did not have the 
same subject-matter; The Franco-Polish Convention was an economic treaty, whereas 
the Treaty of Versailles was a peace treaty (although it has to be noted that both aimed 
at bringing peace and stability after World War I); ii) only France was a common 
party to both these treaties. However, the lack of ‘close proximity’ with respect to 
these areas, is more than compensated by iii) the ‘temporal proximity’; the two 
treaties are separated by a gap of only 2 ½ years, and perhaps most importantly by iv) 
the almost near identity of the provisions of the two treaties. Applying this to Diagram 
2(a) we arrive at Diagram 2(b). 
 
                                                 
310 Japanese House Tax case; US-Italy Air Transport Arbitration; Arone Kahane case; Access to Port 
of Danzig Advisory Opinion. 
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Diagram 2(b)
WHAT
(Treaty B)
WHAT
(Treaty A)
HOW
(Treaty B)
HOW
(Treaty A)
WHO
(Treaty B)
WHO
(Treaty A)
WHEN
(Treaty A)
WHEN
(Treaty B)
Treaty/Provision being interpreted 
(hereinafter TREATY A)
Treaty/Provision examined as 
"relevant" under Art. 31(3)(c)
(hereinafter TREATY B)
HOW WHAT WHEN WHO  
HOW WHAT WHEN WHO
 
Diagram 2(b): How the ‘Proximity Criterion’ Works: The Warsaw 
Electricity Company Case 
 
This Diagram shows that in the Warsaw Electricity Company case the fact that 
very little area is covered when the questions WHO and WHAT were asked, i.e. that  
very little ‘actor proximity’ and ‘subject-matter proximity’ existed between the 
treaties in question was not detrimental to the application of Article 31(3)(c).  Any 
shortcomings were more than compensated for by the proximity expressed through 
the questions HOW and WHEN. Since the relevant provisions were almost identical 
and the relevant treaties were only 2 ½ years apart, in Diagram 2 (b) the area that 
Treaty B covers in the respective quadrants, almost entirely covers those of Treaty A.   
In summation, the greater the area occupied the more chances there are that 
the treaties are relevant and should be considered. This rough representation offers, as 
well, an explanation why certain elements may, at times, cover for shortcomings of 
others. Covering the entire area of the circle is an impossibility, as in that case we 
would be talking about one and the same treaty. So the object is to cover a relatively 
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large area. If one element is near identical with that of the treaty being interpreted 
then the area it would cover in its quadrant would more than compensate for any 
discrepancies as to size and ‘proximity’ with respect to all the other elements.311  This 
construction would also allow for the possibility of reference to posterior treaties as 
well, since the ‘temporal proximity’ element is not restricted towards only one 
direction of the temporal line. 
The above Diagrams are also helpful for one further reason. They show in a 
crystal-clear manner the similarities that the interpretative renvoi has with Article 
31(3)(c).  All elements correspond to an element of what constitutes Article 31(3)(c). 
Terminological and Subject-Matter Proximity are corollaries of ‘all relevant rules of 
international law’; Shared Signatory Parties (‘actor’) Proximity meets its counterpart 
in ‘the relations between the parties’; and finally, Temporal Proximity is nothing more 
than one way of addressing inter-temporal law considerations which, although not 
included expressis verbis in Article 31(3)(c), are nevertheless an inextricable part of 
its function.312 
The above analysis, shows that interpretative renvoi has nothing to do with 
Article 32 of the VCLT; on the contrary it is the logical predecessor of what was to 
become Article 31(3)(c) and still remains an essential part of it. 
This is further reinforced by an additional consideration. Article 31(3)(c) is 
considered to enshrine the principle of systemic integration and as such is a tool of 
integration, its elements should reflect the entirety of the interpretative process, albeit 
in a micro-cosmic level. Returning to the previous Diagrams, one can then identify in 
each of the quadrants and elements of interpretative renvoi313 all schools of 
interpretation. 
 
                                                 
311 This reasoning is again reinforced by the relevant jurisprudence as analyzed supra. 
312 See Chapter II. 
313 And, by association, Article 31(3)(c). 
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DIAGRAM 3
b) Subject-Matter Proximitya) Terminological Proximity
c) Shared Signatory Parties Proximity d) Temporal Proximity
 
Diagram 3: Schematic Representation of the ‘Proximity Criterion’ Thesis Cross-
Sectioned with the Schools of Thought on Interpretation 
 
Consequently, it is beyond doubt that interpretative renvoi is a pre-VCLT 
manifestation of Article 31(3)(c).  
Two more points need to be addressed, in order to have a complete picture of 
the role of interpretative renvoi in the modern framework of interpretation: 
i) whether reference to posterior treaties falls also under Article 
31(3)(c) and 
ii) whether interpretative renvoi comes up in post-VCLT cases  
As to the point of the use of posterior treaties, it is true that there are 
arguments both in favour and against recourse to posterior treaties when applying this 
form of ‘historical interpretation’.314 One side argues that it is not prudent for the 
judges to seek inspiration and solutions from posterior treaties because, in this way, 
they imbue the former with an intention that was not there and of which the original 
drafters were not aware.315 As an additional reinforcement to this line of reasoning a 
                                                 
314 The term ‘historical interpretation’ is used at this point to highlight that, especially in the present 
context, that term is more of an oxymoron as the interpreter takes an examining look into the future and 
not into the past, that is why the present author suggests that the term ‘interpretative renvoi’ is more 
relevant to the subtleties of this method. 
315 Spencer, supra note 187, at 100. 
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dictum of the PCIJ in the Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne Advisory Opinion 
is usually mentioned:  
 
The facts subsequent to the conclusion of the Treaty of Lausanne can only concern the 
Court in so far as they are calculated to throw light on the intentions of the Parties at the 
time of the conclusion of that Treaty (emphasis added).316  
 
The other side argues that  
 
[a]s a general rule a Treaty of a former date may be very safely construed by referring it to 
the provisions of like Treaties made by the same nation on the same matter at a later 
time.317 
 
The reason being that there is a presumption of continuity of intention and, thus, the 
intention present at the former treaty continues in one form or another to permeate the 
treaties that follow.318 It is interesting to note that each theory has as its starting point 
the treaty which it attacks. The side which calls for an anterior-treaty restricted 
approach starts from the intention prevalent in the posterior treaties as having no 
correlation with the previous treaties, whereas the side that argues that all treaties, 
even posterior ones, should be examined in the interpretative process, starts from the 
intention of the former treaty and works up the details of its theory through a 
presumption of continuity of will. 
Regardless of which side should be given prevalence,319 the essence here is 
that this debate is resonant of the debate on intertemporal law. As will be shown in 
Chapter II, an express reference to intertemporal considerations was intentionally 
                                                 
316 Interpretation of Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne, Advisory Opinion of 21 
November 1929, PCIJ Series B, No. 12, 3, at 24 (hereinafter Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne 
Advisory Opinion). 
317 North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, Dissenting Opinion of Dr. Luis M. Drago, at 209. 
318 This argument seems to reflect Vattel’s axiom that while we have no proof that a person has 
changed his mind he is presumed that his thoughts retain a sort of continuity and identity (essentially 
creating a burden of proof that is imposed on the person claiming change), see Vattel, supra note 37; 
Of course, such continuity is not ad infinitum. Allowance should be made for a gradual dissipation of 
the ‘common intention’ the more years pass in between the relevant treaties; again, we see here the 
temporal element. 
319 Although it has to be noted that as mentioned supra the construction of the ‘proximity criterion’ 
allows for recourse to treaties in both directions of the timeline. 
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omitted from the text of the VCLT320 and only echoes remain in the wording of 
Article 31(3)(c). This is an additional consideration in favour of the presented 
argument i.e. that reference to other treaties is more an application of Article 31(3)(c), 
rather than a supplementary means of interpretation. 
One of the most important advantages of the proximity criterion, apart from it 
revealing how the term ‘relevant’ is identified, is that it can explain the variety of 
approaches both of pre-VCLT and post-VCLT jurisprudence, which brings us to the 
second point raised supra. The fact that none of the manifestations of the proximity 
criterion is of absolute validity, means by implication that each must be taken with a 
grain of salt. The term ‘parties’ does not always mean parties to the treaty nor does it 
always mean parties to the dispute. The more flexible interpretation of the term 
‘parties’, as was shown by the relevant jurisprudence, is by no means prohibited. It 
can mean parties to the dispute,321 as seems to have been implied by the Panel in the 
EC-Biotech case,322 but whether this interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) or the more 
restrictive one will depend on consideration of the other manifestations of the 
proximity criterion. This would explain the difference of approach in EC-Biotech and 
US-Shrimp. It would also explain the Oil Platforms case, where a treaty was 
considered to which only one party to the dispute was bound.323 
As to whether reference to other treaties is still witnessed in modern 
jurisprudence, the case-law mentioned in the beginning of Section IV.A of this 
Chapter where treaties were recognized as ‘rules’ within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(c), is more than sufficient as a response.324 
                                                 
320 Both as a separate Article and within the context of Article 31(3)(c); see infra Chapter II. 
321 Or even one of the parties to the dispute. 
322 EC-Biotech case, para. 7.72. 
323 Oil Platforms case, paras. 29-30. 
324 Additionally to those mentioned supra, see also: United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in 
Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment of 24 May 1980, ICJ Rep. 1980, 3, para. 52; In 
this case, the court referred to the textual identity and the number of bilateral treaties as evidencing the 
intention of the parties; this approach was also the basis of the US argument, Pleadings, at 153; Korea 
–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, Panel Report adopted on 31 July 
2000, WTO, WT/DS/161/R, WT/DS/169/R, para. 539 (hereinafter Korea – Various Measures on Beef 
(PR)); United States – Tax Treatment for ‘Foreign Sales Corporations’ Recourse to Article 21.5 of the 
DSU by the European Communities, Appellate Body Report adopted on 14 January 2002, WTO, 
WT/DS/108/AB/RW, para. 144, FN 123 (hereinafter US-FSC (21.5) (AB); this case referred to a 
multitude of bilateral agreements; Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), 
Judgment of 12 November 1991, ICJ Rep. 1991,53, paras. 50-1 (hereinafter Arbitral Award of 31 July 
1989 case); Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, Advisory 
Opinion of 20 December 1980, ICJ Rep. 1980, 73, (hereinafter WHO Agreement Advisory Opinion) 
Separate Opinion of Judge Mosler, at 126; where Judge Mosler examined the 1949 Agreement between 
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The Müller and Others case of the ECtHR deserves special attention. In 
interpreting Article 10 of the ECHR the ECtHR took into consideration the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)325 and held that: 
 
Confirmation that the concept of freedom of expression is such as to include artistic 
expression is also to be found in Article 19 § 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which specifically includes within the right of freedom of expression 
information and ideas ‘in the form of art’ (emphasis added).326 
 
The use of the term ‘confirmation’ might be construed as implying that the ICCPR 
was taken into consideration as a pari materia treaty to the ECHR by virtue of Article 
32 i.e. as a ‘supplementary means of interpretation’. However, the judgment itself is 
revealing on this issue. In the same paragraph just prior to referring to the ICCPR the 
ECtHR uses the term ‘confirmation’ when it is actually engaged in an interpretation 
based on the context 
 
Confirmation, if any were needed, that this interpretation is correct, is provided by the 
second sentence of paragraph 1 of Article 10 (art. 10-1), which refers to ‘broadcasting, 
television or cinema enterprises’, media whose activities extend to the field of art 
(emphasis added).327  
 
This would imply that the term ‘confirmation’ used immediately afterwards should 
put the reference to the context and to a treaty in pari materia on the same level and 
consequently within the same Article i.e.  Article 31 and not Article 32.328  
                                                                                                                                            
WHO and Switzerland (UNTS. 26: 333) which shared the same object and purpose; Case Concerning 
the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Guinea and Guinea-Bissau (Guinea v. Guinea-
Bissau), Award of 14 February 1985, RIAA 19 (1990):149-96, paras. 70 and 81 (hereinafter Guinea – 
Guinea-Bissau Maritime Delimitation case); Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 
1946 between the United States of America and France (US v. France), Award of 9 December 1978, 
RIAA 18(1980): 417-93, paras. 67-8 (hereinafter US – France Air Services case); US-Italy Air 
Transport Arbitration, at 414-8; Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jarnahiriya v. Chad), Judgment of 3 
February 1994, ICJ Rep. 1994, 6, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ajibola, paras. 66-70 (hereinafter 
Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute),; Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan 
Mayen (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment of 14 June 1993, ICJ Rep. 1993, 38, para. 22 (hereinafter Jan 
Mayen case); Rainbow Navigation v. Department of the Navy, Award of 24 August 1990, 96 ILR 97, at 
103. 
325 99 UNTS 171. 
326 Müller and Others v. Switzerland, Judgment of 24 May 1988, 13 EHRR 212, para. 27. 
327 Id. 
328 Along similar lines see van Damme’s comments on the EC-Poultry (AB) case; van Damme, supra 
note 186, at 569-70 commenting on the European Communities – Measures Affecting the Importation 
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It is clear from the above, then, that the proximity criterion revealed by the 
pre-VCLT jurisprudence is still alive and well in current jurisprudence. Not only that 
but the flexibility it allows for, is essential considering the challenges that the 21st 
century poses to Article 31(3)(c).  
V. Conclusion 
In a thesis concerning the content and function of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, no 
better place to start could exist than the text itself. Applying the process of 
interpretation as crystallized in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT329 to Article 31(3)(c) 
itself, the analysis focused first on the text itself and then sought additional support 
from the travaux préparatoires. Despite some interesting findings, however, the core 
issues of Article 31(3)(c) remained still clouded in mystery. For this reason an 
extensive analysis of the relevant jurisprudence, as a ‘supplementary means of 
interpretation’ (Article 32 VCLT), both post and pre-VCLT was undertaken.  
It is this jurisprudence that shed light as to the proper understanding of Article 
31(3)(c). Not only are all norms, irrespective of their source, included in Article 
31(3)(c), but also the way in which ‘relevancy’, ‘applicability’ and ‘parties’ is 
determined is based on one singular criterion: the proximity criterion. Using this 
criterion the courts and tribunals each time examine if the norm proposed is relevant 
for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c). This is done by a combined application of the 
four different manifestations of the proximity criterion: i) terminological proximity ii) 
subject-matter proximity iii) shared signatory parties (‘actor’) proximity and iv) 
temporal proximity. A combined and balanced application of these four different 
manifestations of the proximity criterion not only would explain the variety of 
solutions adopted but is also the correct approach to Article 31(3)(c) as evidenced by 
international jurisprudence.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
of Certain Poultry Products, Appellate Body Report adopted on 13 July 1998, WTO, WT/DS69/AB/R, 
para. 83 (hereinafter EC-Poultry (AB))  
329 Which are customary international law. 
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Chapter II: Article 31(3)(c) and Intertemporality 
 
I. Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was shown that the wording used in Article 31(3)(c) raises 
many questions as to the scope of its application. As will be analyzed infra, from the 
wording of Article 31(3)(c) what was left out was a reference to temporal 
considerations and more generally to the overarching problem of intertemporality in 
the interpretative process. In this Chapter the link between Article 31(3)(c) and the 
intertemporal law doctrine will be examined. 
The case that is most known as having brought forward the issue of 
intertemporal law is the Island of Palmas case, and the dictum made therein by Judge 
Huber. The relevant passage goes as follows: 
 
a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not of 
the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled.330  
 
However, Judge Huber went on to qualify the above statement: 
 
As regards the question which of different legal systems prevailing at successive periods is 
to be applied in a particular case (the so-called intertemporal law), a distinction must be 
made between the creation of rights and the existence of rights. The same principle which 
subjects the act creative of a right to the law in force at the time the right arises, demands 
that the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the 
conditions required by the evolution of law (emphasis added)331 
 
This passage from the Island of Palmas case is reflective of the antithesis between 
stability and change, which is inherent in any kind of system. However, it would be 
erroneous to presume that Judge Huber was the first to identify, at least within the 
international legal system, the issue of intertemporal law. Once again, both Grotius 
and Vattel in their respective seminal works, had the foresight to make references to 
this issue and its corresponding problems.  
                                                 
330 Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. United States of America), Award of 4 April 1928, RIAA 2 
(1949): 829, at 845 (hereinafter Island of Palmas case). 
331 Id. 
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Vattel opted for using the rules and the meaning of the terms, contemporary to 
the signing of the treaty.332 Grotius, on the other hand tackled this issue by reference 
to a historical example; a treaty signed between the Romans and the Carthaginians 
after the war with respect to Sicily. According to a provision of this treaty: “The allies 
of each people shall be safe at the hands of the other people”. The question which 
arose was whether the term ‘allies’ should be interpreted as referring to allies at the 
time of the conclusion of the treaty or whether it should be interpreted in a broader 
sense so as to include all future allies. Both Grotius and Vattel solved this question by 
reference to the distinction between odious and favourable obligations and treaties 
and concluded that the term should refer only to the allies existing at the time of the 
conclusion of the treaty.333 In this sense, both affirmed the principle of 
contemporaneity i.e that the terms of a treaty should be understood and interpreted as 
they were at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. 
The issue arose again in connection with the VCLT in two respects: firstly as a 
separate Draft Article dealing exclusively with intertemporal law334 and secondly 
when that failed, as an addition to Article 31(3)(c), which also failed. 
 
                                                 
332  
Languages vary incessantly and the signification and force of words change with time. When an 
ancient act is to be interpreted, we should then know the common use of the terms at the time when it 
was written 
 
Vattel, supra note 37, Book II, Chapter XVII, para. 272. 
333 Ibid., para. 284; Grotius, supra note 36, para. XIII. 
334 Draft Article 56, see infra analysis. 
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II. Debating Intertemporality During the Travaux Préparatoires of the VCLT 
A. Debate within the ILC 
1. Early Considerations 
Whereas, as was analyzed supra in Chapter I, during the discussions in the Institut de 
Droit International there was quite a bit of debate as to the written elements of Article 
31(3)(c), almost nothing was mentioned about the problem of intertemporal law.335 
This, however, was about to change when the ILC began its work on the law of 
treaties. As was already mentioned supra in Chapter I, the ILC used the discussions of 
the Institut de Droit International as a basis from which they could expand on a 
variety of debatable issues with respect to the law of treaties. Although the ILC 
focused once again on the same issues as their counterparts in the Institut de Droit 
International there was a shift as to the attention to be given to issues of 
intertemporality.  
It was only when the ILC started dealing with the issue of interpretation that 
the connection between intertemporal law and Article 31(3)(c) became apparent. 
Intertemporal law considerations were not merely a problem on its own, but it 
seriously affected the principles of international law that were to be taken into 
consideration during interpretation. The response to the intertemporal questions would 
simultaneously offer solutions to whether the interpreter should look at the principles 
in force at the time of the conclusion of the treaty or at the time of the application of 
the treaty.  
It is for this reason that the issue of intertemporal law that was only hinted at 
by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Verdross during the Institut’s sessions336 now became 
a clear battling field. In more detail: Waldock basically adopted in his proposed 
Article 56 the formulation of Judge Huber in the Las Palmas case;337 essentially that:  
                                                 
335 Only fleeting references were made by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht; see Lauterpacht, in Institut de Droit 
International, supra note 99, at 405. It is, however, interesting to note that a few years after the 
conclusion of the Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties the Institut de Droit International decided 
to address the issue of intertemporal law itself, and actually, during the Session of Wiesbaden, in 1975, 
adopted a Resolution on ‘The Intertemporal Law Problem in Public International law’. This resolution, 
addressed the problems of intertemporality as a self-standing issue and not solely as a problem of the 
interpretative process; The resolution is available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1975_wies_01_en.pdf (last visited 25 January 2010). 
336 See supra note 335 and accompanying text. 
337 Island of Palmas case, at 845. 
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Article 56 – Inter-temporal law 
1. A Treaty is to be interpreted in the light of law in force at the time when the treaty was 
drawn up, [but]  
2. Subject to paragraph 1, the application of a treaty shall be governed by the rules of 
international law in force at the time when the treaty is applied (emphasis added)338.  
 
This intertemporal approach according to Waldock was reinforced by international 
jurisprudence.339 This juxtaposition of interpretation and application seems a little 
bizarre. Waldock followed the reasoning of Judge Huber’s construction; that the rule 
of intertemporal law results in another, no less important rule; i.e. that the continued 
manifestation of a right established by a treaty must follow the conditions required by 
the evolution of the law.340 Waldock actually hinted at the possibility of conflict 
between these two rules but avoided taking any sides. He merely mentioned that the 
second rule was as valid as the first one. He further pointed that the rule on the law of 
treaties, regarding a treaty becoming void due to the emergence of a new peremptory 
norm, was merely a particular application of this rule.341 
Trying to compromise the solutions followed in the arbitral courts in the cases 
of Grisbadarna and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries and at the same time draw 
certain conclusions with regards to the problematic relation between interpretation 
and application, Waldock made the following construction: The reason why the courts 
opted for applying the principle of contemporaneity in those cases was that it was the 
will of the parties,342 when signing the relevant treaties, to resolve once and for all 
                                                 
338 Sir Humphrey Waldock, Third Report on the Law of Treaties, (A/CN.4/167 and Add.1-3), in YILC 
(1964), Vol.II: 5-65, at 8-9; However, see Higgins’ criticism, who considers that the terms 
‘appreciation’ and ‘manifestation’ of Judge Huber’s dictum cannot be equated with the terms 
‘interpretation’ and ‘application’ of Draft Article 56; Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Some Observations on the 
Inter-Temporal Rule in International Law’, in Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st 
Century, Jerzy Makarczyk (ed.) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 173-81, at 178. 
339 Grisbadarna case (Norway v. Sweden), Award of 23 October 1909, RIAA 11 (1961): 147-66, at 
159-160 (hereinafter Grisbadarna case); North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, at 196; and the Case 
Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, (France v. United States 
of America), Judgment of 27 August 1952, ICJ Rep. 1952, 176, at 189 (hereinafter US Nationals in 
Morocco case). 
340 Island of Palmas case, at 845. 
341 Waldock, supra note 128, at 9. 
342 It seems that in deciding issues of intertemporal law, the founding fathers’ approach gains in 
importance, in comparison to the role it plays in other cases of interpretation; similar considerations 
have been expressed with regards to the interpretation of Security Council Resolutions; on 
interpretation of Security Council resolutions see: Efthymios Papastavridis, ‘Interpretation of Security 
Council resolutions under Chapter VII in the Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis’, ICLQ 56 (2007): 83-117. 
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issues of delimitation and not for those boundaries to follow the evolution of 
delimitation principles of international law; for instance, the thalweg principle, the 10-
mile bays etc.343 
The proposed Article 56 started off an intense debate on several grounds. 
Some of the members of the ILC considered that talking about a distinction between 
interpretation and application was a non sequitur or at the very least a misnomer. 
According to Paredes, “interpretation and application coincided in time”.344,345 The 
                                                 
343 Waldock, supra note 128, at 10. 
344 Paredes , (A/CN.4/SR.728), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 34. 
345 The distinction between interpretation and application has always been a difficult one. Various 
definitions have been submitted:  
 
The words ‘interpret’, ‘interpretation’ are often used loosely as if they included ‘apply, application’. 
Strictly speaking, when the meaning of the treaty is clear, it is ‘applied’, not ‘interpreted’. 
Interpretation is a secondary process which only comes into play when it it is impossible to make 
sense of the plain terms of the treaty, or when they are susceptible of different meanings. The Concise 
Oxford Dictionary says: ‘Interpret: expound the meaning of (abstruse words, writings, etc.); make out 
the meaning of’. 
 
 
McNair supra note 186, at 365; while the Commentary on the Harvard Draft Convention provided that: 
 
Interpretation is the process of determining the meaning of a text; application is the process of 
determining the consequences which, according to the text, should follow in a given situation 
 
‘Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’, AJIL 29 (1935): 658, at 938 (Commentary to 
Article 19.- Interpretation of Treaties); Similarly see Charles de Visscher, Problémes d’ Interprétation 
Judiciaire en Droit International Public (Paris : Pedone, 1963), at 27-8. 
Some authors have argued that ‘interpretation’ and ‘application’ are two separate and distinguishable 
notions (see Helmut Coing, ‘Trois Formes Historiques d’ Interprétation du Droit: Glossateurs, 
Pandectistes, École de l’ Exégèse’, Revue Historique de Droit Français et Étranger 48 (1970): 531, at 
540-2); others have claimed that the relationship between them is one of logical precedence. 
Interpretation logically precedes application. The former defines the content of a specific rule, whereas 
the latter deals with the consequences that flow from the now ‘fixed content’ of the rule in the case at 
hand (see Robert Kolb, Interprétation et Création du Droit International ; Esquisses d’  une 
Herméneutique Juridique Moderne pour le Droit International Public (Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2006); 
Yasseen, supra note 71, at 9-10; Gardiner, supra note 13, at 27 ; Serge Sur, L’ Interprétation en Droit 
International Public (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1974), at 193); others 
finally have accepted that although in theory one may distinguish these two notions, in practice there is 
a wide variety of interaction between them, oscillating between clear distinction and total merger (see 
de Visscher, supra note 345, at 193; Maarten Bos, A Methodology of International Law (Oxford: 
North-Holland, 1984), at 112; Donald McRae, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Development of 
International Trade Law by the WTO Appellate Body’, in The WTO at Ten: The Contribution of the 
Dispute Settlement System, Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes (eds.) (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2006), 360, at 363; Jan Klabbers, ‘Reluctant Grundnormen; Article 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Fragmentation of International Law’, in Time, History and 
International Law, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Matthew Craven and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.) (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 141, at 144; Waldock, supra note 128, at 8, para. 3). One of the most notable 
statements to that effect was the one made by Judge Shahabuddeen who argued that: 
 
… since it is not possible to apply a treaty save with reference to some factual field (even if taken 
hypothetically) and since it is not possible to apply a treaty except on the basis of some interpretation 
of it, there is a detectable view that there is little practical, or even theoretical, distinction between the 
two elements of the formula … It seems arguable that the two elements constitute a compendious 
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true issue was that of a modification of a treaty by subsequent law;346 and if one were 
to scratch a little bit further beneath the surface, one would find the primordial issue 
of lex posterior.347 For others, the issue was that of distinguishing between established 
rights and expectations of rights i.e. to know the rule in force medius tempore.348 
Doubts were raised with regards to the customary nature of the second 
paragraph of the proposed Article349, or of the whole Article itself,350 but the greatest 
amount of criticism was with regards to whether Article 56 was more relevant to other 
parts of treaty law351 or that due to its close connection with a multitude of other 
issues352 its discussion should be postponed until those issues had been resolved.353 
Another point raised was that the rule of intertemporal law applied to juridical 
facts, whereas a treaty was more in the nature of a juridical act and, thus, the 
intertemporal rule seemed not to be relevant with regards to the discussion of 
interpretation.354 Dissents were raised to this argument. For instance Bartos 
                                                                                                                                            
term of art generally covering all disputes as to rights and duties having their source in the controlling 
treaty… 
 
Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations Headquarters 
Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion of 26 April 1988, ICJ Rep. 1988, 12, Separate Opinion 
of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 59 (hereinafter Headquarters Agreement Advisory Opinion). 
All the aforementioned serve in placing into the right perspective the awkwardness that the ILC 
members faced with the wording of Draft Article 56. 
346 Verdross, (A/CN.4/SR.728), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 33.  
347 Id., although Verdross seems to make an exception for law-making treaties, “for such a treaty took  
a life of its own, independent of the will of the parties at the time of its conclusion”. 
348 Luna, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 37. 
349 Pal, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 35, in more detail, Pal considered that the rule in 
paragraph 1 reflected custom but should always be put to the test of the will of the parties, whereas the 
2nd paragraph did not reflect accurately the principle underlying Huber’s judgment since in the Island 
of Palmas case, the issue revolved around a right conferred by law and not by a treaty, whereas in the 
North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, the treaties in question did not cover the issue in dispute. 
Consequently the second paragraph was a misrepresentation of the existing jurisprudence, according to 
Pal; contra see Tabibi, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 35. 
350 Amado, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 38, for reasons of the wording used by 
Waldock; Amado considered that this wording actually pushed Article 56 beyond the scope of Huber’s 
dictum; contra Rosenne (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 35 citing McNair, supra note 186, 
at 468 and Charles Rousseau, Principes Généraux de Droit International Public, Vol. I (Paris: Pedone, 
1944), at 498, and El-Erian, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 38. 
351 See for instance Luna that suggested that the first paragraph would be more appropriate in the 
section on interpretation whereas the second one “should be linked to the whole problem of the 
transformation and duration of treaty rules”, Luna, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 37; 
Lachs, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 39. 
352 E.g. modification by subsequent practice, treaty or custom, emerging jus cogens norms etc. 
353 Elias, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 36; Tunkin, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), 
Vol. I, at 38; El-Erian, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 39. 
354 Jiménez de Aréchaga, (A/CN.4/SR.728), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 33; Aréchaga was a proponent of 
the principle of ‘tempus regit actum’, and referring to the Grisbadarna and North Atlantic Coast 
Fisheries cases came to a different conclusion than that of Special Rapporteur Waldock, by means of 
stating that “the rule had been applied not to the treaties as juridical acts, but to certain concepts 
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considered that a single treaty could simultaneously have two different aspects. It 
could be a fact as indicated in the Statute of the ICJ itself. But it could also be a legal 
act as well as a normative rule of law.355 In more detail, a treaty is a legal act 
concluded between two or more parties and, thus, the will of the parties is the 
dominant feature. Consequently, it is the law at the time of the drawing up of the 
treaty that should prevail; this is356 indicated in Article 36(2)(a) of the ICJ Statute as 
well. A treaty, however, can also be a source of international law, a “normative rule of 
law” as indicated by Article 38(1)(a) of the Statute. In this case 
 
[w]hereas the will of the parties remained fixed at the time at which it was expressed, 
normative rules were dynamic and evolved with time, as did the whole system of positive 
international law.357 
 
In any event, it was the will of the parties that should be the decisive factor; this will, 
however, acted in a constraining way for both legs of the proposed Article 56. With 
regards to the first paragraph, Jiménez de Aréchaga stated that the  
 
will of the parties should not be prevented by crystallizing every concept as it had been at 
the time when the treaty was drawn up as proposed in paragraph 1  
 
but also that  
 
[there have been instances] in which the rule proposed in paragraph 2 was not in fact 
applied because the intention of the parties had been to reach a definitive settlement.358 
 
                                                                                                                                            
contained in them that had undergone a process of historical evolution”, see Jiménez de Aréchaga, 
(A/CN.4/SR.728), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 34. 
355 Bartos, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 35. 
356 Always according to Bartos.  
357 Bartos, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 36; both these ideas led Judge Huber to his 
construction in the Island of Palmas case, although he seems to have preferred the unity of the act and 
the autonomy of the will, a fact which Bartos attributes to the general tendency of the jurists at the 
time, Tsuruoka also was in favour of this balance between the autonomy of the will and the stability of 
the conventional international law on the one hand, and the retention of a certain flexibility of 
customary international law on the other, see Tsuruoka, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 
36; similarly see Luna, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 37. 
358 Jiménez de Aréchaga, (A/CN.4/SR.728), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 34; of a similar mind was 
Paredes, (A/CN.4/SR.728), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 34; and Tsuruoka, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC 
(1964), Vol. I, at 36. 
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It is clear from the above quotes that de Aréchaga considered the will of the parties as 
the decisive criterion on how to resolve issues of intertemporality. 
Perhaps the issue that touched upon the very core of the nature of the 
international legal system per se, was that of whether there should be a hierarchical 
relationship between paragraphs 1 and 2 of the proposed Article 56. Paragraph 1 
stated that “1. A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the law in force at the time 
when the treaty was drawn up”.359 Paragraph 2, on the other hand, provided that: “2. 
Subject to paragraph 1, the application of a treaty shall be governed by the rules of 
international law in force at the time when the treaty is applied.”360 
Those supporting the idea that the will of the parties was the decisive factor 
were of the mind that the rules at the time of the drawing up361 of the convention 
should apply, unless the will of the parties was evidently to the contrary. The clear 
exception to this rule362 was the case of a change occurring in the field of jus cogens 
norms. In such cases it would be reasonable to presume that the parties, had they been 
aware of such a change would not have willed to act in contradiction to the jus cogens 
norm that had arisen.363  
Others believed that the second paragraph of the proposed article should 
prevail364 and that it expressed the primary rule, whereas the first paragraph was 
merely the exception to that rule.365 Finally, there were also members that believed 
that the provisions should not be viewed under the prism of a hierarchical relationship 
but were more of a complementary nature.366 
To further complicate matters, it was not just the content of the provision 
which was debatable. The wording itself raised some critical questions. Certain 
members of the ILC considered the title of Article 56 i.e. “The Inter-temporal law” an 
                                                 
359 Waldock, supra note 128, at 8.  
360 Ibid., at 9. 
361 Or negotiation. 
362 Which was also dictated by the legal construction of a hypothetical or supposed common will. 
363 Paredes, (A/CN.4/SR.728), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 34; Luna, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), 
Vol. I, at 37. 
364 And in fact that the paragraphs should be reversed to show the primacy of the second paragraph of 
the proposed Article 56; see Castrén, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 35. 
365 Id. 
366 Rosenne, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 36; Briggs, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC 
(1964), Vol. I, at 38; Lachs, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 35. 
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unfortunate one.367 Another instance of criticism was that Waldock’s Article 56 used 
the terms “in force at the time when the treaty was drawn up” (emphasis added)368. 
This was felt to be too restrictive from a temporal point of view. Therefore, a re-
phrasing of paragraph 1 was suggested. It was felt that the wording “at the time when 
the treaty was negotiated” should be used instead as it covered a much larger time 
period and therefore, would be more helpful in finding the true will of the parties.369 
Another member of the ILC suggested that the adoption of the text was the critical 
date.370 Furthermore, in the wording of paragraph 1 “a treaty is to be interpreted”, the 
term “treaty” was found to mean “individual words and phrases rather than the 
meaning of the treaty as a whole”.371 Finally, although Waldock based his Article 56 
on Huber’s dictum in the Island of Palmas case, he used different terms. The latter 
had used the term “appreciate”, whereas the former used the term “interpret”.372 
However, it was not only with respect to Article 56 per se that the issue of 
intertemporal law was debated. The issue of intertemporality started slowly making its 
appearance in the debate surrounding the principles of treaty interpretation. For 
instance, in the 765th meeting of the ILC, although initially the main point was 
diverted to whether rules/canons of interpretation were at all desirable373 the debate 
quickly returned to more practical elements. Pessou suggested a redrafting of the 
proposed article on treaty interpretation so as to read in the following manner: “In the 
light of the context and of the general principles of application the provisions of a 
treaty shall be interpreted…”.374 The precise meaning of this wording was not 
clarified375 but from the context it can be deduced that it was an effort to address in a 
single sentence both the issues of general principles of law and the issue of 
intertemporality by referring to the rules of ‘application’. 
                                                 
367 Reuter, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 35; Bartos, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), 
Vol. I, at 36; Lachs, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 39. 
368 Waldock, supra note 128, at 8. 
369 Paredes, (A/CN.4/SR.728), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 34; contra see Bartos, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in 
YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 36, where he suggests that the “drawing up” of the text is the critical date. 
Acceptance can be considered as the critical date only in those instances where between the drawing up 
and the acceptance a considerable amount of time has passed (this would probably include also the 
cases of accession, although Bartos himself does not make the distinction). 
370 Rosenne, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 36. 
371 Id. 
372 Ibid., at 38. 
373 Briggs, de Luna and  Rosenne, (A/CN.4/SR.765), in YILC, (1964), Vol. I, at 275-8. 
374 Pessou, (A/CN.4/SR.765), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 278. 
375 As this proposal was not followed. 
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On the contrary, the issue turned, once again, on the temporal element. One 
group, following Mr. Tunkin’s suggestion, considered that the wording of the text376 
should return to that adopted by the Institut de Droit International, with the 
understanding that the principles referred to were the ones contemporary to the 
process of interpretation and not the ones prevailing at the time of the conclusion of 
the treaty.377 This proposal was based on the hypothetical situation of the emergence 
of a future peremptory norm (jus cogens).378  
The other group379 favoured the wording adopted by the Special 
Rapporteur.380 They considered that interpretation should be based on the “legal order 
in force at the time of the conclusion of a treaty”381 and that in any case the issue 
raised by Tunkin had been or could be covered by the articles dealing with the issue 
of emergence of a lex posterior of customary nature,382 which would also cover the 
case of emergence of a later norm of jus superveniens.383 It is highly interesting that at 
this point the debate continued to focus on the subsequent evolution of international 
law, but only with respect to the norms with the highest normative value, i.e. jus 
cogens norms. The members of the ILC seemed reluctant to touch upon the issue of 
subsequent development via general or even regional custom. It was only during the 
770th meeting of the ILC when the issue of intertemporality was, once again, raised 
that a new proposition was brought to the forefront. According to it there should not 
be a rigid rule dictating which set of rules/principles should be used. On the contrary 
the decisive criterion should be the intention of the parties as expressed in the text, the 
                                                 
376 I.e. the text that dealt with the rules on interpretation, not Article 56 which was solely devoted to 
regulating the issue of intertemporal law. 
377 Tunkin, Verdross and Bartos, (A/CN.4/SR.765), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 278-9. It is quite striking 
that Mr. Bartos, while agreeing with Mr. Tunkin and Mr. Verdross, went a bit further by suggesting 
that the process of interpretation should have as its starting point not the text but the principles of 
international law. He based this on his belief that the “exegetical method in international law” had 
serious shortcomings, see (A/CN.4/SR.765), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 279, para. 64.  
378 Tunkin, (A/CN.4/SR.765), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 278. 
379 Comprising of Mr. Yasseen, Mr. Pal and the Chairman. 
380 Yasseen, Pal and the Chairman, (A/CN.4/SR.765), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 279-82. 
381 Yasseen, (A/CN.4/SR.765), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 279. 
382 At that time Article 73 of the draft articles proposed by the Special Rapporteur, Sir Waldock. 
383 Yasseen and the Chairman, (A/CN.4/SR.765), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 281-2, although the 
Chairman tried to compromise the two groups by advocating in favour of the non-inclusion of any 
reference to temporal elements within the article (which he considered that deserved, due to their 
complexity, an article of their own; an opinion which he reiterated in the following meeting; see 
(A/CN.4/SR.766), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 291) and only in his personal opinion did he consider that 
the rules applicable were those contemporary at the conclusion of the treaty. 
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relevant documentation and the subsequent practice or as deduced from the same 
sources.384 
Prompted by the aforementioned debate, Waldock redrafted Article 31(3)(c) 
(then Draft Article 70) in order to read “1.(b) in the light of the rules of international 
law [in force at the time of its conclusion]”.385 This redrafting, however, instead of 
being a step forward to reaching a compromise, spawned a heated debate on several 
topics. The issue of whether the phrase in brackets should be included or not 
prompted the same responses.386  
The discussions resumed in 1966, but in the meantime, the Governments 
presented their take on the topics under discussion. Intertemporal law was one that 
evoked the most numerous and diverse responses. 
 Some Governments were of the opinion that it was the intention of the parties 
that should decide the question,387 some that the temporal elements were to be judged 
on the basis of “good faith”,388 others remained firm to their position that only the 
                                                 
384 Sir Humphrey Waldock and Mr. de Luna, (A/CN.4/SR.770), in YILC, (1964), Vol. I, at 317. 
385 Sir Humphrey Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 309. 
386 Against its inclusion was, once again, Mr. Tunkin, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 311. 
The Chairman was increasingly finding himself leaning towards the complete omission of this sub-
paragraph, for he considered that the technical or not terms used by those drafting a treaty were bound 
to evolve through time and it would be extremely confusing and dangerous to try and set in stone rules 
of what principles should the interpreter refer to; (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 311-2. 
This position was shared by Mr. Rosenne, who considered that the reference to international law was 
already incorporated in the definition of a treaty as “an agreement governed by international law”, 
whereas Mr. Verdross had no objection to its deletion, as long as this was the opinion of the majority 
and since they considered that its content was self-evident; (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 
310 and 312, respectively. In favour of its retention were Mr. Yasseen, who quoted the North Atlantic 
Coast Fisheries case; Mr. Briggs, who considered that should this reference be omitted then 
mentioning the rules of international law in Article 70 would be utterly “out of place”, and in such a 
case he would prefer the paragraph 1 (b) to be omitted altogether; Mr. de Luna, who quoted several 
international decisions to make his point (i.e. the Georges Pinson case, at 422; the River Oder case; the 
German Interests in Upper Silesia case; and the Ambatielos case (Greece v. the United Kingdom), 
Judgment on Merits of 19 May 1953, ICJ Rep. 1953, 10 [hereinafter Ambatielos case); de Luna, 
(A/CN.4/SR.770), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 317; Sir Humphrey Waldock considered that the purpose 
of Article 70 was exactly that; to establish the meaning of a term in a treaty at the time of its 
conclusion. He felt that the interpretation of Article 70 and the interpretation that Mr. Tunkin advocated 
were two completely separate issues. The second one dealt with interpretation based on subsequent 
practice and development of law, a scenario that the Special Rapporteur felt had already been 
sufficiently addressed by the redrafted Article 69A, which tackled the issue of modification of a treaty 
by subsequent events (e.g. treaty, practice and customary law); Yasseen, Briggs, Amado and Sir 
Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.769), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 310, 311-312, 312 and 311, respectively.  
387 Kenya, (A/CN.6/20/SR.850), para. 40 and Syria, (A/CN.6/20/SR.845), para. 9. 
388 The Netherlands, in ILC, supra note 134, at 322-3. 
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rules in force at the time of the conclusion of a treaty were relevant,389 while other 
delegations considered that the evolutionary interpretation should be opted for.390  
As is evident from the above, the question that returned again and again in the 
discussions of the ILC was what the critical time was391 and which were the relevant 
customs and/or rules to be taken into consideration;392 time and customs/rules. 
  
2. In dubio pro deletione393 
All the above show the complexities and intricacies of the issue of intertemporality. 
In 1966, when the ILC resumed its work on the law of treaties what is immediately 
striking both in the discussions at the ILC as well as in the Sixth Report of the Special 
Rapporteur Waldock,394 is the disappearance of the former Article 56 that dealt 
specifically with the issue of intertemporal law. It seems that the concerns regarding a 
specific provision for intertemporal law that had been expressed in the meetings in 
1964 prevailed.395 It was considered that the two legs of intertemporal law, as 
expressed in draft Article 56, had already been dealt with in other areas and other 
draft articles on the law of treaties. In more detail, the first limb of Article 56 i.e. that 
“1. A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of law in force at the time when the treaty 
was drawn up”, was considered to be already incorporated in the proposed rules of 
interpretation, whereas the second leg396 i.e. that “2. Subject to paragraph 1, the 
application of a treaty shall be governed by the rules of international law in force at 
the time when the treaty is applied” was considered to touch upon the issue of 
modification of treaties by subsequent practice, subsequent agreement, by the 
emergence of new customary law or even more by the emergence of a new 
peremptory norm, which were dealt with in Draft Article 68. 397 
                                                 
389 UK, (A/CN.6/20/SR.843), para. 25. 
390 In support of this the Greek delegation referred to the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Monetary Fund, where the term “exchange control” was interpreted in the light of the evolution that 
had taken place since the Fund had been established in 1944, (A/CN.6/20/SR.845), paras. 41-2. 
391 The time of the conclusion of the treaty or the time of the application of the treaty. 
392 General principles of international law, general custom, regional custom or even treaty-based rules. 
393 This is the author’s paraphrasing of the in dubio pro reo principle of Criminal Law, which means 
“in case of doubt favour the accused”; see supra note 138; Bearing that in mind, the title translates to: 
in case of doubt favour deletion. 
394 Sir Humphrey Waldock, Sixth Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/186 and Add.1-7), in YILC 
(1966), Vol. II : 51-103. 
395 (A/CN.4/SR.728) in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 33 et seq. 
396 Which had raised certain objections by members of the ILC. 
397 Draft Article 68 went as follows:  
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Despite the deletion of the relevant provision (Article 56), nevertheless, the 
debate on intertemporal law persisted in the ILC discussions. It is characteristic that 
the Governments of the UK and the US, in their comments to the proposed articles, 
suggested that Draft Article 68(c),398 unlike modification by means of subsequent 
practice and agreement between the parties, was not a rule of customary international 
law399 or that it would cause too many difficulties in its application.400 Therefore, both 
Governments suggested that it should be deleted.  
The Government of Israel, on the other hand, did not make any such 
suggestion; it nevertheless highlighted a very interesting point. In the first form of the 
article on intertemporal law, the second leg followed the first one. After the deletion 
of Draft Article 56 which dealt with intertemporal law, the regulation of intertemporal 
law considerations now existed in two separate Articles. The second leg of Draft 
Article 56, i.e. that “the application of a treaty shall be governed by the rules of 
international law in force at the time when the treaty is applied”, was incorporated in 
Draft Article 68(c), whereas the first leg, i.e. that “[a] treaty is to be interpreted in the 
light of law in force at the time when the treaty was drawn up” was now incorporated 
in Draft Article 69 (which would become Article 31 of the VCLT). Summing up, the 
second limb of Draft Article 56 was now in Draft Article 68, whereas the first limb 
was now at a later article, Draft Article 69. Israel considered that this reversal in order 
might have implications to the relevant hierarchy, or at least to the relationship 
between these two approaches. Therefore, the Government of Israel proposed that the 
initial order should be restored.401 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Article 68. Modification of a treaty by a subsequent treaty, by subsequent practice or by 
customary law 
The operation of a treaty may also be modified: 
(a) By a subsequent treaty between the parties relating to the same subject matter to the extent that 
their provisions are incompatible;  
(b) By subsequent practice of the parties in the application of the treaty establishing their agreement 
to an alteration or extension of its provisions; or 
(c) By the subsequent emergence of a new rule of customary law relating to matters dealt 
 
ILC, Report of the International Law Commission covering the work of its sixteenth session, 11 May-24 
July 1964 – Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties (A/5809), in YILC (1964), Vol. II: 173, at 198. 
398 I.e. that a treaty may be modified “(c) By the subsequent emergence of a new rule of customary law 
relating to matters dealt”. 
399 UK argument, supra note 134, at 346. 
400 US argument, in ILC, supra note 134, at 359. 
401 Israel, in ILC, supra note 134, at 300-1. 
 92
Waldock also recognized the problems arising from the drafting of Article 31 
(then Article 69). He, actually, acknowledged that it was poorly drafted for several 
reasons. Firstly, rules of interpretation should precede those of modification and/or 
application.402 Secondly, it reflected the ambivalence and uncertainty of the ILC, on 
how to deal with the underlying fundamental issues of Article 68. The issue was more 
than just modification; it was, in essence, an issue of conflict and of hierarchy of 
norms and sources in international law. The same problem had been addressed by the 
ILC in its discussions on successive treaties on the same subject-matter. In that case 
the issue was of a conflict between two treaties and of the possibility of a hierarchical 
structure. Here the question was one of conflict between two different sources of 
international law; treaty and custom. 
For these reasons Waldock proposed that paragraph (c) of Draft Article 68 
should be removed and that the ILC should discuss on how better to include it within 
the ambit of Article 31 (then Draft Article 69) that outlined the rule of 
interpretation.403 Bearing also in mind the comments of the Governments and of the 
Sixth Committee, he redrafted Article 31 so as to read: “1. A treaty shall be 
interpreted ….in the light of….(b) the rules of international law”.404  
Having already decided to steer clear away from the drafting of an article 
specifically referring to issues of intertemporal law, the ILC now focused on whether 
any reference should exist within the textual body of Article 31 (then Draft Article 
69).405 A stark contrast is immediately evident in the arguments put forward. 
Although there were some voices still advocating in favour of the retention of the 
wording “in force at the time of its conclusion”,406 they were a clear minority.  Others 
                                                 
402 Waldock, supra note 394, at 90-1; the way it stood at the time the rule on interpretation was 
incorporated in Article 69, which followed the rule on modification, which was incorporated in Article 
68.  
403 Waldock, supra note 394, at 90-1, paras. 13-5. 
404 Sir Humphrey Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.869), in YILC (1966), Vol. I, Part II, at 184. 
405 Id. 
406 Mr. Bartos, was of the opinion that the rules referred to in sub-paragraph (b) of the article were 
those in force at the time of the conclusion of the treaty. Mr. Bartos seems, however, to consider these 
rules as ‘principles’, since immediately afterwards he lapses again into the ‘jus cogens’ argument, the 
difficulties and errors of which have already been analyzed supra. Mr. Bartos considered that truly 
such “rules” could develop and change, but then the new rules would be jus cogens norms and thus the 
issue would be not one of interpretation but of a treaty being null and void; Bartos, (A/CN.4/SR.870), 
in YILC (1966), Vol.II, Part II, at 192; The Chairman, was also in favour of the retention of the 1964 
wording, and insisted on the distinction between  
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supported the existence of a reference to intertemporal law, but with the intention of 
the parties being the decisive criterion.407 However, the vast majority, despite their 
personal opinions on the subject, were of the mind that the issue was so complex and 
difficult that it was best left out from the draft articles and that intertemporal 
linguistics should only be implied.408  
Mr. Jiménez de Aréchaga differs slightly from the aforementioned members of 
the ILC in the sense that he applauded the abandonment of any reference to 
intertemporal law not due to its complexity but because he considered that it was 
already tacitly incorporated in other notions of the text409. Similarly to Mr. El-Erian 
and Mr. Ago he felt that it was the intention of the parties that was the decisive 
criterion, but unlike the latter he allowed for the parties to have intended that certain 
terms should be allowed to evolve through time. He felt that the 1964 draft “prevented 
                                                                                                                                            
the interpretation of rules, the purpose of which was to discover what existed, and free scientific 
research, which was concerned with the evolution or modification of rules of law by other sources of 
the legal order  
 
The Chairman, (A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC (1966), Vol.II, Part II, at 197; Ago supported the 1964 draft 
text, because he considered that the role of interpretation was to identify the will of the parties at the 
time when the treaty was concluded. Consequently, for him, the Commission should not let itself be 
confused by considerations of intertemporal law, when the solution was simply identifying the 
intention of the parties; Ago, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 189. 
407 El-Erian, (A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 195-6. 
408 Verdross and Rosenne, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 186 and Tsuruoka, 
(A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC (1966), Vol.II, Part II, at 196; Mr. de Luna, although accepting the 
eradication of any intertemporal reference, felt that the commentary should address the question and 
opt for the ‘intention of the parties’ solution. In this he was in agreement with the comments made by 
the Government of the Netherlands. To support his argument, he quoted the case: Interpretation of 
Paragraph 4 of the Annex following Article 179 of the Treaty of Neuilly (Bulgaria v. Greece), Judgment 
of 12 September 1924, PCIJ Series A, No. 3, (hereinafter Interpretation of the Neuilly Treaty case); and 
the Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Basdevant, Winiarski, McNair and Read in the case: Conditions 
of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1948, ICJ 
Rep. 1948, 57 at 82 (hereinafter Admission to the United Nations Advisory Opinion); de Luna, 
(A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 185-6; similarly Mr. Reuter, who made a 
distinction between “fixed concepts” and “variable concepts”; (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. 
II, Part II, at 188 and (A/CN.4/SR.871), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 195; Mr. Castrén also 
supported the eradication of intertemporal references as he was in complete disagreement with the 
wording “in force at the time of its conclusion”; Castrén, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, 
Part II, at 188; this wording, on the contrary, found Mr. Tunkin in complete accord; Tunkin, 
(A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 190; Mr Briggs, although agreeing to the non-
inclusion of any intertemporal reference came up, as an alternative, with a redrafting of the text so as to 
read: “the rules of international law in force at the time of its conclusion as well as those rules in force 
at the time of its interpretation”. However, this wording seems to be merely a vicious circle, since it 
offers no solution to the problem but simply regurgitates the available set of rules.  It is, most likely, for 
this reason that this proposal was not followed up; Briggs, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, 
Part II, at 187; Finally, the Special Rapporteur, conceded to the absence of any intertemporal 
provisions, but expressed his personal opinion on the subject which was that the intention of the parties 
should be the relevant criterion. He felt that the question was essentially not one of intertemporal law, 
since “the evolution of the law affected the application of the agreement, but not its meaning”; Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.872), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 199. 
409 See infra. 
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the free operation of the will of the parties by crystallizing every concept as it had 
existed” at the time of the conclusion of the treaty410.  
What is striking, however, is his last comment. Having advocated in favour of 
the intention of the parties he concludes that the temporal element should be 
considered as “implicitly covered by the concept of good faith”.411 This means that 
the notion of ‘good faith’ applied correctly would lead the interpreter to investigate 
the will of the parties and through this medium reach the correct decision regarding 
intertemporality. It is the first time that the triptych of intertemporality, ‘will of the 
parties’ and ‘good faith’ are presented as three different emancipations of the same 
thing. 
Irrespective of whether they applauded or lamented the abandonment of any 
direct reference to intertemporal law within Article 31 (then Draft Article 69) of the 
VCLT, the general consensus amongst the members of the ILC seems to have been 
that the decisive criterion for resolving issues of intertemporality would always be the 
intention of the parties. 
In conclusion, the form in which Article 31(3)(c) was finally adopted412 was 
stripped down to the bare minimum and the solution that the ILC opted with respect 
to the problem of intertemporal law was merely to delete any specific reference to it. 
This happened in two ways. Not only the Draft Article 56, which dealt exclusively 
with intertemporal law was omitted, but also the same fate was reserved for the 
insertion of any reference to temporal elements within Article 31(3)(c); i.e. in the 
form of the wording “[rules of international law] in force at the time of its [i.e. the 
treaty’s] conclusion”.413  
 
B. Final Comments in the 6th Committee and the Vienna Conference on the Law 
of Treaties 
This approach of the ILC i.e. eradicating any specific reference to intertemporal law 
was commended by various Governments. It was felt that opting for vagueness 
                                                 
410 Jiménez de Aréchaga, (A/CN.4/SR.870), in YILC (1966), Vol. II, Part II, at 191. 
411 Id. 
412 And as it appears today. 
413 See supra note 402 and accompanying text. 
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instead of a rigid rule for the issues of intertemporality was the right tactic.414 The 
Netherlands also argued that the issues of progressive development of law and 
intertemporality that tantalized the ILC for the whole length of the discussions were 
easily resolvable without any need for specific provisions. The reason for that was 
that both intertemporal law and the rules of interpretation were merely expressions of 
the principle of good faith.415 Consequently the application of ‘good faith’ could 
always guide the judge to the appropriate solution in each case. 
Apart from these considerations the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT, from 
this point onwards, essentially repeat in a condensed form all the arguments already 
analyzed. The only interesting point to be mentioned is that Czechoslovakia’s 
delegate tried to revive the debate on intertemporal law by expressing that 
Czechoslovakia considered the rules in force at the time of the application of the 
treaty as the appropriate solution.416 To this the Special Rapporteur simply replied 
that the issue of intertemporal law presented immense difficulties and the 
Commission after having struggled with them had decided to abandon the issue as it 
would mean, otherwise, entering the slippery slope of the relationship between 
customary law and treaty law.417  
From the above analysis of the travaux préparatoires it is evident that the 
issue of intertemporal law was one that caused serious headaches to the members of 
both the ILC and the Institut de Droit International. So complex was the issue that 
finally the ILC selected not only to scrap Draft Article 56 on intertemporal law, but 
also any similar reference within the wording of Article 31(3)(c). Despite this, the 
discussions in these two fora, offer some useful information, in the sense that 
irrespective of the variety of opinions and solutions expressed the common 
                                                 
414 UAR, (A/CN.6/SR.911), para. 27. 
415 The Netherlands, (A/CN.6/21/SR.903), para. 15. 
416 Czechoslovakia, in Vienna Conference I, supra note 46, at 182, paras. 53-4.  
417 Sir Humphrey Waldock, in Vienna Conference I, supra note 46, at 184, para. 74; see, however, 
Jacobs, who argues that the fact that the suggested wording ‘at the time of the conclusion of the treaty’ 
was deleted from Article 31(3)(c) implies that this provision includes “subsequent developments not 
initially  envisaged by the parties” (emphasis added); Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Varieties of Approach to 
Treaty Interpretation: With Special Reference to the Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties Before 
the Vienna Diplomatic Conference’, ICLQ 18 (1969): 318, at 331. Such an absolute – no exceptions 
allowed – interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) does not seem to be supported by the jurisprudence, see 
infra. Greig, based on a contextual interpretation of Article 31(3)(c), considers that since 31(3)(a) and 
(b) refer to future events, despite the lack of any temporal indication in paragraph (c), it should be read 
as covering both rules of international law at the time of the conclusion of a treaty and rules of 
international law at the time of the interpretation of the treaty, Donald Greig, Intertemporality and the 
Law of Treaties, (London: British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2001), at 46. 
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denominator to any and all of them was that the intention of the parties should be the 
decisive criterion. 
 
III. Intertemporal Law: Between Stability and Change 
In his series of Articles in the BYIL on ‘The Law and Procedure of the International 
Court of Justice’ Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice identified several principles of interpretation. 
Amongst them was the principle of contemporaneity,418 which he described in the 
following way: 
 
The terms of a treaty must be interpreted according to the meaning which they possessed, or 
which would have been attributed to them, and in the light of current linguistic usage, at the 
time when the treaty was originally concluded419 
 
Several years later and continuing the tradition of these articles, Thirlway 
considered it necessary, based on the jurisprudence of the time, to supplement this 
with a qualification: 
 
Provided that, where it can be established that it was the intention of the parties that the 
meaning or scope of a term or expression used in the treaty should follow the development 
of the law, the treaty must be interpreted so as to give effect to that intention (emphasis 
added).420 
 
This is indicative of the whole debate on intertemporal law; the tug of war between 
ensuring stability of a system and providing enough flexibility for it to evolve and 
survive. This dual approach is also reflected on the international jurisprudence where 
                                                 
418 Also known as “contemporanea expositio”; see Markus Kotzur, ‘Intertemporal Law, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009), para. 11, accessible at: www.mpepil.com (last 
accessed on 25 January 2010). 
419 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951-4: 
Treaty Interpretation and Other Points’, BYIL 33 (1957): 203, at 212; see also on the principle of 
contemporaneity Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
1951-54: General Principles and Sources of Law’, BYIL 30 (1953): 1, at 5-8; Hugh Thirlway, ‘The 
Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960 – 1989: Supplement 2006: Part Three’, 
BYIL 77 (2006): 1, at 65 et seq. 
420 Thirlway, supra note 11, at 57; Thirlway also employed the term ‘intertemporal renvoi’ to describe 
the situation that arises when the intention of the parties is deemed to have been “to subject the legal 
relations created to such law as might from time to time thereafter become effective”; Hugh Thirlway, 
‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: 1960-1989, Part One’, BYIL 60 (1989): 
1, at 135. 
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some tribunals have expressly recognized the principle of contemporaneity421 while 
others have opted for a more ‘evolutive/dynamic’ interpretation.422,423 When adopting 
a dynamic interpretation the courts and tribunals apart from basing their decision on 
the intention of the parties, have also frequently referred to the nature of certain terms 
or whole treaties as ‘generic’.424 A ‘generic term’ is a “known legal term, whose 
                                                 
421 Minquiers and Ecrehos (France v. United Kingdom), Judgment of 17 November 1953, ICJ Rep. 
1953, 47, at 56 (hereinafter Minquiers and Ecrehos case); US Nationals in Morocco case, at 189; 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge de Castro, at 63, para. 4; Case 
Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Merits) (Portugal v. India), Judgment of 12 April 
1960, ICJ Rep. 1960, 6, at 37 (hereinafter Right of Passage case); Case Concerning a Boundary 
Dispute between Argentina and Chile Concerning the Frontier Line between Boundary Post 62 and 
Mount Fitzroy (Argentina v. Chile), Award of 21 October 1994, RIAA 22 (2000): 3 at 43, para. 130 
(hereinafter Mount Fitzroy case); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana v. Namibia), Judgment of 13 
December 1999, ICJ Rep. 1999, 1045, para. 25 (hereinafter Kasikili/Sedudu Island case); Decision 
regarding Delimitation of the Border between Eritrea and Ethiopia (Eritrea v. Ethiopia), Decision of 
12 April 2002, RIAA 25 (2006):83, at 110, para. 3.5 hereinafter Eritrea/Ethiopia Delimitation case); 
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria ; Equatorial 
Guinea intervening), Judgment of 10 October 2002, ICJ Rep. 2002, 303, para. 59; Land, Island and 
Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v. Honduras; Nicaragua intervening), Judgment of 11 
September 1992, ICJ Rep. 1992, 350, para. 392 (hereinafter Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute case); Grisbadarna case, at 159; North Atlantic Coast Fisheries case, at 196; Western Sahara, 
Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975, ICJ Rep. 1975, 12, para. 126 (hereinafter Western Sahara 
Advisory Opinion); Temple of Preah Vihear (Merits) (Cambodia v. Thailand), Judgment of 15 June 
1962, ICJ Rep. 1962, 6, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sir Percy Spender, at 128 (hereinafter Temple of 
Preah Vihear case); Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), 
Judgment of 13 July 2009, ICJ Rep. 2009, Separate Opinion of Judge Skotnikov, para. 5, accessible at: 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/15327.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 2010) (hereinafter 
Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights). 
422 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, ICJ Rep. 
1971, 16, at 31, para. 53 (hereinafter Namibia Advisory Opinion); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, 
para. 77; Gabcikovo–Nagymaros Project case, para. 112; Jan Mayen case, at 38 et seq.; Case 
Concerning the Delimitation of Maritime Boundary between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal (Guinea 
Bissau v. Senegal), Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 RIAA 20 (1993): 119, paras 80-5; Iron Rhine 
Arbitration, paras. 79-81; Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, Declaration of Judge ad 
hoc Guillaume, paras. 9-16, accessible at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/15330.pdf (last 
accessed on 25 January 2010); Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 21 July 
2000, ICTY, IT-95-17/1-A, Declaration of Judge Patrick Robinson, para. 276, accessible at: 
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/furundzija/acjug/en/fur-aj000721e.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 2010); 
Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 25 April 1978, 2 EHRR 1, para. 31; Matthews v. the United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 18 February 1999, 28 EHRR 361, para. 39. 
423 More generally on dynamic interpretation see Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic (Evolutive) 
Interpretation of Treaties: Part I’, Hague Yearbook of International Law 21 (2008): 101-53; Richard 
Bernhardt, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
GYIL 42 (2000): 11 et seq; George Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2007), at 58-79; Catherine Brölmann, ‘Limits of the Treaty Paradigm’, 
in Interrogating the Treaty: Essays in the Contemporary Law of Treaties, Malgosia Fitzmaurice and 
Matthew Craven (eds.) (Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2005), 29, at 34-6; see also Malgosia 
Fitzmaurice, ‘The Tale of two Judges: Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice – Human 
Rights and the Interpretation of Treaties’, Revue Hellénique de Droit International 61 (2008):125-70, 
analyzing the differences and similarities of the take on dynamic interpretation of two of the most 
influential figures in treaty interpretation, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. 
424 Iron Rhine Arbitration, paras. 79-80; Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, Advisory 
Opinion of 7 February 1923, PCIJ Series B., No. 4, at 24 (hereinafter Nationality Decrees in Morocco 
case); Namibia Advisory Opinion, at 31; Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, paras. 74-7; Gabcikovo – 
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content the Parties expected would change through time”425  a term whose “meaning 
was intended to follow the evolution of the law”.426  
One point that needs to be made with respect to this latter definition is that it 
focuses on the aspect of the evolution of the law. However, Georgopoulos argues that 
with respect to ‘generic terms’ a distinction should be made between ‘renvoi mobile’ 
and ‘ouverture du texte’. In the former case, a norm anticipates the evolution of the 
law and is connected to it. As the law changes so does the content of that norm (An 
example of such a case would be the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case). In the latter 
case, a treaty provision changes alongside the factual situation contemplated by the 
treaty (An example of this second category would be the Gabcikovo – Nagymaros 
Project case).427 Nevertheless and despite the merit of this distinction, the effects in 
both scenarios seem to be identical.428 
Irrespective of which solution is opted for, i.e. principle of contemporaneity or 
dynamic/evolutive interpretation, there is general consensus in jurisprudence and 
doctrine alike that the application of the intertemporal rule has at least one limit; jus 
cogens norms.429 Paragraph 3 of the Resolution of the Institut de Droit International 
addresses this aspect of intertemporal law in a most poignant manner. 
  
3. States and other subjects of international law shall, however, have the power to 
determine by common consent the temporal sphere of application of norms, … subject to 
any imperative norm of international law which might restrict that power. 430 
                                                                                                                                            
Nagymaros Project case, para. 112; US-Shrimp (AB), para. 130; Dispute Regarding Navigational and 
Related Rights case, accessible at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/15321.pdf (last accessed on 
25 January 2010). 
425 Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, Declaration of Judge Higgins, para. 2.  
426 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, para. 77. 
427 Théodore Georgopoulos, ‘Le Droit Intertemporel et les Dispositions Conventionelles Evolutives – 
Quelle Thérapie contre la Vieillesse des Traités ?’, RGDIP 108 (2004): 123, at 132-4. 
428 Thirlway, supra note 419, at 67. 
429 Markus Kotzur, ‘Intertemporal Law, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (2009), 
para. 13, accessible at www.mpepil.com (last accessed on 25 January 2010); Edward McWhinney, 
‘The Time Dimension in International Law, Historical Relativism and Intertemporal Law’, Essays in 
International Law in Honour of Judge Manfred Lachs, Jerzy Makarczyk (ed.) (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1984), 179, at 183; Georgopoulos, supra note 427, at 146; Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and 
Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Rep. 2007, Joint Declaration of Judges Shi and 
Koroma, para. 2, accessible at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf (last accessed on 25 
January 2010) (hereinafter Application of the Genocide Convention case); similarly South-West 
Africa(Second Phase) (Liberia and Ethiopia v. South Africa), Judgment of 18 July 1966, ICJ Rep. 
1966, 6, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 293-5 (hereinafter South-West Africa cases (Second 
Phase)). 
430 Institut de Droit International, Resolution of Session of Wiesbaden, 1975 – The Intertemporal 
Problem in Public International Law, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 56 (1975): 536. 
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The analysis of the heated debate that intertemporal law sparked during the travaux 
préparatoires of the VCLT, combined with the above brief presentation of the various 
approaches to intertemporal law in doctrine and jurisprudence, has offered a useful 
insight as to the complexities of intertemporal law, while simultaneously functioning 
as a guide towards a legally sound solution. The main problems of intertemporal law 
can be broken down in two main categories, the understanding of each of which, will 
lead us cumulatively to the final conclusion. These categories are: i) temporal –
exoteric i.e. the alleged conflict between intertemporality and principle of non-
retroactivity and ii)  systemic i.e. the relationship of intertemporal considerations with 
the various schools of interpretation as a way of determining the correct approach to 
the problems raised by intertemporality. 
 
A. Intertemporality and the Notion of Retroactivity 
An issue that needs to be explored in order to come to any sort of conclusion 
regarding the problem of intertemporality in the interpretative process is whether the 
second leg of the intertemporal law doctrine as stated by Huber i.e. that “the existence 
of [a] right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions 
required by the evolution of law”431 violates the principle of non-retroactivity. Firstly, 
however, what needs to be established is whether non-retroactivity is a principle of 
international law. Should this be the case, then and only then can one proceed to 
examine whether intertemporality violates it and if so that the only logical solution is 
that the principle of contemporaneity432 should be adopted. 
 
1. Non-retroactivity as a Principle of International Law 
The Statute of the ICJ in article 38 states the sources of international law that the 
Court can resort to. Amongst them, one can find “the general principles of law, 
recognised by civilised nations”.433 This provision has been the focal point of the 
                                                 
431 Island of Palmas case, at 845. 
432 As outlined by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his articles on ‘Law and Procedure of the international 
Court of Justice’; see Fitzmaurice, supra notes 419. 
433 Art. 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute. 
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writings of renowned publicists434 who all accept non-retroactivity as one of these 
principles. However, such “teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”435 do not 
suffice in order to qualify non-retroactivity as a principle of international law. Further 
evidence is required both at a domestic level as well as in international jurisprudence 
and such evidence is more than abundant. 
The principle of non-retroactivity has been crystallized and incorporated in a 
multitude of national constitutions and codes. However, perhaps more revealing is 
that the status of non-retroactivity as a principle of international law has been 
recognized in a multitude of international judicial decisions in various fora. In the 
Chamizal case, in his individual opinion the Mexican commissary invoked the 
“universal maxim of the irretroactivity of the laws”.436 This followed the Grisbadarna 
case and was reaffirmed in the Clipperton Island case,437 although it has to be 
                                                 
434 Bin Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, 
(Cambridge: Grotius, 1987); Lord McNair, ‘The General Principles of Law Recognised by Civilised 
Nations’, BYIL 33  (1957): 1, at 1-19; Alfred von Verdross, ‘Les Principes Généraux du Droit dans la 
Jurisprudence Internationale’, RCADI 52 (1935/II) : 191, at 195-251; Paul Reuter, ‘Le Recours de la 
Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes à des Principes Généraux de Droit’, in: Mélanges 
Offerts à Henri Rolin: Problèmes de Droit des Gens, Henri Rolin and Jean A. Salmon (eds.)  (Paris: 
Pedonne, 1964), 263-283. 
435 Art. 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute. 
436 The Chamizal case (Mexico v. United States of America), Award of 15 June 1911, RIAA 11 (1961): 
309, at 343 (hereinafter Chamizal case); although it has to be pointed out that the Commission, despite 
accepting non-retroactivity as a principle, argued that declaratory (interpretative) treaties or 
conventions were an exception to that rule, a point which has also bearing on our own problematic 
regarding an alleged clash between intertemporality and non-retroactivity. In more detail the 
commission stated: 
 
On behalf of Mexico it has been strenuously contended that this convention was intended to operate 
in the future only, and that it should not be given a retroactive effect so as to apply to any changes 
which had previously occurred. Reference was made to a number of well known authorities 
establishing the proposition that laws and treaties are not usually deemed to be retrospective in their 
effect. An equally well-known exception to this rule is that of laws or treaties which are intended to 
be declaratory, and which evidence the intention of putting an end to controversies by adopting a 
rule of construction applicable to laws or convention which have been subject to dispute. The 
internal evidence contained in the convention of 1884 appears to be sufficient to show an intention 
to apply the rules laid down for the determination of difficulties which might arise through the 
changes in the Rio Grande, whether these changes had occurred prior to or after the convention, 
and they appear to have been intended to codify the rules for the interpretation of the previous 
treaties of 1848 and 1853 which had formed the subject of diplomatic correspondence between the 
parties. While it is perfectly true that the convention was to be applied to disputes which might 
arise in the future, it nowhere restricts the difficulties to future changes in the river. It expressly 
declares that, by the treaties of 1848 and 1853, the dividing line had followed the middle of the 
river, and that henceforth the same rule was to apply.  
 
Chamizal case, at 325. 
437 Clipperton Island Arbitration (Mexico v. France), Award of 28 January 1931 RIAA 2 (1949): 1105-
11. 
 101
acknowledged that the commission in the Chamizal case was more direct in its 
affirmation of the non-retroactivity principle.438 
The ICJ also has had to deal with the issue of non-retroactivity and found the 
following in the Ambatielos case:  
 
These points raise the question of the retroactive operation of the Treaty of 1926 and are 
intended to meet what was described dung the hearings as ‘the similar clauses theory’, 
advanced on behalf of the Hellenic Government. The theory is that where in the 1926 
Treaty there are substantive provisions similar to substantive provisions of the 1886 Treaty, 
then under Article 29 of the 1926 Treaty this Court can adjudicate upon the validity of a 
claim based on an alleged breach of any of these similar provisions, even if the alleged 
breach took place wholly before the new treaty came into force. The Court cannot accept 
this theory for the following reasons : (i) To accept this theory [i.e. the ‘similar clauses 
theory”’ would mean giving retroactive effect to Article 29 of the Treaty of 1926, whereas 
Article 32 of this Treaty states that the Treaty, which must mean all the provisions of the 
Treaty, shall come into force immediately upon ratification. Such a conclusion might have 
been rebutted if there had been any special clause or any special object necessitating 
retroactive interpretation. There is no such clause or object in the present case. It is 
therefore impossible to hold that any of its provisions must be deemed to have been in force 
earlier.439 
 
It is interesting to note that the ICJ adopts an almost identical stance as the 
commission in the Chamizal case. On the one hand, it acknowledges the status of non-
retroactivity as a principle of international law; on the other hand, however, it 
qualifies it by stating that an exception to this rule can exist only if there is “any 
special clause or any special object necessitating retroactive interpretation”.440 
The ECmHR and the ECtHR have also had their fair share of cases 
establishing the non-retroactivity principle most notably in the De Becker case, where 
the Commission in no unclear terms stated that:   
 
Considérant que le jugement du Conseil de guerre et l’ arrêt de la Cour militaire de 
Bruxelles, qui ont entraîne l’ application de l’ article 123 sexies au requérant, remontent 
respectivement au 24 juillet 1946 et au 14 huin 1947, soit à une date antérieure au 14 juin 
1955, date d’ entrée en vigeur de la Convention européenne de Sauvegarde des Droits de l’ 
Homme et des Libertés fondamentales à l’ égard de la Belgique; que la question pourrait 
                                                 
438 See in more detail: Paul Tavernier, Recherches sur l’ Application dans le Temps des Actes at des 
Règles en Droit International Public: Problèmes de Droit Intertemporel ou de Droit Transitoire, 
(Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1979), at 116-7; Paul Fauchille, “Le Conflit de 
Limites entre le Brésil et la Grande-Bretagne et la Sentence du Roi d’ Italie”, RGDIP 12 (1905) : 25 et 
seq. 
439 Ambatielos case (Greece v. United Kingdom), Judgment on Preliminary Objections of 1 July 1952, 
ICJ Rep. 1952, 28, at 40 (hereinafter Ambatielos case (Preliminary Objections)). 
440 Id. 
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dès lors se poser de savoir si le grief précité n’ est pas irrecevable ratione temporis; qu’ il 
est vrai que ce chef d’ irrrecevabilité ne figure point parmi ceux qu’ enumérent les articles 
26 et 27 de la Convention; que l’article 66 de la Convention se borne à determiner quand se 
produit l’ entrée en vigueur de la Convention, sans préciser à partir de quelle date cette 
entrée en vigueur déploie ses effets; que l’ existence du chef d’ irrecevabilité ratione 
temporis derive cependant du principe de la non-rétroactivité des traits et conventions, 
lequel se range parmi les principes de droit international généralment reconnus; que, dans 
une série de decisions, la Commission a déjà reconnu qu’ en vertu de ce principe la 
Convention ne régit, pour chaque Partie contractante, que les faits postérieurs à son entrée 
en vigueur à l’ égard de cette Partie.441 
 
Finally the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Communities needs 
to be mentioned as well, where the General Advocate Maurice Lagarange in his 
concluding remarks on the Algera and others case, when dealing with the non-
retroactivity of acts of a legislative or regulatory character, as a principle of law, 
clearly stated that: “it is sufficient that these acts do not have a retroactive effect, in 
accordance with the general principles”.442  
This synopsis of the main jurisprudence and publications on the matter, 
indicates that non-retroactivity is accepted as a general principle of law recognized by 
civilized nations (Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute), albeit with a very important 
caveat founded on the will of the drafters; that there is no “special clause or … special 
object necessitating retroactive interpretation”.443  
 
                                                 
441 Author’s translation:  
 
Considering that the judgment of the Council of war and the judgment of the military Court of 
Brussels, which have involved the application of article 123 sexies to the applicant, go back 
respectively at July 24, 1946 and the 14 June 1947, that is to say on a date prior to June 14, 1955, date 
of entry into force of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
freedoms with regard to Belgium; that the question could consequently arise to know if the above 
mentioned objection is not inadmissible ratione temporis; that it is true that this claim of 
irrrecevability does not appear among those which articles 26 and 27 of Convention enumerate; that 
article 66 of Convention is restricted to determine when the coming into effect of the Convention 
occurs, without specifying starting from which date this coming into effect produces its effects; that 
the existence of the claim of inadmissibility ratione temporis, however, derived from the principle of 
the non-retroactivity of treaties and conventions, [a principle] which lines up among the principles of 
international law generally recognized; that, in a series of decisions, the Commission already 
recognized that under the terms of this principle the Convention does not govern, with respect to each 
Contracting party, any other facts other than those posterior to its coming into force with regard to this 
Party.  
 
De Becker v. Belgium, Decision No. 214/56 of 9 June 1958, ECmHR, accessible at: 
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=open&documentId=824138&portal=hbkm&source=
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 at 11 (last accessed on 25 
January 2010). 
442 Algera and others v. Common Assembly, Judgment of 12 July 1957, Court of Justice of the 
European Communities,  3 Rep. CJEC 133, at 133-78. 
443 Id. 
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2. Conflict between the Non-retroactive Principle and Max Huber’s Statement 
on Intertemporal Law 
2.1. The Doctrinal Perspective 
Max Huber’s solution to the intertemporal problems posed during the interpretative 
process was to make a sharp distinction between the “creation of a right” and “its 
continued manifestation”.444 This “mediatory solution”, as it has been characterized 
by Tavernier,445 has been severely criticized as being inconsistent with the principle 
of non-retroactivity on two grounds: a doctrinal one and a more practical one. 
Consequently, these authors argue, such a contradiction can lead to the only logical 
conclusion that Huber’s legal construction is erroneous and should be dispensed with. 
Beginning with the doctrinal critique, Professor Tavernier argues that the two 
legs of Huber’s construction are not homogenous.446 In order to establish this, he 
argues that, if one reads the decision of the Island of Palmas case, one would447 
conclude that both parties, i.e. the United States of America and the Netherlands, were 
in total agreement regarding both legs of Huber’s construction.448 However, such a 
meeting of the minds existed only with respect to the first leg, i.e. that “a juridical fact 
must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it”. Regarding the 
second leg, i.e. that the “existence of the right, in other words its continued 
manifestation, shall follow the conditions required by the evolution of law”, Huber’s 
dictum seems to have been more in line with the Dutch position rather than the 
American one.449 Consequently, Tavernier criticizes Huber’s solution450 for being 
nothing more than a mediator’s solution, similar to the one proposed by Pope Leon 
XIII when he acted as a mediator in the Caroline Islands case451,452 and not one with 
                                                 
444 Island of Palmas Arbitration, at 845. 
445 Tavernier, supra note 438, at 267. 
446 Ibid., at 267 et seq. 
447 erroneously, according to Tavernier. 
448 Island of Palmas case, at 845. 
449 Id.; see also Tavernier, supra note 438, at 267; Robert Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory 
(Manchester: MUP, 1963), at 28. 
450 finding also support in Waldock, supra note 128, at 6; in Lauterpacht, who remarked that the 
distinction made in the Island of Palmas case was not accepted by everybody, Hersch Lauterpacht, The 
Function of Law in the International Community, (Oxford: OUP, 1933), at 283-5; and in Baade, who 
argued that although the first leg of the dictum was generally accepted, the same could not be said for 
the second one, Hans W. Baade, ‘Intertemporales Völkerrecht’, Jahrbuch für Internationales Recht 7 
(1958): 229-56.  
451 known as Carolinas 
 104
sound legal foundations. Another point of criticism is that the first leg adopts an 
‘objective’ viewpoint i.e. that of the act under consideration, whereas the second leg 
opts for a ‘subjective’ viewpoint i.e. removing itself from dealing with the act and 
opting for following the evolution of the law.453 This shift in focus, moving from the 
characterization of the fact to the evolution of the law, is according to Tavernier one 
more indication of the lack of homogeneity between these two rules and their intrinsic 
fallacy. 
The same author, concludes that, in essence, the distinction between ‘creation 
of a right’ and ‘its continued manifestation’ proposed by Judge Huber, has a 
 
‘self-destructive’ effect, which limits its field of application and its effect on judicial 
settlements removes its reason of being [raison d’ être], which is to establish an equilibrium 
between the past and the present.454  
 
This ‘self-destructive effect’ is expressed, in Tavernier’s analysis, by the inutility of 
Huber’s rules. If one has to examine the validity of a right based on contemporary 
law, then it becomes immaterial to know if the right was validly created based on the 
anterior law. As Tavernier puts it:  
 
either the new law does not permit the continued manifestation of such a right or it permits 
it. In both these cases the previous juridical order is of little importance.455 
 
Furthermore, Tavernier tacitly bases his argument on the following premises: 
i) that the requirements for creation and maintenance of a right are identical in each 
and every instance and ii) (which flows from premise (i)) that the requirements of 
creation of a right remain frozen through time. Perhaps, the simplest example to 
highlight that these premises do not lend themselves to application in each and every 
case is that of acquisition of territory. Prior to its prohibition, use of force was one of 
                                                                                                                                            
452 Tavernier, supra note 438, at 267; on the Caroline Islands case see: Carlos Manuel Corral Salvador, 
La Mediación de León XIII en el Conflito de las Islas Carolinas, (Madrid: Universidad Pontificia 
Comillas, 1995). 
453 Tavernier, supra note 438, at 267-8. 
454 Ibid., at 267 (author’s translation). The original text goes as follows: “Son effet ‘autodestructeur’ 
limite son champ d'application et son effet sur l’ordonnancement juridique supprime sa raison d' être 
qui est d'etablir un equilibre entre le passé et le présent”. 
455 Ibid., at 271. 
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the means of acquiring territory. Ergo, it created a valid right. After the prohibition, 
the prior acquisition in no way can be overturned by application of the modern law.456 
Contemporary law is restricted to function merely as the guideline of whether the 
right already acquired457 continues to manifest itself and the criteria for this are 
completely different from the criteria of acquisition of territory.458,459  
Tavernier seems to read the Island of Palmas case as stating that the past fact 
of discovery is not sufficient for the creation of a title and consequently, that the 
effects that would have manifested themselves through a sovereignty based on 
discovery are not recognized as valid.460 
However, a different reading is also possible and seems to be closer to the true 
intentions of Huber.461 The law of the 16th century (for the Palmas case) regulated the 
conditions for the acquisition of the territory, whereas the contemporary law 
determines the conditions during which it perishes. In such a case the ‘continued 
manifestation’ would mean that for the relevant critical periods, the apposite to those 
periods laws would apply, being assimilated, thus, to a finding of an absence of 
extinction.462 Consequently, since each period of time has its corresponding law, there 
is absolutely no overlap and most certainly no retroactive effect. From the above, 
intertemporal law, at least from a doctrinal point of view,  does not seem to conflict 
with the principle of non-retroactivity. 
 
                                                 
456 As would be required by Tavernier’s construction. 
457 By means which were at the critical period legal, irrespective of their current illegality. 
458 For instance exercise of governmental authority etc. 
459 This is also reinforced by the relevant jurisprudence on the matter: for instance Legal Status of 
Eastern Greenland (Denmark v. Norway), Judgment of 5 April 1933), PCIJ Series A/B, No. 53, 21 
(hereinafter Status of Eastern Greenland case) and the Minquiers and Ecrehos case. 
460 Tavernier, supra note 438, at 275. To reinforce this interpretation Tavernier also mentions India’s 
claim to the UN Security Council with respect to the Goa affair i.e. that the occupation of Goa by 
Portugal (which occurred during the 15th – 16th century, a time during which the acquisition of 
territories through conquest was legal) was illegal because it was contrary to resolution 1514 (XV) of 
the UN General Assembly; see Maurice Flory, ‘Les Implications Juridiques de l’ Affaire de GOA’, 
Annuaire Française de Droit International 8 (1962):.476-91; and Jennings, supra note 449, at 31. 
461 Jennings, supra note 449, at 29. 
462 on the issue of the non-conflict between Huber’s rules and the principle of non-retroactivity see: 
Baade, supra note 450, at 229-56. 
 106
2.2. The Practical Perspective 
Greig tackles the issue of the relationship between intertemporality and non-
retroactivity not so much from a doctrinal point of view463 but from a more practical 
one.464 
As analyzed supra, the principle of non-retroactivity is a principle of 
international law. Not only that but it has also been incorporated in provisions of the 
VCLT itself. For instance, Article 28 which states:  
 
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established, its 
provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation 
which ceased to exist before the date of entry into force of the treaty with respect to that 
party.465 
 
In the present examination, the most pertinent provision is Article 4 of the VCLT 
VCLT which attempts to strike a balance between, on the one hand the principle of 
non-retroactivity and on the other hand the effectiveness and application of those rules 
that already constituted customary international law.466 Article 4 goes as follows: 
 
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present Convention to 
which treaties would be subject under international law independent of the Convention, the 
Convention applies only to treaties which are concluded by States after the entry into force 
of the present Convention with regard to such States.467 
 
It is with respect to this provision that Greig raises some important questions. If one 
follows the wording of Article 4, this leads inexorably to the logical conclusion that 
for treaties concluded prior to the date of entry into force of the VCLT and which are 
the object of interpretation, the VCLT rule on interpretation468 would not apply as 
                                                 
463 As was done by Tavernier. 
464 Greig, supra note 417. 
465 Article 28 of the VCLT. 
466 As allowed by the Nicaragua judgment, where it was clearly stated that the fact that a rule of 
customary international law is codified in a treaty text, that does not mean that it absorbed by the latter. 
On the contrary, both these rules continue to exist and evolve in their own way; see Nicaragua case, 
paras. 176-8. 
467 Article 4 of the VCLT. 
468 Enshrined in Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT. 
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such i.e. as VCLT provisions, but only to the extent that it constituted the customary 
international law contemporary to the treaty being interpreted. 
It is exactly this that, according to Greig, raises concerns. In the 
Kasikili/Sedudu Island case the issue was that of interpretation of an 1890 treaty 
between Britain and Germany, which defined their spheres of influence and which in 
time became the boundary between Botswana and Namibia. Greig raises two points 
with respect to this decision:  
i) The Analysis of the Court’s Use of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT 
The Court in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case stated that although Botswana 
and Namibia were not parties to the VCLT they both considered Article 31 was 
applicable “inasmuch as it reflects customary international law”.469 The objection 
raised by Greig is that it is not up to the States to determine which rules are to apply 
to a particular dispute, but for the Court itself to identify them, as was clearly stated in 
the Nicaragua case: 
 
The Court notes that there is in fact evidence, to be examined below, of a considerable 
degree of agreement between the Parties as to the content of the customary international 
law relating to the non-use of force and non-intervention. This concurrence of their views 
does not however dispense the Court from having itself to ascertain what rules of customary 
international law are applicable. The mere fact that States declare their recognition of 
certain rules is not sufficient for the Court to consider these as being part of customary 
international law, and as applicable as such to those States. Bound as it is by Article 38 of 
its Statute to apply, inter alia, the Court may not disregard the essential role played by 
general practice. Where two States agree to incorporate a particular rule in a treaty, their 
agreement suffices to make that rule a legal one, binding upon them ; but in the field of 
customary international law, the shared view of the Parties as to the content of what they 
regard as the rule is not enough. The Court must satisfy itself that the existence of the rule 
in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice.470 
 
However, it has to be noted that the ICJ, immediately after the aforementioned 
statement in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, reiterated that on numerous occasions it 
has itself identified that Articles 31 and 32 reflect customary international law.471  
 
 
                                                 
469 Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, para. 18. 
470 Nicaragua case, para. 184. 
471 Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, para. 18; citing Libya/Chad Territorial Dispute case, para. 41; Oil 
Platforms case, para. 23. 
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ii)The Court did not take into Consideration the Intertemporal Issues 
Greig also criticizes the court for failing to consider all the intertemporal 
implications with respect to using Article 31 as custom in the Kasikili/Sedudu Island 
case. Despite the fact that both Judge Oda472 and Judge Higgins473 also expressed 
concerns regarding the various aspects of intertemporality, none doubted the identity 
of the content of customary Article 31 during the late 19th century and its content in 
later periods; which is exactly the point that Professor Greig is making. Despite the 
valid questions that Greig raises the relevant jurisprudence and the literature of the 
period seem to suggest that the content of Article 31 had not undergone any earth-
shattering changes.474 
 
B. Intertemporality through the Prism of the three Schools of Interpretation 
As was explained above, despite appearances intertemporality does not clash with the 
principle of non-retroactivity either on the doctrinal level or on the practical one. 
Having established therefore the legal validity of the intertemporal law doctrine, the 
next point of inquiry will be whether any school of interpretation is most suited in 
addressing the problems of intertemporality and may offer the greatest level of legal 
certainty when dealing with intertemporal law issues. 
A lot of literature has been written on what should be the correct approach to the 
problem of intertemporal law475. These can be grouped as follows: 
                                                 
472 Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, Separate Opinion of Judge Oda, para. 4. 
473 Kasikili/Sedudu Island case, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 4. 
474 Van Bokkelen case, Award of 24 May 1888, Moore International Arbitrations 2 (1898):1807, at 
1849; Samoan Claims (Germany, Great Britain and United States of America), Award of 14 October 
1902, RIAA 9 (1959):15-27, at 25; the Chamizal case. 
475 Tavernier, supra note 438; Greig, supra note 417; Anthony D’Amato, ‘International Law, 
Intertemporal Problems’, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law: Volume II, Rudolf Bernhardt 
and Rudolf L. Bindschedler (eds.) (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992), 1234; Kotzur, supra note 418, 
para. 11; Higgins, supra note 338, at 173-81; Fitzmaurice (1957), supra note 419, at 225-7; 
Fitzmaurice (1953), supra note 419, at 5-8; Thirlway, supra note 420, at 128-143; Thirlway, supra note 
11, at 57-60; Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989: 
Supplement 2005: Parts One and Two’, BYIL 76 (2005): 1, at 67-77; Taslim Olawale Elias, ‘The 
Doctrine of Intertemporal Law’, AJIL, 74 (1980): 285-307; de Visscher, supra note 345, at 66-9; 
Sinclair, supra note 53, at 124-6 and 138-40; Sur, supra note 345, at at 207-10; Yoshifumi Tanaka, 
‘Navigational Rights on the San Juan River:  A Commentary on the Costa Rica v. Nicaragua Case’, 
accessible at 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/Commentaries%20PDF/Tanaka_Navigational_Rights_EN.pdf 
(last accessed on 25 January 2010), at 8-10; ILC Study Group, supra note 16, paras. 475-8; Ulf 
Linderfalk, ‘Doing the Right Thing for the Right Reason – Why Dynamic or Static Approaches Should 
be Taken in the Interpretation of Treaties’, ICLR 10/2 (2008): 109-41; French, supra note 10, at 295-
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• The categorically static approach – using conventional language, or the ‘relevant rules of 
international law’, the interpreter of a treaty is allowed to draw only upon such language 
and such rules that were in existence when the interpreted treaty was concluded. 
• The categorically dynamic approach – using conventional language, or the ‘relevant rules 
of international law’, the interpreter of a treaty is allowed to draw only upon such language 
and such rules that are in existence at the time of interpretation. 
• The flexible approach – using conventional language, or the ‘relevant rules of 
international law’, the interpreter of a treaty will sometimes have to draw upon the language 
and rules that were in existence when the interpreted treaty was concluded, and sometimes 
upon the language and rules existing at the time of interpretation.476 
 
International jurisprudence as well as the majority of the writers tends to favour the 
flexible approach.477 However, this does not by itself suffice to validate the legal basis 
of such an approach. What needs to be examined is whether there is a concrete 
                                                                                                                                            
300; McLachlan, supra note 10, at 279-320; Fitzmaurice, supra note 423, at 101-53; Bernhardt, supra 
note 424, at 11 et seq; Letsas, supra note 423, at 58-79; Don Greig, ‘The Time of Conclusion and the 
Time of Application of Treaties as Points of Reference in the Interpretative Process’, in Time, History 
and International Law, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Matthew Craven and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.) (Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 163; Georgopoulos, supra note 427, at 123-48; Sompong Sucharitkul, ‘The 
Intertemporal Character of International Law Regarding the Ocean’, in Liber Amicorum Judge Shigeru 
Oda: Vol. II, Ando Nisuke, Edward McWhinney and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds.) (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 2002), 1287-302; Yasseen, supra note 71, at 26-7 and  64-7; McWhinney, supra 
note 429, at 179-99; Eduardo Jímenez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a Century’, 
RCADI 159 (1978/I): 3, at 48-50; Institut de Droit International, ‘Travaux dans le problème dit du droit 
intertemporel dans l’ordre international’, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 55 (1973): 1-
116; Institut de Droit International, ‘Travaux dans le problème dit du droit intertemporel dans l’ordre 
international’, Annuaire de l’Institut de Droit International 56 (1975), at 339-74, 536-541; Carlos 
Fernández de Casadevante y Romani, Sovereignty and Interpretation of International Norms 
(Heidelberg: Springer, 2007), at 153-4 ; Bos, supra note 345, at 287-97; Carlos Fernández de 
Casadevante y Romani, La Interpretación de las Normas Interancionales (Pamplona : Aranzadi, 1996), 
at 225-6 ; Philip Jessup, ‘The Palmas Island Arbitration’, AJIL 22 (1928): 750 et seq. 
476 Linderfalk, supra note 475, at 113. 
477 Even the authors and decisions which could be presented as favouring the “categorically static 
approach”, have always qualified their comments in one way or another, showing that in reality they 
are based oln the “flexible approach”. For instance Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s outlining of the principle 
of contemporaneity in the Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice went as follows:  
 
In a considerable number of cases, the rights of States (an more particularly of Parties to an 
international dispute) depend or derive from rights, or a legal situation, existing at some time in the 
past, or on a treaty concluded at some comparatively remote date . . . It can now be regarded as an 
established principle of international law that in such cases the situation in question must be 
appraised, and the treaty interpreted, in the light of the rules of the treaty interpreted, in the light of the 
rules of international law as they existed at the time, and not as they exist today. In other words, it is 
not permissible to import into the legal evaluation of a previously existing situation, or of an old 
treaty, doctrines of modern law that did not exist or were not accepted at the time, and only resulted 
from subsequent development or evolution of international law. 
 
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, (Cambridge: 
Grotius Publications Limited, 1986), at 345-6; However, the last part of the quote is critical. “and only 
resulted from subsequent development” (emphasis added). Consequently, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice does 
not argue, that, by definition, the past rules should apply, but that merely the development of law does 
not suffice. An added element is also required i.e. that of the intention of the parties. 
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justification why the flexible approach is more legally sound than the other 
approaches. The jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals is most revealing 
on the issue, for one more reason as well. The solutions offered by these courts tend to 
revolve around the three schools of interpretation as their main focal points: i.e. i) 
intention of Parties ii) object and purpose iii) text. The question which then poses 
itself is which of these schools of interpretation should be opted for in dealing with 
intertemporality. 
 
1. Intention of Parties 
In order to arrive to any sort of conclusion a re-examination of the relevant 
jurisprudence is mandatory.478 As has been mentioned supra, the most-cited case 
regarding intertemporal law is the Island of Palmas case and the dicta made by Judge 
Huber.479 
The ripple effect of this dictum was immense. This can be understood not only 
by the subsequent jurisprudence480 and the surrounding publications481 but also that an 
almost identical construction was adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 
1975 in its Resolution on Intertemporal Problems in Pubic International Law. 
 
4. Wherever a provision of a treaty refers to a legal or other concept without defining it, it is 
appropriate to have recourse to the usual methods of interpretation in order to determine 
whether the concept concerned is to be interpreted as understood at the time when the 
provision was drawn up or as understood at the time of its application. Any interpretation of 
a treaty must take into account all relevant rules of international law which apply between 
the parties at the time of application.482 
 
In the Namibia Advisory Opinion the issue to be decided revolved around the UN 
General Assembly Resolution 21 which declared that South Africa had not fulfilled its 
                                                 
478 a more detailed analysis of the relevant jurisprudence, as well as elaboration of the links between 
intertemporality and dynamic interpretation can be found in: Fitzmaurice, supra note 423. 
479 i.e. that “[A] juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it, and not 
of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to be settled” and “the 
existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required 
by the evolution of law”; Island of Palmas case, at 845. 
480 See supra analysis. 
481 See supra note 475. 
482 Resolution of the Institut de Droit International, supra note 430; it has to be noted that Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice strongly objected to the second sentence and proposed its deletion. Despite some support 
of this proposition, it was eventually defeated on vote; ibid., at 367-70. 
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obligations under the Mandate for South West Africa/Namibia and as a result its 
mandate was terminated. South Africa, however, did not withdraw from Namibia and 
the Security Council issued Resolution 276 declaring that South Africa’s continued 
presence in Namibia was a violation of international law. The Court was, thus, seized 
in its advisory capacity to render an opinion on the correct interpretation of Namibia’s 
Mandate and determine whether ‘C’ mandates, were different from ‘A’ and ‘B’ 
mandates483.  
The Court made the following finding: 
 
[m]indful as it is of the primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance with 
the intentions of the Parties at the time of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into 
account the fact that the concepts embodied in Article 22 of the Covenant – ‘strenuous 
conditions of the modern world’ and ‘the well-being and development’ of the peoples 
concerned - were not static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the 
concept of the ‘sacred trust’. The Parties to the Covenant must consequently be deemed to 
have accepted them as such. That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must 
take into consideration the changes which have occurred in the supervening half-century, 
and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent development of law, 
through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law (emphasis 
added).484  
 
Consequently, the Court honed in on the intentions of the Parties and used them as the 
main criterion for determining which rules in time should be applied. Of course the 
decision of the Court was met with strong criticisms. For instance, Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice in his Dissenting Opinion criticized the Court for its decision since, 
according to him, no evidence of the intentions ascribed by the Court to the ‘C’ 
mandates at the time of the League of Nations, could be found.485 However, even this 
criticism is a reinforcement of the approach to be adopted with respect to 
intertemporality. The main point of the criticism by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice was that 
no intention of the Parties was found,486 not that recourse to intention or that evolutive 
interpretation were ipso facto erroneous. Similarly, Thirlway criticized the Advisory 
Opinion on the grounds that no such intention was proven and that the Court merely 
based its decision on the fact that the notions under consideration were evolutionary 
                                                 
483 see Fitzmaurice, supra note 423, at 107, who also states that: “In the period of the development of 
the mandate system, ‘C’ mandates almost amounted to annexation”.  
484 Namibia Advisory Opinion, para. 53. 
485 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, para. 85. 
486 For an evolutive interpretation. 
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by nature and did not substantiate this finding with a specific intent.487 Once again, 
this critique reinforces the argument that the intention of the Parties is the pivotal 
criterion for deciding whether rules at the time of conclusion or the time of 
application of a treaty should be resorted to. What is also interesting is that if one 
accepts Thirlway’s argument, then the Court’s decision would seem to reinforce the 
clearly “textual based” solution to intertemporality proposed by Professor 
Linderdalk.488 
Another example where the intention of the Parties was the critical element of 
the Court’s decision-making process was the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case. In 
this case the ICJ had to determine whether the term ‘territorial status of Greece’ had 
been used as a ‘generic term’ in Greece's reservations to its accession of the 1928 
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Turkey and Greece 
disputed rights over the continental shelf adjacent to their territories in the Aegean 
Sea. Greece argued that its reservation did not apply to disputes over the continental 
shelf, since that notion was unknown in 1928. The Court made the following 
statement: 
 
the presumption necessarily arises that its meaning was intended to follow the evolution of 
the law and to correspond with the meaning attached to the expression by the law in force at 
any given time. 489 
 
In this case, despite the application of the notion of ‘generic terms’, the Court once 
again focused on the intention of the Parties as is evidenced by the wording “... 
intended to follow... ”. 
This search for the intention of the parties has been consistently reaffirmed in 
jurisprudence,490 and most recently in the Dispute Regarding Navigational and 
Related Rights case between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. In that case the ICJ held that: 
 
…where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been 
aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has 
                                                 
487 Thirlway, supra note 420, at 137; see also Fitzmaurice, supra note 423. 
488 Which will be analyzed infra. 
489 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, para. 77.  
490 See case-law mentioned supra. 
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been entered into for a very long period or is ‘of continuing duration’, the parties must be 
presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning.491 
 
The Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights case and the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf case are not the only examples of cases where the use of ‘generic 
terms’ has led to the Court identifying a ‘presumed intention’.492 In all cases where 
the notion of ‘generic terms’ has been used in order to explain the adoption of a 
dynamic interpretation, the entire judicial reasoning is based on the understanding that 
the use of such ‘generic terms’ actually leads to a presumption;493 that the parties 
intended those terms to follow the evolution of law.494 
Consequently, whether directly or indirectly, through the use of ‘generic 
terms’, the international courts and tribunals always look for the intention of the 
parties for guidance as to what solution should be given in case an intertemporal issue 
arises. 
Finally, one more case needs to be mentioned from more recent jurisprudence, 
which also acts as an introduction to the solutions to intertemporal problems based on 
‘object and purpose’ considerations; the main point of that case was the interpretation 
and the validity of the 1977 Treaty between Hungary and Czechoslovakia on the 
construction of a series of locks, in particular two hydroelectric power plants. The 
most relevant part of the decision stated: 
 
…the Court wishes to point out that newly developed norms of environmental law are 
relevant for the implementation of the Treaty and that the Parties could, by agreement, 
incorporate them through the application of Articles 15, 19 and 20 of the Treaty. These 
articles do not contain specific obligations of performance but require the parties, in 
carrying out their obligations to ensure that the quality of water in the Danube is not 
impaired and that nature is protected, to take new environmental norms into consideration 
when agreeing upon the means to be specified in the Joint Contractual Plan” ... By inserting 
these evolving provisions in the Treaty, the Parties recognized the potential necessity to 
adapt the Project. Consequently, the Treaty is not static, and is open to adapt to emerging 
norms of international law. By means of Articles 15 and 19, new environmental norms can 
be incorporated in the Joint Contractual Plan. The responsibility to do this was a joint 
                                                 
491 Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights case, para. 66. 
492 Apart from this notion of ‘presumed intention’, Letsas considers a variety of diverse typologies of 
intention and how, if at all, they may be used for the purposes of intertemporality and dynamic 
interpretation; some of these are ‘abstract intention’, ‘concrete intention’, ‘intentions of principle’ and 
‘intentions of detail’; in more detail see Letsas, supra note 423, at 70-1. 
493 See case-law analyzed supra on generic terms; Additionally see South-West Africa cases (Second 
Phase) Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 294; Petroleum Development LtD v. Sheikh of Abu 
Dhabi, Award of September 1951, 18 ILR 144. 
494 Or of facts, if one follows Georgopoulos’ construction, see Georgopoulos, supra  note 427, at 132-4. 
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responsibility. The obligations contained in Articles 15, 19 and 20 are, by definition, 
general and have to be transformed into specific obligations of performance through a 
process of consultation and negotiation. Their implementation thus requires a mutual 
willingness to discuss in good faith actual and potential environmental risks.495 
 
This passage of the Court’s decision is open to different interpretations. On the one 
hand, it can be argued that it follows the aforementioned mainstream approach of 
focusing on the intention of the parties496: “By inserting these evolving provisions in 
the Treaty, the Parties recognized the potential necessity to adapt the Project” 
(emphasis added). However, another interpretation is also possible, which brings us 
closer to the second school of interpretation i.e. ‘object and purpose’. 
 
2. Object and Purpose 
The above passage of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case is not as clear-cut as to 
whether the main focal point was indeed the intention of the Parties.497 Firstly, not 
only the vague wording in the critical passage raises questions, but also subsequent 
passages. For instance: 
 
By inserting these evolving provisions in the Treaty, the parties recognized the potential 
necessity to adapt the Project. Consequently, the Treaty is not static, and is open to adapt to 
emerging norms of international law … In order to evaluate the environmental risks, current 
standards must be taken into consideration. This is not only allowed by the wording of 
Articles 15 and 19, but even prescribed, to the extent that these articles impose a continuing 
- and thus necessarily evolving – obligation on the parties to maintain the quality of the 
water of the Danube and to protect nature. … Throughout the ages, mankind has, for 
economic and other reasons, constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often 
done without consideration of the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific 
insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind for present and future 
generations - of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and unabated pace, new 
norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a great number of instruments during 
the last two decades. Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new 
standards given proper weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also 
when continuing with activities begun in the past. 498 
 
All these passages seem to indicate that it not only the intentions of the Parties at play, 
but also the nature of the obligations, or in more general terms the very “object and 
                                                 
495 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, paras. 111-2. 
496 this is also reinforced by Judge Bedjaoui’s Separate Opinion; Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Bedjaoui, at 121-2. 
497 see more analytically: Fitzmaurice, supra note 423; French, supra note 10, at 296. 
498 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case, paras. 112 and 140. 
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purpose” of a treaty that might give indications as to whether a specific provision 
should be understood as a ‘generic’ one or not. This is exactly what Judge 
Weeramantry argues in his Separate Opinion. Viewing the treaties as ‘living 
instruments’, he argues that there are specific areas of law and treaties which are by 
their very purpose and nature more prone to an evolutive interpretation. A 
characteristic passage from Judge Weeramantry’s opinion states: 
 
Environmental concerns are live and continuing concerns whenever the project under which 
they arise may have been inaugurated. It matters little that an undertaking has been 
commenced under a treaty of 1950, if in fact that undertaking continues in operation in the 
year 2000. The relevant environmental standards that will be applicable will be those of the 
year 2000... Environmental rights are human rights. Treaties that affect human rights cannot 
be applied in such a manner as to constitute a denial of human rights as understood at the 
time of their application. A Court cannot endorse actions which are a violation of human 
rights by the standards of their time merely because they are taken under a treaty which 
dates back to a period when such action was not a violation of human rights499 
 
In this context mention needs to be made of the opinion of Judge Higgins. According 
to Higgins the object and purpose are of primordial importance in ascertaining the 
intention of the parties500. Such an approach “allows one to see that ‘generic clauses’ 
and human rights provisions are not really random exceptions to a general rule” but 
“an application of a wider principle -intention of the parties, reflected by reference to 
the object and purpose -that guides the law of treaties”.501 Similarly Engelen argues 
that in assessing the intention of the parties the rules of interpretation enshrined in 
Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT should be applied in their entirety. In such a process 
good faith and object and purpose play a seminal role.502 Based on the above, it is 
clear that the reason why international courts and tribunals may refer to the ‘object 
and purpose’ or the ‘nature’ of a treaty in order to establish whether that treaty (and its 
provisions) should be considered as evolutionary or static, is because these notions in 
                                                 
499 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry, at 114; see also Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Herczegh, at 178; for a more detailed analysis of the 
problems with the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project case see Afshin Al-Khavari, ‘The Passage of Time in 
International Environmental Disputes’, Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law 10 (2003), 
accessible at: http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n4/akhavari104.txt (last accessed on 25 
January 2010). 
500 Higgins, supra note 338, at 180.   
501 Ibid., at 181. 
502 Fransciscus A. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under International Law. A Study of Articles 
31, 32 and 33 of Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Their Application to Tax Treaties 
(Amsterdam: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 2004), at 291; for a more detailed analysis 
of the opinions of Higgins and Engelen, see Fitzmaurice, supra note 423. 
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the present context are reflective of the intention of the parties.503 Consequently, it is 
again the intention of the parties that is the key to any judgment on intertemporal 
issues. 
    
3. Intertemporal Approach based Solely on the Text 
Although in the interpretative process, the text itself is the point of departure504 in 
dealing with intertemporal law it has been only rarely raised as a valid approach. By 
this, the present author does not mean that the text has no use at all in addressing 
issues of intertemporality. What is meant is that the text has rarely been used as the 
sole justification, without being supplemented by references to the intention of the 
parties.  
In this context, Professor Linderfalk argues that another way to solve the 
problems of intertemporality with greater legal certainty than that offered by the 
previously analyzed approaches is by simply adhering strictly to the text and the terms 
used. By making use of the science of linguistics he identifies three main groups of 
‘referring expressions’:505  
i) ‘definite referring expressions’, which refer to one or more 
specific phenomena  
ii) ‘indefinite referring expressions’, which refer to one or more 
non-specific phenomena and  
iii) ‘generic referring expressions’, which refer to one or more 
phenomena as they change in time, i.e. the expression will follow the 
                                                 
503 See similarly Yasseen, who argues that the object and purpose of a treaty may assists in indentifying 
the presumed intention of the parties; Yasseen, supra note 71, at 66-7. 
504 as to whether this point of departure is merely chronological or an in-built form of hierarchical 
structure between the different schools of interpretation see Fitzmaurice and Merkouris, who opt for the 
former solution; Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Panos Merkouris, ‘Canons of Treaty Interpretation: 
Selected Case Studies From the World Trade Organization and the North American Free Trade 
Agreement’, in Issues of Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias and Panos Merkouris (eds.) (Leiden: BRILL/Martinus Nijhoff, 
forthcoming 2010).   
505 ‘referring expression’ is defined as an expression which is used by a person (‘utterer’) for the 
purpose of ‘reference’. ‘Reference’ in its turn is defined as the relationship between an expression and 
what the expression stands for in the world at the time that it is uttered; see Linderfalk, supra note 475, 
at 129. 
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changes that will occur in the meaning of those phenomena as time goes 
by.506 
As Linderfalk points out the main difference between these three groups is that 
‘definite referring expressions’ and ‘indefinite referring expressions’ “express 
propositions that are time-bound”, whereas “[w]here a generic expression is uttered, 
no relationship is established between the time of the utterance and the time when the 
referent was assumed to exist” (emphasis added).507 Based on this construction, the 
solution with respect to intertemporal problems would be the following:  
 
In the interpretation of a singular or general referring expression, we have stronger reasons 
for the assumption that the parties to the treaty expressed their agreement in such a way that 
(a) the meaning of the treaty agrees with the conventional language that existed at the time 
of conclusion, and that (b) the treaty will have effects consistent with the international law 
then in force... [whereas]... In the interpretation of a generic referring expression, if the 
referent of that expression is assumed to be alterable, we have stronger reasons for the 
assumption that the parties expressed their agreement in such a way that (a) the treaty 
agrees with the conventional language that exists at the moment of interpretation, and that 
(b) the treaty will have effects consistent with the international law then in force. If, on the 
other hand, the referent of the expression is assumed to be constant, then obviously we have 
no reason to depart from the assumption adopted in the interpretation of singular and 
general referring expressions.508 
 
4. Concluding Remarks on the Interrelationship between Intertemporality and 
the three Schools of Interpretation 
In the previous parts an analysis was made of intertemporal law as a doctrine and its 
function within the interpretative process in order to understand better the 
complexities of the issue. For this reason it is only natural to wonder why any solution 
to the problem of intertemporality should be the same for the problems of 
intertemporality in interpretation.509 One could argue extensively, that this distinction 
is merely an exercise in semantics or that the two are merely sides of the same coin 
and consequently, intertemporal considerations are the same thing no matter which 
field they appear in. However, the most straightforward argument is the simple fact 
that in the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT, when Article 56 fell through, the ILC 
                                                 
506 Ibid., at 130-1; An example of ‘generic referring expression’ is the term ‘territorial status of Greece’ 
which was the point of dispute in the Aegean Continental Shelf case. 
507 Ibid., at 132. 
508 Ibid., at 135. 
509 Ibid., at 128 et seq.; especially at 137-41. 
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discussed extensively whether it should be expressly incorporated in Article 31.510 
Despite the fact that they selected not to, the consensus was that implicitly 
intertemporal law was already part and parcel of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT. 
Consequently, any solutions to the intertemporal problems posed by the proposed 
Article 56 would by the same token apply to the identical problems raised by Article 
31(3)(c).511 
The analysis of the relevant jurisprudence confirmed that the ‘flexible 
approach’ was the one adopted constantly by international courts and tribunals. This 
is a logical corollary of the pacta sunt servanda principle that a State is bound only to 
the extent to which it has agreed. Consequently, both the ‘categorically static’ and the 
‘categorically dynamic’ approach fail to take into account the possibly different 
intents of different drafters. They are so rigid that they cannot offer a viable solution 
to the problem of intertemporality. 
This ‘flexible’ approach leaves, however, open the door to the problem of 
which school of interpretation is more accurate and offers greater legal certainty when 
dealing with intertemporality issues. The previous analysis indicated that all three 
schools of interpretation have been argued to offer valid solution to the intertemporal 
problem. So which is the one most suited for the challenges of intertemporal law? The 
answer is none. Not because they are all problematic, but because they all have the 
same starting point and are all reflective of the search for the same thing, i.e. the 
intention of the parties. 
To elaborate on this: The majority of the jurisprudence and the writers, as 
evidenced by the previous analysis leaned towards searching for the intention of the 
parties in order to find out the rules of which period were applicable, those 
contemporary to the conclusion of the treaty or its interpretation.512 However, the 
same can be said for the proponents of the ‘object and purpose’ and the ‘text’. The 
object and purpose of a treaty as Higgins stated in her seminal work on 
                                                 
510 See supra analysis of the VCLT travaux préparatoires. 
511 A solution which was also endorsed during the ILC discussions on the Articles on Law of Treaties. 
512 Additionally to the ones mentioned supra see also: Arechaga, (A/CN.4/SR.729), in YILC (1964), 
Vol.I, at 34, para. 10; Taslim O. Elias, The Modern Law of Treaties (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1974), 
at 77; Jiménez de Arechaga, supra note 475, at 48-9; Sinclair, supra note 53, at 139-40; Higgins, supra 
note 338, at 181; Yasseen, supra note 71, at 27 ; de Visscher, supra note 345, at 66-7 ; Georgopoulos, 
supra note 427, at 144-7 . 
 119
intertemporality are essential in ascertaining the intention of the parties513 and thus 
‘generic clauses’ are merely “an application of a wider principle - intention of the 
parties, reflected by reference to the object and purpose - that guides the law of 
treaties”.514 Consequently, object and purpose as far as intertemporal law is concerned 
are just one more way to identify the true intentions of the drafters. 
The same thoughts apply to Linderfalk’s construction. His categorization and 
proposed solutions based on the notion of ‘referring expressions’ may be valid and 
quite useful in judicial practice, however, what they also seek to identify is the 
intention of the parties. This is so for two reasons, which, in a matter befitting 
temporal considerations of law, have as a point of departure two diametrically 
opposed points in time:  
i) ex ante i.e. prior to the conclusion of the treaty -  whether a 
definite, indefinite or generic referring expression is selected, is not an 
automated process. On the contrary, it is based on the will of the utterer, 
which in the present case is the drafter of the treaty being interpreted. 
Consequently, the selection of one group over another is a clear indication 
of the true intent of the drafter.  
ii) ii) ex post facto i.e. during the interpretation of a treaty - not all 
terms are immediately evident as to which group they belong to. This will 
depend on the context and most importantly the intent of the utterer. 
Consequently, in order to categorise the terms in question in one group 
over the other, the interpreter has to, once again, seek the true intention of 
the parties. 
Consequently, even Linderfalk’s construction although relying on the text, is 
also premised on finding the true intention of the parties. 
Due to the above, all of the aforementioned approaches are essentially a res 
unum. They are tools to reach the same goal; the identification of the intention of the 
                                                 
513 Higgins, supra note 338, at 180.   
514 Ibid., at 181; the same is also argued by Engelen, supra note 502, at 291. 
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parties. The only difference being as to how many stages are interposed i.e. either 
directly or through reference to object and purpose or the text515 
One final issue needs to be raised. Based on the above considerations how 
should the term ‘rules of international law’ of Article 31(3)(c) be interpreted? It is to 
this exact point, that all our previous analysis has led us. The term ‘rules of 
international law’ is itself a ‘generic term’. Its correct interpretation therefore would 
require us trying to find the intention of the parties; whether they wanted it to be 
‘rules at the time of the conclusion of the treaty’ or ‘rules at the time of the 
interpretation of the treaty’. The travaux préparatoires516 clearly showed that no 
single solution was acceptable and therefore the members of the ILC decided to be 
silent on it and not to make any reference at all in the text. It is exactly this silence 
that indicates the ‘generic’ nature of Article 31(3)(c), i.e. that it was intended to be a 
generic term. Since no one single solution was possible, the only road was flexibility. 
This was the only solution. If the provision, which supposedly enshrines intertemporal 
elements, were in interpreting itself to select either the ‘static’ or the ‘dynamic’ 
approach, that would be a paradox, a self-contradiction. On the one hand, for itself it 
would have selected either the ‘dynamic’ or ‘static’ approach, and on the other, for all 
the rest treaties to which it would be applied it would have selected the flexible 
approach. Consequently, the only logical conclusion is that the ‘rules of international 
law’ are to be interpreted each time based on the treaty under consideration and the 
intentions of the parties. If the drafters wanted an evolutive interpretation, then also 
the ‘rules of international law’ would similarly be the ones contemporary to the 
interpretation. If not, then the relevant rules would be the ones contemporary to the 
conclusion of the treaty.517 
 
                                                 
515  Without this meaning that although indirect they are more complex and time-consuming. On the 
contrary, in some cases they may allow for a more expedited identification of the intention of the 
Parties. 
516 As analyzed supra. 
517 This issue also touches upon the problem of later supervening custom, which is analyzed infra in 
Chapter III, in the Sections on lex posterior and lex specialis. The solution adopted here, is in 
conformity with the analysis in that Section. 
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IV. Conclusion 
In this Chapter the focus of analysis remained on the text of Article 31(3)(c). 
However, whereas in Chapter I the written elements were scrutinized, in Chapter II, 
the unwritten elements, those that were intentionally left outside the text of the 
provision were examined i.e. references to intertemporal law. The discussions in the 
ILC and the Institut de Droit International revealed that the topic of intertemporal law 
was such a complex issue that the deletion of any reference to it, both as an individual 
Draft Article and within Article 31(3)(c), was considered to be the optimal solution in 
order to safeguard the utility of Article 31 and facilitate the achievement of a 
consensus.  
The relevant jurisprudence as well revealed that international courts and 
tribunals did not adopt a uniform approach, but oscillated between strict application of 
the principle of contemporaneity and that of dynamic/evolutive interpretation. Despite 
the seemingly irreconcilable differences between these approaches, the jurisprudence 
revealed that they share a common element; Regardless of whether the various 
decisions focused on the ‘intention’, the ‘object and purpose’ and/or the ‘text’, all 
these approaches were reflective of one singular and overarching criterion; the search 
for the intention of the parties. It is this intention that, as Higgins acknowledged, is 
they key to understanding and confronting intertemporal law. Since, therefore, any 
approach to intertemporal law requires a degree of flexibility based on the intentions 
of the parties, a similar approach to Article 31(3)(c) is prescribed. The question, 
whether the term ‘rules of international law’ should be understood as rules applicable 
‘at the time of the conclusion of the treaty’ or ‘at the time of the interpretation of a 
treaty’ cannot be given ex ante a singular response.518 The solution will depend each 
time on the interpreted treaty and the intention of its parties. In that sense the term 
‘relevant rules’ of Article 31(3)(c) is a ‘generic term’. 
                                                 
518 With the obvious exception of jus cogens norms, which as analyzed supra are a limit of 
intertemporal law. 
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Part II: Article 31(3)(c) and the Principle of Systemic 
Integration from a Systemic Point of View 
In the first part of this thesis, the analysis focused on both the written and unwritten 
elements of Article 31(3)(c). The common element of these two chapters was that the 
starting point was the VCLT provision itself; starting from Article 31(3)(c) what was 
examined was the function, the limits and limitations of this provision and how these 
may reflect on the structure of the international system itself. However, such an 
analysis would be incomplete if it stopped at that point. It is not only Article 31(3)(c) 
that can affect our understanding of the system of international law; the reverse is also 
possible. For this reason, in the second part of the thesis, instead of using Article 
31(3)(c) as point of departure for the ensuing analysis, it will be the system of 
international law that will serve this function.  
Chapter III will examine whether the so-called principles of conflict resolution 
have any bearing at all in the interpretative process envisaged by Article 31(3)(c). 
Conflict of norms has always been considered an unavoidable,519 yet not 
insurmountable, by-product of an incomplete system. The conflict-resolution tools 
that have been proposed and applied in international jurisprudence to address this 
systemic flaw will be scrutinized to reveal to what extent they can also apply within 
the stricter confines of Article 31(3)(c). Finally, in Chapter IV the analysis will be 
taken one step further520 and focus on one of the sources of international law i.e. 
custom. The question that will be addressed is whether this source of international law 
can be an object of interpretation and if this is answered in the affirmative what role 
can (or has) Article 31(3)(c) played in this process. By starting from the written 
elements of the provision itself, moving on the unwritten ones, then to resolution of 
conflicts and finally to the very sources of international law, no stone will have been 
left unturned and no aspect of Article 31(3)(c) unexamined. 
 
                                                 
519 Wilfred Jenks, ‘Conflict of Law-Making Treaties’, BYIL 30 (1953): 401, at 429; Christopher 
Borgen, ‘Resolving Treaty Conflicts’, George Washington International Law Review 37 (2005): 57 et 
seq. 
520 Perhaps one step back would be more accurate, considering that we are moving backwards from 
more specialized provisions to the sources of international law, with the proverbial Kelsenian 
Grundnorm being the absolute starting point. 
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Chapter III: Principles of Conflict Resolution within the 
Interpretative Process of Article 31(3)(c) 
In Chapter 1 the analysis focused on the various disputed elements of Article 31(3)(c). 
Special care was taken to analyze the term ‘relevant’. The conclusion that was 
reached was that in order to determine relevancy the criterion to be used was the 
proximity criterion, the four manifestations of which corresponded to the three 
schools of interpretation and temporal considerations.521  
However, the question that logically arises, is whether this is the only stage of 
the interpretative process of Article 31(3)(c). The provision itself is silent on the 
matter. Neither do the travaux préparatoires shed any light. Therefore, we need to 
examine this question logically. The principle of systemic integration will be invoked, 
in case of a dispute.522 Consider the following hypothetical situation. In a dispute 
between States A and B, the question is the interpretation of a particular provision of 
treaty c. Both States A and B, invoke Article 31(3)(c) VCLT. State A, proposes an 
interpretation of treaty c based on a rule or set of rules523 a. State B, on the other hand, 
offers a different interpretation based on a rule or set of rules b. In order for there to 
be a dispute on this issue of interpretation of treaty c, the interpretations have to be 
conflicting. If they were not conflicting then there would be no dispute. Essentially, 
rules a and b yield two different and conflicting interpretations of treaty c, 
interpretation c1 and interpretation c2, with c1 ≠ c2 and c1 ∩ c2 = O.524 Since, then, we 
are dealing with two conflicting interpretations based on the suggested application of 
31(3)(c), to what extent do the principles of conflict resolution apply? 
                                                 
521 See analysis of the proximity criterion at Chapter I. 
522 A dispute is a “disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests” 
(emphasis added); The Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. the United Kingdom), 
Judgment of 30 August 1924, PCIJ, PCIJ Series A No. 2, 6, at 11 (hereinafter Mavrommatis Palestine 
Concessions case); a case where a “claim of one party is positively opposed by the other” (emphasis 
added); South-West Africa Cases (Preliminary Objections) (Ethiopia and Liberia v. South Africa), 
Judgment of 21 December 1962, ICJ Rep. 1962, 319, at 328 (hereinafter South-West Africa cases 
(Preliminary Objections); similarly see, Case Concerning the  Northern Cameroons (Preliminary 
Objections) (Cameroon v. the United Kingdom), Judgment of 2 December 1963, ICJ Rep. 1963, 15, at 
27 (hereinafter Northern Cameroons case); Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of 30 
March 1950, ICJ Rep. 1950, 65, at 74 (hereinafter Interpretation of Peace Treaties Advisory Opinion); 
Headquarters Agreement Advisory Opinion, para. 35.  
523 Customary or conventional makes no difference. We shall return to this point infra. 
524 c1 ≠ c2 means that c1 is different from c2 and c1 ∩ c2 = O means that c1 and c2 cannot apply in the 
same case simultaneously. 
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In a perfect system, structured in the form of the pyramid as put forward by 
Kelsen in his Pure Theory of Law525, “with a transcendental Grundnorm at the apex of 
the pyramid … it [would] always be possible to determine the relationship between 
two or more norms”.526 Kelsen went as far as claiming that a legal system cannot have 
conflict of norms. A system founded on a Grundnorm cannot allow for two equally 
valid norms to contradict each other as this would threaten the unity of the system527 
and would indicate that there was something flawed with the Grundnorm itself, which 
would be an argumentum ad absurdum.528 
However, this is not the case with international law in its current form. As the 
ILC Study Group on Fragmentation of International Law pointed out  
 
normative conflict is endemic to international law. Because of the spontaneous, 
decentralized and unhierarchical nature of international law-making – law-making by 
custom and by treaty – lawyers have always had to deal with heterogeneous materials at 
different levels of generality and with different normative force.529 
 
It comes then as no surprise, especially if we take into account the proliferation of 
international courts and tribunals and the multiplicity of law-making processes530 that 
we have witnessed in the last few decades, that conflict of norms has, once again, 
                                                 
525 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970). 
526 Anja Lindroos, ‘Addressing Norm Conflicts in a Fragmented Legal System: The Doctrine of Lex 
Specialis’, NJIL 74 (2005): 27, at 27. 
527 See contra Errich Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issues in International Law, 
WTO Law, and Legal Theory, (Oxford: OUP, 2009), at 14. 
528 Kelsen, supra note 525 ; similarly Paul Foriers, ‘Les Antinomies en Droit’, in Les Antinomies en 
Droit, Chaïm Perelman (ed.) (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1965), 20, at 22-3; Charles Huberlant, ‘Antinomies 
et Recours aux Principes Généraux’, in Les Antinomies en Droit, Chaïm Perelman (ed.) (Bruxelles: 
Bruylant, 1965), 204, at 212. However, Kelsen later on changed his mind on the subject. The reason for 
this was that he acknowledged that conflict of norms is a conflict of will, not a logical contradiction; 
Hans Kelsen, ‘Derogation’, in Essays in Jurisprudence in Honour of Roscoe Pound, Ralph A. 
Newmann (ed.) (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrili, 1962), 339-61.  
529 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 486 (emphasis added); Pauwelyn offers a variety of 
additional reasons, such as the multitude of law-makers both at the international and the domestic level, 
the time factor, the move from a law on ‘co-existence’ to a law on ‘co-operation’, globalization, the 
emerging hierarchy of values and the proliferation of judicial settlement of disputes; Pauwelyn, supra 
note 51, at 13-24; see also Nele Matz-Lück (2009), ‘Treaties, Conflicts between’, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 2, accessible at www.mpepil.com (last accessed on 25 
January 2010). 
530 See Brown Chester, ‘The Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Finding your Way 
through the Maze’, Melbourne Journal of International Law 3 (2002): 453-75; Thomas Buergnethal, 
‘Proliferation of International Courts and tribunals: Is it Good or is it Bad?’, Leiden Journal of 
International Law 14 (2001): 267-75; Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial 
Organs: Institutional and Substantive Issues: The International Court of Justice and other International 
Courts’, in Proliferation of International Organizations: Legal Issues, Niels M. Blokker and Henricus 
G. Schermers (eds.) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International), 251-78. 
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come to the forefront of academic research.531 In international law there is a 
presumption against conflict.532 However, this is not a panacea to the issue of norm 
conflict. This presumption “may eliminate certain potential conflicts; it cannot 
eliminate the problem of conflict”.533 The same thing can be said about harmonization 
through interpretation, which has been considered a tool for conflict prevention or at 
least resolution.534 Nevertheless this tool has its limitations; as Pauwelyn very 
eloquently described it “[harmonization] may resolve apparent conflicts; it cannot 
resolve genuine conflicts”.535 
The common problem that everybody dealing with conflict of norms faces is a 
definitional one; how do we define conflict. 
 
                                                 
531 See Michael Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law’ BYIL 47 (1974): 273; 
Akehurst, in this article had submitted that “the problem of hierarchy of the sources of international law 
has seldom given risen to difficulties in practice”. To his credit, though, Akehurst had the foresight to 
interject that despite this “there is no guarantee that that state of affairs will continue”, at 274; Nguyen 
Quoc Dinh, ‘Evolution de la Jurisprudence de la Cour Internationale de la Haye Relative au Problème 
de la Hiérarchie des Normes Conventionelles’, in Mélanges Offerts à Marcel Walline, le Juge et le 
Droit Public, Georges Vedel and Marcel Waline (eds.) (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, 1974), Vol. I, 215; Maarten Bos, ‘The Hierarchy among the Recognized Manifestations 
(‘Sources’) of International Law’, NILR 25 (1978): 334; Emmanuel Roucounas, ‘Engagements 
Parallèles et Contradictoires’, RCADI  206 (1987/VI): 9; Wladyslaw Czapliński and Gennady 
Danilenko, ‘Conflict of Norms in International Law’, NYIL 21 (1990): 3; Seyed Ali Sadat-Akhavi, 
Methods of Resolving Conflicts between Treaties, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff: 2003); Pauwelyn, supra 
note 51; ILC Study Group, supra note 16. For earlier discussions on the issue see: Charles Rousseau, 
‘De la Compatibilité des Normes Juridiques Contradictoires dans l’ Ordre International’, RGDIP 39 
(1932): 139; Hans Aufricht, ‘Superssession of Treaties in International Law’, Cornell Law Quarterly 
37 (1952): 655; Jenks, supra note 519. 
532 Aufricht, supra note 531, at 657; Jenks, supra note 519, at 427-9; Akehurst, supra note 531, at 275; 
Wolfram Karl, ‘Conflicts between Treaties’, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. VII, 
Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.) (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984), 467, at 470; Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, 
Second Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/87), in YILC (1954)Vol. II: 123, at 137-8; Pauwelyn, 
supra note 51, at 212 et seq.; Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, para. 37, accessible at www.mpepil.com (last accessed on 
25 January 2010); see also the Haya de la Torre case where the solution and corresponding explanation 
given by the court seems to have been prompted by this ‘presumption against conflict’; Haya de la 
Torre Case (Colombia v. Peru), Judgment of 13 June 1951, ICJ Rep. 1951, 71, at 82 (hereinafter Haya 
de la Torre case); Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, Panel Report 
adopted on 23 July 1998, WTO, WT/DS54/R, WT/DS59/R, WT/DS64/R, para. 14.28 (hereinafter 
Indonesia – Autos); Case Concerning Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Preliminary Objections) 
(Portugal v. India), Judgment of 26 November 1957, ICJ Rep. 1957, 125, at 142 (hereinafter Right of 
Passage (Preliminary Objections) case); Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, 
paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, ICJ Rep. 1962, 151, at 168 and para. 
42 (Certain Expenses case).  
533 Jenks, supra note 519, at 429. 
534 Matz-Lück, supra note 529, para. 20; Rousseau mentions that such ‘adaptation’ is an autonomous 
mechanism to harmonize diverging treaties; Rousseau, supra note 531; on the principle of 
harmonization see Georg Schwarzenberger, International Law, vol. I: International Law as Applied by 
International Courts and Tribunals (London: Stevens, 1957, 3rd ed.), at 474; Czapliński and Danilenko, 
supra note 531, at 13; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 240-4.  
535 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 272.  
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I. Definition 
The most cited definition of conflict is the one provided by Jenks: “A conflict in the 
strict sense of direct incompatibility arises only where a party to the two treaties 
cannot simultaneously comply with its obligations under both treaties”.536 All other 
cases are not conflicts, they are merely divergences. Jenks, concedes the fact that such 
a divergence may “prevent a party to both the divergent instruments from taking 
advantage of certain provisions of one of them … [and that] from a practical point of 
view [this divergence may] be as serious as a conflict”537. Despite this, however, he 
maintained his strict definition, even though such divergences may end up with one 
agreement losing “much or most of its practical value”.538 
Marceau suggests that definitions of normative conflict depend on one’s pre-
conception of the international legal system and that “[i]f one believes that 
international commitments should be understood in the light of some coherent 
international order, one favours narrow definitions of conflict.539 Similarly, narrow 
definitions have been adopted by a variety of authors540 and in international case-
law.541  
On the other hand, wider definitions have also been proposed as being more 
attune to the reality and needs of the international legal system;542 concerns which 
                                                 
536 Jenks, supra note 519, at 426. 
537 Id. 
538 Ibid., at 427. 
539 Marceau, supra note 51, at 1082 (emphasis added). 
540 Joel Trachtman and Gabrielle Marceau, ‘TBT SPS, and GATT: A Map of WTO Law and Domestic 
Regulation’, in The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2003, Federico Ortino and Ernst-Ulrich 
Petersmann (eds.) (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004), 275, at 330-1; Karl, supra note 532,  
at 468; Wolfrum and Matz opt for a broader definition, than that of Jenks, yet still it does not 
incorporate scenarios of conflict between obligations and permissions; Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele 
Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, (Berlin: Springer, 2003), at 4-11. 
541 The panel in Indonesia – Autos in no unclear terms opted for the strict definition of conflict:  
 
In international law for a conflict to exist between two treaties … [their] provisions must conflict, in 
the sense that the provisions must impose mutually exclusive obligations … there is conflict when 
two (or more) treaty instruments contain obligations which cannot be complied with simultaneously 
(emphasis added)  
 
Indonesia – Autos at footnote 649 (however, see Pauwelyn who argues that the Panel was in error in 
this judgment; Pauwelyn,  supra note 51, at 367); the Panel in Turkey – Textiles moved along similar 
lines; Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products, Panel Report adopted on 19 
November 1999, WTO, WT/DS34/R, para. 9.88 (hereinafter Turkey – Textiles).  
542 Czapliński and Danilenko, supra note 531, at 12-3; Pauwelyn distinguishes between two types of 
conflict: i) those where one of the two norms is invalid or illegal (this would be the case of a rule 
conflicting with a jus cogens norm). This he calls an “inherent normative conflict”. The result of such a 
conflict is the disappearance of one of the two norms, and ii) the remaining genuine conflicts, the 
 127
have also found their way in international case-law.543 According to these authors the 
problem with a strict definition of conflict is that it does not allow for a conflict to 
arise between a prescriptive norm and a permission.544 It also “will often favour the 
most stringent obligation”,545 as was shown in the Indonesia – Autos and Turkey – 
Textiles cases.  
Another criticism of the strict definition is that it does not take into 
consideration that the will of the states is not written in stone, it fluctuates with time. 
Such a definition does not allow for the scenario that States may wish at a later time 
to mitigate their obligations by establishing permissions.546 This also means that 
principles of conflict resolution such as lex posterior and lex specialis, would be 
restricted to a smaller set of rules and would be seriously hindered in identifying the 
true ‘current state of consent’ of the States. 
Finally, Vranes argues in favour of a wide definition based on definitional 
considerations. There is a clear distinction between analytical/lexical and 
synthetic/stipulative definitions. An analytical definition examines the way a term is 
                                                                                                                                            
“conflicts in the applicable law”. Both norms are and remain valid. The result of this conflict is simply 
giving priority in a specific case to one rule over another; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at Chapters 6 and 
7, and especially at 176-80. This leads him to conclude that “[c]onflict of norms is essentially governed 
by priority rules and state responsibility, not by rules invalidating either of the conflicting norms”; 
Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 436; Aufricht, supra note 531, at 655-6; Jean Salmon, ‘Les Antinomies en 
Droit International Public’, in Les Antinomies en Droit, Chaïm Perelman (ed.) (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 
1965), 285; ILC, Commentaries on the Draft Articles Article on State Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) (A/56/10 Supplement 10), at 358; Jan Mus, ‘Conflicts between 
Treaties in International Law’, NILR 45 (1998): 208, at 209-11; Rousseau, supra note 531, at 133-92; 
Kelsen, supra note 528, at 349; Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, at 5-6, 35 and 38 (who argues i) that one 
of the norms in conflict at least should be a mandatory one and ii) that two norms having a ‘cancelling 
effect’ are not in conflict); ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 25; Against the suggestion that a 
conflict can arise only between rules that deal with the ‘same subject-matter’, the ILC Study Group 
argues that this would lead to a situation where  
 
[e]verything would be in fact dependent on argumentative success in pigeon-holing legal instruments 
as having to do with ‘trade’, instead of ‘environment’ [and other similar situations]…. The criterion of 
‘subject-matter’ leads to a reductio ad absurdum  
 
ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 22. 
543 The Lockerbie case, where the ICJ dealt with an explicit right under the Montreal Convention and 
an obligation emanating from a UN Security Council Resolution. In that case the Court acknowledged 
the existence of a conflict between an obligation and a right since it made use of Article 103; 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America), Preliminary Objections, 
Judgment of 27 February 1998, ICJ Rep. 1998, 115 (hereinafter Lockerbie case); see also European 
Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, Panel Report adopted on 
25 September 1997, WTO, WT/DS27/R, para. 7.159 and footnote 728 (hereinafter EC – Bananas). 
544 Vranes, supra note 527, at 10; despite the fact that even Jenks himself had recognized that such 
‘divergences’ may be as serious as a conflict; Jenks, supra note 519, at 426. 
545 Marceau, supra note 51, at 1085. 
546 Vranes, supra note 527, at 19. 
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being used in language, “it is an assertion concerned with past or present usage and 
possesses truth-value”, whereas a stipulative definition “establishes the meaning of a 
word; it thus takes the form of a command or proposal on the meaning of a given 
term. Therefore, it cannot be true or false”.547 Since, in the present case, we are 
dealing with a stipulative definition there is no need to opt for a strict definition. It 
would serve no purpose.548 
Although a wider definition of conflict seems to be adopted by most 
academics and to be more in line with the need for unity in international law, no 
consensus exists. However, regardless of which of the two definitional approaches to 
conflict one might adopt, this does not affect the application of the principles of 
conflict resolution within Article 31(3)(c). In this case we do not have a conflict of 
norms as such, but a conflict of norms on an interpretative level. The norms do not 
conflict with each other directly, but within the process of Article 31(3)(c). Reference 
to norms A and B, leads to two conflicting interpretations549 of norm C, i.e. 
interpretations c1 and c2 respectively. These two interpretations cannot both be 
adhered two. One must give way to the other. Ergo, they are in conflict, a conflict 
which can be traced back to the very norms (in this case, norms A and B) which led to 
these interpretations. Furthermore, even if the norm being interpreted is a permissive 
one, this would not ipso facto render this case as one which is not a conflict, even if a 
strict definition of conflict has been adopted.550 The interpretation of a permissive 
norm is not a permissive norm itself. Interpretation is a statement on how a norm must 
be understood. Consequently, if norm C is of the form: “State A may do action B”, 
the interpretation of the aforementioned norm is a statement of the following form: 
“Norm C must be understood as meaning the following: ….”. Under this prism, even 
a strict definition of conflict poses no problems for the application of the principles of 
conflict resolution within Article 31(3)(c). 
                                                 
547 Ibid., at 11. 
548 Ibid., at 20; on an extensive analysis of how conflict is to be understood, and a description of 
conflicts arising between obligations and permissions, contrary and contradictory conflicts, and how 
they are illustrated through the use of the ‘deontic square’ see Vranes, supra note 527, at 25-30. 
549 It is no coincidence that the term ‘conflicting’ has consistently been used to describe the two 
different interpretations of the same norm, presented by the disputing parties; see Martti Koskenniemi, 
From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), at 
337; United States – Continued Existence and Application of Zeroing Methodology, Appellate Body 
Report adopted on 19 February 2009, WTO, WT/DS350/AB/R, para. 273 (hereinafter US-Zeroing). 
550 No problems would arise if the wider definitions of conflict are adopted.   
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The principles of conflict resolution that we will be examining are the ones 
that are generally accepted as the four most important in conflict resolution, i.e. jus 
cogens norms, conflict clauses, lex posterior derogat priori and lex specialis derogat 
generali.551 The common element of all principles of conflict resolution is that the 
solutions they offer are influenced by considerations of the triad of: i) the contractual 
freedom of states, ii) the pacta sunt servanda principle and iii) the pacta tertiis nec 
nocent nec prosunt.552 However, before we proceed with the analysis of each of these 
principles one further issue needs to be tackled. 
The previous analysis showed that the definition of conflict does not pose any 
problems as the application of the principles of conflict resolution within Article 
31(3)(c), but what about their nature? Article 31(3)(c) talks about ‘rules’. In Chapter 
1, the analysis of the travaux préparatoires and the relevant jurisprudence showed 
that this covered general principles, custom and conventional rules, with some 
conditions for the last. Jus cogens norms clearly fall within |Article 31(3)(c) and so do 
the conflict clauses. Although they are conventional rules, nevertheless, if the 
instrument in which they are incorporated is ‘relevant’ for purposes of Article 
31(3)(c) then, by the same token, they also fall within Article 31(3)(c). Consequently, 
the only problematic principles are lex posterior derogat priori and lex specialis 
derogat generali.  
Shwarzenberger felt strongly about these principles not being either principles 
or rules. 
 
In view of the self-eliminating character of these maxims and counter-maxims it is hardly 
arguable that any of them epitomizes a rules of international customary law. This aspect of 
the matter alone debars any of these maxims from being accepted as a general principle of 
law recognized by civilized nations.553 …. These maxims are neither legal rules nor 
principles. They merely express in the form of quasi-rules conclusions reached by means of 
the logical technique of treaty interpretation. Yet this method, like any other method of 
treaty interpretation, derives such justification as it may claim from assisting in the 
application of the jus aequum rule to the task of determining the legal effects of treaties. 
(emphasis added)554 
 
                                                 
551 Roucounas, supra note 531, at 56 et seq. and 76 et seq.  
552 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 327-8; Vranes, supra note 527, at 43. 
553 However, on this point see contra Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procès Verbaux of the Meetings 
of the Advisory Committee of Jurists: 16 June – 24 July 1920 with Annexes (The Hague: van 
Langenhuysen, 1920), at 335-7 (hereinafter Procès Verbaux). 
554 Schwarzenberger, supra note 534, at 472-3. 
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However, Schwarzenberger seems to stand relatively alone in his negation.555 First 
and foremost, in the preparatory work for the drafting of the PCIJ Statute it was felt 
by the Advisory Committee of Jurists that such maxims could be considered as 
examples of general principles of law.556 Ever since, the lex posterior and lex 
specialis have been the subject of various characterizations: 
i) general principles557 
ii) rules of interpretation558 
iii) principles of interpretation and/or conflict resolution559 
iv) ‘subordinate (or functionally equivalent) interpretative 
criteria’560 
v) guidelines561 
                                                 
555 Linderfalk rejects lex specialis as a customary rule of interpretation; Although he remains silent on 
the possibility of lex specialis as a customary rule of conflict resolution; Ulf Linderfalk, On the 
Interpretation of Treaties (Dordrecht: Springer, 2007), at 311-2; contra Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty 
Law and Practice (Cambridge: CUP, 2000), at 201; Mus, supra note 542, at 218; de Visscher, supra 
note 345, at  104-5; McLachlan, supra note 10, at 291; also Mavroidis and Howse seem to suggest that 
lex specialis may not form part of customary law, but that is not to say that it cannot be a general 
principle of law; Robert Howse and Petros Mavroidis, ‘Europe’s Evolving Regulatory Strategy fro 
GMOs: the Issue of Consistency with WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine’, Fordham International Law 
Journal 24 (2000): 317, at 322-3. 
556 Procès Verbaux, supra note 553, at 335-7. 
557 Sinclair and Waldock in the Vienna Conference itself talked about the principle of lex specialis, 
while discussing the limits of article 30 VCLT, without any objections being raised; Sinclair, in United 
Nations, United Nations Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, Second Session, Vienna, 9 April – 
22 May 1969, Official Records (New York, NY: United Nations, 1970), at 222 (hereinafter Vienna 
Conference II); Waldock, Vienna Conference II, at 253; Aufricht, supra note 531, at 655; Czapliński 
and Danilenko, argue that when applied to conflict they are not “rules of interpretation but rather … 
general rules of law accepted by all legal systems”.; Czapliński and Danilenko, supra note 531, at 21; 
similarly Egbert Vierdag, ‘The Time of the ‘Conclusion’ of a Multilateral Treaty: Article 30 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Related Provisions’, BYIL 59 (1989): 75, at 96; 
Rousseau, also says that they are principles of international law, however he raises concerns as to their 
‘transposability’ into the international legal system; Rousseau, supra note 531, at 156. 
558 Malgosia Fitzmaurice and Olufemi Elias, Contemporary Issues in the Law of Treaties (Utrecht: 
Eleven International Publishing, 2005), at 322; McNair, supra note 186, at 219; Sinclair, supra note 53, 
at 93; Ilmar Tammelo, ‘Tensions and Tenebrae in treaty Interpretation’, in Les Antinomies en Droit, 
Chaïm Perelman (ed.), (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1965), 337 et seq. 
559 Quincy Wright, ‘Conflicts between International Law and Treaties’, AJIL 11 (1917): 579; Rousseau, 
supra note 531, at 150-6; Jenks, supra note 519, at 444-6; Akehurst, supra note 531, at 273; Czapliński 
and Danilenko, supra note 531, at 19-22; Sinclair, supra note 53, at 98; Karl, supra note 532, at 937-8; 
Aust, supra note 555, at 201; Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet, Droit International Public, (Paris: 
Librairie Générale de Droti et de Jurisprudence, 2002), at 270; Wolfrum and Matz, supra note 540, at 
152-8. 
560 They are “no more than subordinate interpretative criteria (or at least functionally equivalent criteria 
in the search for the ‘correct’ sense of the conflicting rules”; Vranes, supra note 527, at 49. 
561 These guidelines are seen “as techniques of ‘second order justification’ that enable the solution of 
hard cases (i.e. cases where no ‘automatic’ decisions are possible) and that look either to the 
consequences of one’s decision or to the systemic coherence and consistency of the decision with the 
legal system (seen as a purposive system)”; ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 36 and note 35; 
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vi) presumptions562 
vii)  system rules563 
viii) principles of legal logic564 
Despite the different terms employed their common element is that the lex 
posterior and lex specialis principles are considered by all as either customary 
international law or as general principles. In either case, they clearly fall within the 
limits of the term ‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c). This holds true even for those cases 
where terms other than ‘custom’ or ‘principle’ have been employed. For instance, 
Pauwelyn who argues that they are ‘principles of legal logic’, earlier had identified 
four categories of general principles of law. ‘Principles of legal logic’ were the fourth 
category amongst them and even more, the canons of treaty interpretation, which have 
consistently been recognized as customary international law in international 
jurisprudence, were classified in the same group.565 
Having established that the principles of conflict resolution are ‘rules’ within 
the meaning of Article 31(3)(c), we can now proceed with the examination of the 
content of each principle, their problematic areas and their inherent limitations. These 
are essential for our theoretical construction,566 because whereas in classical 
                                                                                                                                            
referring to Neil McCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), at 
100-28. 
562 Lex specialis is a “presumption that the authority laying down a general rule intended to leave room 
for the application of more specific rules which already existed or which might be created in the 
future”; Akehurst, supra note 531, at 273; similarly see Nancy Kontou, The Termination of Treaties in 
Light of New Customary International Law (Oxford: Clarendon press, 1994), at 142. 
563 Lex posterior as a ‘system rule’. A ‘system rule’ is a rule which is necessary for the proper 
functioning of a legal system; Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, at 211; see similarly Vranes who argues 
that they are dictated by the very structure of the international system itself, otherwise “the system’s 
legal structure would be led ad absurdum”.Vranes, supra note 527, at 46. 
564 They are not  
 
absolute and self-standing norms. They are more practical methods in the search for the ‘current 
expression of state consent. They deduce logical consequences from the fact that a norm is later in 
time or more specific … In that sense they are rather ‘principles of legal logic’. 
 
Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 388. 
565 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 126; citing Daniel P. O’Connell, International Law, Vol. I (London: 
Stevens, 1970), at 252-3. 
566 As will be analyzed in more detail infra in Section XI. 
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normative conflict they would lead the judge to a Zugzwang,567 as he would be unable 
to find a solution, in the interpretative process this drawback does not apply.568 
 
II. Hierarchy – Jus Cogens 
The issue of identifying hierarchical relationships between identical or different 
sources of law is as old as society itself. Of course, in those first instances the issue 
was more a question of hierarchy between jus divinum and jus hominum rather than 
between different sources within the same human legal system.569 Cicero, as well, in 
De inventione argues that  
 
First of all, therefore, it is requisite to show the nature of the laws, by considering which 
law has reference to more important, that is to say, to more honourable and more necessary 
matters. From which it results, that if two or more, or ever so many laws cannot all be 
maintained, because they are at variance with one another, that one ought to be considered 
the most desirable to be maintained, which appears to have reference to the most important 
matters.570 
 
In international law the debate has focused on whether there is an a prioi hierarchy 
between its sources as they are stated in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.571 Although 
Article 38 is not an official enumeration of the sources of international and it should 
by no means be considered as an exhaustive list, nevertheless, it has been used as an 
informal guideline.572 All sources of international law, be they treaty, custom, or 
                                                 
567 Zugzwang is a term used in game theory to denote a position where one of the players has no good 
moves. Any move he makes will only worsen his position; In more detail on the notion of Zugzwang 
see Aaron Nimzowitch, My System (London: quality Chess Europe, 2007).   
568 See infra Section XI. 
569 The most famous example comes not from a legal treatise but from the ancient Greek tragedy of 
Antigone. There Antigone, whose brother Polyneices has been declared by Creon, king of Thebes, as a 
traitor has been declared a traitor and as punishment his dead body has been left unburied, prey for 
carrion animals. Antigone, secretly, tries to give her brother a semblance of burial and when she is 
revealed to have broken the explicit orders of the king she defends herself in a fiery monologue 
regarding the supremacy of divine law over the law of man; see Sophocles, Antigone, lines 450-470. 
570 Cicero, De Inventione, Liber II, .para. L.XLIX (translation by C.D. Yonge), accessible at: 
http://fxylib.znufe.edu.cn/wgfljd/%B9%C5%B5%E4%D0%DE%B4%C7%D1%A7/pw/cicero/dnv2-
7.htm#XLIX  (last accessed on 25 January 2010); This construction as we shall see comes very close to 
the contemporary notion of jus cogens. 
571 It has to be noted that the list of Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute is not to be considered as an 
exhaustive one. In more detail see Fitzmaurice, supra note 57, at 153 et seq.; Clive Parry, The Sources 
and Evidences of International Law (Manchester: MUP, 1965), at 15; Maarten Bos, ‘The Recognized 
Manifestations of International Law’, GYIL 20 (1977): 9, at 18. 
572 See Hazel Fox, ‘Time, History, and Sources of Law Peremptory Norms: Is there a Need for New 
Sources of International Law?’, in Time, History and International Law, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, 
Matthew Craven and Maria Vogiatzi (eds.), (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 119; Amanda Perreau-
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general principles of law573 are considered to be on equal footing. No source is a 
priori superior to the rest;574 the main reason for this being that international law is 
‘decentralised’575 and that it is a law of co-operation rather than subordination.576 
Particularly notable is the Institut de Droit International 1995 Resolution on 
‘Problems Arising from a Succession of Codification Conventions on a Particular 
Subject’. The relevant part is Conclusion 11 dealing with hierarchy of sources, where 
the members of the Institut stated in unequivocal terms that:  “There is no a priori 
hierarchy between treaty and custom as sources of international law”.577 
Despite the aforementioned, some authors recognize a sort of informal 
hierarchy, in the sense that treaties “enjoy priority over custom and particular treaties 
over general treaties”578, “the body of customary law has primacy over the general 
principles of law under Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute”579 and that the general 
principles of law play a ‘secondary’ role580 and can be overridden not only by custom 
as mentioned supra but by treaties as well.581 This informal hierarchy, as the ILC 
Study Group pointed out, “follows from no legislative enactment but, emerges as a 
‘forensic’ or a ‘natural’ aspect of legal reasoning”.582 Irrespective of the 
                                                                                                                                            
Saussine, ‘A Case Study on Jurisprudence as a Source of International Law: Oppenheim’s Influence’, 
in Time, History and International Law, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Matthew Craven and Maria Vogiatzi 
(eds.), (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2007), 91. 
573 Elements (a) to (c) within Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. 
574 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), at 3, who 
notes that the sources mentioned in Article 38 “are not stated to represent a hierarchy, but the 
draftsmen intended to give an order and in one draft the word ‘successively’ appeared”; see also 
Akehurst, supra note 531, at 274-5; Roucounas, supra note 531, para.72; Czapliński and Danilenko, 
supra note 531, at 7; Mark Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the 
Theory and Practice of the Interrelation of Sources, (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 
para. 84 who very eloquently states that “an a priori  hierarchy of sources is an alien concept”. 
575 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 95. 
576 Id., citing Rousseau, supra note 531, at 150. 
577 Institut de Droit International, Resolution of 1 September 1995 on Problems Arising from a 
Succession of Codification Conventions on a Particular Subject, Annuaire de l’ Institut de Droit 
International 66 (1995/I): 245, at 248. 
578 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 85; although this falls more within the ambit of lex specialis, 
which we will analyze infra. 
579 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 85, citing Daillier and Pellet, supra note 559, at 114-6 and 
Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Cours Général de Droit International Public’, RCADI 207 (1987) : 1, at 188. 
580 Albeit an important systemic one. 
581 Akehurst, supra note 531, at 279; Nguyen Quoc Dinh, Patrick Daillier and Alain Pellet, Droit 
International Public (Montreal: Wilson and Lafleur, 1999), para.60 and 220; Bin Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, (London: Stevens, 1953), at 393; 
Georges Abi-Saab, ‘Les Sources du Droit International: Essai de Déconstruction’, in Le Droit 
International dans un Monde en Mutation, Mélanges E. J. de Arechaga, Manuel Rama-Montaldo 
(Montevideo: Fundación de Cultura Universitaria, 1994), 29, at 33-4; although this overriding is again 
nothing more than the application of the maxim lex specialis derogat lege generali. 
582 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 85, citing Sir Robert Jennings and Sir Arthur Watts (eds.) 
Oppenheim’s International Law, (London: Longman, 1992, 9th ed.), at 26, footnote 2; Villiger, supra 
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aforementioned, however, the general consensus remains that there is no a priori 
hierarchy between the sources of international law.583 
A more recent trend has been the proposition of a sort of ‘soft hierarchy’ of 
norms in environmental treaties. Emerging notions such as ‘Common Concern of 
Humankind’ (CCH) and ‘intergenerational equity’, according to this theory would 
give rise to obligations of an ‘integral’ nature.584 This would, thus, recognize to 
treaties under the regime of CCH and/or intergenerational equity a form of priority 
over other treaties of “a ‘lower’ order”.585 However, the authors themselves 
acknowledge that this “graduated normativity”586 based on the concept of integral 
obligations and “linking it to (emerging) concepts of international law, such as the 
CCH and intergenerational equity”, is “of course largely speculative as it has not been 
tested in practice” 587 and would still not offer any easy solution in cases of conflict of 
environmental treaties of the same status.588 
There is, nonetheless, an exception to this denial of an a priori hierarchy not in 
the form of a particular source of law but in the form of a particular set of norms i.e. 
jus cogens norms. These norms are considered to be hierarchically superior to other 
norms, not due to their source, but due to their content,589 and no derogation is 
possible.590 McNair felt that such rules are essential to each legal system since “it is 
difficult to imagine any society, whether of individuals or of States, whose law sets no 
limit whatever the freedom of contract”.591 The roots of this notion of jus cogens 
norms can be traced back to “the Roman law distinction between jus scriptum and jus 
                                                                                                                                            
note 51, at 161 and Elihu Lauterpacht (ed.) International Law: The Collected Papers of Sir Hersch 
Lauterpacht, Vol. I, (Cambridge: CUP, 1978), at 86-8. 
583 Another attempt at an a priori hierarchy was the notion of ‘objective regimes’; see Sadat-Akhavi, 
supra note 531, at  192 and  Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 103 and cases cited therein. 
584 On the notion of ‘integral’ and ‘interdependent’ obligations, their consequences and the history of 
the relevant debate see infra Section VII. 
585 Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 343-4. 
586 A term coined by Weil; Prosper Weil, ‘Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?’, AJIL  
77 (1983): 413. 
587 Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 343-4; similarly see Vaughan Lowe, ‘Sustainable 
Development and Unsustainable Arguments’, in International Law and Sustainable Development: Past 
Achievements and Future Challenges, Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds.) (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 
19-37. However, the importance of this method for interpretative reasons is substantial and we shall 
return to it infra  in Section XI. 
588 Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 345. 
589 ILC, supra note 542, Commentary of Article 40, at 283, para.3;  Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 98. 
590 The exact translation of jus cogens from Latin is ‘compelling law’, which points towards its 
hierarchical superiority with respect to other norms. 
591 McNair, supra note 186, at 213-4. 
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dispositivum and the maxim jus publicum pactis mutari non potest”,592 although as 
Lachs points out the term ‘jus cogens’ as such was never used in antiquity.593 
Vattel in His Law of Nations set out the main characteristics of these norms: 
 
§ 7. Definition of the necessary law of nations.  
We call that the Necessary Law of Nations which consists in the application of the law of 
nature to Nations. It is Necessary because nations are absolutely onliged to observe it. … 
§ 8. It is immutable 
Since therefore the necessary law of nations consists in the application of the law of nature 
to states, — which law is immutable, as being founded on the nature of things, and 
particularly on the nature of man, — it follows that the Necessary law of nations is 
immutable. 
§ 9. Nations can make no change in it, nor dispense with the obligations arising from it. 
Whence, as this law is immutable, and the obligations that arise from it necessary and 
indispensable, nations can neither make any changes in it by their conventions, dispense 
with it in their own conduct, nor reciprocally release each other from the observance of it. 
This is the principle by which we may distinguish lawful conventions or treaties from those 
that are not lawful, and innocent and rational customs from those that are unjust or 
censurable. 
There are things, just in themselves, and allowed by the necessary law of nations, on which 
states may mutually agree with each other, and which they may consecrate and enforce by 
their manners and customs. There are others of an indifferent nature, respecting which, it 
rests at the option of nations to make in their treaties whatever agreements they please, or to 
introduce whatever custom or practice they think proper. But every treaty, every custom, 
which contravenes the injunctions or prohibitions of the Necessary law of nations is 
unlawful.594 
 
These main elements of jus cogens norms were essentially incorporated in Articles 
53595 and 64596 of the VCLT, although the ILC intentionally avoided giving a list of 
                                                 
592 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 361; see also Jochen Frowein, ‘Jus Cogens’, in Encyclopedia 
of Public International Law, Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.) (Amsterdam: Elsevier: 1997), at 65; Sinclair, 
supra note 53, at 110. 
593 Manfred Lachs, ‘The Development and General Trends of International Law in our Time’, RCADI 
169 (1980-IV):9, at 202. 
594 Vattel, supra note 37, at ‘Preliminaries’, paras. 7-9 (emphasis in original) 
595 Article 53 VCLT: 
 
Article 53 
Treaties conflicting with a peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) 
 
A treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general 
international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general 
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a 
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a 
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character. 
 
 
596 Article 64 VCLT: 
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peremptory norms,597 and reaffirmed in international jurisprudence.598 Although 
during the discussions in the ILC, there was skepticism with respect to the notion of 
jus cogens599 nowadays “[t]he concept of peremptory norms of general international 
law is recognized in international practice, in the jurisprudence of international and 
national courts and tribunals in legal doctrine”600 and the debate has shifted from the 
validity of the concept to its scope and applicability.601  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
Article 64 
Emergence of a new peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens)  
 
If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any existing treaty which is in 
conflict with that norm becomes void and terminates. 
 
Both Articles 53 and 64 seem to reflect the maxim lex superior derogat legi inferiori.   
 
597 The reason being that the members of the ILC felt that “there is no simple criterion by which to 
identify a general rule of international law as having the character of jus cogens” and that it was the 
wiser choice to define the norm through its consequences and “to leave the full content of this rule to 
be worked out in State practice and in the jurisprudence of international tribunals”; ILC (1966), ‘Draft 
Articles on the Law of Treaties – Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its 
Eighteenth Session’, YILC, Vol. II, at 248; or as McNair very elegantly put it: “it is easier to illustrate 
these rules, than to define them”; McNair, supra note 186, at 215.  
598 The most notable example being the Furundzija case where the ICTY found that:  
 
Because of the importance of the values [the prohibition of torture] protects, this principle has evolved 
into a peremptory norm or jus cogens, that is, a norm that enjoys a higher rank in the international 
hierarchy than treaty law and even "ordinary" customary rules. The most conspicuous consequence of 
this higher rank is that the principle at issue cannot be derogated from by States through international 
treaties or local or special customs or even general customary rules not endowed with the same 
normative force. 
 
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundžija, Judgment of Trial Chamber II of 10 December 2008, ICTY, IT-
95-17/1, para. 153. However, reference to peremptory norms has occurred in quite a few other 
cases as well: OSPAR Arbitration, para. 84. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention of 
1902 Governing the Guardianship of Infants (Netherlands v. Sweden), Judgment of 28 November 
1958, ICJ Rep. 1958, 55, Separate Opinion of Judge Moreno Quintana, at 106 et seq. (hereinafter 
Guardianship of Infants case); North Sea Continental Shelf cases, (Federal Republic of Germany 
v. Denmark and the Netherlands), Judgment of 20 February 1969, ICJ Rep. 1969, 3, Separate 
Opinion of Judges Padilla Nervo and Sörensen, at 97 and 248, Dissenting opinion of Judge 
Tanaka, at 182; Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light  and Power Company, Limited 
(Second Phase) (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment of 5 February 1970, ICJ Rep. 1970, 3, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Ammoun, at 304; Regina v.  Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex 
parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), 24 March 1999, House of Lords, 119 ILR 136; Al-Adsani v. the 
United Kingdom.  
599 The most characteristic being that of France.  
600 ILC, supra note 542, at 282. 
601 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 2005), at 11; however, see contra 
Weil who argues that the establishment of hierarchical relationships between peremptory norms and 
other “merely binding norms” essentially threatens the very normativity it aims to serve and might be 
detrimental to the structure of the international system; Weil, supra note 586, at 413. 
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III. Limitations of Jus Cogens 
Based on the previous analysis, the effects of jus cogens norms seem to be pretty 
straightforward and their application would seem to raise no issues. Nevertheless, as 
we mentioned supra, none of the principles of conflict resolution, which we will be 
examining, is devoid of limitations and problems. 
Firstly, the formulation adopted in Article 53 of the VCLT, as pointed by the 
ILC Study Group on Fragmentation, has “a disturbing circularity about it. If it is the 
point of jus cogens to limit what may be lawfully agreed by States – can its content 
simultaneously be made dependent on what is agreed between States?”.602 
Secondly, Sir Humphrey Waldock questioned whether when dealing with jus 
cogens norms the issue of conflict is raised at all. According to him “where a treaty 
was invalid for conflict with a rule of jus cogens, it was not a treaty for legal purposes 
and no question of a conflict between two treaties arose”.603 This, however, does not 
seem to be a true limitation of jus cogens norms, as tools of conflict resolution. This 
construction by Waldock focuses on the end result, of disappearance of the treaty, but 
the whole process which led to this consequence remains to be examined. A treaty 
cannot be rendered null and void in abstracto. This will be done by an international 
judge and through a process of legal reasoning. The judge will have to identify if a 
treaty is in conflict with a peremptory norm604 before applying Articles 53 or 64 of the 
VCLT. Consequently, identification of conflict is indispensable in order for the 
activation of Articles 53 and 64, which will then resolve the conflict by rendering the 
conflicting treaty void.  
Third, Articles 53 and 64 of the VCLT regulate the situations of conflict 
between a peremptory norm and a treaty. Similar solutions are accepted to apply in 
cases of conflict with a customary norm.605 However, no such easy solution seems to 
be available in case of conflict between jus cogens norms.606 In this case, since no 
hierarchy would exist, the situation would seem to bear a striking resemblance with 
all the other cases of conflict between norms of equal standing. The judge would, 
                                                 
602 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 375; referring to Koskenniemi, supra note 549, at 323-5. 
603 Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.742), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 121, para. 23. 
604 It has to be noted that both the title and the main text of Article 53 and the text of Article 64 include 
the word ‘conflict’ or a derivative of it. 
605 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 367. 
606 Id. 
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thus, resort to application of the other principles of conflict resolution, i.e. lex 
specialis and lex posterior.607  
Fourth, the superiority of jus cogens norms has not always been upheld by 
international tribunals. In the Al- Adsani case, the ECtHR held that the prohibition of 
torture had achieved the status of jus cogens. However, because the case involved not 
a claim of criminal liability of an individual for acts of torture, but was a civil suit the 
Court was  
 
unable to discern in the international instruments, judicial authorities or other materials 
before it any firm basis for concluding that, as a matter of international law, a State no 
longer enjoys immunity from civil suit in the courts of another State where acts of torture 
are alleged.608 
 
In this case the Court seems to have actually stripped jus cogens of its determining 
element i.e. its hierarchical superiority over all other norms. 
 
                                                 
607 This is not to say, of course, that this would be a perfect solution in all cases since these principles, 
as well, suffer from inherent limitations. See infra Sections VII, IX and X. 
608 Al-Adsani v. UK, para. 61; see also Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bravo. 
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IV. Conflict Clauses 
As was analyzed in the previous section, an a priori hierarchy of sources is a concept 
alien to the international legal system. The vast majority of the rules in force are jus 
dispositivum. In that sense and bearing also in mind, as Pauwelyn suggested, that the 
raison d’être of the techniques of conflict resolution is the quest for the identification 
of the intent of the parties, the relationship between norms and the solutions in case of 
conflict should be left to the discretion of the parties themselves. 
The insertion of clauses to that effect, the so-called ‘conflict clauses’ has been 
considered as an indispensable tool for resolving conflicts between treaties and has 
been highly recommended both by the ILC609 and, more recently, by the Institut de 
Droit International in its 1996 Resolution.610 
The ILC defined conflict clauses as “clause[s] intended to regulate the relation 
between the provisions of the treaty and those of another treaty or of any other treaty 
relating to the matters with which the treaty deals”.611 Such clauses can be found 
anywhere within the corpus of a treaty, usually as a separate article, but in some cases 
even within the preamble of a treaty,612 and as all techniques of conflict resolution 
                                                 
609 Waldock, Third Report, supra note 128, at 37, para. 10. 
610  
[The Institut de Droit International, r]ecommends that the negotiators of any codification convention 
relating to the same subject matter as that of an earlier codification convention should incorporate 
provisions in that convention regulating the relationship between it and the earlier convention”; 
(emphasis added) 
 
Institut de Droit International (1996-II), Resolution on Problems Arising from a Succession of 
Codification Conventions on a Particular Subject, Annuaire de l’ Institut de Droit International 66 
(1996/II): 435.  
611 This was mentioned in the Commentary on Article 26 [Article 30 VCLT] of the VCLT; ILC, 
Reports of the International Law Commission on the Second Part of its Seventeenth Session and on its 
Eighteenth Session (A/6309/Rev.1), in YILC (1966), Vol. II: 169, at  214, para. 2; a similar definition 
had been presented by Sir Waldock in his Third Report: a conflict – clause is “a clause in a treaty for 
the purpose of determining the relation of its provisions to those of other treaties entered into by the 
contracting States”; Waldock, Third Report, supra note 128, at 37, para. 10; 1999 Hague Agreement 
Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial Designs, 2279 UNTS 156; and the 1980 Convention 
on Future Multilateral Co-operation in North-East Atlantic Fisheries, 1285 UNTS 129; Sadat-Akhavi, 
supra note 531, at 86. 
612 The preamble according to Article 31 is part of the treaty. Sadat-Akhavi offers some examples of 
such conflict clauses e.g. the 1967 Hague Agreement Concerning the International Deposit of Industrial 
Designs, 828 UNTS 389; and the 1980 Convention on Future Multilateral Co-operation in North-East 
Atlantic Fisheries, 1285 UNTS 129; Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, at 86. Another example is the 2002 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, accessible at: 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 2010). 
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they are a ‘last resort’ solution, i.e. to be used only when harmonization through 
interpretation has failed.613 
So important were these conflict clauses considered that their priority over 
general principles of conflict resolution (such as lex posterior or lex specialis) was 
established through Article 30(2) VCLT, which states that “[w]hen a treaty specifies 
that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or 
later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail”614. This priority of the conflict 
clauses logically follows from the principles of contractual freedom of States and 
pacta sunt servanda. As Fitzmaurice and Elias, correctly, point out, such a reading of 
Article 30(2) VCLT is reinforced by the comments of the Special Rapporteur Sir 
Humphrey Waldock in his Third Report who stated  
 
[t]hese clauses appear in any case of conflict to give priority to the other treaty and 
therefore be of decisive effect in the application of the two treaties. Accordingly, even if in 
particular instances the application of these clauses may not differ from the general rules of 
priority set out in paragraphs 3 and 4, it is thought that they should be made the subject of a 
special paragraph in the present article615.616 
 
Conflict clauses can be categorized in three groups based on their temporal 
relationship with the treaties they refer to. Consequently, there are conflict clauses 
that establish a hierarchical relationship with respect to i) prior treaties ii) subsequent 
treaties iii) both prior and subsequent treaties. Each of these categories can be further 
divided in two sub-categories based on whether the conflict clause gives priority to 
the treaty which incorporates the conflict clause or whether the treaty to which 
reference is made through the conflict clause.617 
                                                 
613 A comment to that effect was made by the representative of the United States in the Vienna 
Conference on the Law of Treaties, who found support in the opinions expressed by Sir Waldock 
himself: in Vienna Conference II, supra note 557, at 56, paras. 52-3.   
614 Article 30(2) VCLT. 
615 Waldock, Third Report, supra note 128, paras. 38-40. 
616 Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558 at 324. 
617 Various other categorizations have been proposed: see Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 
325; Sadat-Akhavi, who considers that there are two categories, with each being further divided in 
three parts. Sadat-Akhavi’s construction gives precedence to the priority element, whereas the 
categorization proposed above focuses on the temporal element; Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531,  at 87 
et seq.; Pauwelyn also suggests that there are three categories of conflict – clauses: i) those referring to 
pre-existing treaties, ii) those referring to future treaties and iii) those regulating conflict of norms 
within the same treaty; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 328 et seq.; Czapliński and Danilenko consider that 
there are 4 categories; Cazplinski and Danilenko, supra note 531, at 13-8; whereas the ILC Study 
Group identified no less than seven types of conflict – clauses; ILC Study Group, supra note 16, at 
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Considering that both the ILC and the Institut de Droit International highly 
recommended the adoption and incorporation of conflict clauses in the text of treaties, 
and the fact that this conflict resolution technique actually allows the negotiating 
parties themselves to remain behind the steering wheel and clarify their intentions, it 
should come as no surprise that there is an abundance of examples of conflict clauses 
of all types. Below are examples of conflict clauses for each of the three main 
categories and their corresponding sub-categories: 
A. Conflict – Clauses Referring to Earlier Treaties 
i. Overriding Earlier Treaty (or Treaties) 
Article 134 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War (Third Geneva Convention)618, Article 6(a) of the 1974 International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention)619, Article 2(1) of the 
1994 Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea620, Article 15 of the 1962 Brussels Convention on 
the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships621, Article 103 of the 1992 North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).622 
 
ii. Giving Priority to Earlier Treaty (or Treaties) 
Article 73(1) of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,623 Article 
30 of the 1958 High Seas Geneva Convention,624 Article 311(2) of the 1982 
UNCLOS,625 Article 4 of the 1994 European Energy Charter Treaty (not affecting 
WTO Agreements),626 Article 40 of the 1993 North American Agreement on 
Environmental Cooperation (not affecting existing international environmental 
                                                                                                                                            
135-7. The reason why in the present thesis the author opted for focusing on the temporal element, is 
that this seems to be consistent not only with the temporal considerations expressed in Chapters 1 and 2 
supra, but also because it would allow to better identify the possible interplay between the various 
conflict resolution techniques and in particular between conflict – clauses and lex posterior, which will 
be analyzed infra. 
618 75 UNTS 135. 
619 1184 UNTS 2. 
620 1836 UNTS 41. 
621 57 AJIL 268. 
622 32 ILM 289. 
623 596 UNTS 261. 
624 450 UNTS 82. 
625 1833 UNTS 396. 
626 2080 UNTS 100. 
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agreements),627 Article 2(2) of the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (not 
affecting the rights with regard to freedom of the seas),628 Article 2 of the 1980 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate 
Effects, (not detracting from obligations imposed under international humanitarian 
law),629 Article 12 of the 1986 Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency (not affecting reciprocal rights and obligations 
of States Parties under existing international agreements which relate to the matters 
covered by this Convention),630 Article 3(a) of the 2003 Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (not affecting the Convention on the 
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of World Heritage 
properties).631 
 
B. Conflict – Clauses Referring to Future Treaties 
i. Overriding Subsequent Treaty (or Treaties) 
Article 11 of the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal632 and Article 311(3) of 
UNCLOS. 
 
ii. Giving Priority to Subsequent Treaty (or Treaties) 
Article 4(b) of the 1975 Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in 
their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character,633 Article 
3(1) of the 1997 Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
Watercourses.634 
 
                                                 
627 32 ILM 1480. 
628 24 ILM 1440. 
629 1342 UNTS 137. 
630 25 ILM 1377. 
631 Accessible at: http://www.tarihikentlerbirligi.org/i/belgeler/somutolmayanmiras.pdf (last accessed 
on 25 January 2010). 
632 1673 UNTS 125. 
633 69 AJIL 730. 
634 36 ILM 700. 
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C. Conflict – Clauses Referring to both Earlier and Subsequent Treaties 
i. Overriding both Earlier and Subsequent Treaty (or Treaties) 
Article 103 of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations,635 Article 8 of the 1949 
North Atlantic Treaty 636, Article 311(6) of UNCLOS, Article 20 of the 1886 Bern 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (prior and later treaties 
remain applicable only if they accord broader rights protection).637  
 
ii. Giving Priority to both Earlier and Subsequent Treaty (or 
Treaties) 
Article 20 if the 1978 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to 
Matrimonial Property Regimes,638Article 23 of the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)639 
Article 35 of the 1989 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries (ILO Convention No. 169),640 Article 21 of the 1980 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome Convention);641 
Article 14(2) of the 1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of 
Wild Fauna and Flora.642 
 
                                                 
635 1 UNTS XVI. 
636 34 UNTS 243. 
637 1161 UNTS  3. 
638 16 ILM 18. 
639 1249 UNTS 13. 
640 28 ILM 1382. 
641 19 ILM 1492. 
642 993 UNTS 243. 
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V. Limitations  
Having recourse to conflict clauses can be a useful tool in the resolution of possible 
conflicts; however, as in the case of jus cogens norms it is not a panacea and is 
characterized by its own share of limitations. First and foremost amongst these is that 
conflict clauses do not become operational in cases where a State is a party to one 
treaty but not a party to the treaty containing the conflict clause.643 This limitation is 
dictated by the principle pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt.  
Additionally, there is such a multiplicity of possible permutations of conflict 
clauses, which makes it difficult to agree even on a common typology.644 This 
situation is compounded by the fact that “there are a number of different situations or 
variables that can exist”645 and which the conflict clauses need to address. To make 
matters even worse, even the solution that the conflict clause provides may not be so 
clear-cut as one would wish. Examples of such clauses can be found in the 2002 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,646 the 2000 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (Cartagena Protocol),647 the 1989 Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal,648 and the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).649 Despite their 
vagueness, the ILC Study Group felt that such clauses “give recognition to the fact 
that it seems inadvisable to produce a general rule on treaty priority” and that they 
“emphasize the importance of harmonizing interpretation”.650 Nevertheless, it 
admitted that such solutions geared towards “mutual accommodation” may be of 
                                                 
643 Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 332; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 332. 
644 See supra note 617, presenting the different typologies proposed by various authors. 
645 Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 324. 
646 supra note 612. 
647 39 ILM 1027. 
648 1673 UNTS 126. 
649 1760 UNTS 79; Article 22 of the CBD provides:  
 
1. The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any Contracting Party 
deriving from any existing international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and 
obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.  
 
The construction of this conflict – clause is rather bizarre, as in the first paragraph priority is given to 
earlier treaties. However, an exception is provided for “where the exercise of those rights and 
obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity”. This seems to leave the 
door open for an extensive abrogation from earlier treaties. As Wolfrum and Matz indicated “[t]his 
exemption to the rule is unusual and can lead to a de facto precedence of the Convention on Biologial 
Diversity in respect to other instruments”. See Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, ‘The Interplay of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on Biological Diveristy’, Max 
Planck Yearbook on United Nations Law 4 (2000): 445, at 475. 
650 ILC Study Group, supra note 16,  at 141, para. 277. 
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limited application and offer no real solution to a scenario of conflict.651 On the 
contrary they may have an adverse effect; they may  
 
create a danger of ‘structural’ bias – namely that what is understood as a ‘mutually 
supportive’ solution is determined in accordance with the priorities of the body whose task 
it is to interpret the conflict clause.652 
 
To combat the uncertainty of the wording of certain conflict clauses, Waldock, during 
the discussions of Article 30, had drafted the following paragraph: 
 
Whenever it appears from the terms of a treaty, the circumstances of its conclusion or the 
statement of the parties that their intention was that its provisions should be subject to their 
obligations under another treaty, the first mentioned treaty shall be applied so far as 
possible in a manner compatible with the provisions of the other treaty. In the event of a 
conflict, the other shall prevail.653 
 
The reason for the aforementioned paragraph was that Waldock felt that cases could 
arise where the relationship between two or more treaties could have been discussed 
and agreed upon during the course of the travaux préparatoires but not included in 
the text of the treaty itself654. Although the ILC chose to discard the above paragraph, 
because it felt that it laid down a rule of interpretation that had no place within Article 
30,655 the essence of what Waldock proposed, i.e. the search for the intention of the 
parties even outside the strict confines of the text, has been utilized in practice in 
order to clarify certain vague conflict clauses.656 
Some types of conflict clauses bring nothing new to the table. For instance, the 
conflict clauses that ensure the priority of the later treaty are nothing more than an ex 
abundante cautela reaffirmation of the lex posterior principle.657 However, its 
diametrically opposite conflict clause is much more problematic. In the case of 
                                                 
651 Ibid., at 140-1, paras. 276-7. 
652 Ibid., at 143, para. 282. 
653 (emphasis added); Waldock, Third Report,  supra note 128, at 34.  
654 Ibid., at 38, para. 12. 
655 Comments by Luna, Lachs and Briggs, (A/CN.4/SR.742), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 121, para. 27, at 
122, para. 38 and at 123, para. 49 respectively. 
656 Sadat-Akhavi, mentions three cases where this was done by reference to the travaux préparatoires: 
i) the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 520 UNTS 151 ii) the 1951 Universal Copyright 
Convention, 943 UNTS 178 iii) the 1974 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to 
the Carriage by Sea of Passengers and their Luggage. See Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, at 206-7.  
657 Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 323. 
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clauses that claim ex ante priority over all future treaties, shouldn’t the lex posterior 
principle apply here as well? This would seem to be the case based on the contractual 
freedom of States, with Article 103 of the UN Charter being the natural exception 
since it is explicitly mentioned as such in Article 30(1) VCLT.658 Nothing prevents 
the parties to the original treaty from changing their mind and expressing this change 
of their intention through the conclusion of a subsequent treaty conflicting with the 
earlier one.659 Consequently, if in the subsequent treaty B no explicit clause exists 
stating that it is subject to the earlier treaty A660, then in case of conflict treaty B will 
prevail despite treaty A’s conflict clause by virtue of the lex posterior principle661. As 
Wolfram poignantly summarized the situation:  
 
Clauses which claim priority over future treaty engagements are futile: They cannot be 
invoked against third States; they do not render conflicting treaties void; and they can 
always be overcome by the common will of the parties (emphasis added).662 
 
The greatest limitation, however, of conflict clauses arises in case of conflict between 
the conflict clauses themselves. The most notable examples are Article 311(2) 
UNCLOS which provides that:  
 
This Convention shall not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from 
other agreements compatible with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment 
by other States Parties of their rights or the performance of their obligations under this 
Convention. (emphasis added) 
 
If we juxtapose this with Article 22(1) CBD, 
 
                                                 
658 “Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of States 
Parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be determined in accordance with 
the following paragraphs.” 
659 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 336. 
660 Or if we apply Waldock’s solution, if no such intention can be found by reference to circumstances 
of the conclusion of the treaty, statements by the parties or travaux préparatoires. 
661 Unless an argument can be made that Treaty A is also lex specialis, in which case what we are 
essentially dealing with is a clash of two principles of conflict resolution, lex posterior and lex specialis 
and the solution to the above hypothetical conflict between treaties A and B, will depend on how we 
resolve the clash between these two principles of conflict resolution (this will be analyzed infra, 
immediately after the analysis of both lex posterior and lex specialis).  
662 Karl, supra note 532, at 471.  
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The provisions of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any 
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international agreement, except where the 
exercise of those rights and obligations would cause a serious damage or threat to 
biological diversity (emphasis added). 
 
then it seems that in the event where the exercise of the rights under UNCLOS would 
cause ‘serious damage or threat to biological diversity’, these two provisions would 
seem to be mutually exclusive.663 
It is not just conflict clauses in different instruments that may conflict. 
Conflict664 can arise in conflict clauses within the same instrument. A classical 
example is that of the preambular clauses 9-11 of the Cartagena Protocol. 
 
Recognizing that trade and environment agreements should be mutually supportive with a 
view to achieving sustainable development,  
Emphasizing that this Protocol shall not be interpreted as implying a change in the rights 
and obligations of a Party under any existing international agreements,  
Understanding that the above recital is not intended to subordinate this Protocol to other 
international agreements 
 
On the face of it, clauses 10 and 11 seem to blatantly cancel each other out. Clause 10 
gives priority to existing agreements, whereas clause 11 claims that the Protocol is not 
subordinate to other international agreements. Safrin argues that these clauses can be 
read in three ways: i) as being completely ineffective, ii) that clauses 10 and 11 
essentially neutralise each other,665 or iii) that the rights and obligations under earlier 
agreements are preserved.666 The first two solutions would seem to be contrary to the 
principle of effective interpretation and the third approach seems to be counter-
intuitive, since a clause to the contrary exists as well. However, a closer reading of the 
clauses as a whole can reveal a form of organic unity.667 Clause 10 gives priority to 
earlier agreements, but this needs to be understood in the light of clause 9, the aim of 
which is to promote harmonization, be it through action or interpretation. Bearing 
                                                 
663 Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 334; also see their analysis on the correct interpretation of 
Article 237 UNCLOS based on a juxtaposition of the official English and French texts, in accordance 
with Article 33 of the VCLT; Fitzmaurice and Elias, supra note 558, at 335-6. 
664 Or to be more exact, interpretative problems. 
665 An interpretation that Pauwelyn supports; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 334. 
666 Sabrina Safrin, ‘Treaties in Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade Organization 
Agreements’, AJIL 96 (2002): 606, at 618-21. 
667 Imperfectly worded, granted, but a unity nonetheless. 
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these in mind, clause 11 should be interpreted in line with the two previous clauses. 
Its reason is probably not to cancel out clause 10, but actually to appease any concerns 
regarding the status of the Protocol. What is meant through this clause is not that the 
Protocol supersedes other agreements, but to remind that despite the fact that it does 
not affect the rights and obligations of earlier agreements, this does not ipso facto 
diminish its status. It remains on par with the other agreements and the overarching 
principle should be that of eliminating any differences through a process of 
harmonizing interpretation as required by clause 9. In case of an inconsistency 
between the Protocol and an earlier treaty, clause 10 should not, automatically, 
become operational. First, an effort to find a harmonizing solution should be 
attempted and then and only if this fails should there be recourse to clause 10.668 
Despite the solution proposed, this does not subtract from the fact that conflicts 
between conflict clauses in the same instrument may be difficult to be avoided 
through a process of interpretation and are almost impossible to resolve, because even 
the principles of conflict resolution themselves would not be able to lead to a result.669 
Finally, fraught with difficulties is another type of conflict between conflict 
clauses, a ‘negative conflict’. Treaty A contains a provision that it does not affect the 
rights created by any other agreement. The later Treaty B has an identical clause. 
Essentially, Treaty A refers matters to Treaty B and vice versa, ad infinitum. This sort 
of scenario is known in private international law as renvoi en turpie.670 As comical as 
this scenario may seem, it has actually occurred. Article 90 of the 1980 UN 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods671 provides that “This 
convention does not prevail over any international agreement which has already been 
or may be entered into and which contains provisions concerning the matters 
governed by this Convention” (emphasis added). Article 23(a) of the 1986 Hague 
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,672 
                                                 
668 For another example of a poorly drafted provision and the interpretative problems that these cause 
see Fitzmaurice and Merkouris, supra note 504, who analyze Article 17.6(ii) of the 1994 WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement; 1994 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement), 1868 UNTS 201. 
669 Being in the same instrument lex posterior would not apply, and lex specialis would be impossible 
to identify, unless clearly stated in the text or in the travaux préparatoires of the relevant instrument.  
670 The scenario there is a case before a court of State A, the law of which states that the law of State B 
must be applied. However, the law of State B has an identical provision that refers back to the law of 
State A. 
671 1489 UNTS 3. 
672 510 UNTS 147. 
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on the other hand, states that it “does not prejudice the application of the United 
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods”. This situation 
was characterized by von Mehren as a “negative conflict”.673 How should such a 
situation be resolved? Sadat-Akhavi, argues that the latter treaty mirroring the current 
state of consent should prevail, and thus, its conflict clause is the more relevant.674 
The author of this thesis agrees with the end result of Sadat-Akhavi’s logical process 
but would like to frame it in a more theoretical perspective. Since the conflict clauses 
in such cases have failed, the solution is to apply the remaining principles of conflict 
resolution .i.e. the lex posterior and lex specialis principles. Such a ‘holistic 
approach’, where all the principles assist in addressing each other’s limitations, is not 
only logically sound but a prerequisite for these principles to effectively resolve as 
many conflicts as possible and will be seen repeatedly in our analysis.675  
    
                                                 
673 A. von Mehren, ‘Explanatory Report’, in Actes et Documents de la Session Extraordinaire, 14 au 30 
Octobre 1985, Hague Conference on Private International Law (The Hague, 1987), at 755-6.  
674 Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, at 97. 
675 See  all Sections of this Chapter. 
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VI. Lex Posterior 
The principle of lex posterior derogat priori i.e. that the ‘later law supersedes the 
earlier law’, has often been cited as a principle of interpretation or conflict resolution 
in international law.676 Its roots have been traced by the ILC as back as the Justinian 
Codes677 and included in the seminal works of the early writers of international law.678 
However, mention of this principle as a conflict resolution mechanism can be traced 
even further back in time to Cicero’s second book of his treatise De Inventione where 
he stated that: “Then comes the question also, which law was passed last; for the 
newest law is the most important”.679 
The underlying reason for the use of the lex posterior maxim in resolving 
normative conflicts is that it is based on the contractual freedom of States680 and on 
the logical assumption that States may wish to change the existing law, in order to 
better adapt to a constantly changing environment. The ILC itself commented that: “a 
later expression of intention is to be presumed to prevail over an earlier one”681 and 
felt so strongly on the subject that it effectively codified it in Article 30(3) VCLT682. 
In order, thus, to understand the function and limitations of the lex posterior principle, 
both Article 30 and the travaux préparatoires will be revealing and will function as a 
starting point for our analysis. 
Art. 30 of the VCLT goes as follows: 
                                                 
676 Wright, supra  note 559, at 579; Jenks, supra  note 519, at 445, Aufricht, supra  note 531, at 675 et 
seq.; Karl, supra  note 532, at 469; Pauwelyn, supra  note 51, at 335-63, Czapliński and Danilenko, 
supra  note 531, at 19-22. 
677 See ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 255, FN 291, citing Papinian Digest 50, 17, 80; Paul. 
Digest 32, 66, 5 and Dig. 1, 4, 1; Theodor Mommsen and Paul Kruger, Latin text (eds.) The Digest of 
Justinian, Vol. IV, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985). 
678 “Lastly it is to be observed that a subsequent law or treaty always repeals a former”; Grotius, supra 
note 36, Book II, Chapter XVI, Section XXIX;  
 
§ 315. 4th Rule. 4. The dates of laws or treaties furnish new reasons for establishing the exception in 
cases of collision. If the collision happen between two affirmative laws, or two affirmative treaties 
concluded between the same persons or the same states, that which is of more recent date claims a 
preference over the older one: for it is evident, that since both laws or both treaties have emanated 
from the same power, the subsequent act was capable of derogating from the former. (emphasis 
added) 
 
See also Vattel, supra note 37, Book II, Chapter XVII, para. 315. 
679 The original Latin text goes as follows: “deinde, utra lex posterius lata sit; nam postrema quaeque 
gravissima est”; Cicero, supra note 570, Liber 2.145, accessible at: 
http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/cicero/inventione2.shtml (last accessed on 25 January 2010). 
680 One of the three main principles, which according to Pauwelyn permeate the entirety of the conflict 
resolution principles. 
681 ILC, supra note 611, para.10. 
682 Borgen, supra note 519, at 603; Mus, supra note 542, at 219-20. 
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Article 30 
Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter 
1. Subject to Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations, the rights and obligations of 
States Parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be determined 
in accordance with the following paragraphs. 
2. When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as 
incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail. 
3. When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier 
treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies 
only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. 
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one: 
(a) as between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3; 
(b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the 
treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations. 
5. Paragraph 4 is without prejudice to article 41, or to any question of the termination or 
suspension of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of responsibility 
which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty the provisions of 
which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty. 
  
From a cursory reading it is evident that Article 30(3) and 30(4)(a) are a clear 
expression of the lex posterior principle as defined supra.683 Furthermore, the 
provisions of Article 30 that pertain to lex posterior are, essentially, of a residual 
nature;684 more specifically Article 30(1), (2) and (4) give priority to jus cogens norms 
and conflict clauses,685 the latter being in line with the intent of the parties functioning 
as the driving force in resolving any possible conflict and, to a greater extent, in 
establishing the hierarchy they wish in their conventional commitments.686 
However, the fact that once it has been established that one treaty is posterior 
with respect to another that does not mean ipso facto that lex posterior becomes 
operational. The relevant provisions of Article 30 reveal that the lex posterior 
principle they codify and its scope of application is defined by three main elements: 
                                                 
683 Whereas Article 30(4)(b) reaffirms the pacta tertiis nec nocent ne prosunt principle. 
684 Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, at 61-2; Pauwely, supra note 51, at 363. 
685 Sir Humphrey Waldock who was in support of the introduction of  this provision within Article 30 
explained his reasoning:  
 
These clauses appear in any case of conflict to give priorityto the other treaty and therefore be of 
decisive effect in the application of the two treaties. Accordingly, even if in particular instances the 
application of these clauses may not differ from the general rules of priority set out in paragraphs 3 
and 4, it is thought that they should be made the subject of a special paragraph in the present article. 
 
Waldock, Third Report, supra note 128, at 38-40.  
686 Note, however, that Article 30 relegates the scenarios where a treaty subjects itself to another treaty. 
It remains conspicuously silent as to the more problematic issue, of a treaty having a conflict cause, 
which supposedly overrides later conflicting treaties (see analysis supra in Section on conflict  
clauses). This would seem to suggest that the no exception exists in this case, and that the lex posterior 
principle becomes operational (thus, invalidating the earlier conflict clause) as has been suggested by 
various authors; see supra.  
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1. the succession of treaties (time – element)687 
2. the parties of the successive treaties in question and 
3. their subject – matter 
With respect to how the wide range of non-existent, partial or complete 
overlaps of parties to successive treaties affect the application of the lex posterior 
principle, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice in his Third Report on the Law of Treaties offered 
an exhaustive enumeration of the possible permutations. 
: 
(i) The two treaties have no common parties: no party to the one is also a party to the other, 
(ii) The two treaties have common and identical parties: all the parties to the one are also 
parties to the other. 
(iii) The two treaties have partly common and partly divergent parties: some parties are 
parties to both, some to the earlier only, and some to the later only…. 
(iv) Partially common parties, both or all of the parties to the earlier treaty being also parties 
(but not the only parties) to the later treaty (case of a later treaty to which both or all of the 
parties to the earlier agree). 
(v) Partially common parties, but where some only of the parties to the earlier one are 
parties to the later, which has no other parties (case of a later treaty to which some only of 
the parties to the earlier agree, i.e. case of a separate and subsequent treaty on the same 
subject concluded between less than the full number of the parties to the earlier).688 
 
The solutions given to each of these cases is essentially a mixture, or more precisely a 
complementary application, of the lex posterior and pacta tertiis principles. In the 
first case, neither treaty affects the other since they share no common parties by virtue 
of the pacta tertiis principle. In the second case, due to the complete identity of 
parties lex posterior becomes applicable. In the remaining cases, only when the 
parties in question are parties to both treaties does the lex posterior principle become 
relevant. In the other possible relationships between States – parties, the decisive 
convention is the one to which both are parties.689 It is evident, thus, that a specific 
overlap of parties needs to exist between the treaties in question in order for lex 
posterior to become a mechanism that the international judge can resort to. 
The same can be said about the notion of subject – matter. Article 30 of the 
VCLT has the title “Application of successive treaties relating to the same subject 
                                                 
687 Since this is one of the main problematic areas of the lex posterior principle, it will be analyzed 
infra in the Section on limitations of lex posterior. 
688 Fitzmaurice, Third Report, supra note 127, at 27. 
689 Be that the earlier or the later one. This is in accordance with the pacta tertiis principle; see 
Fitzmaurice, Third Report, supra note 127, at 27.  
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matter” (emphasis added).  During the debate that revolved around this topic the 
general consensus was that ‘same subject - matter’ should be understood narrowly. 
The Express Consultant, Sir Humphrey Waldock responding to a comment made by 
the UK delegation stated that: 
 
[o]n the second point raised by the United Kingdom delegation concerning the words 
‘relating to the same subject – matter’, [I concur] that those words should not be held to 
cover cases where a general treaty impinges indirectly on the content of a particular 
provision of an earlier treaty; in such cases the question involve[s] such principles as 
generalia specialibus non derogant.690 
 
Contrary opinions, however, have been expressed by contemporary authors, such as 
Pauwelyn, who argues in favour of defining ‘same subject - matter’ by recourse to the 
notion of ‘continuing treaties’,691 and the ILC Study Group that argued that the 
qualifying test for the notion of ‘same subject – matter’ should be “whether the 
fulfilment of the obligation under one treaty affects the fulfilment of the obligation of 
another”.692 This last construction, however, seems a little bit too expansive, in the 
sense that such an interpretation of ‘same subject – matter’ would resolve all cases of 
conflict in favour of lex posterior, stripping, thus, lex specialis of any meaning and 
rendering it, in essence, ineffective. This, of course, is an argumentum ad absurdum. 
Consequently, a more narrow construction of ‘same subject – matter’ is required, 
which would respect the delicate balance between lex posterior and lex specialis.693 
 
                                                 
690 Comments made by Sir Humphrey Waldock, in Vienna Conference II, supra note 557, at 253, para. 
41; this comment of Sir Humphrey Waldock was prompted by a fictional case raised by the UK 
delegation, according to which cases of conflict between a convention on a specific topic such as third 
liability in the field of nuclear energy (which contained provisions on recognition of foreign 
judgments) and a later more general convention on recognition and enforcement of judgments, should 
not be considered as having the same subject – matter. Such cases should be resolved by having 
recourse to other maxims such as generalia specialibus non derogant; Comments made by Sir Ian 
Sinclair, ibid., at 222, para. 41.  
691 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 364; similarly see ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 255, that talks 
about “‘chains’ or clusters of treaties that are linked institutionally”. 
692 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 254. 
693 Such an approach is given support by the various comments during the VCLT travaux préparatoires 
mentioned supra; a more detailed analysis of the interaction and relationship between these two 
principles is provided infra in Section X. 
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VII. Limitations of the Lex Posterior Principle  
Similarly to all the previous methods of conflict resolution, so does the lex posterior 
principle suffer from various limitations, a fact which led Sir Ian Sinclair to 
characterise it694 as a “particularly obscure aspect of the law of treaties”.695 Since lex 
posterior essentially deals with temporal elements, it comes as no surprise that the 
majority of limitations are of a temporal hue. 
The lex posterior principle has been reaffirmed and employed in a wide 
variety of cases in international jurisprudence.696 However, this does not mean that in 
every case of conflict between two treaties, the later treaty will always prevail. On the 
contrary, there have been also quite a few cases where the lex prior principle i.e. that 
the temporally earlier rule overrides the later one, was employed to resolve a 
conflict.697 The major point of divergence between the lex posterior and the lex prior 
principles is their field of application. Lex posterior is not an exact opposite, an 
inversion of lex prior since the former requires a certain identity of parties i.e. in order 
for lex posterior to become operational the parties to the dispute must be parties to 
both the conflicting treaties,698 whereas the lex prior principle may apply even in 
cases where there is a divergence of the contracting parties.699 
These lex prior considerations were raised in the context of another debate, 
which also constitutes another limitation of the lex posterior principle, the so – called 
AB/AC conflict i.e. a conflict which may arise between a treaty that has been signed 
and ratified by States A and B, and a later treaty, which has been signed by States A 
and C. The problem with this scenario is which obligation of State A should prevail, 
                                                 
694 When dealing with Article 30 of the VCLT. 
695 Sinclair, supra note 53, at 94. 
696 Most notable amongst them the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case; the Jurisdiction of 
Danube Commission Advisory Opinion and the Oscar Chinn case. The reason of the application of the 
lex posterior principle lies in the fact that the later treaty is considered to express the “correct common 
intent” of the parties; see, however, contra Vranes, who argues that this presumption is questionable; 
Vranes, supra note 527, at 57.  
697 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, Decision of October 7, 1916, Central American Court of Justice, AJIL 11 
(1917): 181; El Salvador v. Nicaragua, Decision of  9 March 1917, Central American Court of Justice, 
AJIL 11 (1917): 674; Customs Regime between Germany and Austria, Advisory Opinion of 5 
September 1931, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 41, 36, at 42; Oscar Chinn case (United Kingdom v. Belgium), 
Judgment of 12 December 1934, PCIJ Series A/B, No. 63 , 64, Separate Opinion of Judge Eysinga, at 
131 and Separate Opinion of Judge Schücking, at 148; a recent case for which an argument could be 
made that the Court applied the lex prior principle is the Al-Adsani case, where the ECtHR yielded in 
favour of the earlier customary rule of state immunity; Al-Adsani v. UK, para. 61. 
698 Matz-Lück, supra note 529, para. 24; see also supra analysis. 
699 Karl, supra note 532, at 469. 
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that which is owed towards State B or that which is owed towards State C; the earlier 
or the later treaty? It is, therefore, easy to understand how lex prior and the AB/AC 
conflict scenario, share common elements. 
Vattel, in one of the first attempts to address this issue, came to the following 
conclusion: 
 
If there be a collision between two treaties made with two different powers, the more 
ancient claims the preference: for, no engagement of a contrary tenor could be contracted in 
the subsequent treaty; and if this latter be found, in any case, incompatible with that of more 
ancient date, its execution is considered as impossible, because the person promising had 
not the power of acting contrary to his antecedent engagements.700 
 
The issue re-emerged with great tenacity during the VCLT travaux préparatoires and 
in connection with the effects of conflict to the validity of the subsequent treaty. 
Vattel’s take on the issue was supported by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht in his First Report 
on the Law of Treaties, who argued that in case of AB/AC conflict the earlier treaty 
will prevail, and the later would be null and void.701 The superiority of the earlier 
treaty and the resulting nullity of ‘contracts to break a contract’ was a general 
principle of law, which “followed cogently” from the principle of good faith and 
requirements of international public policy,702 while at the same time secured the 
unity of law.703 Of course, even Lauterpacht himself admitted the fact that an 
unqualified application of the lex prior principle could lead to absurd results704 and 
that is why he qualified the invalidity of the later treaty with two conditions.705 
                                                 
700 Vattel, supra note 37, Book II, Ch. XVII, para. 315. 
701 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, First Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/63) reproduced in YILC 
(1953), Vol. II, at 156; Sir Lauterpacht had consistently been in support of this solution throughout his 
writings, see: Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Contracts to Break a Contract’, in International Law: The Collected 
Papers of Hersch Lauterpacht, in Elihu Lauterpacht (ed.) (Cambridge: CUP, 1978), 340, at 374; 
Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Covenant as the ‘Higher Law’’, BYIL 17 (1936): 54,  63-4. 
702 Lauterpacht, First Report, supra note 701, at 157. 
703 Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Second Report, supra note 532, at 136, para.7. 
704 Lauterpacht, First Report, supra note 701, at 156-9. 
705 I.e. that 1. the departure from the terms of the earlier treaty had to be of such a magnitude “as to 
interfere seriously with the interests of the other parties to that treaty or seriously impair the original 
purpose of the treaty” or 2. if the later treaty conflicted with treaties  
 
partaking of a degree of generality which imparts to them the character of legislative enactments 
properly affecting all members of the international community or which must be deemed to have been 
concluded in the international interest. 
 
Lauterpacht, First Report, supra note 701, at 156. 
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Lauterpacht’s solution to the AB/AC conflict was criticised as too dogmatic 
and unsupported by international jurisprudence706 and was largely reversed by Sir 
Gerald Fitzmaurice in his Second Report on the Law of Treaties. In that Report 
Fitzmaurice argued that treaties can be grouped in two categories: i) the reciprocating 
type and ii) the non – reciprocating type. The latter category could then be further 
subdivided in i) interdependent type treaties and ii) integral treaties.707 With respect 
to multilateral conventions of the interdependent or integral type, any later treaty 
conflicting with them would be ipso facto null and void.708 Pertaining to treaties of the 
reciprocating type and more specifically in case of an AB/AC conflict, which is the 
issue at question, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice favoured the priority of the earlier treaty. 
This was not a sentiment shared by all members of the ILC709 which led Fitzmaurice 
to recognize that there was no way of preventing a State from selecting which 
obligation it will comply with and which it will violate. This “does not mean that 
international law confers a ‘right of election’, but only that … it may not be possible 
to prevent a power of election from being exercised”.710 The third Rapporteur, Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, restricted the consequence of invalidity even further to conflicts 
with jus cogens norms.711 With respect as to how AB/AC type conflicts should be 
resolved, Waldock and the ILC were of the opinion that no strict rule could or should 
be adopted. This issue raised questions pertaining more to international state 
responsibility rather than the law of treaties.712 Consequently, it was felt that the 
‘power of election’ was the optimal solution,713 which is mirrored indirectly through 
Article 30(4)(b), but more directly via the silence of Article 30 on which treaty should 
prevail in case of an AB/AC conflict. 
                                                 
706 Jenks, supra note 519, at 444; Fitzmaurice, Third Report, supra note 127, at 41 et seq.; Sir 
Humphrey Waldock, Second Report on the Law of Treaties (A/CN.4/156 and Add. 1-3), in YILC 
(1963), Vol. II: 36, at 56 et seq. 
707 Fitzmaurice, Third Report, supra note 127, at 27. 
708 Ibid., at 27-8. 
709 For those who favoured the priority of the earlier treaty see comments made by: Jiménez de 
Aréchaga, (A/CN.4/SR.742), in YILC (1964), Vol. I, at 123, para. 46; Tunkin, (A/CN.4/SR.857), in 
YILC (1966), Vol. I, Part II, at 100, paras. 67-9; Contra see comments made by: the Chairman, and 
Ago, (A/CN.4/SR.857), in YILC (1966), Vol. I, Part II, at 102, para. 88 and paras. 90-1 respectively. 
710 Fitzmaurice, Third Report, supra note 127, at 42, para. 85; Zuleeg calls this power of election the 
“principle of political freedom”; Manfred Zuleeg, ‘Vertragskonkurrenz im Völkerrecht. Teil I: Verträge 
zwischen Souveränen Staaten’, GYIL 20 (1977): 246, at 267-8.  
711 Waldock, Second Report, supra note 706, at 56 et seq.. 
712 Which prompted the insertion of paragraph 5 into Article 30 of the VCLT. 
713 See comments made by: Waldock, (A/CN.4/SR.858), in YILC (1966), Vol. I, Part II, at 103, para. 
10; the Chairman and Ago, (A/CN.4/SR.857), in YILC (1966), Vol. I, Part II, at 102, paras. 88-9 and at 
99, para. 49 respectively. 
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When applying the lex posterior principle, what is required is an ‘earlier’ 
treaty and a ‘later’ treaty. It would seem to go without saying that establishing which 
is which would be child’s play. However, this has proven to be one of the most 
complex issues with respect to the lex posterior principle. The reason is that we are 
predisposed to thinking of treaties as coming into existence in a singular point in time, 
which is common for all contracting parties. This assumption, however, “will often 
appear not to be correct, as it fails to take account of the complication in time of 
multilateral treaty – making through complex procedures”.714 
The problem is that various dates can and have been used in order to 
determine when a treaty is considered to have been concluded, e.g. the conclusion of 
the negotiations, the opening of the treaty for signature, the actual signature, the entry 
into force.715 Of course, some conventions have a specific provision to that effect,716 
but the vast majority lacks such foresight. The matter is further complicated by the 
fact that the term ‘conclusion’717 is used in a number of different provisions of the 
VCLT with different meanings.718 Consequently, the notion of ‘conclusion’ of a treaty 
is a generic term, which will be interpreted each time depending on the context and 
object and purpose of each provision.719  
As to what concerns Article 30, the generally accepted formula for 
determining the timing of a treaty is the date of adoption of a treaty.720 This was the 
                                                 
714 Vierdag, supra note 557, at 98. 
715 Ibid., at 76 et seq. 
716 1974 International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention), Article 6, 1184 
UNTS 278; 1962 Convention on the Liability of Operator of Nuclear Ships, Article 14, 37 AJIL 268; in 
some cases one can be deduced from the travaux préparatoires, as in the case of the 1951 Universal 
Copyright Convention, Article 17; in more detail see Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, at 78-9. 
717 And its derivatives. 
718 Vierdag, supra note 557, at 81-2; In order to overcome this obstacle Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice had 
proposed an article defining the term ‘conclusion’: 
 
1. The conclusion of a treaty – which is not the same thing as bringing it into force, though the same 
act may do both – is the process of giving active assent to the text of the treaty as the basis of an 
agreement, but not necessarily a consent then there to be bound by it. 
2. Conclusion is usually effected by signature (provided in full signature), but other acts may have a 
concluding aspect… 
 
However, this proposal was not followed up during the negotiations of the VCLT. 
719 Vierdag, supra note 557, at 79-82. 
720 This should not be confused with the question of when Article 30 of the VCLT would have for each 
party.  
 
In that connection, the date of entry into force of a treaty for a particular party [would be] relevant for 
the purposes of determining the moment at which that party would be bound by the obligations under 
[Article 30] (emphasis added). 
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solution that seemed to prevail during the VCLT travaux préparatoires721 and has 
ever since been upheld by a number of authors.722 However, the date of adoption of a 
treaty is not a panacea. It may be a useful tool for identifying the timing of bilateral 
treaties, but it fails to give a satisfactory solution to all the conflicts that may arise 
from the wild permutations of modern treaty - making. This weakness is especially 
felt when it comes to multilateral conventions or conventions that are subject to 
periodic revisions.723 The classical example that Sir Ian Sinclair used in the Vienna 
Conference on the Law of Treaties goes as follows:  
 
Supposing a multilateral convention was opened for signature in 1960, State A ratified it in 
1961, and the convention entered into force in 1962. Then State A and B concluded a 
bilateral treaty on the same subject in 1963 which entered into force in 1964, after which 
State B acceded to the multilateral convention in 1965. Which of the treaties was the earlier 
and which was the later? In State A’s view, the multilateral convention was the earlier but 
in State B’s view it was the later.724 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Sir Humphrey Waldock, in Vienna Conference II, supra note 557, at 253, paras. 39-40. 
721 Sir Ian Sinclair, in Vienna Conference II, supra note 557, at 222, para. 40; Delegation of Ceylon, in 
Vienna Conference II, supra note 557, at 56, para. 50; Sir Humphrey Waldock, in Vienna Conference 
II, supra note 557, at 253, para. 39; 
722 Sadat – Alkhavi, supra note 531, at 75-84; Matz-Lück, supra note 529, para. 25; Pauwelyn, supra 
note 51, at 370-81; Pauwelyn, however, in the case of multilateral treaties suggests a different 
perspective, see infra ; see, however, contra Vierdag, who argued that this approach fails because it 
focuses on the treaty as a whole, whereas the real issue is that of conflicts between ‘concrete treaty 
rights and obligations’. The approach adopted by Article 30 falls short of resolving such conflicts; 
Vierdag, supra note 557, at 110. In more detail Vierdag commented:  
 
A multilateral [treaty] can be given a date, and it is in fact given a date. Usually this is the day on 
which its text was adopted or it was opened for signature. There will also be a date on which it 
entered or enters into force, albeit usually only for a number of the States that ultimately constitute its 
parties. These dates have no direct relationship to the dates on which States parties to that treaty 
actually incur obligation or acquire rights under it. These dates can be determined but do not 
necessarily correspond in time with the relevant dates of the treaty itself. 
Since the regulation of Article 30 is predominantly based on ‘successive’ treaties, it does not solve 
questions of conflicts between earlier or later rights or obligations of States under different treaties … 
In so far as the rules contained in Article 30 approach the conflict as one between treaties, based on 
the time of treaties, they cannot solve conflicts between concrete treaty rights and obligations. These 
have their own time, which is not necessarily related to the time of the treaties involved. (emphasis 
added) 
  
723 An even more problematic area in the application of the lex posterior principle would arise in a case 
where the norms that had to be ‘time-labelled’ came from different sources, i.e. one was treaty law and 
the other was customary law. Since lex posterior is of customary nature (apart from being codified in 
Article 30), its scope covers any kind of lex irrespective of its source. Ergo, it woud apply equally to 
treaties, custom and principles; and herein lies the crux of the problem. Due to the inherent vagueness 
of custom as a source it would be extremely difficult to pinpoint exactly in time when the customary 
norm arose, and consequently which of the two conflicts leges was earlier and which later in time. 
724 Sir Ian Sinclair, in Vienna Conference I, supra note 46, at 165. 
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In such a scenario, States A and B would come to diametrically opposed results as to 
which treaty is earlier and which later, despite the fact that they applied the same 
criterion. A similar ‘scizophrenic’ result would arise in the case of treaties that are 
subject to regular revisions.725  Let us take for instance treaty A, which was concluded 
in 1980 and treaty B, which was concluded in 1982. In this scenario treaty A is earlier 
compared to treaty B. However, what happens if treaty B is a technical treaty subject 
to periodic revisions and was indeed revised in 1985. The revised treaty A has now 
morphed from the ‘earlier’ treaty to the ‘later’ one. 726 
These flaws have prompted some authors to look for different solutions to the 
problem of ‘time – labelling’.727 Two are the most notable:  
i) instead of the date of the adoption of the treaty the critical date should be the 
date  at which the consent of the states in question converged.728 However, apart from 
the fact that this solution  does not seem to be in line with the intentions of the 
drafters,729 it also does not solve the drawbacks of the adoption of a treaty date. In 
cases of conflicting multilateral conventions the end result would, once again, be a 
kaleidoscope of conflicting outcomes; for some States treaty A would be the earlier 
one, for others treaty B. 
ii) a disapplication of Article 30, when the conflict concerns treaties of a 
‘continuing’ or ‘living’ nature.730 Such treaties due to their continuing nature would 
fall outside the scope of Article 30 and thus, the remainder of the principles of conflict 
resolution would have to provide a solution to the conflict.731 However, it seems that 
even without ‘carving out’ a special category of treaties, the judge would end up with 
                                                 
725 For instance the SOLAS Convention. 
726 See also Pauwelyn, who citing Argentina – Footwear, wonders whether the fact that the 1947 
GATT was incorporated in 1994 into the WTO Agreement, meant that with respect to the treaties 
concluded between 1947 – 1994, GATT had now been transformed from a lex prior into a lex 
posterior; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 376; for other relevant examples see Vierdag, supra note 557, at 
98 et seq.; Matthias Buck and Roda Verheyen (2001), ‘International Trade Law and Climate – A 
Positive Way Forward’, accessible at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/stabsabteilung/01052.pdf (last 
accessed on 25 January 2010). 
727 With Pawelyn arguing in favour of shifting away from treating the treaty as an “abstract 
instrument” to assessing it as a “source of rights and obligations resting on particular states”; 
Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 372; similarly see Vierdag, supra note 557, at 94. 
728 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 374. 
729 See supra analysis. 
730 Such treaties, according to Pauwelyn, would be “part of a regulatory framework or legal system that 
wads created at one point in time but continues to exist and evolve over a mostly indefinite period”; 
Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 378. Such a definition would cover the most important universal and 
regional treaties, as well as those treaties that are subject to periodic revision.  
731 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 378-80. 
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the same solution. When the lex posterior principle cannot apply, resort can also be 
had to other principles of conflict resolution, such as the lex specialis principle; even 
more so, since these two principles do not exist in some sort of hierarchical 
relationship.732 Consequently, the international judge would always be able to resort 
to lex specialis to resolve the conflict. No need exists for a special category of 
‘continuing’ or ‘living’ treaties, since by molecularizing treaties in various categories 
we may end up complexifying  an already complex situation. 
A final issue with respect to the application of the lex posterior principle is the 
problem of the supervening custom i.e. whether a customary rule that emerges after 
the conclusion of a treaty should supersede the latter. During the VCLT travaux 
préparatoires an article to that effect was put to discussion, which provided that: 
 
The interpretation at any time of the terms of a treaty … shall take account of: (a) the 
emergence of any later rule of customary international law affecting the subject – matter of 
the treaty and binding upon all the parties.733 
 
However, because it was felt that this principle essentially dealt with modification of 
treaties, it was later incorporated in the draft Article pertaining to modification: 
 
The operation of a treaty may also be modified … (c) by the subsequent emergence of a 
new rule of customary law relating to matters dealt with in the treaty and biding upon all 
the parties.734 
 
Although originally the comments by the Governments seemed to favour such a 
provision,735 the objections raised by Greece that argued that it could not envisage 
how an opinio juris necessary for the creation of custom could be established when it 
so blatantly contradicted previous conventional commitments,736 and more 
importantly the United Kingdom that argued the aforementioned provision 
disregarded the principle that treaties should not be modified but with the consent of 
                                                 
732 See infra Section X. 
733 Waldock, Third Report, supra note 128, at 53. 
734 ILC, supra note 397, at 198. 
735 See Kontou, supra note 562, at 137. 
736 Greece, GAOR (1966), 845th Meeting, at 38, para. 41. 
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the parties,737 seemed to sway the ILC in its direction.738 In the end the reference to 
supervening custom was deleted from the Articles of the VCLT, because it was felt 
that such an absolute rule did not admit of automatic application. In each case it 
should be examined whether the parties intended for their treaty to be a lex specialis 
not to be modified by any subsequently emerging customary norm.739  
More recently the Institut de Droit International in its 1995 Resolution on 
‘Problems Arising from a Succession of Codification Conventions on a Particular 
Subject’ avoided making any pronouncements on the issue of supervening custom.740 
In an earlier draft of Conclusion 11, however, there was a specific reference to that 
effect i.e. that a later customary law could modify an earlier treaty,741 which was left 
out in the end because it was too complex of an issue to be dealt with “as an ancillary 
point at the end of a Conclusion”.742 
The issue of supervening custom essentially touches upon the topic of the 
relationship between the principles of lex posterior and lex specialis. Since this will 
be analyzed in more detail infra, for now what can be said is that a solution as to the 
effect of supervening custom will depend on the answer given to the existence or not 
of a hierarchy between lex posterior and lex specialis. Since this author argues that 
both principles stand on par, whether a supervening custom indeed supersedes an 
earlier treaty will depend on an ad hoc examination of which set of rules is more 
reflective of the current state of consent of the parties. This approach seems also to be 
implied by the four conditions that Kontou sets for the supervening custom;743 
especially the fourth condition although referring to the notion of lex specialis is 
actually more of a safe guard against the automatic application of supervening 
                                                 
737 United Kingdom, supra note 134, at 345. 
738 See Kontou, supra note 562, at 138 and references therein. 
739 Id. 
740 Institut de Droit International, supra note 577. 
741 Ibid., at 248. 
742 Comments by Higgins, in Institut de Droit International, supra note 577, at 207. 
743   
New customary law may be invoked as a ground of termination or revision of a prior treaty if: i) it is 
incompatible with the treaty provisions; ii) it is different from the customary international law in force 
at the time of the conclusion of the treaty; and iii) is binding upon all parties to the treaty, unless iv) 
the parties intended that the treaty should continue applying as special law 
 
Kontou, supra note 134, at 146. Kontou also mentions the following cases as supporting her 
conclusions: A-G v. Burgoa, Case 812/79, ECJ, (1980), ECR 2787; La Bretagne Arbitration (1986), 
RGDIP 90 (1986): 716; Fisheries Jurisdiction case;  Fisheries Jurisdiction case (Merits) (United 
Kingdom v. Iceland), Judgment of 25 July 1974, ICJ Rep. 1974, 3; UK-France Continental Shelf 
Arbitration (1989), 18 ILM 397. 
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custom.744 What this condition asks for is that the true intent of the parties is revealed, 
the reference to lex specialis is only incidental and should not be construed as a sort of 
hierarchy between lex posterior and lex specialis. Once again the guiding principle is 
the intention of the parties. 
 
                                                 
744 See also Pauwelyn, who argues that there must be a presumption in favour of the later custom. The 
burden of proof is then on the States to reverse this presumption and show that their intention was for 
the earlier rule to continue to apply; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 141; contra Villiger, who argues in 
favour of such an automatic application; Villiger, supra note 574, at para. 324. 
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VIII. Lex Specialis 
Finally, we turn to the principle of lex specialis derogat generali i.e. that the more 
special law supersedes the more general one.745 As with previous methods of conflict 
resolution so was this identified by Cicero in De Inventione: 
 
Then, too, it is right to consider which law comprehends the entire class of subjects to 
which it refers, and which embraces only a part of the question; which may be applied 
generally to many classes of questions, and which appears to have been framed to apply to 
some special subject. For that which has been drawn up with reference to some particular 
division of a subject, or for some special purpose, appears to come nearer to the subject 
under discussion, and to have more immediate connection with the present action 
(emphasis added).746,747 
 
As can be seen from this quote, Cicero not only identified the principle as such, but 
also its raison d’ être. The principle of lex specialis derogat generali logically follows 
from the fact that a special law (if it is applicable) will have a closer connection and 
be more relevant to the case in question than a general one. It will more closely and 
accurately reflect the current state of will of the parties concerned.748 Thus, it will be 
more suitable to be applied compared to the general law. The same logical process led 
early authors to include the lex specialis principle in their works as a method of 
                                                 
745 Other formulations under which this principle has appeared are: ‘Generalibus specialia derogant’, 
‘Generi per speciem derogatur’, ‘specialia generalibus, non generalia specialibus’; However, the lex 
specialis principle must not be confused with the ejusdem generis rule i.e. that in the process of 
interpretation a special meaning of a word will prevail over a more general one if that was the intention 
of the parties; see ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 56, FN 57, referring to McNair, supra note 
186, at 393-9. The ejusdem generis rule has been codified in Art. 31(4) of the VCLT. 
746 Translation by Yonge, supra note 570, The original Latin text goes as follows:  
 
deinde, utra lex de genere omni, utra de parte quadam; utra communiter in plures, utra in aliquam 
certam rem scripta videatur; nam quae in partem aliquam et quae in certam quandam rem scripta est, 
propius ad causam accedere videtur et ad iudicium magis pertinere (emphasis added)  
 
Cicero, supra note 570, at 2.146. 
747 Earlier expositions of this principle can be found in ancient Greek philosophy; Lindroos and the ILC 
Study Group claim that its origins are found in the Corpus Juris Civilis of the Digest of Justinian but 
this is chronologically much later than the quote by Cicero; The relevant passage, is a gloss by 
Aemilius Papinianus which went as follows: “in toto jure generi per speciem derogatur et illud 
potissimum habetur, quod ad speciem derectum est”, which translates to: “in the entirety of law, the 
special takes precedence over genus, and anything that relates species is regarded as most important”; 
Papinian Digest, 50, 17, 80 and Dig. 48, 19, 41, Mommsen and Kruger, supra note 677, see also, 
Theodor Schilling, Rang und Geltung von Normen in Gestuften Rechtsordnung (Berlin: Nomos, 1994), 
at 447. 
748 See Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 388; Kontou, supra note 562, at 142; Lindroos, supra note 526, at 
37. 
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conflict resolution; The ‘holy trinity’ of early international law i.e. Vattel, Grotius and 
Puffendorf, all included in their seminal works reference to this principle.749 
Similar considerations of reflection of the latest expression of consent are the 
basis of the lex posterior principle as well.750 However, a major difference between 
the lex posterior and lex specialis principles is that whereas the former has been 
codified in Article 30 of the VCLT the latter partakes of no such explicit inclusion. 
This, nevertheless, should not be construed as an indication by the VCLT drafters to 
acknowledge a hierarchy between these two principles.751 Both Sir Humphrey 
Waldock and Sir Ian Sinclair expressly stipulated that Article 30 was never intended 
to be exhaustive and other principles of interpretation and conflict resolution were to 
apply in parallel.752 Aust, on the other hand, posits that lex specialis is included within 
the ‘supplementary means’ of Article 32.753 The author of this thesis although in 
agreement with Aust in the sense that the lex specialis principle is incorporated within 
the provisions of the VCLT,754 deviates on the specific provision. Since the nature of 
                                                 
749        
Among those treaties, which, in the above named respects, are equal, the preference is given to such 
as are more particular, and approach nearer to the point in question. For where particulars are stated, 
the case is clearer, and requires fewer exceptions than general rules do. 
 
Grotius, supra note 36, at Book II, Chapter XVI, Section XXIX. 
 
[d]e deux Conventions ou deux Lois d’ ailleurs également obligatoires, il faut donner la preference à 
celle qui est la moins générale, qui approche le plus de l’ affaire dont il s’ agit 
 
Samuel Puffendorf, Of the Law of Nature and Nations, Book V, Chapter XII 
 
Of two laws or two conventions, we ought (all other circumstances being equal) to prefer the one 
which is less general, and which approaches nearer to the point in question: because special matter 
admits of fewer exceptions than that which is general; it is enjoined with greater precision, and 
appears to have been more pointedly intended. 
 
Vattel, supra note 37, Vol. I, Book II, Chapter XVII, para. 316. 
750 See supra Sections VI-VII. 
751 This will be analyzed separately infra in Section X. 
752 Sinclair, Vienna Conference I, supra note 46, at 96-7; Waldock, Vienna Conference II, supra note 
557, at 253. 
753 Aust, supra note 555, at 200-1.  
754 A similar situation occurred with respect to the principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat (known 
also as principle of effectiveness). During the discussions in the ILC, the issue arose as to whether the 
principle ut res magis valeat quam pereat had to be expressly incorporated in the Article on treaty 
interpretation. The ILC eventually decided against such an inclusion  
 
[not because it] consider[ed] that the principle expressed in the maxim ut res magis valeat quam 
pereat should not be included as one of the general rules [of interpretation … [but because it] took the 
view that, in so far as the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat reflects a true general rule of 
interpretation, it is [already] embodied in [Article 31(1)] (emphasis added). 
 
ILC Commentary, supra note 611; the same considerations, mutatis mutandis, can be said to have been 
the case with respect to the lex specialis principle. 
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the lex specialis principle is a customary one, it would seem that the apposite 
provision would be Article 31(3)(c).755 
Apart from the general description of the principle as the application of the 
more special rule, no further specific definitions are available. To fill this lacuna two 
requirements have been proposed. In order for lex specialis to apply  
i) there have to be two rules of international law dealing with the 
same subject – matter and  
ii) an inconsistency must exist between the aforementioned 
rules.756 
The term inconsistency was used by the ILC in its Commentary to Article 55  
of the (then Draft) Articles on State Responsibility757 in lieu of conflict in order to 
avoid any negative connotations with Jenk’s strict definition of conflict. Inconsistency 
here is intended to be understood as conflict lato sensu. However, whereas the first 
requirement is self – evident,758 international jurisprudence is not consistent as to 
what may concern the second requirement. WTO Panels and the Appellate Body have 
habitually required the element of conflict in order for lex specialis to be 
applicable,759 whereas the ECtHR does not feel that the element of conflict is 
essential760 a sentiment which has been shared in certain cases by other international 
                                                 
755 This assertion and the reasons in support of it will be examined in more detail infra. 
756 Fitzmaurice (1957), supra note 419, at 236-7; Karl, ‘Treaties, Conflicts Between’, Encyclopedia of 
Public International Law, Vol. IV (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2000), at 936; ILC, supra note 542, at 358; 
Pauwelyn on the other hand also requires two elements, but instead of conflict his second element is 
‘membership’ in the sense that “some treaty norms must be seen as lex specialis because they deal with 
the same subject matter as the opposing lex generalis does, but in a way that goes further, either in 
terms of detail or in terms of objectives pursued under both treaties”; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 390; 
for further attempts to provide criteria for establishing a relationship between a special and general rule 
see Vranes, supra note 527, at 64-5; and K. Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft (Berlin: 
Springer, 1979), at 251-2. 
757 ILC, supra note 542. 
758 In order for a rule to be more special with respect to a general rule, they need to have a common 
point of reference. A rule cannot be more special if it deals with a completely different subject – 
matter, in that case they would be just different rules, with no common elements. 
759 Brazil – Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Panel Report adopted on 20 August 1999, 
WTO, WT/DS46/R, para. 7.40 (hereinafter Brazil-Aircraft); Turkey – Textiles, para. 9.92; Indonesia – 
Autos, paras. 14.28 – 14.34. 
760 De Jong, Baljet and van den Brink v. the Netherlands, Judgment of 22 May 1984, 8 EHHR 20; 
Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 26 May 1993, 17 EHHR 539; Murray v. 
the United Kingdom, 28 October 1994, 19 EHHR 193; Nikolova v. Bulgaria, 25 March 1999, 31 EHHR 
64; Brualla Gómez de la Torre v Spain, 19 December 1997, 33 EHHR 1341; Vasilescu v. Romania, 
Judgment of 22 May 1998, 28 EHHR 241; Kudla v. Poland , Judgment of 26 October 2000, 35 EHHR 
11; Yankov v. Bulgaria, 11 December 2003, 40 EHHR 36; Følgero and Others v. Norway, Judgment of 
29 June 2007, 46 EHRR 47; Bantayeva and Others v. Russia, Judgment of 12 February 2009, 
(Application no. 20727/04). 
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tribunals.761 It is for this reason that the ILC Study Group held the lex specialis 
principle as functioning in two ways: 
 
[i.] where the specific rule should be read and understood within the confines or against the 
background of the general standard, typically as an elaboration, updating or a technical 
specification of the latter ….[or more narrowly] 
[ii.]  where two legal provisions that are both valid and applicable, are in no express 
hierarchical relationship, and provide incompatible direction on how to deal with the same 
set of facts … instead of the (general) rule, one should apply the (specific) exception.762 
 
Such an approach would also go a long way towards explaining the jurisprudence 
where the lex generalis has been used as a kind of ‘fall - back’ when the lex specilais 
fails to offer a clear solution. The reason for this discrepancy between the ILC Study 
Group approach and that requiring the element of conflict may be better understood 
through the prism of lex specialis as a multi – faceted principle; i.e. as a principle that 
is considered both a principle of interpretation as well as a principle of conflict 
resolution. Under the first guise no conflict is required, whereas as a conflict –
resolution technique, conflict is an absolute prerequisite. Consequently depending on 
how one applies the lex specialis principle and in what context, the element of conflict 
may be mandatory or optional. 
Returning to the two requirements mentioned supra, it is worth noting that the 
first element just requires two rules dealing with the same subject – matter. It makes 
no provision on the specific elements of these two rules. Consequently, and as has 
been upheld by jurisprudence, these rules do not necessarily have to exist in two 
different instruments. They can both exist within the same legal instrument,763 – an 
                                                 
761 Nicaragua case, para. 274; INA Corporation v. Iran, Judgment of 12 August 1985, Iran – USCTR 8 
(1985-I), at 378. In these cases the respective tribunals only examined whether the relevant rules dealt 
with the same subject – matter, not if there was a conflict between them. Maybe in these cases the 
conflict was considered as a given  (see Akehurst, who suggests that “a special custom, by definition, is 
one which conflicts with the general custom”; Akehurst, supra note 531, at 78), but if so, if it is 
automatic the moment they deal with the same subject – matter then there would be no need for a 
second element as it would already be implied by virtue of the existence of the first element. 
762 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, paras. 56-7. 
763 Beagle Channel Arbitration (the Argentine Republic v. the Republic of Chile), Award of 18 April 
1977, 52 ILR 97, at 141, paras. 36-9;  Colleanu v. German State, Award of 12 January 1929, Germano 
– Rumanian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal, Annual Digest of Public International Law 1929-1930 5 (1933-
4), at 440.Libor Cipra et Clastimil Kvasnicka v. Bezirkshauptmannschaft Mistelbach, Judgment of 16 
January 2003, ECJ, Case C-439/01, ECR 2003 I-745, paras. 27-40; Rudolf Gabriel, Judgment of 11 
July 2002, ECJ, Case C-96/00, ECR 2002 I-06367, paras. 35-6 and 59; Brazil – Export, para. 7.40; 
Turkey – Textiles, para. 9.92; Indonesia – Autos, paras. 14.28-34. 
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interesting side point of this is that since the rules are within the same instrument, the 
lex posterior principle has no application, ergo only the lex specialis principle can 
resolve the possible conflict764 – or arise from two different sources of international 
law765 or even both be non – treaty based.766,767 
 
                                                 
764 The same would apply for two different instruments sharing the same date of conclusion as was the 
case in: Iran – United Staes, Case A/2, Iran – USCTR 1 (1981): 101 at 104; and Ambatielos Case 
(Preliminary Objections), at 35-44. 
765 E.g. treaty and custom, see Nicaragua case, para. 274; INA Corporation v. Iran, at 378;  
766 Right of Passage case, at 40-4. 
767 Jennings and Watts point out that the lex specialis principle is not restricted to treaty law and that it 
functions as a “discretionary aid” which is “expressive of common sense and normal grammatical 
usage”; Jennings and Watts, supra note 582, at 1270, 1280: see however, Thirlway who expressed 
doubt as to whether lex specialis and lex posterior could operate with respect to custom; Hugh 
Thirlway, ‘The Sources of International Law’, in International Law, Malcolm Evans (ed.) (Oxford: 
OUP, 2003), at 136. However, both international jurisprudence and academic writing seem to set aside 
these doubts by Thirlway. 
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IX. Limitations of the Lex Specialis Principle 
Whereas the notion of ‘two rules’ allows for the lex specialis principle to encompass 
all possible permutations of rules emanating from different sources of international 
law, the notion of ‘dealing with the same subject – matter’ proves to be more 
problematic. The same considerations as in the lex posterior principle apply mutatis 
mutandis. Should a broad or a restrictive interpretation of ‘same subject – matter’ be 
adopted? This question becomes more relevant with the proliferation of treaties and 
the blurring of the lines between various fields of international law. Lindroos offers 
the example of a vessel carrying oil that sails in the EEZ of a state. In such a case, 
freedom of navigation may conflict with environmental rights, and UNCLOS and 
IMO rules with an environmental treaty.768 Treaties begin to have far reaching effects 
in a variety of fields regulated by international law e.g. an environmental treaty may 
have provisions that deal also with trade, law of the sea and human rights. In such a 
diversified and constantly changing scene, any attempt to qualify a priori which rules 
or sets of rules deal with the ‘same subject – matter’ is doomed from the start.769 Such 
judgments can be rendered only on a case by case analysis. 
The same can be said about attempts to define what is general and what is 
special.770 As the ILC correctly pointed out generality and speciality are relational i.e. 
a rule cannot be determined as special or general in abstracto. What is required is a 
point of reference and that point of reference is another rule.771 Only when we have a 
set of rules opposed to one another can the process of identifying which is special and 
which is general have any meaning. Furthermore, the relationality covers two distinct 
areas: i) subject – matter and ii) the number of actors who are bound by it. These two 
areas may not always lead to identical results.772 The situation is a complex one and it 
comes as no surprise that the general consensus is that all of the above point towards 
                                                 
768 Lindroos, supra note 526 at 48; see also ILC Study Group, supra note 16, paras. 116-8. 
769 Which is the reason why Lindroos suggests that the lex specialis principle is well – suited for a 
limited amount of conflicts i.e  normative conflicts within the same instrument or within  instruments 
that have an established relationship to each other; Lindroos, supra note 526 at 41. However, the fact 
that it is easy to apply in such cases the lex specialis principle does not mean that its scope of 
application should also be restricted to them. In fact, it is in the ‘hard cases’ that these principles of 
conflict resolution may assist the judge the most. 
770 Jenks, supra note 519, at 447. 
771 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 112; Lindroos, supra note 526, at 42. 
772 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 112, citing Villiger, supra note 51, at 36; and Kontou, supra 
note 562, at 19-20; this is also reflected in Pauwelyn’s requirements for the application of lex specialis. 
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the fact that the lex specialis principle “does not admit of automatic application”,773 
that “[n]o general, context – independent answers can be given to such questions”774 
and, thus, can only be decided on an ad hoc basis. This, however, has not put a halt to 
efforts to define ex ante facto which rules are lex specialis compared to others, based 
on the source. For instance, it is considered that should a case arise where a treaty rule 
or custom deviates from a general principle of law, the judge would have to apply the 
treaty or custom, as being closer to the intention of the parties i.e. as a sort of lex 
specialis.775 Also a treaty is considered to be lex specialis with respect to custom.776 
However, one must be careful not to consider such classifications as irrebuttable 
presumptions. True, in the majority of cases a treaty will be a lex specialis but that 
does not mean that no cases can arise where the reverse is true. Akehurst, for instance, 
posits the case of historic rights under the law of the sea, where customary law might 
actually be lex specialis compared to general treaty rules.777 
Finally, to complicate matters even further, the fact that in a case a certain rule 
has indeed been found to be a lex specialis does not automatically mean that it will 
supersede the lex generalis. There have been a number of cases where it was actually 
the lex generalis that superseded the lex specialis.778 The common element in all those 
cases was that the decisive criterion was not so much an abstract notion of speciality 
                                                 
773 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 58. 
774 Ibid., para. 119. 
775 Comments by Baron Descamps, in Procès-Verbaux, supra note 553, at 337; Bin Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (London: Stevens, 1953), at 393; 
Akehurst, supra note 531, at 279; Quoc Dinh, supra note 531, para. 60; H. Mosler, ‘General Principles 
of Law’, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol. VII, Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.) (Amsterdam: 
North-Holland, 1984), 89, at 97. 
776 See Amoco International Finance Corp. v. Iran, Judgment of 14 July 1987, Iran-USCTR 15 (1987-
II): 189, para. 112; Nicaragua case, para. 274; the ILC Study Group considered that the fact “[t]hat 
treaty rules enjoy priority over custom is merely an incident of the fact that most general international 
law is jus dispositivum” (emphasis added); ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 7; cases re-affirming 
this jus dispositivum character of general international law are:  North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 
para. 472; Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), Judgment of 24 
February 1982, ICJ Rep. 1982, 18, para. 24 (hereinafter Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case); 
Anzilotti goes a step further than the ILC by using the ‘number of actors’ element of identifying the 
relationality between two rules. Thus not only a treaty would prevail over custom, but a bilateral treaty 
would prevail over a multilateral one; Dionisio Anzilotti, Cours de Droit International: Tôme I (transl. 
by Gilbert Gidel) (Paris: Sirey, 1929), at 103; see, however, contra: Georges Scelle, Cours de Droit 
International Public (Paris: Domat-Montchrestien, 1948), at 642; Oscar Schachter, ‘Entangled Treaty 
and Custom’, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, 
Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds.) ((Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1989), 717, at 721. 
777 Akehurst, supra note 531, at 275.  
778 Minorities in Upper Silesia case, at 30-1; see also cases presented by Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, 
at 114-31. 
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but more tangible considerations of intention of the parties, relevancy and 
importance.779 
 
                                                 
779 ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 58. 
 171
X. The Relationship between the Lex Posterior and Lex Specialis Principles: 
Antogonism or Complementarity? 
Principles of conflict resolution resolve conflicts between norms. But what happens 
when those principles themselves are in conflict? What happens if the solution arrived 
at by application of the lex posterior principle is diametrically opposed to that arrived 
through lex specialis? In essence, this problem can be summed up in the question of 
whether between the lex specialis and lex posterior principles there exists a 
hierarchical relationship.  
This issue has not been the object of extensive academic research and is 
usually only referred to in passim. International tribunals have adopted the same 
prophylactic approach. In the few cases where lex specialis and lex posterior are 
mentioned in the same context, the tribunals have opted for by-passing the issue, by 
finding that the rule selected was both lex specialis and lex posterior.780 
In such a terra incognita it comes as no surprise that all possible solutions 
have been put forward and supported in academic writings. There are those who argue 
that the special rule should prevail over the later rule in all instances. This is based on 
the adages generalia specialibus non derogant and lex posterior generalis non 
derogat priori speciali. The first author to argue in favour of the supremacy of the lex 
specialis principle was Grotius who held that: 
 
When there is any accidental collision between one part of a written document and another, 
Cicero, in the second book of his treatise ON INVENTION, has given rules for deciding 
which of them ought to have the preference. Though his arrangement is not very accurate, 
yet it is by no means to be neglected. To supply therefore this defect of accuracy, the rules 
may be digested in the following order…. Among those treaties, which, in the above named 
respects, are equal, the preference is given to such as are more particular, and approach 
nearer to the point in question. For where particulars are stated, the case is clearer, and 
requires fewer exceptions than general rules do….Lastly it is to be observed that a 
subsequent law or treaty always repeals a former. (emphasis added)781 
 
                                                 
780 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, at 31; Polish Postal Service in Danzig, Advisory Opinion 
of 16 May 1925, PCIJ Series B No.11, 5; Jurisdiction of Danube Commission Advisory Opinion; 
Affaire des Chemins de Fer Zeltweg-Wolfsberg et Unterdrauburg-Woellan (Austria v. Yugoslavia), 
Award of 6 August 1934, RIAA 3 (1949): 1795, at 1803; see also claims made by Libya in the 
Lockerbie case, Oral Statement of Libya, public sitting held on 17 October 1997, (CR97/20), accessible 
at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/89/5287.pdf (last accessed on on 25 January 2010); and Japan in 
the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, para. 38(c). 
781 Grotius, supra note 36 Book II, Chapter XVI, Section XXIX. 
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Grotius placed in a hierarchical order first the lex specialis principle and then the lex 
posterior. Several authors share this position with Grotius,782 which seems to have 
been reaffirmed in international case-law.783 However, such an absolute priority of the 
lex specialis principle raises some serious concerns. This would seem to create a 
hierarchy that is inconsistent both with the VCLT and its travaux préparatoires, an 
inconsistency further reinforced by the fact that out of the two principles it was lex 
posterior that was explicitly mentioned in Article 30 of the VCLT.784 
Unlike Grotius, Vattel adopted a different order of principles of conflict 
resolution in which lex posterior donned the fourth place, whereas lex specialis was 
just below it as rule number five.785 A similar approach seems to have been implicitly 
held by the Special Rapporteur on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses,786 although the final outcome seems to indicate that the 
majority felt that such a proposed hierarchy was not valid.787 A more moderate 
approach has been suggested by Pauwelyn, who argues that the lex posterior principle 
“is and should remain the rule of first resort”, but in those hard cases where Article 30 
does not apply788 or to which it cannot offer a solution, lex specialis would then be 
activated.789 The idea behind this construction is that due to the restrictive 
interpretation of the notions of ‘same subject - matter’ and ‘successive treaties’ there 
would be little room for both principles to apply concurrently. However, if such a case 
should arise, Pauwelyn argues that “in the event that Art. 30 … does apply, the fact 
                                                 
782 Kontou, supra  note 562, at 143-4; Aufricht, supra  note 531, at 698;  W. Malgaud, ‘Les Antinomies 
en Droit’, in Les Antinomies en Droit, Chaïm Perelman,(ed.) (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1965), 7, at 12-3; 
Wolfrum and Matz, supra note 540, at 445-80; Waldock, Vienna Conference II, supra note 557, at 253; 
Schilling, supra  note 747, at 455-8; Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), at 180; Maarten Bos, ‘The Hierarchy among the Recognized Manifestations 
(‘Sources’) of International Law’, in Estudios de Derecho Internacional: Homenaje al Professor Miaja 
de la Muela (Madrid: Editorial Tecnos, 1979), 363, at 365-6; Comments by Roberto Ago, 
(A/CN.4/SR.866), in YILC (1966), Vol. I, Part II, at 167, para. 50. 
783 INA Corporation v. Iran case, at 379; Phillips Petroleum Co. Iran v. Iran, Award of 29 June 1989, 
Case No. 39, Iran-USCTR  21 (1989-I): 79, para. 107. 
784 However, some authors suggest that lex specialis  is implicitly incorporated in Article 30, 
Roucounas, supra note 531, at 111-2; or Article 31 (the present author), or Article 32, Aust, supra note 
189, at 200-1. 
785 Vattel, supra note 37, Book II, Chapter XVII, paras. 315-6. 
786 Robert Rosenstock, First Report on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses, (A/CN.4/451), in YILC (1993), Vol. II Part I: 179, at 182. 
787 Comments of the Chinese Delegation, (A/C.6/51/SR.13), at 7, para. 8. 
788 E.g. in the case of ‘continuing’ treaties. 
789 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 407-8; similarly see P. Eeckhout, ‘Review: Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law: How WTO Relates to other Rules of International Law’, Journal of International 
Economic Law 8 (2005): 583-9. 
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that the earlier norm is lex specialis should not prevent the later lex generalis from 
prevailing”.790 
Finally, there is the middle ground of not accepting any sort of hierarchy as 
existing between these two principles of conflict resolution. The question of 
preferring one principle over another will be judged on a case by case basis,791 or as 
Jenks described the situation “[neither of these principles] can be regarded of absolute 
validity. There are a number of principles which must be weighed and reconciled in 
the light of the circumstance of the particular case”.792 This solution seems to be the 
one most in line with the nature of the principles of conflict resolution.793 As the 
previous analysis illustrated in the problematic areas of each principle, no clear-cut 
solutions could be given. Each case would have to be decided on its own merits; the 
guiding principles always being the search for the solution that best reflects the 
intention of the parties. It would seem extremely odd then if in this case an all 
encompassing singular solution was the right path. If an absence of hierarchy is 
accepted, then these principles would function in a complementary fashion and in the 
remote case of their conflict this would be decided based on the specific details of 
each case. Under this light, it would be easy also to comprehend the case-law which 
sometimes has opted in favour of the lex specialis and others in favour of the lex 
posterior. 
 
                                                 
790 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 409 (emphasis added); citing in support Quoc Dinh, supra note 531, at 
270, para. 273. 
791 If at all, see for instance the Gorham case where the US – Mexican General Claims Commission 
equally rejected to consider both of the principles; Sarah Ann Gorham v. United Mexican States (US v. 
Mexico), Award of 24 October 1930, RIAA 4 (1951): 640, at 643. 
792 Jenks, supra note 519, at 407. 
793 And has been adopted by a number of authors: Salmon, supra note 542, at 312; Vranes, supra note 
527, at 51; Lindroos, supra note 526, at 41; ILC Study Group, supra note 16, para. 233. 
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XI. Principles of Conflict Resolution within the Interpretative Process of Article 
31(3)(c) 
In the first Section of this Chapter the question that was examined was whether the 
notion of conflict could be applied mutatis mutandis within the confines of the 
interpretative process and in particular within Article 31(3)(c). Irrespective of whether 
a strict definition of conflict, as suggested by Jenks, or a wider one, as advocated for 
instance by the ILC Study Group, Pauwelyn and Vranes, was to be adopted the 
conclusion remained the same. Conflict could arise within the process of 
interpretation, not as conflict of norms eo nomine but as conflict of norms on an 
interpretative level. The reason being that even in the case of a strict definition of 
conflict, the ruling revolves around the interpretation of a norm.794 The ruling on the 
interpretation of such a norm should not be understood as being of the same type. 
Even if a norm A says “State B may do the following action”, the ruling on the 
interpretation of such a norm should be understood as: “Norm A must be taken as 
meaning the following”.  Consequently, there is a conflict. 
Furthermore in every case where the issue of interpretation is raised, two (or 
more) conflicting interpretations need to be at the apex of the dispute. If they were not 
conflicting then there would be no dispute. It is no coincidence that the term 
conflicting has been extensively used to describe these interpretations.795 But whereas 
Articles 31 and 32 in toto have created a system through which one can select an 
interpretation through a variety of tools, Article 31(3)(c) offers one more possibility, 
when the two conflicting interpretations are based on the relevancy of two different 
instruments or sets of instruments. This is not to say that the principles of conflict 
resolution do not have a place within the remaining structure of Articles 31 and 32. 
They still have, but not as principles of conflict resolution but as interpretative 
criteria.796 Article 31(3)(c), however, allows for the application of the principles of 
conflict resolution as such, i.e. as principles of conflict resolution.797 The reason being 
                                                 
794 be it an obligation, a prohibition, an exception or a permission. 
795 See supra note 549. 
796 See for instance Aust, who categorizes them as supplementary means. Aust, supra note 189 at 249. 
797 At this point it needs to be clarified that this construction may apply only in the case where two 
different sets of norms point towards two different and contradicting interpretations. If there is only one 
set, as has been the case up till now in international jurisprudence, then there is no issue of conflict 
since we have one set of norms the relevancy of which is to be determined, via the use of ‘the 
proximity criterion’ described in Chapter I. Consequently, the principles of conflict resolution as such, 
do not apply and the first leg of the juridical process described infra (see following pages and 
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that within this provision, we may be dealing apart from the interpreted provision, 
with other sets of norms as well. These norms support conflicting interpretations and 
thus by proxy, are conflicting themselves. This is the route of entry of principles of 
conflict resolution into Article 31(3)(c) and that is why our analysis focused on the 
principles of conflict resolution and not their “interpretative criteria” counterparts. 
The next question was whether the principles of conflict resolution are 
‘relevant rules’ within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c). In Chapter 1, the analysis of 
the travaux préparatoires proved beyond a doubt that, regardless of any ‘party-
oriented’ uncertainties with respect to the inclusion of conventional rules,798 general 
principles and custom were never in doubt. In the first Section of this Chapter the 
nature of lex posterior and lex specialis was put under the microscope. Jus cogens 
norms and conflict clauses were left out because the former’s nature has never been in 
question while the latter, as long as the treaty in which it is incorporated falls within 
Article 31(3)(c), it will also be taken into consideration. The perusal of international 
jurisprudence and the writings of acclaimed publicists, showed that despite the 
diversity of characterizations attributed to them, they have been consistently 
considered as either being general principles or customary norms. By that token they 
fall within Article 31(3)(c). 
Having established that the principles of conflict resolution can be used in the 
relevancy-identification process of Article 31(3)(c) we need to address why they have 
to be used. The ‘proximity criterion’, albeit a very useful tool in cases where there are 
two norms A and B, which support conflicting interpretations of norm C, is, in and of 
itself, an incomplete one. The ‘proximity criterion’ focuses on the relationship 
between i) norms A and C and ii) norms B and C. The common point of reference 
being norm C, which is logical since it is the norm being interpreted. Nevertheless, 
the insertion of the principles of conflict resolution allows us to change our vantage 
point and get a more complete picture of the interrelationships between the various 
norms.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
Diagrams) is by-passed. However, the author feels that with the proliferation of treaties and 
international tribunals, it is only a matter of time for this situation to arise.  
798 I.e. whether both parties to the dispute had to be parties to the treaty invoked, or if just one sufficed. 
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Diagram 4: Different Approach to Norm Interrelationship Examination  
 
A final point that needs to be made is that apart from the aforementioned 
reasons there is one more that argues in favour of the inclusion of the principles of 
conflict resolution within the interpretative process of Article 31(3)(c); their 
similarities with the various manifestations of the ‘proximity criterion’. In Chapter 1, 
the conclusion was that the variety of criteria used by the international courts and 
tribunals in determining ‘relevancy’ under Article 31(3)(c), were not self-standing, 
isolated criteria, but different manifestations of a singular criterion, the ‘proximity 
criterion’. Similarly, Schwarzenberger has argued that the principles of conflict 
resolution, like lex posterior and lex specialis,799 derive their justification (if any) 
from assisting in the application of the jus aequum rule.800 The jus aequum rule is the 
common denominator in all cases of conflict resolution and the apposite maxim used 
                                                 
799 Although neither rules or principles, according to him. 
800 Schwarzenberger, supra note 534, at 473. 
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in each case to resolve the conflict is just an ad hoc tool/manifestation that assists in 
the application of the former. Such an approach has a striking resemblance with our 
‘proximity criterion’, and if applied to all principles of conflict resolution would result 
to the following: 
 
DIAGRAM 5
 
Diagram 5: Principles of Conflict Resolution as Different Manifestations of the 
Jus Aequum Rule 
 
Furthermore, each manifestation of the jus aequum rule is driven by 
considerations that belong to one or more of the schools of thought on interpretation. 
All partake of the ‘intentions approach’ but are also imbued with considerations of 
another school as well, in this sense they can be considered as interstitial norms. So 
for instance, lex posterior is driven by the ‘intentions approach’ and by ‘temporal 
considerations’; lex specialis, by the ‘intentions approach’ and ‘object and purpose’; 
conflict clauses by the ‘intentions approach’ and the ‘textual approach’; while finally, 
jus cogens norms by the ‘intentions approach’ and the ‘object an purpose’ not just of 
the norms themselves but of the international community as a whole. 
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DIAGRAM 5
 
Diagram 6: Schematic Representation of the Jus Aequum Manifestations Cross-
Sectioned with the Schools of Thought on Interpretation 
 
What needs to be addressed now is how this affects the previous construction 
of ‘the proximity criterion’ of Chapter 1. Should we consider then that the principles 
override ‘the proximity criterion’? The answer is an emphatic ‘no’. The analysis of 
the principles revealed that each principle has inherent limitations e.g. time – label, 
AB/AC conflicts, conflicting conflict clauses, supervening custom, general posterior 
rule vs. special prior rule, and right of election to name but a few. The consequence 
being that in many cases of norm conflict the end result is, unfortunately, no 
resolution at all, just the recognition of the existence of a lacuna.801  
However, here we are no longer in the conflict resolution stage but in the 
interpretative stage and interpretation, as enshrined in Article 31-33, is designed to 
always lead to a result.802 This is exactly the point where both the process of Article 
31(3)(c) and the principles of conflict resolution benefit from the inclusion of the 
latter in that process. Article 31(3)(c) benefits by the application of the principles of 
                                                 
801 Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 419; citing Salmon, supra note 542, at 449 and Ulrich Fastenrath, 
Lücken im Völkerrecht: zu Rechtscharakter, Quellen, Systemzusammenhang, Methodenlehre und 
Funktionen des Völkerrechts (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1991), at 227.  
802 Fitzmaurice and Merkouris, supra note 504. 
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conflict resolution in the sense that the results arrived at through their application can 
offer valuable insight for determining ‘relevancy’, whereas the principles themselves 
benefit since even in those ‘hard cases’ where the eventuality of a lacuna is looming 
over the whole process, the judge can always resort to ‘the proximity criterion’ to 
reach a decision on the ‘relevancy’ or not of a specific norm or set of norms. 
These considerations actually outline the whole process of identifying 
‘relevancy’. At a first stage, the judge will apply the principles of conflict resolution. 
The conclusions arrived at will not terminate the process, but will assist in the second 
stage in which the judge will apply the ‘proximity criterion’. Essentially, the 
principles of conflict resolution and ‘the proximity criterion’ apply in tandem. 
It might seem bizarre, or even downright wrong, that the starting point of this 
process is the principles of conflict resolution, especially if one considers that in 
international law there is a presumption against conflict.803 Even more so, since 
interpretation precedes conflict resolution from a temporal point of view. The 
adjudicating body first attempts to harmonize the two diverging instruments through 
interpretation. Only when this is not possible does the issue of conflict resolution 
come up804. 
However, what we have here is a reversal of the process. The reason for this is 
that the interpretative process, in the scenario mentioned supra, is actually predicated 
upon the fact that there is a conflict; a conflict between two sets of norms that lead to 
two conflicting interpretations. Additionally, the presumption against conflict is 
aimed at ensuring the unity of law. However, the fear of fragmentation does not apply 
in the present case, because the presumption of conflict not only does not promote the 
molecularization of the international system, it actually enhances its unity. Whereas in 
‘normal’ conflict resolution, there will be instances where the judge will be faced with 
a lacuna and might end up giving a non liquet decision,805 in Article 31(3)(c) there is 
no such contingency. Even if the application of the principles of conflict resolution 
                                                 
803 Right of Passage (Preliminary Objections), at 142; Canada – Certain Measures Concerning 
Periodicals, Appellate Body Report adopted on 30 July 1997, WTO, WT/DS31/AB/R, at 19 (Canada-
Periodicals); EC – Bananas paras. 219-22; Indonesia – Autos, para 14.28 and FN 649; Lauterpacht, 
Second Report, supra note 532, at 133 et seq.; Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 240-1; Jenks, supra note 
519, at 427. 
804 ILC Study Group, supra note 16 paras. 37-43; Sadat-Akhavi, supra note 531, at 26-7, Pauwelyn, 
supra note 51, at 240 et seq. 
805 See supra. 
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fails to offer a result, the judge will always be able to resort to ‘the proximity 
criterion’. 
The process can be represented schematically thus: 
 
Diagram 7: The Process of Article 31(3)(c) 
 
As was mentioned supra, the process of Article 31(3)(c) is a two stage process 
(the two hemispheres of the above sphere). This construction offers a complete 
evaluation of all the possible interrelationships between all the relevant norms.  None 
of the two stages is complete without the other. But what is then the usefulness of any 
result that might be produced by the application of the first stage of the interpretative 
process of Article 31(3)(c)? It does not offer a final solution to the issue of 
‘relevancy’, that is the job of the second stage, yet any conclusion on the 
interrelationship between norms A and B cannot be easily ignored. From this 
description it is easy to identify that the outcome of the first stage is the creation of a 
legal presumption. This presumption is not set in stone. On the contrary, it is a 
rebuttable one. The reason being that the principles focus on the intention of the 
parties with respect to norms A and B. This may offer some insight as to what the 
parties meant the relationship of these norms to be, or which norm best reflects the 
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current state of consent of the States, yet the decisive element here is the intent of the 
States with respect to norm C. Consequently, the presumption arrived at via the 
principles of conflict resolution can only be a rebuttable one and this is the point 
where the ‘proximity criterion’ comes into play. After the application of the conflict 
resolution principles a rebuttable presumption may be created.806 It is then up to the 
‘proximity criterion’ to transform this presumption into a certainty or reverse it. In the 
case of reversal however, the burden of proof would be on the party invoking it to 
prove that actually the norm it is advocating for is the more ‘relevant’, or the only 
relevant in the process of Article 31(3)(c). 
Recapitulating, in a scenario where two conflicting interpretations (c1 and c2) 
of a norm C have been proposed based on two different norms (or sets of norms) A 
and B, the relevant tribunal will decide which the most apposite/‘relevant’ one is by 
means of the following process:  
i) Application of principles of conflict resolution. This examines the 
relationship between norms A and B. This examination may in turn lead 
to:  
a) a temporary lacuna,807 in those cases where the conflict 
resolution is unable to offer a solution, or 
b) a result of one norm superseding the other, which would 
create a rebuttable presumption. 
ii) In both cases, the court would then have to apply the ‘proximity 
criterion’, with a view to reaching a definite conclusion as to which norm 
(if any) is more relevant for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c) in interpreting 
norm C. Based on the previous contingencies this would take the form of: 
a) filling the temporary lacuna by establishing which 
norm is more relevant. 
b) reaffirming the arrived at presumption, or 
c) reversing the rebuttable presumption. 
                                                 
806 The word ‘may’ is used because as was mentioned supra there are scenarios where even the 
principles of the conflict resolution may come at an impasse.  
807 This lacuna is characterized as a temporary one because unlike in the normative conflict per se, in 
this case since we are still in the interpretative process, the judge can resort to the second stage, that of 
the application of the ‘proximity criterion’, which will yield a result in every case. 
 182
 
 
 
 
 
Diagram 8: Diagram of the various Permutations during the Application of 
Article 31(3)(c) 
 
Transferring this to Diagram 7, the process of Article 31(3)(c) takes the 
following form: 
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Diagram 9: Process of Article 31(3)(c) from Start to Finish (from Uncertainty to 
Judicial Certainty) 
 
So far, no case has arisen in front of an international court or tribunal that 
would require the application of this construction. The reasons for this are simple: i) 
the proliferation of international courts and tribunals is a recent phenomenon; ii) only 
recently, as was shown in Chapter 1, have international courts and tribunals started 
referring explicitly to Article 31(3)(c);  iii) there is still uncertainty as to how Article 
31(3)(c) is to be properly applied; and iv) several conditions need to be 
simultaneously satisfied in one particular case, i.e. an issue of interpretation of a treaty 
needs to be at the heart of the dispute; two different instruments or norms need to be 
invoked by the two disputing parties; these must be invoked under Article 31(3)(c) 
and they must lead to conflicting interpretations of the treaty being interpreted. 
However, due to the rate of increase of treaties being signed and of areas being 
regulated by international law such a scenario is becoming increasingly probable. 
Furthermore, it is becoming more and more common that treaties regulating one field 
of international law have ‘spill-over’ effects. A classical example of this is 
environmental law treaties and/or law of the sea treaties being invoked in trade 
disputes (see for instance, the EC-Biotech and the US-Shrimp cases analyzed supra in 
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Chapter 1). A hypothetical situation that could arise is the following: States A and B 
take a dispute on the interpretation of a trade treaty C in front of an international 
tribunal. In their pleadings, State A invokes under Article 31(3)(c) an environmental 
treaty A1, which gives the disputed provision of the trade treaty C a certain 
interpretation, whereas State B invokes a different environmental treaty B1, which 
gives the disputed provision the completely opposite interpretation. 
The theoretical construction analyzed in this Chapter offers the judges a clear-
cut step-by-step process, through which they can examine all the relationships 
between the treaties in question, i.e. treaties A1, B1 and C and come to an informed 
decision through a legally correct application of Article 31(3)(c). In more detail: At 
the first stage, the judges will apply the principles of conflict resolution (jus cogens, 
conflict clauses, lex posterior and lex specialis) to determine whether treaties A1 and 
B1 are in some sort of hierarchical relationship with each other. If the application of 
the principles of conflict resolution leads to a result, giving precedence to one of these 
treaties, let us say for example treaty A1, this will create a rebuttable presumption 
regarding the ‘relevancy’ value of treaty A1 with respect to treaty C. If, on the other 
hand, the principles of conflict resolution do not lead to a result, no such presumption 
will exist. In both cases, the judges will then move on to Stage 2 of the process, i.e.  
the application of the ‘proximity criterion’, as has been analyzed supra in Chapter 1.  
In this Stage, both treaties A1 and B1 are examined, individually, with respect 
to treaty C, in order to verify whether they are ‘relevant’ as required by Article 
31(3)(c). Three can be the possible outcomes of this second Stage: The judges by 
applying the ‘proximity criterion’ may reaffirm the presumption arrived at after Stage 
1, i.e. that treaty A1 is the relevant one for the purposes of Article 31(3)(c). Another 
option could be the reversal of the presumption of Stage 1. This would happen if the 
judges, by examining the four different manifestations of the proximity criterion, and 
by asking the four main questions by which they identify ‘relevancy’ and ‘proximity’ 
(the How, What, Who, When questions of Diagrams 1(b) and 2(a)), come to the 
conclusion that treaty B1 is much more relevant under Article 31(3)(c). Finally, a third 
outcome could be that the ‘proximity criterion’ demonstrates that neither treaty A1 nor 
treaty B1 are relevant and consequently Article 31(3)(c) can not be activated.  In such 
a case the judges would have to resolve the interpretative issue through other 
provisions of Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT.   
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XII. Conclusion 
Irrespective of whether a broad or narrow definition of conflict is adopted, principles 
of conflict resolution fall within the notion of ‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c). In this sense, 
they are ‘relevant rules’ that can be used to determine the ‘relevancy’ of other ‘rules’. 
The use of principles of conflict resolution in the process of Article 31(3)(c) is 
reinforced by the fact that unlike the limitations in the course of classical normative 
conflict resolution, within Article 31(3)(c) such limitations are no obstacle in the 
reaching of a judicial conviction. Whereas the application of principles of conflict 
resolution, due to their inherent limitations, may lead to a non result, i.e. to the 
identification of a lacuna, which the judge in order to avoid a non liquet decision 
would have to find a way to fill, in the interpretative process we do not face the same 
dilemma. After the application of the principles of conflict resolution we move on to 
the proximity criterion, which will give a definite, single result808 as to which 
interpretation is more relevant and closer to what the drafters intended.  
Consequently this two staged – approach, starting from principles of conflict 
resolution and ending with the proximity criterion, takes into consideration all forms 
of relationship between the norms examined (A-C, A-B and B-C type relationships) 
offers the judge a clear and accurate image of the situation and will always lead to an 
interpretation of the relevant provision, thus ensuring greater harmonization and unity 
within the system of international law. 
                                                 
808 On how Articles 31-33 and their customary counterparts are designed to always lead to a singular 
result, see Fitzmaurice and Merkouris, supra note 504. 
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Chapter IV: Interpretation of International Customary Law by 
Reference to the Customary Law Equivalent of Article 31(3)(c) 
 
I. Introduction 
In the three previous Chapters the content and the process of Article 31(3)(c) was 
scrutinised. In Chapters I and II both written (Chapter I) and unwritten (Chapter II) 
elements of Article 31(3)(c) were examined to shed light as to its correct meaning. 
This examination led, amongst others, to the discovery of the ‘proximity criterion’ as 
the quintessential tool for the identification of ‘relevancy’ for the purposes of Article 
31(3)(c).809 In Chapter III the focal point shifted from the provision itself to the 
system of international law and what was researched was how principles regulating 
the relationship between norms (and their possible conflicts) affected, if at all, the 
principle of systemic integration. The end result was a validation of the truly systemic 
nature of Article 31(3)(c), since the principles of conflict resolution were shown to be 
included810 in the overall process envisaged by Article 31(3)(c). However, the 
common element that all these previous Chapters share is that they focus on 
interpretation of treaties, within the paradigm of systemic interpretation.  
However, the scope of this thesis would not be complete without an 
examination of whether the principle of systemic integration is also applicable to 
customary international law. It is this lacuna that this final Chapter attempts to 
address. Is interpretation a process restricted only to written sources, and if not what 
are the methods of interpretation of customary international law and what role does 
Article 31(3)(c)811 play in them? In this way, the thesis will conclude with perhaps the 
most systemic-related analysis of all; an analysis of the very content and function of 
one of the mercurial sources of international law and what, if at all, influence on it 
does the principle of systemic integration have. 
                                                 
809 See Chapter I. 
810 In some situations, i.e. when various treaties are submitted, on the basis of Article 31(3)(c), in 
support of conflicting interpretations. In more detail, see Chapter III.  
811 The author is aware that Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT, as such, would not apply in cases of 
interpretation of customary law, since the VCLT applies only to the interpretation of treaties as its own 
title clearly states. However, for reasons of fluidity of the text, and bearing in mind that Article 31(3)(c) 
of the VCLT and its customary equivalent have the same content (see  supra ‘Prolegomena’), although 
perhaps not the same field of application (as the author will prove in this Chapter), the term Article 
31(3)(c) will still be used in this Chapter, denoting, however, not the VCLT Article per se but its 
customary equivalent.  
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Since the topic of interpretation of international customary law is not 
sufficiently researched the question is how to approach it. In this Chapter an 
investigation will be provided of the views expressed in doctrine and in the relevant 
jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of international customary law.   
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II. Is an Interpretation of Customary International Law Possible? 
A. Identity, Identification and Pitfalls of International Customary Law 
Before embarking on an analysis of whether customary international law can be 
interpreted we should consider the main characteristics of custom as a source of law. 
The essence of custom, its main problems812 and its origins were the subject-matter of 
                                                 
812 ILA, Final Report of the Committee – Statement of Principles Applicable to the Formation of 
General Customary International Law (London: ILA, 2000), accessible at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/30 (last accessed on 25 January 2010); Rudolf Bernhardt, 
‘Customary International Law’, in Encyclopedia of Public International Law: Volume I, Rudolf 
Bernhardt and Rudolf L. Bindschedler (eds.) (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1992), 898; Michael 
Akehurst, ‘Custom as a Source of International Law’, BYIL 47 (1977): 1-53; Eduardo Jinenez de 
Arechaga, ‘La Costumbre como Fuente del Derecho Intenacional’, in Estudios de Derecho 
Internacional : Homenaje al Professor Miaja de la Muela, Adolfo Miaja de la Muela (ed.) (Madrid : 
Editorial Tecnos, 1979), 375 ; Maarten Bos, ‘The Identification of Custom in International Law’, GYIL 
25 (1982): 9; Julio Barberis, ‘Réflexios sur la Coutume Internationale’, Annuaire Français de Droit 
International 36 (1990) : 9; Peter Haggenmacher, ‘La Doctrine des Deux Éléments du Droit Coutumier 
dans la Pratique de la Cour Internationale’, RGDIP 90 (1986) : 5 ; Alain Pellet, ‘Article 38’, in The 
Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary, Andreas Zimmermann, Christian 
Tomuschat and Karin Oellers-Frahm (eds.) (Oxford: OUP, 2006), at 748-64; Bin Cheng, ‘Custom : The 
Future of State Practice in a divided World’, in Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory, 
Ronald McDonald and Douglas Johnston (eds.), (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), 513-54; Hugh 
Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification: An Examination of the Continuing Role of 
Custom in the Present Period of Codification of International Law (Leiden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), at 
46-60; Photini Pazartzi, ‘Le Rôle de la Pratique dans le Droit Coutumier’, in L’ Influence des Sources 
sur l’ Unité et la Fragmentation du Droit International (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2006), 81-102; Oscar 
Schachter, ‘Entangled Treaty and Custom’, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in 
Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Yoram Dinstein and Mala Tabory (eds.) (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1989), 717; Tiyanjana Maluwa, ‘Custom, Authority and Law: Some Jurisprudential Perspectives on the 
Theory of Customary International Law’, African Journal of International and Comparative Law 6 
(1994): 387; Rudolf Bernhardt, ‘Customary International Law: New and Old Problems’, Thesaurus 
Acroasium 19 (1992): 203; Grigori Tunkin, ‘Remarks on the Juridical nature of Customary Norms of 
International Law’, California Law Review 49 (1961): 419-30; Bin Cheng, ‘United Nations Resolutions 
on Outer Space: ‘Instant’ International Law Customary Law?’, Indian Journal of International Law 5 
(1965): 23-48;  Gerald J. Postema, ‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’, in 
The Nature of Customary Law, Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James B. Murphy (eds.) (Cambridge: 
CUP, 2007), 279; Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules : International Rules and 
Customary International Law (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), especially at 129-46; Gennady Danilenko, 
‘The Theory of International Customary Law’, GYIL 31 (1988): 9-47; Arthur M. Weisburd, 
‘Customary International Law: The Problem of Treaties’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 21 
(1988): 1-46; Serge Sur, La Coutume Internationale (Paris: Librairies Techniques, 1990); Charles de 
Visscher, ‘La Codification du Droit International’, RCADI 6 (1925/I) : 325, at 349-66; Roger S. Clark, 
‘Treaty and Custom’, in International Law, the International Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands (eds.) (Cambridge: CUP, 1999), 171; 
Koskenniemi, supra note 549, at 388 et seq., especially 450 et seq.; Ian Brownlie, ‘Some Problems in 
the Evaluation of the Practice of States as an Element of Custom’, in Studi di Diritto Internazionale in 
Onore di Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz Vol. I, Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz (ed.) (Napoli: Editoriale Scientifica, 
2003), 313; David P. Fidler, ‘Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives on the Future 
of Customary International Law’, GYIL 39 (1996): 198; Henri Torrione, L’ Influence des Conventions 
de Codification sur la Coutume en Droit International Public (Fribourg : Éditions Universitaires 
Fribourg Suisse, 1989). 
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innumerable publications.813 Perhaps, the main obstacle in comprehending custom lies 
in its inherent abstractness. Whereas conventional law, by definition can be found in 
written instruments, customary law does not partake in such identification. Custom, as 
many authors tend to mention, is vague.814 Even the term used in connection with 
codification treaties, i.e. that they ‘crystallize customary international law’, seems to 
imply per se that customary law is by nature vague.815  
However, vagueness is not characteristic of customary international law alone. 
According to Hart all terms used in law have “a core of settled application and a 
fringe or penumbra of uncertainty”.816 In this context saying that custom is vague does 
not ipso facto presuppose that conventional law is not. On the contrary, both 
customary and conventional law are characterized by a degree of vagueness and 
uncertainty. Consequently, the argument of vagueness cannot by itself substantiate a 
different approach to custom, at least for interpretative purposes, than the one adopted 
for conventional law.817 
However, it is not merely the element of vagueness that causes awkwardness 
when attempting to approach customary law; it is how one identifies custom, as well. 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute describes custom as “evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law”.818 This wording has been criticized by many authors as poor 
draftmanship. The problem is that it is not customary law that is the evidence of 
practice, it is the other way around; it is ‘general practice accepted as law’ that is an 
                                                 
813 Grégoire Gianni, La Coutume en Droit International (Paris : Pedone, 1931), at 15 et seq. ; Jean 
Bodin Society for Comparative Institutional History,  La Coutume = Custom : Parts I-IV, (Bruxelles : 
De Boeck Université, 1989/92) 
814 ILA, supra note 812, at 2-3; John Gilissen, ‘La Coutume : Essai de Synthése Générale’, in La 
Coutume = Custom : Fourth Part – The Contemporary World, Jean Bodin Society for Comparative 
Institutional History (Bruxelles : De Boeck Université, 1989/92), 433, at 464 ; Theodor Bühler, ‘La 
Coutume en Droit International’, in La Coutume = Custom : Fourth Part – The Contemporary World, 
Jean Bodin Society for Comparative Institutional History (Bruxelles : De Boeck Université, 1989/92), 
13, at 32 ; Charles de Visscher, Les Effectivités du Droit International Public (Paris : Pedone, 1967) ; at 
73 ; Karol Wolfke, ‘Treaties and Custom: Aspects of Interrelation’, in Essays on the Law of Treaties: A 
Collection of Essays in Honour of Bert Vierdag, Jan Klabbers and René Lefeber (eds.) (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1998), 31, at 36; Frederick Schauer, ‘Pitfalls in the Interpretation of Customary 
Law’, in in The Nature of Customary Law, Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James B. Murphy (eds.) 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2007), 13, at 20;  
815 “crystallize …3.make or become definite or clear”; Oxford Dictionaries, supra note 48. 
816 Schauer, supra note 814, at 20, referring to Herbert L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994, 2nd edition), at 124-54. 
817 A point to which we shall return infra. 
818 Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute 
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evidence of the existence of customary international law.819 This may have led the ICJ 
in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, to tweak the aforementioned definition a bit 
and state that the creation of customary international law postulates: “two constitutive 
elements: (1) a general practice of States and (2) the acceptance by States of the 
general practice as law”.820 Two elements, thus, evidence customary international 
law: i) a material one, i.e. practice and ii) a psychological one, i.e. opinio juris; and 
whereas ‘practice’ as a notion does not raise many issues,821 opinio juris, on the other 
hand, has been at the epicentre of judicial and academic discourse on sources of 
international law for ages.822  
                                                 
819 For a more detailed analysis of the critique regarding the poor draftmanship of Article 38 of the ICJ 
Statute see: Max Sørensen, Les Sources du Droit International (Copenhague: Munskgaard, 1946), at 
84; Rousseau, supra note 350, at 825; Schwarzenberger, supra note 534, at 39; Wolfke, supra note 
814, at 6; Iain MacGibbon, ‘Customary Law and Acquiescence’, BYIL 33 (1957): 115, at 125; Olufemi 
Elias and Chin Leng Lim, The Paradox of Consensualism in International Law (The Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1998), at 5 and accompanying notes; generally on problems of Article 38 see 
Onuma Yasuaki, ‘Is the International Court of Justice an Emperor Without Clothes?’, International 
Legal Theory 8 (2002): 1; Krzysztof Skubiszewski, ‘Elements of Custom and the Hague Court’, 
Zeitschrift für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 31 (1971): 810, at 812. 
820 North Sea Continental Shelf cases (Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands), Judgment of 20 
February 1969, ICJ Rep. 1969, 3, at 44 (hereinafter North Sea Continental Shelf cases). 
821 As to what constitutes state practice (see Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and 
Treaties: A Study of their Interactions and Interrelations with Special Consideration of the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), at 4 et seq.; Villiger, 
supra note 574, at 16-28, paras. 16-33). Two prime examples are: if other treaties and/or international 
judicial decisions can be used as evidence of state practice in the process of identifying a customary 
norm. For other treaties see: Thirlway, supra note 475, at 102-5; Villiger, supra note 51 at 10; Karol 
Wolfke, Custom in Present International Law (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1993), at 68-72; 
Skubiszewski, supra note 819, at 818-25; Steffen Hindelang, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom 
and a Healthy Investment Climate : The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary International 
Law Revisited’, Journal of World Investment and Trade 5 (2004): 789; Julio A. Barberis, Les Éléments 
Constitutifs de la Coutume, en tant que Procédé Créateur de Droit, d Après la Jurisprudence de la 
Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale et de la Cour Internationale de Justice (Thésé, Institut 
Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales, 1964), at 60-77; Richard Baxter, ‘Multilateral Treaties 
as Evidence of Customary International Law’, BYIL 41 (1965-1966): 275-300. Regarding international 
judicial decisions as evidence of State practice according to the Principles Applicable to the Formation 
of General Customary International Law that the ILA adopted in the 2000 London Conference 
 
[a]lthough international courts and tribunals ultimately derive their authority from States, it is not 
appropriate to regard their decisions as a form of State practice 
 
ILA, supra note 812, at 18-9; see, however, contrary opinion of Wolfke and qualified opinion of 
Villiger; Ibid., at 19, note 42. 
822 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 176; Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Lachs, at 231; and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Sørensen, at 246-7; Maurice Mendelson, ‘The 
Subjective Element in Customary International Law’, BYIL 66 (1995): 177; Olufemi Elias, ‘The Nature 
of the Subjective Element in Customary International Law’, ICLQ 44 (1995) : 501 ;  Elias and Lim, 
supra note 819, at 3-21; Rodolfo Piza Escalante, ‘La ‘opinio juris’ como Fuente Autónoma del 
Derecho Internacional’, Annuario Hispano-Luso Americano de Derecho Internacional 8 (1987): 131; 
Raphael Walden, ‘The Subjective Element in the Formation of Customary International Law’, Israel 
Law Review 12 (1977): 344.  
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An indication of how difficult the notion of opinio juris is, can be found in the 
writing of Bin Cheng, who identifies no less than five different types of opinio 
juris,823 which in turn can combine with each other in order to describe any form of 
opinio juris that appears in domestic or international law and in any form of social 
organization.824 Another problem is this sort of circularity of opinio juris or what 
Byers calls the ‘chronological paradox’,825 i.e. that the states must believe that the 
rules their practice is creating already exist.  
Debate exists also on the gravitas of each element relative to the other. The 
problems posed by the notion of opinio juris has led some authors to conclude that 
opinio juris is irrelevant826 or at least of limited importance as an autonomous 
element.827 There are also authors, however, that seem to consider opinio juris as the 
most important of the two elements, or at a minimum that a density of practice is not a 
sine qua non element.828 One of the most famous quotes in the context of this debate 
is one made by Haagenmancher who wrote that claiming that the two constitutive 
elements of custom are separate and identifiable is like Baron Munchausen’s claim 
that he could fly by lifting himself from his own wig!829 To make matters even worse, 
the tug of war between practice and opinio juris is not the only issue. Various other 
theoretical problems, such as the notion of regional custom and the position of new 
                                                 
823 The five different types of opinio juris are: i) opinio individualis juris ii) opinio generalis juris iii) 
opinio imperialis juris iv) opinio juris consuetudinalis and v) opinio juris legalis; see  Bin Cheng, 
‘Opinio Juris: A Key Concept in International Law that is much Misunderstood’, in International Law 
in the Post-Cold War World: Essays in Memory of Li Haopei, Sienho Yee and Wang Tieya (eds.) 
(London: Routledge, 2001), 56, at 60 et seq. 
824 Id. 
825 Byers, supra note 812, at 130-33. 
826 Hans Kelsen, ‘Théorie du Droit International Coutumier’, Révue Internationale de la Théorie du 
Droit 13 (1939) : 253-74; Paul Guggenheim, ‘Les Deux Élements de la Coutume en Droit 
International’, in La Technique et les Principes du Droit Public : Études en l’ Honeur de Georges 
Scelle : Vol. I, Geroge Scelle, Suzanne Bastid (eds.) (Paris: Librairie Générale de Droit et de 
Jurisprudence, 1950), 275, at 280; Paul Guggenheim, ‘Les Principes de Droit International Public’, 
RCADI 80 (1952/I) : 5, at 70-2 ; it has to be  noted, however, that both Kelsen and Guggenheim later 
abandoned this position ; see  Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1966, revised by Robert Tucker); Paul Guggenheim, Traité de Droit International 
Public: Tome I (Genève: Librairie de l’ Université, Georg, 1967)  
827 Sørensen, supra note 819, at 88-111 ; Lazare Kopelmanas, ‘Custom as a Means of the Creation of 
International Law’ BYIL 18(1937) : 127, at 148; Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public 
International Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), at 149, note 29;  
828 Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), Judgment 
of 25 July 1974, ICJ Rep. 1974, 3, Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro, at 100 (hereinafter Fisheries 
Jurisdiction case); Cheng, supra note 812, at 23-48; René-Jean Dupuy, ‘Coutume Sage et Coutume 
Sauvage’, in Mélanges Offerts à Charles Rousseau: la Communauté Internationale, Charles Rousseau 
and Suzanne Bastid (eds.) (Paris: Pedone, 1974), 75-87. 
829 Haggenmacher, supra note 812. 
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states with respect to existing custom830 and the notorious notion of ‘persistent 
objector’,831 render an already messy situation even more complex, to the point that it 
has been claimed that any effort to solve all of these issues is like trying to “square the 
juridical circle”.832 To add insult to injury the ICJ has not been consistent in the 
identification of custom, not always looking for practice and opinio juris.833 
Despite the aforementioned problems and in an attempt to break the circulus 
inextricabilis834 (i.e. vicious circle),835 various constructions have been proposed: 
Stern’s distinction between “assentiment” and “sentiment”, i.e. between ‘consent’ or 
‘will’ that something be a norm of customary law and ‘belief’ that it is a rule;836 
MacGibbon’s argument that customary norms should be separated in those that create 
rights and those that create obligations. Opinio juris, according to him, is principally, 
if not exclusively, relevant only in the latter case;837 d’Amato is also in favour of the 
abandonment of the concept of opinio juris and usage and their substitution by 
‘articulation’ and ‘act of commitment’;838 Kirgis proposes the adoption of a ‘sliding 
scale’, the less frequent and consistent the practice becomes, the stronger the 
demonstration of opinio juris should be;839 while van Hoof offers a detailed analysis 
of the ‘stages-theory’.840 
 
 
                                                 
830 Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2008), at 92-100. 
831 Jonathan Charney, ‘The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International 
Law’, BYIL 56 (1985); 1; Ted Stein, ‘The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the 
Persistent Objector in International Law’, Harvard International Law Journal 26 (1985): 457; David 
Colson, ‘How Persistent must the Persistent Objector be?’ Washington Law Review 61 (1986): 957; J. 
Brock McLane, ‘How Late in the Emergence of a Norm of Customary International Law may a 
Persistent Objector Object?’, ILSA Journal of International Law 13 (1989): 1. 
832 Godefridus J. H. van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Deventer: Kluwer Law 
and Taxation Publishers, 1983), at 91. 
833 Zimmermann, Tomuschat and Oellers-Frahm, supra note 812, at 759-60; Yasuaki, supra note 819, 
at 16. 
834 Thirlway, supra note 812, at 48; Giuseppe Barile, ‘La Structure de l’ Ordre Juridique International: 
Règles Générales et Règles Conventionelles’, RCADI 161 (1978/III): 9, at 48-51.  
835 that is the result of the traditional approach to opinio juris. 
836 Brigitte Stern, ‘La Coutume au Coeur du Droit International: Quelques Réflexions’, in Melanges 
Offerts à Paul Reuter ; Le Droit International,Unité et Diversité, Paul Reuter and Daneil Bardonnet 
(eds.) (Paris: Pedone, 1981), 479, at 486 ; ILA, supra note 812, at 30.  
837 MacGibbon, supra note 819, at 127-8. 
838 Anthony d’ Amato, The Concept of Custom in International Law (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1971). 
839 Frederic Kirgis, ‘Custom on a Sliding Scale’, AJIL 81 (1987): 146-51. 
840 van Hoof, supra note 832,  at 91 et seq. 
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B. Is Interpretation Restricted only to Written Sources? 
1. Arguments that only Written Sources can be Interpreted 
Irrespective of the problems and vagueness of custom, its status as a source of 
international law is unchallenged.841 The question then that logically arises is once a 
customary norm has come into existence, and apart from the possibility of it being 
modified or terminated by subsequent practice and opinio juris, shouldn’t its inherenet 
vagueness842 require ipso facto that its continued manifestation should be an object of 
interpretation? Vagueness and indeterminacy that exist even in written documents are 
the raison d’ être of interpretation. It would seem counter-intuitive then to deny 
interpretation to norms emanating from a source of law that has those exact same 
characteristics. 
Despite the great amount of research devoted to custom as a source of 
international law, very little has been written on the subject of interpretation of 
customary law. Bernhardt states that interpretation is only for written sources and 
although immediately afterwards he concedes that the contention that interpretation 
also encompasses norms of a customary nature is “a question of definition” however 
he feels that “it is neither usual nor advisable to use the notion of interpretation in 
connection with the clarification of norms of customary law”.843 Similarly Tullio 
Treves again in the Encyclopedia of Public International Law argues that “the 
irrelevance of linguistic expression excludes interpretation as a necessary operation in 
order to apply them [i.e. customary norms]”.844 Other authors have also expressed 
similar opinions.845 
                                                 
841 Although its importance is considered by some authors to be declining in an evolving world where 
the regulation of international matters is achieved through an ever increasing number of treaties; see 
Mark E. Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Manual on the Theory and Practice of 
the Interrelation of Sources (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2nd edition, 1997), at 289-91; de 
Visscher, supra note 814, at 70-5. 
842 See supra. 
843 Rudolf Bernhardt, ‘Interpretation in International Law’, in Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law: Volume II, Rudolf Bernhardt and Rudolf L. Bindschedler (eds.) (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
1992), 1416, at 1417. 
844 Tullio Treves, ‘Customary International Law’, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International 
Law, para. 2, accessible at www.mpepil.com (last accessed on 25 January 2010). 
845 Degan holds that interpretation concerns only written treaties, therefore even verbal treaties cannot 
be the object of interpretation; Vladimir D. Degan, L’ Interprétation des Accords en Droit 
International (The Hague : Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), 162 (However, see contra Report on the 
Interpretation of Unilateral Acts, where even verbal acts can be interpreted); Jan H. Verzijl, 
International Law in a Historical Perspective: Vol. I (Leyden: Sijthoff, 1968), at 32; Maarten Bos has 
dealt more extensively with the issue. See Bos, supra note 345, at 106 et seq.; Maarten Bos, ‘Theory 
and Practice of Treaty Interpretation’, NILR 27 (1980): 3, at 6-10 
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Perhaps the only author who rejects the possibility of interpretation of 
customary norms and has provided a somewhat more extensive analysis of the issue is 
Maarten Bos. His main argument against the extension of the process of interpretation 
to unwritten sources lies in the fact that he considers that the mere fact of the 
identification of the customary rule delineates its content as well. According to him, 
in the case of customary international law “content merges with existence”.846 The 
same does not hold true for written texts, since the identification of a rule, is simply 
verifying whether the text is a treaty or not. If it is, then the content of a specific 
provision is a matter of interpretation.847 However, the practice of international courts 
and tribunals does not seem to reinforce this argument. International tribunals do not 
go through the process of identifying custom, by searching for practice and opinio 
juris, in each and every case.848 Furthermore, even if this were the case, the fact 
remains that the customary norm pronounced would be couched in vague terms.849 
These vague terms, would then be subject to interpretation in order to identify 
whether a norm of customary international law can be applied in a certain case or not. 
Finally, the statement that “content merges with existence”,850 seems to based on the 
premise that unlike treaties, which are living instruments, custom is like a series of 
still images, individual in time.  
 However, a norm of international customary law, once it has been identified 
by an international court or tribunal, does not cease to exist. Consequently, when the 
next tribunal attempts to apply the same norm, it usually does not go on about re-
establishing that the norm in question is customary international law. It considers it as 
a given. However, that does not mean that it can immediately apply it either. In this 
context between the identification of a customary norm from one tribunal and its 
application from another there is an intermediate stage; that of interpretation of the 
norm by the latter tribunal. The reason for that is that not only are customary norms 
generally identified in vague terms but also that each case is unique. If a tribunal does 
not wish to identify the content of a customary norm (or if it can’t, in cases where no 
State practice or opinio juris exists regulating the matter in question) then, if it is to 
apply that norm, the only explanation is that it has interpreted it. In summation, there 
                                                 
846 Bos, supra note 345, at 109. 
847 Id., and accompanying Figure I. 
848 See supra relevant jurisprudence. 
849 See supra analysis. 
850 (emphasis in original), Bos, supra note 345, at 109. 
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exists extensive practice of international judicial organs, which based on a previous 
‘vague identification’851 apply customary international law, without identifying its 
content852 but merely by interpreting it.853 
Finally, another common element that all the aforementioned arguments share 
is that they reject interpretation of customary international law on the premise that 
interpretation is restricted only to written sources. However, this is not an obvious 
conclusion. There is no indication in law that the scope of interpretation is restricted 
to written documents. In fact there is quite an extensive practice to the contrary.854 
 
2. Arguments that Interpretation Covers both Written and Unwritten Sources 
The academic discourse on the issue of interpretation of customary international law 
is not dominated by the voices of those rejecting it. Although the opinions expressed 
in favour of interpretation of customary international law are, usually and similarly to 
the opinions rejecting the possibility of interpretation of customary international law, 
a bit laconic,855 they nevertheless illustrate that the subject is not as ‘open-and-shut’ a 
case as the previously mentioned authors professed.  
 An interesting point that needs to be raised here is that although not many 
authors tackle the issue of interpretation of customary norms directly, yet the 
expression ‘interpretation of custom’ or some version of it appears quite often in the 
writings of several authors,856 most notable amongst them Sir Hersch Lauterpacht,857 
                                                 
851 Made by them or another tribunal. 
852 i.e. without researching the State practice and opinio juris on the matter. 
853 See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996, ICJ Rep. 
1996, 226, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 398 (hereinafter Advisory Opinion on 
Nuclear Weapons). Further relevant jurisprudence proving this point will be analyzed infra. 
854 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case (United Kingdom v. Iran), Preliminary Objections. Judgment of 22 
July 1952, ICJ Rep. 1952, 93, at 104 (hereinafter Anglo-Iranian Oil Company case); Nuclear Tests case 
(Australia v. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, ICJ Rep. 1974, 253, at 269 (hereinafter Nuclear 
Tests case); Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, at 31-2. 
855 See comments on Kolb by Fouad Zarbiev, ‘Book Review: Robert Kolb, Interprétation et Création du 
Droit International ; Esquisses d’  une Herméneutique Juridique Moderne pour le Droit International 
Public’, Leiden Journal of International Law 22 (2009) : 211, at 213. 
856 “Interpretation of ‘fair and equitable standard’”, in Catherine Yannaca-Small, ‘Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard in International Law’, OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, 
Working Papers on International Investment 3 (2004), accessible at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/53/33776498.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 2010), at 26; 
“interpretation and application of [fair and equitable treatment]”, Stephan W. Schill, ‘Book Review: 
Ioana Tudor, The Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in the International Law of Foreign 
Investment’, EJIL 20 (2009): 236; “Did the Tribunal Interpret the Minimum Standard of Treatment for 
Foreign Investors under International Law as the same Standard Applied by NAFTA Countries to their 
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Martti Koskenniemi858 and Serge Sur859.The fact that these authors mention the 
interpretation of customary international law in passim is perhaps, the greatest proof 
that interpretation of customary international law is possible and does occur.  
Alongside the explicit mentions of interpretation of customary law, mention 
must be made of those statements where the acceptance of such an interpretation is 
the only logical inference from the authors’ argumentation.860 
All the above references are pertinent to the issue of interpretation of 
customary law. This should not be confused with the interpretation of the practice 
leading to customary international law. Whereas the former is the subject we are 
addressing for the purposes of this thesis, the latter is irrelevant. It does not refer to 
the interpretation of the rule as such, because at that stage it is still a matter of the 
identification of the rule. What is being interpreted are the various acts considered as 
                                                                                                                                            
Own Domestic Investors”, Patrick Dumberry, ‘The Quest to Define ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment’ for 
Investors under International Law: The Case of the NAFTA Chapter 11 Pope & Talbot Awards’, 
Journal of World Investment 3(4) (2002): 657, at 686; “the interpretation of these standards”, Peter 
Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), at 682. 
857 Lauterpacht in his book The Development of International Law by the International Court  has a 
whole Section entitled ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Custom and Regional International Law’; Sir 
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (London: 
Stevens and Sons Limited, 1958), at 381-4, where he considers that in the Asylum case the ICJ 
restrictively interpreted the regional customary rule of granting political asylum, by reference to 
general principles of international law (i.e. state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention). 
This was essentially a systemic interpretation of customary law, or an interpretation based on reference 
to ‘other relevant rules of international law’.  This point will be further analyzed infra. 
858 “Customary rules tend to be interpreted differently”, Koskenniemi, supra note 549, at 391. 
859 Sur, supra note 345, at 189-90. 
860 See Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice who argues that the absence of the precision of the 
relevant rule still leaves the matter to be judged by the ‘general and preponderant 
trend’ of the law on the subject. This is not only an inference of interpretation of a 
customary rule, but even more so one by reference to ‘any relevant rules of 
international law’, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, The Law and Procedure of the 
International Court of Justice (Cambridge: Grotius, 1986), at 151-2. In the context of 
international investment law although the ‘fair and equitable treatment’ is a rule of 
customary international law there is no agreement on its precise meaning. The logical 
inference form this is that for a Court to apply it in a given case it must give it a 
precise meaning, i.e. interpret it: see Yannaca-Small, supra note 856, at 25 ; Rudolf 
Dolzer and Magrete Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1995); Mahmoud Salem, ‘Le Développement de la Protection 
Conventionnelle des Investissements Étrangers’, Journal du Droit International 113 
(1986): 579-626; Muchlinski explicitly states that “the interpretation of these standards by arbitral 
tribunals has been considered [in previous sections of the book]”; Muchlinski, supra note 856, at 682. 
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state practice, the gravitas of which will evidence or not the existence of a customary 
norm.861 
However, a few references scattered across a variety of academic writings are 
not the only indication of academic acceptance of the interpretation of customary law. 
Kolb, Orakhelashvili and Bleckmann have devoted some analysis on the subject.862 
Despite the fact that their analysis focuses on different aspects of the interpretation of 
customary norms,863 the important fact is that all of them explicitly acknowledge that 
customary international law can be interpreted. 
Furthermore, a negation of the interpretation of custom would lead to an 
absurdum. It is common knowledge that international customary law can be codified 
and incorporated in treaty instruments.864 According to the Nicaragua case the fact 
that a customary norm has been codified does not mean ipso facto that it ceases to 
exist; that it is subsumed by the conventional norm.865 The provisions of the 
codification treaties can, nevertheless, still be an object of interpretation. If we follow 
this line of reasoning to the bitter end then what we end up with is two norms with 
identical content,866 of which only the one incorporated in a text can be the object of 
interpretation. Since there is no hierarchy between these sources of law, i.e. treaty and 
custom, such a discriminatory approach does not seem to flow logically from the 
above premise. Consequently, logic dictates that customary international law can be 
interpreted. 
 
                                                 
861 See Serge Sur, who clearly distinguishes between, on the one hand, the interpretation of the practice 
leading to the establishment of a customary norm and on the other hand, the interpretation of the 
already established norm; Sur, supra note 345, at 189-90; similarly, Alexander Orakhelashvili, The 
Interpretation of Acts and Rules in Public International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2008), at 496; de Visscher 
who clearly states that he is referring to interpretation of practice, de Visscher, supra note 345, at 219 
et seq.; see also Schauer who seems to use ‘interpretation’ to denote, depending on the relevant 
context, both interpretation of custom as such and interpretation of the practice which leads to custom; 
Schauer, supra note 814, at 13-34. 
862 Kolb, supra note 345, at 219 et seq. ; Orakhelashvili, supra note 830, Ch. 15; Albert Bleckmann, 
‘Zur Feststellung und Auslegung von Völkergewohnheitsrecht’, ZAöRV 37 (1977): 504 
863 Both Kolb and Bleckmann focus more on providing a logical and/or theoretical basis for the 
interpretation of custom, whereas Orakhelashvili adopts Bleckmann’s propositions and gives more 
emphasis to jurisprudential examples of interpretation of custom (without, however, categorizing them 
in the methods of interpretation of custom proposed by Bleckman). 
864 See for instance Article 2(4) UN Charter, several provisions of the VCLT, the UNCLOS and even 
the Articles on State Responsibility. 
865 Nicaragua case, para. 179. 
866 At least at the time of the original codification. 
 198
3. The ICJ and PCIJ Statutes as the Definitive Argument in Favour of 
Interpretation of International Customary Law 
However, what is striking is that in all these discussions regarding the possibility or 
not of interpreting international customary law, an examiniation of the travaux 
préparatoires of Articles 36 and 38 of the ICJ Statute and the corresponding Articles 
of the PCIJ Statute does not seem to have been undertaken. This is crucial, since it is 
exactly in this context that perhaps the most definitive argument in support of 
interpretation of customary law867 can be found. Article 38 of the ICJ Statute 
enumerates the sources of international law, so it would seem that this Article would 
be the best place to start researching the possibility of interpretation of customary law. 
However, the issue of interpretation within Article 38 did not come up either in the 
travaux préparatoires of the ICJ Statute or in those of the PCIJ Statute. 
The next candidate is, of course, Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute, which states 
that: 
  
…the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law;…868 
 
A closer look at the wording of Article 36 shows a discrepancy between 36(2)(a) and 
36(2)(b). The former refers to “interpretation or application of a treaty”, while the 
latter refers to “any question of international law”. It is only logical to presume that 
the former refers to international conventional law whereas the latter refers to 
international customary law. So the question that needs to be addressed is what the 
reason for this different wording was and if it should be construed as a negation of the 
possibility of customary law being interpreted.  
The discussion on what would become Article 36 of the ICJ Statute was 
entrusted during the San Francisco Conference to Committee IV/1, which delegated 
the issue, further, to Subcommittee IV/1/D, and which, essentially, followed the 
                                                 
867 Second, perhaps, only to the extensive jurisprudence on the matter, see infra Section III. 
868 1945 ICJ Statute, 59 Stat. 1055 
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paradigm of the relevant Article in the PCIJ Statute.869 During the travaux 
préparatoires of that Committee the discussions revolved mainly around the issue of 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court870 without much discussion on the wording of 
Article 36(2). For this reason and since the relevant part of the PCIJ Statute was 
adopted verbatim, the preparatory work of the PCIJ Statute needs to be examined as 
well. 
Article 36 of the PCIJ Statute reads as follows: 
 
 
…the jurisdiction of the Court in all or any of the classes of legal disputes concerning: 
a. the interpretation of a treaty; 
b. any question of international law;…871 
 
This was based on a draft prepared by Lord Phillimore which was, as to the 
relevant part, identically worded.872 
During the discussions on the drafting of what would become Article 36 of the 
PCIJ Statute and in response to the original draft of Lord Phillimore and a later one by 
Baron Descamps, Mr. Ricci-Busatti submitted the following amendment: 
 
Annex No. 3bis 
Baron Descamps text as amended by M. Ricci-Busatti. 
Article 1. 
The Permanent Court of International Justice is competent to decide disputes between 
States concerning cases of a legal nature which deal with: 
a. the interpretation or application of a treaty; 
b. the interpretation or application of a general rule of international law…(emphasis 
added)873 
 
The importance of Mr. Ricci-Busatti’s amendment for the purposes of this Chapter 
cannot be overstated. Not only did it explicitly accept the notion of  ‘interpretation of 
                                                 
869 With only just two changes that did not affect the heart of the provision; see United Nations, 
Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization (UNCIO), San Francisco, 
1945: Vol. XIII (London: United Nations Information Organizations, 1945-55), at 560. 
870 An issue that was also at the heart of the discussions at the travaux préparatoires of the PCIJ 
Statute. 
871 1920 PCIJ Statute, 6 LNTS 379. 
872 Procés Verbaux, supra note 553, at 252. 
873 Ibid., at 275. 
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international customary law’, but wished to place it in Article 36 which defined the 
jurisdiction of the PCIJ. The ensuing debate sheds even more light on this.  
In explaining his amendment Mr. Ricci-Busatti said that he suggested this 
wording because he felt that the original one was defective and should be amended.874 
In response to that Lord Phillimore and the President of the Advisory Committee 
during the 12th Meeting of 1 July 1920 stated that they felt that it was necessary to 
follow the wording of Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.875 
The relevant part of Article 13 of the Covenant goes as follows: 
 
…2. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law… 
are declared to be among those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration 
(emphasis added)876 
 
Consequently, both Lord Phillimore and the President of the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists did not comment on the validity per se of the content of Mr. Ricci-Busatti’s 
amendment. Their main concern was to simply follow an existing wording. This is 
reinforced by the fact that at a later stage the discussion returned again on the issue of 
the wording of para. 1(b). This time, in the 13th Meeting of 1 July 1920 both the 
President and Lord Phillimore agreed that “the amendments did not affect the heart of 
the question, but concerned rather the drafting”.877 In this sense they essentially 
agreed that the substance of the amendment proposed by Mr. Ricci-Busatti was 
correct, i.e. that a norm of customary law could be interpreted and that the PCIJ could 
deliver such an interpretation. However, despite their agreement with the essence of 
Mr. Ricci-Busatti’s amendment they felt that the original wording ‘any question of 
international law should be retained’, not due to its correctness or superiority to Mr. 
Ricci-Busatti’s proposal, but only because 
 
                                                 
874 Ibid., at 265. 
875 Ibid., at 264-5. 
876 Article 13 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; 1919 Covenant of the League of Nations, 1 
LNTS 7; The Commentary of the Covenant, as well, focuses on the issue of compulsory jurisdiction 
and does not make any other comments regarding a possible interpretation of custom; House of 
Commons, The Covenant of the League of Nations with a Commentary Thereon, [Cmd. 151], 20th 
Century House of Commons Sessional Papers LIII (1919): 685, at 700 accessible at: 
http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-
2004&res_dat=xri:hcpp&rft_dat=xri:hcpp:fulltext:1919-022455 (last accessed on 25 January 2010). 
877 Procés Verbaux, supra note 553, at 283. 
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[c]onsideration must be taken also of the important part this expression [i.e. ‘any question 
of international law’] played in the Conferences of 1899 and 1907; as well as of legal 
conscience and world opinion which would be astonished not to find this term in the 
Committee’s plan. … Definite previous documents must be followed as much as possible, 
and it must not be forgotten that the expression used in the project is contained in Article 13 
of the Covenant.878  
 
Some of the conventions, which preceded the Covenant of the League of Nations, that 
had this wording i.e. ‘any question of international law’ or some variation of it were: 
Articles 16 of the 1899 Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International 
Disputes879 and Article 38 of the identically named 1907 Convention880; Article 1 of 
the 1903 Arbitration Treaty between Great Britain and France881 and the 1908 Treaty 
between the United States and Great Britain.882,883 
Once again, Mr. Ricci-Busatti countered the considerations with respect to an 
‘established wording’ by insisting that the wording of the Covenant was defective and 
that “the members of the Committee were not bound by the Covenant”.884 Similar 
feelings on the defective nature of the wording of Article 13 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations and the superiority of Mr. Ricci-Busatti’s amendment were 
expressed by Mr. de la Pradelle and Mr. Hagerup.885 
In the end, however, the concerns over retaining an established wording 
prevailed and the wording any ‘question of international law’ was adopted. Despite 
this outcome, the entirety of the debate within the Advisory Committee proves 
beyond doubt that all the members considered Mr. Ricci-Busatti’s construction as 
correct. Customary norms could be interpreted and applied. Not one single member 
raised an objection to this point. On the contrary the only reason why this amendment 
did not pass was because it was felt that the PCIJ Statute should reflect a continuity 
                                                 
878 Id.; Mr. Root also agreed with this explanation, and expressed the concern that should they adopt a 
different terminology, albeit a better worded one, they might inadvertently indicate that they wanted to 
express a different meaning than that of the drafters of the Covenant; Ibid., at 283; de la Pradelle, 
opposed Ricci-Bussati’s amendment, not on its substance, but because he felt that “interpretation is 
included in application”. To this the President of the Advisory Committee of Jurists responded that it 
was a traditional expression; see ibid., at 283.  
879 187 CTS 410. 
880 215 CTS 233. 
881 Hertslet Treaties XXIII, at 492. 
882 Hertslet Treaties XXV, at 1203. 
883 See generally, with further examples of such treaties Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law 
in the International Community (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), at 26-37; and James Scott (ed.), 
Reports to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917) 
884 Procés Verbaux, supra note 553, at 284 . 
885 Id. 
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and link with the wording of the Covenant,886 even if it was defective and inferior to 
Ricci-Busatti’s amendment. In summation, the Advisory Committee of Jurists felt that 
both versions of Article 36 should be considered as having the same meaning and 
therefore, that the PCIJ could interpret and apply not only treaties but custom as well. 
It is interesting to note that the application of Articles 31 and 32 of the 
VCLT887 to Article 36 of both ICJ and PCIJ Statutes would lead to the same result. 
Even if the textual interpretation, object and purpose and intention’s approach of 
Article 31 fail to offer a solution as to whether Article 36 of the ICJ/PCIJ Statute 
refers to interpretation of custom, Article 32 clearly leads to such an affirmative 
interpretation. As to what pertains to the  ICJ Statute, since its own travaux 
préparatoires offer no indication of the appropriate interpretation, the solution would 
be given by reference to the PCIJ Statute,888 which for all purposes is a ‘relevant rule 
of international law’. Consequently, in a twist befitting a thesis analyzing Article 
31(3)(c) and the principle of systemic integration, the fact that Article 36 of the ICJ 
Statute should be understood as giving the Court the power to interpret customary 
law889 is arrived at through an interpretation based on the principle of systemic 
integration (customary Article 31(3)(c)). 
From the above analysis it is clear that the arguments restricting interpretation 
to written sources do not hold up to scrutiny. This is further reinforced by the fact that 
the most apposite international documents on the subject, the ICJ and PCIJ Statute, 
not only do not prohibit interpretation of customary international law, but actually 
consider it as within the powers of the Court. The analysis will now turn to the 
relevant jurisprudence to determine if it reinforces or contradicts the findings so far. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
886 And other previous treaties. 
887 Or to be exact: an application of the customary law equivalents of Articles 31 and 32. The reason for 
this being that the VCLT, by virtue of its Article 4, is not applicable either to the ICJ or to the PCIJ 
Statute. 
888 And its own travaux préparatoires. 
889 And by inference accepting that customary law can be interpreted. 
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4. International Jurisprudence Acknowledging or Applying an Interpretation of 
International Customary Law 
A question that inescapably arises is that if the interpretation of international 
customary law was feasible and therefore applied by international courts and tribunals 
it would have been undoubtedly analyzed extensively in doctrine. Since, no such 
extensive analysis has occurred this would seem to indicate prima facie that courts 
have not indulged in this form of interpretation, regardless of its logical validity. As 
will be shown infra this could not be further from the truth. Not only is there no lack 
of judicial pronouncements on the issue, but actually there is a plethora of case-law, 
including some of the most famous and most-quoted judicial decisions.  
Once our perception of custom has been broadened by the inclusion of the 
possibility of interpretation of customary law a whole new juridical landscape is 
revealed. Due to the restrictions of this thesis, an extensive analysis of all the 
jurisprudence containing references to interpretation of customary law would not be 
possible. For this reason our analysis will focus on landmark cases. If interpretation of 
customary law can be substantiated in these cases, which have otherwise been 
exhaustively analyzed, it would only be logical to presume that the same could be 
inferred mutatis mutandis for the remainder of the jurisprudence. Furthermore, the 
areas that these cases cover are jus in bello, jus ad bellum, law of the sea, law of 
treaties, state responsibility, and investment law. The reason is twofold: First, this 
diversity ensures that interpretation of customary law is a universal process, not 
restricted to any specific field of international law and second, several of the 
customary norms in this field have already been codified or incorporated in various 
treaties, a point that will be pertinent for the analysis of interpretation of customary 
law by means of the principle of systemic integration.890 
Starting with one of the most influential cases of the ICJ, in the Nicaragua 
case the Court held that: 
 
178. …Rules which are identical in treaty law and in customary international law are also 
distinguishable by reference to the methods of interpretation and application.891 
                                                 
890 See infra Section III.A.1 and III.B on the importance of codification treaties as ‘relevant rules’ (i.e. 
Article 31(3)(c)) for the purposes of interpretation of international customary law. 
891 Nicaragua case, para. 178. 
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accepting in this way, that there are methods of interpretation which are specifically 
tailored to the needs of international customary law. 
In another celebrated case, the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Judge 
Tanaka not only explicitly acknowledged interpretation of customary international 
law as a reality but also identified the methods by which it is realised.  
 
Customary law, being vague and containing gaps compared with written law, requires 
precision and completion about its content. This task, in its nature being interpretative, 
would be incumbent upon the Court. The method of logical and teleological interpretation 
can be applied in the case of customary law as in the case of written law (emphasis 
added).892  
 
On its own this quote should suffice to accept that customary law can be 
interpreted. What augments the importance of this dictum is that it was made in a 
case that is usually cited as having clearly identified the process of creation and 
identification of customary international law. Now it has been shown that the case 
is also important for laying out the foundations for our understanding of the 
process of interpretation of customary law. 
Taking his cue from Judge Tanaka’s Opinion, Judge Morelli makes use of 
this interpretative method: 
 
It follows that failure to indicate the criterion according to which the continental shelf is 
apportioned would not constitute a true lacuna. … Now if that rule did not indicate the 
criterion for apportionment, it would be an incomplete rule. But, unlike other incomplete 
rules which no doubt exist in the international legal system, this rule is one the incomplete 
nature of which would have a most particular importance, because it is the determination of 
the very subject-matter of the rights conferred by the rule that would be omitted. Such an 
omission would totally destroy the rule.  
However this may be, I am of the view that a criterion for apportionment is really provided 
by the law: as will be seen, it is a criterion which it is possible to deduce from the very rule 
which confers on different States certain rights over the continental shelf (emphasis 
added).893 
                                                 
892 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 181. 
893 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Morelli, at 200; The fact that in the North Sea Continental Shelf 
cases the Court did not prove the legal nature of the principles it mentioned, led  Degan to conclude 
that the Court, in essence, decided ex aequo et bono (see Degan, supra note 845, at 114). However, the 
aforementioned quotes of Judges Tanaka and Morelli demonstrate that the Court felt that certain rules 
were custom so there was no need to re-confirm them through an exhaustive research of practice and 
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This reference to a deduction from the customary rule conferring rights to States over 
the continental shelf is a barely concealed process of interpretation. 
The North Sea Continental Shelf cases is one example of a long line of law of 
the sea-related cases that interpret customary international law: In the Gulf of Maine 
case the Court held that 
 
111. A body of detailed rules is not to be looked for in customary international law … It is 
therefore unrewarding … to look to general international law to provide a readymade set of 
rules that can be used for solving any delimitation problems that arise. A more useful course 
is to seek a better formulation of the fundamental norm (emphasis added).894 
 
In the Fisheries case Judge Hsu Mo felt that: 
 
The expression “to conform to the general direction of the coast” … should not be given a 
too liberal interpretation … It must be interpreted in the light of the local condition in each 
sector …. (emphasis added).895 
 
while in the Continental Shelf case between Tunisia and Libya the Court considered 
that: 
 
38. The present case however illustrates how the application of the principles and rules 
enunciated, and the factors indicated, by the Court in 1969 may lead to widely differing 
results according to the way in which those principles and rules are interpreted and 
applied, and the relative weight given to each of those factors in determining the method of 
delimitation. (emphasis added)896 
…………….. 
70. Since the Court considers that it is bound to decide the case on the basis of equitable 
principles, it must first examine what such principles entail … the term ‘equitable 
principles’ cannot be interpreted in the abstract ; it refers back to the principles and rules 
which may be appropriate in order to achieve an equitable result.897 
 
                                                                                                                                            
opinio juris. The way these general and all-encompassing rules and considerations were individualised 
for the purposes of the case at hand was nothing short of a clear process of interpretation. 
894 Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada v. United States of 
America), Judgment of 12 October 1984, ICJ Rep.1984, 246, para. 111 (hereinafter Gulf of Maine 
case); a “better formulation” is nothing short of interpretation. 
895 Fisheries case (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment of 18 December 1951, ICJ Rep.1951, 116,  
Separate Opinion of Judge Hsu Mo, at 154-5 (hereinafter Fisheries case). 
896 Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case, para. 38. 
897 Ibid., para. 70. 
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In all these law of the sea-related cases the Court or the individual judges expressly or 
through their actual judicial reasoning acknowledged and made use of interpretation 
of customary international law. The same pattern was adopted in another well known 
case of the ICJ, the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons.898 In that case, it was 
operative para.2(E) of the Judgment that sparked a fiery debate amongst the judges 
and revealed that they too, following the previous jurisprudence, continue to interpret 
customary international law. 
Commenting on this operative paragraph Judge Ranjeva expressed the opinion 
that:  
 
Two consequences flow from this: firstly, this law of armed conflict cannot be interpreted 
as containing lacunae of the sort likely to warrant reserve or at least doubt. (emphasis 
added)899 
… the second clause of operative paragraph 2 E introduces the possibility of an exception 
to the rules of the law of armed conflict by introducing a notion hitherto unknown in this 
branch of international law: the “extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very 
survival of a State would be at stake”. Two criticisms must be offered. Firstly, … [a] priori 
nothing prohibits an interpretation giving precedence to the rules of self-defence, including 
nuclear self-defence, over the rules of humanitarian law, a difficulty which leads 
consequentially to the second criticism. Secondly, the criticism is addressed to the 
acceptance of this concept of “extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very 
survival of a State would be at stake”. … If such a rule must exist, it can be deduced only 
from the intention of the States authors of and parties to these instruments. If an exceptional 
authorization had been envisaged, the authors of these instruments could have referred to 
it… (emphasis added).900 
 
In this part of his Separate Opinion Judge Ranjeva accepts that the law of armed 
conflict, which at least in the part apposite to this case is customary international law, 
can be interpreted and also that the jus ad bellum  rule of self-defence can be 
interpreted as prevailing over humanitarian law. Finally, he also raises the objection 
of the customary nature of the exception “extreme circumstance of self-defence, in 
which the very survival of a State would be at stake”. He fails to find any reference in 
the Court’s judgement to the practice and opinio juris supporting such an exception. 
The logical implication of this is that it is either an interpretation of self-defence as 
                                                 
898 A case which has been put under the microscope (see for instance all the articles included in: 
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes and Philippe Sands (eds.), in International Law, the International 
Court of Justice and Nuclear Weapons, (Cambridge: CUP, 1999)); yet all the references to 
interpretation of custom had somehow eluded detection so far. 
899 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, at 299.  
900 Ibid., at 299-300. 
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customary law or that the Court exercised ultra vires a pouvoir de legiferer that it 
clearly does not have. But even if it is an interpretation, Judge Ranjeva, concludes it is 
one which is illogical and detrimental to the unity of law:   
 
The distinction proposed by the Court would certainly be difficult to apply and in the end 
would only render even more complicated a problem which is already difficult to handle in 
law.901 
 
Similarly Judge Shahabuddeen makes use of interpretation of customary international 
law.  
 
[T]he principle limiting the right to choose means of warfare subsists. Notwithstanding an 
impression of non-use, it is capable of operation. In what way? The principle may be 
interpreted as intended to exclude the right to choose some weapons (emphasis added).902 
 
An interesting point that Judge Shahabuddeen raises 903 is that the Court does not have 
to identify in every instance a customary norm. Its existence has already been proven 
and is generally accepted. What is at hand here is the issue of application of that 
principle: 
 
A useful beginning is to note that what is in issue is not the existence of the principle, but 
its application in a particular case. Its application does not require proof of the coming into 
being of an opinio juris prohibiting the use of the particular weapon; if that were so, one 
would be in the strange presence of a principle which could not be applied without proof of 
an opinio juris to support each application.904 
 
only to conclude that an application is not possible without first interpreting the norm. 
 
But how can the principle apply in the absence of a stated criterion? If the principle can 
operate to prohibit the use of some means of warfare, it necessarily implies that there is a 
criterion on the basis of which it can be determined whether a particular means is 
prohibited. What can that implied criterion be? As seems to be recognized by the Court, 
                                                 
901 Ibid., at 300. 
902 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 398. 
903 and which seems to contradict Bos’ rejection of ‘interpretation of customary law’. 
904 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 398. 
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humanitarian considerations are admissible in the interpretation of the law of armed conflict 
(see paragraphs 86 and 92 of the Court's Advisory Opinion) (emphasis added).905 
 
The general direction of this quote by Judge Shahabuddeen seems to reflect the debate 
on the difference between the notions of ‘interpretation’ and ‘application’ and the 
general understanding that, regardless of the degree of correlation between these two 
notions, interpretation logically precedes application.906 
Judge Higgins in her turn refers to the various interpretations of the principle 
of distinction promoted by a variety of academics.907 However, this implicit 
acceptance of interpretation of customary law turns immediately afterwards to an 
explicit statement:  
 
For this concept to have a separate existence, … and whichever interpretation of the term is 
chosen, it may be concluded that a weapon will be unlawful per se if it is incapable of being 
targeted at a military objective only, even if collateral harm occurs. Notwithstanding the 
unique and profoundly destructive characteristics of al1 nuclear weapons, that very term 
covers a variety of weapons which are not monolithic in al1 their effects. To the extent that 
a specific nuclear weapon would be incapable of this distinction, its use would be unlawful 
(emphasis added).908 
 
and continues: 
   
In any event, humanitarian law too is very well developed. The fact that its principles are 
broadly stated and often raise further questions that require a response can be no ground for 
a non liquet. It is exactly the judicial function to take principles of general application, to 
elaborate their meaning and to apply them to specific situations. This is precisely the role 
of the International Court, whether in contentious proceedings or in its advisory function 
(emphasis added)909 
 
To elaborate a meaning of a term is but another way of saying that a term should be 
interpreted. One cannot go from a broad statement to a specific one if not through 
                                                 
905 Ibid., at 398-9. 
906 See supra Chapter II, on the debate on the issue of differentiation between ‘interpretation’ and 
‘application’. 
907 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 24. 
908 Id. 
909 Ibid., para. 32. 
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interpretation. Consequently, Higgins accepts that the role of the ICJ is, amongst 
others, to interpret international customary law.910 
A final set of cases that need to be mentioned are the ones dealing with 
investment law. What lies at the apex of the majority of investment law cases is the 
customary norm of ‘fair and equitable treatment’.  In the Mondev case the ICSID 
tribunal had no qualms in saying that it was not looking for practice and opinio juris. 
What it was looking for was finding the content of the existing vague customary 
norm. 
 
113. Thus the question is not that of a failure to show opinio juris or to amass sufficient 
evidence demonstrating it. The question rather is: what is the content of customary 
international law providing for fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security 
in investment treaties?911 
 
Consequently, if the Tribunal was not looking for the two constitutive elements of any 
customary norm, it was not aiming to identify the content of the norm. The only other 
way to reveal the content is through the medium of interpretation. 
In the Alex Genin case the ICSID tribunal acknowledged that the term ‘fair 
and equitable treatment’ 
 
[u]nder international law … is generally understood to ‘provide a basic and general 
standard which is detached from the host State’s domestic law’. While the exact content of 
the standard is not clear, the Tribunal understands it to require an ‘international minimum 
standard that is separate from domestic law, but that is, indeed, a minimum standard. 
(emphasis added)912 
 
Therefore, although the exact content was not clear, the tribunal in order to adjudicate 
had to define it and it promoted its own understanding/interpretation of that standard. 
Finally, in the context of the WTO the Biotech case, as strange as it may 
sound, furnishes another example of interpretation of customary international law. 
WTO Panels and the Appellate Body do not apply Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT as 
                                                 
910 A conclusion to which we already arrived at supra through an interpretation of the ICJ and PCIJ 
Statutes. 
911 Mondev International Ltd. V. United States of America, Award of 11 October 2002, ICSID 
ARB(AF)/99/2, ICSID Rep. 6 (2004): 192, para. 113 (hereinafter Mondev case). 
912  Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil Genin v. Republic of Estonia, Award of 
25 June 2001, ICSID ARB/99/2 (hereinafter Alex Genin case), para. 367. 
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such, but as customary international law, by virtue of Article 3(2) of the DSU, which 
states: 
 
The Members recognize that [the dispute settlement system] serves …to clarify the existing 
provisions of those agreements in accordance with customary rules of interpretation of 
public international law.913 
 
Consequently, the entire judicial reasoning of the Panel in that case914 was an 
interpretation of customary international through the use of the VCLT. Although the 
Panel seemed to apply the VCLT directly, it had no authority to do so. What it could 
apply was merely customary international law. The fact that customary international 
law and VCLT law on the issue of interpretation coincide is irrelevant. Consequently, 
the Panel’s use of the VCLT falls under the customary law equivalent of Article 
31(3)(c), i.e. ‘any relevant rule of international law’. No rule could be more relevant 
than a treaty that incorporates the customary norm. Based on this analysis, the 
conclusion can be easily drawn that the Biotech case is yet another prime example of 
interpretation of customary law.  
All the above cases, spanning various fields of international law demonstrate 
with absolute certainty that not only interpretation of customary norms is possible but 
that the international courts and tribunals have applied it consistently throughout their 
jurisprudence.915 
 
                                                 
913 1994 DSU, 1869 UNTS  401. 
914 Biotech case, paras. 7.68-7.72. 
915 Even in passim; see Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters case, para. 40. 
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III. Methods of Interpretation of Customary International Law  
A. Logical Extrapolation of the Possible Methods of Interpretation of Customary 
Law 
Having established that customary international can and has been interpreted by 
international judicial organs we shall now inquire into the methods of interpretation. 
Although Articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT apply only with respect to interpretation of 
treaties, nevertheless their customary counterparts have been applied in a variety of 
situations to interpret acts, which do not fall within the category of ‘treaties’. They 
have been used in connection with interpreting unilateral acts,916 optional clause 
declarations917 and Security Council Resolutions.918  
The common denominator in all these cases, however, is that Articles 31 and 
32 are not applied strictly, but always mutatis mutandis bearing in mind the specific 
nature of the acts to be interpreted.919 This approach seems to be the germane one in 
the present context as well. Having as a starting point the content of Articles 31 and 
32 and bearing in mind the schools of interpretation that fashioned them and the sui 
generis character of customary international law these are the methods that seem the 
most appropriate: 
 
1. Textual/Grammatical Interpretation   
With respect to a norm emanating from a non-written source, arguing that a 
textual/grammatical interpretation might be relevant would seem a non sequitur. 
However, things are not always as they seem. Bleckmann, suggests that a 
textual/grammatical interpretation might be applicable in the interpretation of 
customary norms.920 This statement can be understood in the following two ways:  
                                                 
916 See Victor Rodríquez Cedeño, Fourth Report on Unilateral Acts of States (A/CN.4/519), 30 May 
2001. 
917 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, ‘The Optional Clause system and the Law of Treaties: Issues of 
Interpretation in Recent Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice’, Australian Yearbook of 
International Law 20 (1999): 127-59. 
918 See Efthymios Papastavridis, ‘Interpretation of Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII in 
the Aftermath of the Iraqi Crisis’, ICLQ 56 (2007): 83-118. 
919 Cedeño, supra note 916, para. 153.  
920 Bleckmann, supra note 862, at 526; Orakhelashvili concurs, but without any further comments; 
Orakhelashvili, supra note 830, at 498. 
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i) that the ordinary meaning of the norm is to be found in a variety of 
documents published by States or to which States have participated.921 
However, this approach is in error since it confuses interpretation of 
custom with interpretation of practice evidencing custom. Such documents 
may be useful for identifying custom but are of limited importance for 
interpreting it.  
ii) The more appropriate way is to consider that textual interpretation 
actually refers to treaties that have incorporated the customary norm in one 
of their provisions (e.g. codification treaties), with the proviso of course 
that both custom and the treaty provision have the same content.922 
However, the problem with this construction is that although courts have 
tended to make use of it,923 it is not really a textual/grammatical 
interpretation. The customary norm and the codification treaty are two 
separate entities. Surely, the text of the codification treaty might assist in 
the interpretation of the customary norm, however, this is because they are 
linked, or to make it more obvious, they are relevant to each other based 
on their shared content. Consequently, interpretation of custom, by 
reference to the text of a codification treaty924 is not textual interpretation 
but a systemic one i.e. one based on the customary equivalent of Article 
31(3)(c). 
iii) A final attempt would be to consider that a grammatical interpretation 
could be based on the wording adopted in previous judgments and/or by 
various academics.925 However, in most cases the Court does that 
incidentally, while referring at the same time to the codification treaty. 
Consequently, since the reference to codification treaties is a form 
of systemic interpretation and not a grammatical one, this form of 
interpretation although applicable is of limited value, for the additional 
reason that even the generally accepted wording of a customary norm is, 
by its nature, couched in such vague terms, e.g. ‘fair and equitable 
                                                 
921 Bleckmann, supra note 862, at 526. 
922 See Nicaragua case, para. 179.  
923 See infra Section III.B. 
924 Or any treaty incorporating it (see Article 1105 NAFTA on the ‘fair and equitable treatment’). 
925 See Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Higgins. 
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treatment’, that no legally substantial conclusion could be arrived at 
through a strictly grammatical interpretation of it. 
 
2. Teleological Interpretation 
This form of interpretation is applicable to the interpretation of customary law926 as it 
to any other act that can be interpreted. The reason is that a teleological interpretation 
identifies what exists in the nucleus of any act with a normative content, its telos, i.e. 
its object and purpose. Every norm has a telos, a purpose that defines its content and 
its function. In the same vein, all customary norms have arisen in order to address 
certain considerations and situations. Consequently, by identifying the telos of the 
customary norm a teleological interpretation can assist in clarifying the customary 
norm’s content in a way that will enable it to achieve its inherent telos. 
A final point that needs to be mentioned is that in some cases the courts refer 
to the object and purpose of a whole area of international law.927 Such a case would 
seem to be an area where the teleological interpretation and the systemic 
interpretation converge. The reason being, that, in order for object and purpose of a 
whole sub-system of international law to be identified, account must be taken of all 
rules within that system. Consequently, an identification of the object and purpose of 
a whole area of international law is a direct product of reference to other ‘relevant 
rules of international law’, which reveal this shared object and purpose. Consequently, 
in such cases both a teleological and a systemic interpretation are being applied.    
 
3. Systemic Interpretation 
This form of interpretation, which is the customary equivalent of Article 31(3)(c) is 
the one which is the most apposite to the sui generis character of customary law. 
Since one of the elements of customary international law is opinio juris this 
presupposes that customary international law even in its statu nascendi takes into 
consideration other ‘relevant rules of international law’. Based on the principle a 
majore ad minus this should still hold true in cases where the existing customary law 
                                                 
926 In agreement see Bleckmann, supra note 862, at 528. 
927 E.g. state responsibility, maritime delimitation etc.; see infra  Section III.B. 
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is being interpreted; even more so since due to its inherent vagueness interpretations 
contra legem are a constant danger. 
All authors who have dealt with the issue of interpretation of customary 
international law acknowledge this is a relevant form of interpretation.928 According 
to Kolb, general principles form a basis for interpreting both customary and 
conventional international law.929 Based on the analysis of the first Chapter of this 
thesis930, one could extend this basis to include any kind of rule, be it customary or 
conventional. Bleckmann, names this kind of interpretation as ‘systematic’.931 This 
method of interpretation seems to be identical with that of the principle of ‘systemic 
integration’. The term ‘systemic’, which has been adopted by the ILC, seems to be the 
more appropriate term for describing this method of interpretation because ‘systemic’ 
means “relating to a system as a whole”932 and thus, denotes the focal point of the 
process of interpretation, whereas ‘systematic’ means “done or acting according to a 
fixed plan or system; methodical”933 and thus, denotes the manner in which an action 
is performed.934 For this reason, the term ‘systemic interpretation’ has been employed 
in the present thesis in order to describe this method of interpretation. 
 
4. Intentions’ Approach is not Relevant 
Having established the limited importance of the grammatical interpretation and the 
greater gravitas of the teleological interpretation, what remains to be seen is what the 
role of an interpretation based on the intention of the parties is. Whereas in 
conventional law, this method of interpretation has its significance, in the context of 
customary international law it has no relevancy. The reason for that is that a research 
of the intention of the parties belongs more within the framework of the identification 
of customary international law rather than its interpretation. It is weaved into the 
                                                 
928 Kolb, supra note 345, at 219, para. 87; Fitzmaurice, supra note 860, at 151-2; Bleckmann, supra 
note 862, at 526-8; Orakhelashvili, supra note 830, at 498. 
929 Kolb, supra note 345, at 240, para. 93(b), citing in support of this Verdross, ‘supra note 86, at 227; 
Lauterpacht, supra note 857, at 158 et seq. and Wolfgang Friedmann, ‘The Uses of General Principles 
in the Development of International Law’, AJIL 57 (1963): 279, at 286. 
930 Where it was shown that the term ‘relevant rules’ of the principle of systemic integration referred to 
all rules of international law irrespective of their source (i.e. general principles, custom and 
conventional law). 
931 Bleckmann, supra note 862, at 526. 
932 Oxford Dictionaries, supra note 48. 
933 Id. 
934 E.g. ‘working in a systematic manner’.  
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notion of opinio juris and consequently the intentions of the parties and the 
documents in which this intention is incorporated are, essentially, practice and opinio 
juris, evidencing the existence and content of a customary norm, not interpreting it. 
Therefore, this method of interpretation is not relevant for the purposes of interpreting 
custom. 
 
5. Tanaka’s Logical Interpretation is Identical with Systemic Interpretation 
The identification of the methods of interpretation of customary norms will conclude 
with an analysis of the term ‘logical interpretation’ from Tanaka’s quote:  
 
the method of logical and teleological interpretation can be applied in the case of customary 
law as in the case of written law.935  
 
The fact that Judge Tanaka refers to a ‘method’ and not ‘methods’ could be construed 
as saying that his idea of logical and teleological interpretation have the same content. 
However, it is this author’s opinion, that it is more a reflection of the spirit of Article 
31 VCLT which is entitled ‘rule of interpretation’ in order to indicate that no element 
of interpretation is superior to the others. Furthermore, the use of ‘and’ as an 
indication of accumulation would seem to point towards two distinct elements.936 
Following this line of thought and based on Article 31 VCLT Tanaka’s ‘logical 
interpretation’ would seem to correspond to either textual interpretation or systemic 
interpretation. However, as already analyzed supra, grammatical interpretation by 
reference to codification treaties is nothing more than another manifestation of 
systemic interpretation. Consequently, Tanaka’s quote should be read as promoting a 
two-pronged approach as to the interpretation of customary law: a systemic one and a 
teleological one. This reinforces the conclusions to which the author has arrived so 
far. 
 
                                                 
935 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 181. 
936 However, a counterargument could be made based on the debate of whether there is a difference 
between object and purpose in the wording ‘object and purpose’ of Article 31 VCLT.  
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B. Jurisprudential Application of the Methods of Interpretation of Customary 
Law 
Since the topic of this thesis is ‘Article 31(3)(c) and the Principle of Systemic 
Integration’, an extensive analysis of any other method of interpretation of customary 
law would exceed the scope of this thesis. However, a brief presentation of the 
relevant jurisprudence is necessary in order to substantiate the conclusions arrived at 
supra regarding the methods of interpretation of customary law.  
 
1. Teleological Interpretation 
As mentioned supra, Judge Tanaka in his Dissenting Opinion explicitly recognized 
the method of teleological interpretation as appropriate in the context of customary 
law:  
 
The method of logical and teleological interpretation can be applied in the case of 
customary law as in the case of written law.937 
 
Just prior to coming to this conclusion, Judge Tanaka had elaborated on this 
teleological interpretation 
 
the rule with regard to delimitation by means of the equidistance principle constitutes an 
integral part of the continental shelf as a legal institution of teleological construction. For 
the existence of the continental shelf as a legal institution presupposes delimitation between 
the adjacent continental shelves of coastal States. The delimitation itself is a logical 
consequence of the concept of the continental shelf that coastal States exercise sovereign 
rights over their own continental shelves. Next, the equidistance principle constitutes the 
method which is the result of the principle of proximity or natural continuation of land 
territory, which is inseparable from the concept of continental shelf. Delimitation itself and 
delimitation by the equidistance principle serve to realize the aims and purposes of the 
continental shelf as a legal institution. …[one] cannot escape from the application of what 
is derived as a logical conclusion from the fundamental concept (emphasis added).938 
 
The Judgments in the Frontier Dispute case and the Fisheries case move along 
similar lines by interpreting relevant customary norms via references to the “obvious 
                                                 
937 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka, at 181. 
938 Id. 
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purpose” of a norm939 and to “considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial 
sea”.940 
This reference to a teleological interpretation is even more apposite in the 
context of human rights and humanitarian law. In the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons, Judge Guillaume explained his understanding of the exception “extreme 
circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake”: 
 
The right of self-defence proclaimed by the Charter of the United Nations is characterized 
by the Charter as natural law. But Article 51 adds that nothing in the Charter shall impair 
this right. The same applies a fortiori to customary law or treaty law. This conclusion is 
easily explained, for no system of law, whatever it may be, could deprive one of its subjects 
of the right to defend its own existence and safeguard its vital interests. Accordingly, 
international law cannot deprive a State of the right to resort to nuclear weapons if such 
action constitutes the ultimate means by which it can guarantee its survival. In such a case 
the State enjoys a kind of “absolute defence” (“excuse absolutoire”) similar to the one 
which exists in al1 systems of criminal law (emphasis added).941 
 
This brief presentation of some of the most important cases employing teleological 
interpretation has illustrated that this method of interpretation is not only employable 
but has already been employed in international jurisprudence. However, since the 
main focus of this thesis is Article 31(3)(c) and the principle of systemic integration, 
we shall now turn to the jurisprudence employing the method of systemic 
interpretation to customary international law.   
 
2. Systemic Interpretation 
2.1. Case-law where Systemic Interpretation was Applied   
                                                 
939   
[the principle of uti possidetis] … is a general principle, which is logically connected with the 
phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs. Its obvious purpose is to prevent 
the independence and stability of new States being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by 
the challenging of frontiers following the withdrawal of the administering power (emphasis added). 
 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali), Judgment of 22 December 1986, ICJ Rep. 1986, 
554, para. 20 (hereinafter Frontier Dispute case). 
940   
In this connection, certain basic considerations inherent in the nature of the territorial sea, bring to 
light certain criteria which, though not entirely precise, can provide courts with an adequate basis for 
their decisions, which can be adapted to the diverse facts in question (emphasis added). 
 
Fisheries case, at 133. 
941 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, at 290, para. 8. 
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Judge Tanaka’s construction of a method of ‘logical and teleological interpretation’ 
was shown supra to refer to systemic interpretation. As the present author also 
posited, due to the characteristic nature of customary international law the method of 
systemic interpretation seemed tailored to meet the challenges posed by any 
interpretation of customary law. It is this postulate that the following jurisprudence 
proves beyond doubt.  
In the Gulf of Maine case the ICJ held that:  
 
So far as conventions are concerned, only ‘general conventions’, including, inter alia, the 
conventions codifying the law of the sea to which the two States are parties, can be 
considered. This is not merely because no particular conventions bearing on the matter at 
issue (apart from the Special Agreement of 29 March 1979) are in force between the Parties 
to the present dispute, but mainly because it is in codifying conventions that principles and 
rules of general application can be identified. Such conventions must, moreover, be seen 
against the background of customary international law and interpreted in its light.942 
 
and that 
 
112. The Chamber therefore wishes to conclude this review of the rules of international law 
on the question to which the dispute between Canada and the United States relates by 
attempting a more complete and, in its opinion, more precise reformulation of the 
‘fundamental norm’ already mentioned. For this purpose it will, inter alia, draw also upon 
the definition of the “actual rules of law . . . which govern the delimitation of adjacent 
continental shelves - that is to Say, rules binding upon States for al1 delimitations” which 
was given by the Court in its 1969 Judgment in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases943 
 
In these passages not only did the Court affirm that the content of customary norms 
can be revealed by reference to other ‘rules of international law’944 but also that 
codification treaties can assist in understanding the meaning of customary norms, and 
thus by inference, the former are ‘relevant rules of international law’ with respect to 
the latter, and further that those conventions themselves should be “seen against the 
background of customary international law and interpreted in its light”945 – a kind of 
reciprocal application of Article 31(3)(c) –. 
                                                 
942 Gulf of Maine, para. 83. 
943 Ibid., para. 112. 
944 Id. 
945 Ibid., para. 83. 
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So far, the opinions of Judge Tanaka and Judge Morelli in the North Sea 
Continental Shelf cases have been analyzed extensively. However, the following 
passage shows that even the judgment itself has something to offer to the concept of 
systemic interpretation of customary international law; it promotes a systemic 
interpretation of customary law relating to maritime delimitation by reference to the 
principles of justice and good faith. 
 
… On a foundation of very general precepts of justice and good faith, actual rules of law 
are here involved which govern the delimitation of adjacent continent shelves-that is to say, 
rules binding upon States for al1 de1imitations;-in short, it is not a question of applying 
equity simply as a matter of abstract justice, but of applying a rule of law which itself 
requires the application of equitable principles, in accordance with the ideas which have 
always underlain the development of the legal regime of the continental shelf in this field 
…946 
 
Moving away from the field of maritime delimitation, our analysis will now turn to 
the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons. In the previous Sections the Advisory 
Opinion on Nuclear Weapons played a pivotal role in substantiating the claim that 
interpretation of customary international law is a valid tool to be used by the 
international judiciary. In the present Section, with respect to the method of systemic 
interpretation for the purposes of interpreting customary law, the Advisory Opinion 
once again comes to the forefront with a multitude of relevant dicta, which if read in 
connection to each other offer new insight to the interpretative issues of this case. Let 
us consider Judge Guillaum’s dictum that: 
 
It may be wondered whether that is indeed the case [i.e. that the right of self-defence 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter and the principles and rules of the law applicable in 
armed conflict are completely independent of each other] or whether, on the contrary, the 
rules of the jus ad bellum may not provide some clarification of the rules of the jus in bello 
(emphasis added)947 
 
Judge Ranjeva’s claim regarding “a combined interpretation of the relevant rules”948 
and that: 
 
                                                 
946 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 85. 
947 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume, at 290, para. 8. 
948 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, at 296. 
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A priori nothing prohibits an interpretation giving precedence to the rules of self-defence, 
including nuclear self-defence, over the rules of humanitarian law, a difficulty which leads 
consequentially to the second criticism [i.e. the lack of any practice, state or judicial, 
confirming the existence of the exception “extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which 
the very survival of a State would be at stake”].949  
 
Judge Fleischhauer’s dictum that: 
 
The principles and rules of the humanitarian law and the other principles of law applicable 
in armed conflict, such as the principle of neutrality on the one side and the inherent right of 
self-defence on the other, which are through the very existence of the nuclear weapon in 
sharp opposition to each other, are al1 principles and rules of law. … [T]hese principles 
and rules … are of equal rank … … there is no rule giving prevalence of one over the other 
of these principles and rules. In view of their equal ranking this means that, if the need 
arises, the smallest common denominator between the conflicting principles and rules has 
to be found.  
The same result [i.e. the legality of recourse to nuclear weapons as a last resort in a situation 
threatening the very existence of the victimized State] is reached if, in the absence of a 
conventional or a customary rule for the conciliation of the conflicting legal principles and 
rules, it is accepted that the third category of law which the Court has to apply by virtue of 
Article 38 of its Statute, that is, the general principles of law recognized in al1 legal 
systems, contains a principle to the effect that no legal system is entitled to demand the self-
abandonment, the suicide, of one of its subjects. Much can be said, in my view, in favour of 
the applicability of such a principle in al1 modern legal systems and consequently also in 
international law (emphasis added).950 
 
and finally Judge Koroma’s opinion that: 
 
while throwing the regime of self-defence into doubt by creating a new category called the 
‘survival of the State’, seen as constituting an exception to Articles 2, paragraph 4, and 51 
of the United Nations Charter and to the principles and rules of humanitarian law… 
The question therefore is not whether a State is entitled to exercise its right of self-defence 
in an extreme circumstance in which the very survival of that State would be at stake, but 
rather whether the use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful under any 
circumstance including an extreme circumstance in which its very survival was at stake - or, 
in other words, whether it is possible to conceive of consequences of the use of such 
weapons which do not entail an infringement of international law applicable in armed 
conflict, particularly international humanitarian law.951 
 
All of these quotes read together seem to reveal a common pattern. Despite the 
difference of approaches encapsulated in these dicta there is a common denominator. 
Despite the fact that some of the judges start by considering the notion of self-defence 
                                                 
949 Ibid., at 301. 
950 Ibid., Separate Opinion of Judge Fleischhauer, at 308-9. 
951 Ibid., Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, at 560 and 562. 
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as the supreme principle, while others reserve this place for the principles of 
international humanitarian law, they all agree that regardless of the solution given to 
this problem the method is the same. Each of the two relevant norms of customary 
international law, i.e. self-defence and humanitarian law, should be interpreted by 
reference to each other, or both should be interpreted by reference to general 
principles of law. All norms, at least the ones relevant to this case, are of equal 
standing; consequently their content should be defined or in other words interpreted 
by taking into consideration the other norms in play.952 Depending which norm one 
selects as a starting point, the others are ‘relevant rules of international law’ with 
respect to it. Therefore, all judges agree that systemic interpretation is the optimal 
solution.  
This solution also echoes certain considerations raised in Chapter III of this 
thesis, where it was stated that there was a ‘presumption against conflict’. For that 
reason and in order to avoid making a finding of conflict, international courts and 
tribunals first attempt to bring the norms in balance through interpretation; 
harmonization through interpretation; this is essentially what the judges in the 
abovementioned dicta apply and the way they attempt it is through the use of the 
customary equivalent of Article 31(3)(c) and, thus, through a systemic interpretation. 
Finally, in the Mondev International LTD v. US case the Tribunal stated that 
 
[i]n the end the question is whether, at an international level and having regard to generally 
accepted standards of the administration of justice, a tribunal can conclude in the light of 
all the available facts that the impugned decision was clearly improper and discreditable, 
with the result that the investment has been subjected to unfair and inequitable treatment. 
This is admittedly a somewhat open-ended standard, but it may be that in practice no more 
precise formula can be offered to cover the range of possibilities (emphasis added).953 
 
The reference to ‘generally accepted standards of the administration of justice’ is but 
another way of referring to general principles of international law, i.e. ‘other rules of 
international law’. This is reinforced by the fact that in a footnote the Tribunal 
commented that one may compare this with the rule stated in the Harvard Draft 
Convention on the International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens, Article 
8(b), referring to a decision which “unreasonably departs from the principles of 
                                                 
952 This would include also the general principles of law. 
953 Mondev case.  
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justice recognized by the principal legal systems of the world”.954 What this passage 
boils down to is that ‘fair and equitable treatment’ is an open-ended principle, 
couched in vague terms, the interpretation of which must take into consideration other 
‘relevant rules’.955 Similar considerations were repeated in the Loewen Group, Inc 
and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America case,956 and in the TECMED 
S.A. v. The United Mexican States case.957  
 
2.2 The Curious Case(s) of Nicaragua and Tadic 
The Nicaragua and Tadic cases also offer support to the claim that customary 
international law can be interpreted by reference to other ‘relevant rules of 
international law’. The reason that they are examined separately is because each of 
them has been a landmark case on its own right.  
The attribution to a State of conduct, which it has authorised, is widely 
accepted in international jurisprudence.958 
                                                 
954 Mondev case, citing the Harvard Draft Convention on the International Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to Aliens, Article 8 reproduced in L.B. Sohn and R.R. Baxter, ‘Responsibility of States for 
Injuries to the Economic Interests of Aliens’, AJIL 55 (1961): 515, at 551. 
955 At another passage the Tribunal held that: 
 
In holding that Article 1105(1) refers to customary international law, the FTC interpretations 
incorporate current international law, whose content is shaped by the conclusion of more than two 
thousand bilateral investment treaties and many treaties of friendship and commerce. Those treaties 
largely and concordantly provide for ‘fair and equitable’ treatment of, and for ‘full protection and 
security’ for, the foreign investor and his investments (emphasis added). 
 
Mondev case, para. 125; in this context, the multitude of bilateral treaties, could function as ‘relevant 
rules of international law’. Despite the fact that each treaty is bilateral, their relevancy would be 
augmented from an interpretative point of view, due to their sheer number (provided of course that the 
solutions adopted share a common direction). This result could be arrived at as well through Diagrams 
1 and 2 of the present thesis.  
956 The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID case 
No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (hereinafter Loewen Group case). 
957 Where the Tribunal interpreted the “fair and equitable treatment standard” as resulting from the 
good faith principle; Técnicas Medioambientales Techmed S.A. v. the United Mexican States, ICSID 
case No. ARB(AF)/00/2 (Award) (May 29, 2003); This does not mean that good faith was a self-
standing source of obligation (such a construction has repeatedly been rejected by the ICJ, see Nuclear 
Tests case, at 268, para. 46 and at 473, para. 49; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (Preliminary Objections) (Cameroon v. Nigeria ; Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment of 
11 June 1998, ICJ Rep. 1998, 275, para. 39, citing Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua 
v. Honduras), Judgment of 20 December 1988, 69, para. 94) but merely a principle that could be used 
to shed light as to the content of ‘fair and equitable treatment’. 
958 See e.g., D. Earnshaw and Others v. United States (the Zafiro case), Award of 30 November 1925, 
RIAA 6 (1955): 160-5; Stephens v. United Mexican States (Stephens case), Award of 1927 RIAA 4 
(1951): 265-8, at 267; Lehigh Valley Railroad Company, and others (USA.) v. Germany (Sabotage 
cases), Award of 16 October 1930, RIAA 8 (1958): 84-468. 
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However, in the Nicaragua case the question the ICJ faced was 
 
whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States government was so much 
one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to equate 
the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States government, or as acting 
on behalf of that Government (emphasis added).959 
 
only to find that 
 
… there is no clear evidence of the United States having actually exercised such a degree of 
control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as acting on its behalf . … For this 
conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to 
be proved that that State had effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in 
the course of which the alleged violations were committed (emphasis added).960 
 
What is interesting is that, despite the importance of this case and that despite the fact 
that the ICJ was describing a rule, which for all intents and purposes, was customary 
international law, there is a remarkable absence of any inquiry into practice and 
opinio juris.961 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY also addressed these issues. In Prosecutor 
v. Tadić, the Chamber stressed that: 
 
The requirement of international law for the attribution to States of acts performed by 
private individuals is that the State exercises control over the individuals. The degree of 
control may, however, vary according to the factual circumstances of each case. The 
Appeals Chamber fails to see why in each and every circumstance international law should 
require a high threshold for the test of control.962 
                                                 
959 Nicaragua case, para. 109. 
960 Ibid., at 62 and 64-65, paras. 109 and 115. See also the Concurring Opinion of Judge Ago, ibid., at 
189, para. 17. 
961 A point which the ICTY stressed in the Tadic case, para. 124; Furthermore, in order to demonstrate 
that the “effective control” interpretation was at variance with international jurisprudence, it cited a 
number of cases, where the “effective control” had not been the level of control required; Tadic case, 
paras. 125 et seq. citing: Stephens case, at 266-7; Kenneth P. Yeager v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award 
of 2 November 1987, Iran-USCTR 17 (1987-IV): 92; William L. Pereira Associates, Iran v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award of 17 March 1984, Iran-UCTR 5 (1984-I): 198 at 226. See also Arthur Young 
and Company v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Telecommunications Company of Iran, Social Security 
Organization of Iran, Award of 30 November 1987, Iran-USCTR 17 (1987-IV): 245; Schott v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Award of 14 March 1990, Iran-USCTR 24 (1990-I): 203, para. 59. 
962 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 15 July 1999, IT-94-1-A, para. 
117 (emphasis in original), accessible at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acjug/en/tad-aj990715e.pdf 
(last accessed on 25 January 2010). 
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The Appeals Chamber held that the requisite degree of control by the Yugoslavian 
authorities over these armed forces required by international law for considering the armed 
conflict to be international was overall control going beyond the mere financing and 
equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the planning and supervision of 
military operations.963  
 
Consequently, in the application of the same rule, with respect to attribution of acts of 
de facto agents,964 the ICJ adopted an ‘effective control’ test, while the ICTY an 
‘overall control’ one. The fact that it is essentially the same rule that both these 
tribunals are applying, yet they managed to reach different results, combined with a 
lack, at least on the part of the ICJ, of any research in the practice and opinio juris 
surrounding this issue, leads us to conclude that what we are up against is two 
different interpretations of the same rule. This solution, apart from being based on the 
Judgments of the two tribunals, i.e. their statements, the overall construction of their 
argumentation, the end result of two different criteria and the lack of research into 
elements evidencing customary international law, is also elegant, straightforward and 
above all simple.965 It would not be the first or the last time that two tribunals arrive at 
two different interpretations.966 
The ILC in its Commentary to Article 8 of the (then Draft) Articles on State 
Responsibility, tried to explain the divergence in the criteria adopted in the 
aforementioned judgements by distinguishing between the legal situations and the 
factual situation in each case. Whereas in the Nicaragua case the legal issue was state 
responsibility, in Tadic it was individual criminal responsibility and the case 
concerned international humanitarian law not responsibility of States. 967  
However, the ICTY had already included in its judgment a response to this: 
                                                 
963 Ibid., para. 145 (emphasis in original). 
964 In more detail on the complex issue of de facto agents see: André de Hoogh, ‘Articles 4 and 8 of the 
2001 ILC Articles on State Responsibility, the Tadic Case and Attribution of Acts of Bosnian Serb 
Authorities to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’, BYIL 72 (2002): 255, at 280; Gregory Townsend, 
“State Responsibility for Acts of de facto Agents”, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 14 (1997):635,.at 650; Clauss Kress, ‘L’Organe de facto en Droit International Public’, RGDIP 
105 (2001): 93, at 95 et seq; The Iran-US Claims Tribunal has dealt with the issue extensively as well: 
Yeager case, para.43; Schering Corp. v. Iran, Award of 13 April 1984, Iran-USCTR 5 (1984-I): 361, at 
370; Eastman Kodak v. Government of Iran, Award of 11 November 1987, Iran-USCTR 17 (1987-IV) 
153, ,paras.41,43 and 47; Eastman and Kodak v. Government of Iran, Award of  1 July 1991, Iran-
USCTR 27 (1991-II): 3, para.32 and Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Judge Brower, paras.1-4; 
Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Iran, Award of 20 June 1984, Iran-USCTR 6 (1984-II): 149, at 159; Foremost 
Tehran, Inc. v. Iran, Award of 10 April 1986, Iran-USCTR 10 (1986-I): 229, at 241-2 . 
965 Which according to Occam’s razor would mean that it is in all probability the correct solution. 
966 See for instance the Zeroing cases in the WTO context. 
967 ILC supra note 542, Commentary to Article 8, at 106-7, para. 5. 
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what is at issue is not the distinction between State responsibility and individual criminal 
responsibility. Rather, the question is that of establishing the criteria for the legal 
imputability to a State of acts performed by individuals not having the status of State 
officials.968 
 
Furthermore, the ILC in the same Commentary, and despite it previous statement, 
acknowledged that the decision on which criterion should apply in the case of de facto 
agents was “a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or 
was not carried out under the control of a State, to such an extent that the conduct 
controlled should be attributed to it”.969 Essentially, this is like saying that it is a 
matter of interpretation.970 
Of course, identifying that the different tests adopted in the Nicaragua and the 
Tadic cases are a result of interpretation, has its own merit. Yet it does not qualify this 
interpretation automatically as a systemic one. In order to do that, attention must be 
paid to paragraph 116 of the Tadic Judgment, where the ICTY held that:  
 
116. A first ground on which the Nicaragua test as such may be held to be unconvincing is 
based on the very logic of the entire system of international law on State responsibility. 
(emphasis added)971 
 
The crucial point of this quote is that the ICTY does not interpret customary law 
merely by reference to one or more other ‘relevant rules’ of international law; what it 
does is interpretation by reference to the whole body of norms of an area of 
international law. That area in the present case is the “entire system of international 
law on State responsibility”. As was alluded to earlier, such an interpretation is unique 
in the sense that it is the point where systemic and teleological interpretation of 
customary international law converge. In order to interpret the customary law at hand 
                                                 
968 Tadic case, para. 104. 
969 ILC supra note 542, Commentary to Article 8, at 107, para. 5; citing also Yeager case at 103. See 
also Starrett Housing Corp. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award of 19 December 
1983, Iran-USCTR 4 (1983-III): 122, at 143. 
970 Judge Higgins, in her turn talked about “differences of perception”; see Speech by H.E. Rosalyn 
Higgins, President of the International Court of Justice, at the Meeting of Legal Advisers of the 
Ministries of Foreign Affairs, 29 October 2007, accessible at http://www.icj-
cij.org/presscom/files/7/14097.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 2010) 
971 Tadic case, para. 116. 
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the ICTY, in one simple sentence, refers both to the entire set of norms, incorporated 
in the system of the law of State responsibility, and to the telos of the system itself.  
After this hybrid teleological/systemic interpretation the ICTY, then, returns to 
more familiar methods of interpretation. By invoking another customary rule of 
international law (the one enshrined in Article 7 of the Articles on State 
Responsibility i.e. attribution to the State of an act of one of its organ even if the latter 
has acted ultra vires) it held that a similar reasoning should apply in the interpretation 
of the customary rule enshrined in Article 8.972 Essentially the Court interpreted one 
customary rule by reference to another ‘relevant’ customary rule or to a whole set of 
‘relevant rules’ of customary law .973 
Despite the different approaches, adopted by the ICJ and the ICTY, in the 
interpretation of the relevant customary norm of State responsibility, Pauwelyn had 
predicted that since there is a ‘presumption against conflict’, the tribunals in order to 
avoid conflicting judgments would end up harmonizing their decisions. This would 
entail with respect to the ICJ and the ICTY, that the ICJ would, if given the chance, 
adopt the less strict test of ‘overall control’.974 The reality, unfortunately, proved 
Pauwelyn wrong. Both tribunals have remained firm in their respective interpretations 
of the appropriate level of control required for attribution to a State of acts of an 
individual or group under Article 8 of the Articles on State Responsibility. The ICTY 
                                                 
972 The Court goes even a step further, arguing that the reasoning behind Article 7 is shared by the 
entirety of the law on State responsibility.  
 
The rationale behind this provision [i.e. Article 7] is that a State must be held accountable 
for acts of its organs whether or not these organs complied with instructions, if any, from 
the higher authorities. Generally speaking, it can be maintained that the whole body of 
international law on State responsibility is based on a realistic concept of accountability, 
which disregards legal formalities and aims at ensuring that States entrusting some 
functions to individuals or groups of individuals must answer for their actions, even when 
they act contrary to their directives.  
… 
The same logic should apply to the situation under discussion [i.e. which is the appropriate 
‘control’ for the purposes of the customary equivalent of Article 8] 
 
Tadic case, paras. 121-2; this method of interpretation, as noted earlier, blurs the distinction between 
systemic and teleological interpretation of customary international law. 
973 The entirety of the law on State responsibility. 
974 See Pauwelyn, supra note 51, at 124. 
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in the Aleksovski case not only reaffirmed the “overall control” interpretation975 but 
also held that: 
 
146. To the extent that it provides for greater protection of civilian victims of armed 
conflicts, this different and less rigorous standard is wholly consistent with the fundamental 
purpose of Geneva Convention IV, which is to ensure “protection of civilians to the 
maximum extent possible”.976 
 
The implication of this paragraph is that apart from the systemic interpretation by 
reference to the entirety of the system of international law on state responsibility, 
which the ICTY applied in the Tadic case,977 in the Aleksovski case the customary rule 
on attribution of acts of de facto agents was interpreted by reference to Geneva 
Convention IV, as ‘a relevant rule’. The result of this systemic interpretation was that 
the “overall control” standard was found to be the appropriate one. This interpretation 
was recently, once again, reaffirmed in the Celebici case.978 
The ICJ, on its part, affirmed the effective control in a series of recent 
judgments.979 Germane to the analysis of this Section is the Serbia and Montenegro 
case where the ICJ, after reviewing the ICTY’s reasoning, nevertheless rejected the 
‘overall control’ test for several reasons980 the most important being:  
 
406. It must next be noted that the “overall control” test has the major drawback of 
broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle 
governing the law of international responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own 
conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf. … In 
this regard the “overall control” test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking 
                                                 
975 Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 24 March 2000, IT-95-14/1-
A, accessible at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/aleksovski/acjug/en/ale-asj000324e.pdf (last accessed on 
25 January 2010),  para. 145. 
976 Ibid., para. 146. 
977 Tadic case, para. 116.  
978 Prosecutor v. Hazim Delic, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber of 20 February 2001, IT-96-21-A 
(Celebici case), accessible at: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf (last 
accessed on 25 January 2010), paras. 41-2; which quoted the above paragraphs of the Aleksovski 
judgment. 
979 Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 2005), 
ICJ Rep. 2005, paras. 131-5, 146 and 160, accessible at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 2010); and Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment of 26 February 2007, ICJ Rep. 2007, 91, paras. 377-415 
(hereinafter Application of Genocide Convention case) 
980 Application of Genocide Convention case, paras. 403-5. 
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point, the connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its 
international responsibility (emphasis added).981 
 
Consequently, the ICJ in its turn interprets the relevant rule of State responsibility by 
reference to a “fundamental principle governing the law of international 
responsibility”. 
Despite the fact that no single, generally accepted, interpretation of the 
relevant customary rule on attribution has been found and that each tribunal remains 
firm in its own interpretation, this does not subtract from the value of the above 
analyzed jurisprudence. Not only have the Nicaragua and Tadic cases and the 
jurisprudence that they have spawned interpreted customary international law but 
perhaps most importantly the method they have applied is that of either systemic 
interpretation as such or the one which is on the fringe between systemic and 
teleological interpretation of customary international law.   
 
2.3. Systemic Interpretation of the Rules on Interpretation 
The CCFT v. US case merits separate examination not only due to the many issues it 
raises with respect to interpretation of customary international law, but perhaps most 
importantly because it attempts to interpret not just any customary norm but the 
customary rules on interpretation themselves.  
The entire award is devoted to various issues of interpretation. Nevertheless it 
is Section I.VI which steals the limelight. The importance of that Section can be seen 
even from the title which goes as follows: ‘Decisions in Other Cases as 
Supplementary Means of Interpretation (Article 32 VCLT)’. The Tribunal in CCFT v. 
US is one of the very few courts that have expressly acknowledged judicial decisions 
as other supplementary means. The reasoning of the court is quite revealing: 
 
50. On the other hand, Article 32 VCLT permits, as supplementary means of interpretation, 
not only preparatory work and circumstances of conclusion of the treaty, but indicates by 
the word ‘including’ that, beyond these two means expressly mentioned, other 
supplementary means may be applied. Article 38 [paragraph 1.d.] of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice provides that judicial decisions are applicable for the 
interpretation of public international law as ‘subsidiary means’. Therefore, they must be 
                                                 
981 Ibid., paras. 403-6. 
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understood to be also supplementary means of interpretation in the sense of Article 32 
VCLT. 
51. That being so, it is not obviously clear how far arbitral decisions are of relevance to the 
Tribunal’s task. It is at all events plain that the decisions of other tribunals are not binding 
on this Tribunal, and the Tribunal refers in this connection to paragraphs 73-76 of the 
Decision on Jurisdiction in Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan 
of November 14, 2005 (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/29). This does not, however, preclude the 
Tribunal from considering other arbitral decisions and the arguments of the Parties based 
upon them, to the extent that it may find that they throw useful light on the issues that arise 
for decision in this case. Such an examination will be conducted by the Tribunal later in this 
Award, after the Tribunal has considered the Parties’ contentions and arguments regarding 
the various issues argued and relevant to the interpretation of the NAFTA provisions at 
stake.982 
 
Before we proceed a few points need to be made with respect to the applicable law 
and the nature of Article 32. Since one of the parties to the dispute is the US, which 
has not ratified the VCLT, Articles 31 and 32 as such do not apply. Customary 
international law is applicable ab initio. Consequently, the Tribunal in the present 
case had to apply customary international law. However, since these principles are 
considered to be codified in Articles 31 and 32, the Tribunal adopts a common 
approach; it uses the text of the latter as a template for their interpretation of what is 
to be included in the notion of ‘supplementary means’. This reference to the VCLT 
is, as has been analyzed supra, nothing short of a systemic interpretation. The 
VCLT as such is not applicable law in the present case, yet the Tribunal takes it 
into consideration in order to interpret what the content of the customary law 
equivalent of Article 32 is. Consequently, by the mere fact of invoking the VCLT, 
and using its wording, the Tribunal has started a systemic interpretation. We have 
left the realm of identification of custom (through practice and opinio juris) and 
entered that of interpretation of custom. 
But the importance of this decision does not rest merely on this. The Tribunal 
goes on to interpret the meaning of ‘supplementary means’ as incorporated in Article 
32. At this point a few comments need to be made regarding the nature of Article 32 
(be it conventional or customary law). Article 32 deals with the so-called 
supplementary means of interpretation. However, the list of supplementary means, 
                                                 
982 In the Consolidated Arbitration under Chapter Eleven of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules between the Canadian Cattlemen for Fair Trade 
(CCFT) and the United States of America, Award on Jurisdiction of 28 January 2008, paras. 50-1 
(emphasis in original), (hereinafter CCFT v. US case), accessible at: 
www.naftaclaims.com/Disputes/USA/CCFT/CCFT-USA-Award.pdf (last accessed on 25 January 
2010). 
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mentioned in Article 32 - travaux préparatoires and ‘circumstances of conclusion’ of 
a treaty - is clearly not a numerus clausus. The use of the term ‘including’ in the text 
of Article 32 is pretty straightforward. It was the clear intention of the drafters of the 
VCLT to allow the judge certain flexibility in the interpretative process. As can be 
seen from the travaux préparatoires of the VCLT, there was originally a huge debate 
as to whether rules of interpretation existed, let alone should be included in the 
VCLT.983 Some argued in favour of the existence of ‘principles’ of interpretation, not 
‘rules’, while others feared that putting any such rules down in black-letter law, might 
make them too rigid, and eventually hinder the work of the judges.984 In this climate, 
one can understand the effort that the drafters put in ensuring a level of flexibility for 
the rules of interpretation they would end up with. Article 32 is but one more example 
of that effort. What is, nevertheless, strange is that the term ‘including’, although not 
an object of controversy, was not an object of discussion either. The entirety of the 
debate focused on the notion of travaux préparatoires and its various complexities.985 
This, on the one hand, gives the judges a relative ‘clean slate’ to work with, on the 
other hand, though, it deprives the judges of any basic guideline with which to work. 
In general, international courts and tribunals have been hesitant in making 
pronouncements on whether their own previous judgments or those of other courts 
can be used for interpretative purposes through an application of Article 32.986 It is 
exactly this situation, which makes the stance of the Tribunal in CCFT v. US all the 
more interesting. First, the Tribunal reiterates that the term ‘including’ clearly 
indicates that there are other supplementary means available to the judges, apart from 
travaux préparatoires and ‘circumstances of conclusion’ of a treaty. So far everything 
is pretty self-evident. It is logical also to infer that since the Tribunal focuses on the 
                                                 
983 ILC, (A/CN.4/SR.726) in YILC (1964), Vol.I: 20, para. 4, 15, 24, 28; ILC, (A/CN.4/SR.765 & 66), 
in YILC (1964), Vol. I: 275 et seq.; also see ILC, Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with 
Commentaries, in YILC (1964), Vol.II: 176, at 199-201. 
984 Id. 
985 For a general overview, see Franciscus A. Engelen, Interpretation of Tax Treaties under 
International Law: A Study of Articles 31, 32 and 33 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
and their Application to Tax Treaties (Amsterdam: IBFD, 2004), 293 et seq. 
986 This is not to say, of course, that they have refrained from quoting judgments of other courts, a 
phenomenon more known as judicial cross-fertilization. On this issue, see Francis G. Jacobs, ‘Judicial 
Dialogue and the Cross-fertilization of Legal Systems: the European Court of Justice’, Texas 
International Law Journal 38 (2003): 547-56; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘A Global Community of 
Courts’, Harvard International Law Journal 44 (2003): 191-219; Société Française pour le Droit 
International, La juridictionalisation du Droit International : Colloque de Lille (Paris: Pedone, 2003). 
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term ‘including’ it feels that judicial decisions fall neither in the group of  travaux 
préparatoires nor in that of ‘circumstances of conclusion’.987  
The Tribunal then, in order to substantiate why judicial decisions are 
supplementary means within the meaning of Article 32, invokes the Statute of the ICJ. 
It is exactly this point that needs to be stressed. As was mentioned earlier, by focusing 
on the text of the VCLT, the Tribunal already started a systemic interpretation of the 
customary rules of interpretation themselves. By now interpreting Article 32988 by 
reference to the ICJ Statute, it applies a systemic interpretation once again.  
Let us proceed now with an examination of the interpretative process per se. 
Although the Tribunal does not explain the reasoning behind the reference to the ICJ 
Statute, it must fall within the customary rules on interpretation. The only element 
that seems to fit the bill is Article 31(3)(c), or to be exact, its customary equivalent.989 
The Tribunal is seeking to determine whether judicial decisions, can be 
supplementary means within Article 32. If we are to apply the essence of Article 
31(3)(c) and refer to “all relevant rules of international applicable in the relations 
between the parties”, where better to start than with the UN Charter, which epitomises 
the notion of a treaty with global participation. The ICJ Statute is an integral part of 
the UN Charter990 and “[a]ll Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice”.991 This would resolve the issue of 
‘applicable between the parties’, even if we were to apply the strictest criterion992 set 
by the Panel in the Biotech case,993 since all States parties to the VCLT are parties to 
the UN Charter, and most importantly if the VCLT as a treaty were to apply. 
However, in the present case, as was mentioned supra, we are dealing with customary 
law, which might complicate things depending on the criterion applicable. 
                                                 
987 We shall return to the latter infra, when the CCFT v. US is juxtaposed with  the relevant 
jurisprudence of the WTO. 
988 Or its customary equivalent for the purposes of the present case. 
989 Because as we analyzed supra we are now in the realm of customary law. 
990 Article 92, UN Charter. 
991 Article 93, UN Charter. 
992 Which, however, does not seem to reflect either the true meaning of Article 31 as text or the current 
status of customary law. In more detail see Panos Merkouris, ‘Debating the Outoboros of International 
Law: The Drafting History of Article 31(3)(c)’, ICLR 9 (2007): 1-31. 
993 Which applied an interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) in the sense that all parties to the treaty 
interpreted must be parties to the treaty used by means of Article 31(3)(c); in more detail see supra 
Section III.B.3. Similarly, the intertemporality issues of 31(3)(c) do not come into play here as the UN 
Charter precedes the VCLT. 
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Nevertheless, even in this case, the universal participation of the UN Charter is 
sufficient to satisfy even the Biotech case criterion.  
The only issue then, which remains, is whether the ICJ Statute is ‘relevant’. 
The Tribunal seems to address the issue when it says:  
 
Article 38 [paragraph 1.d.] of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that 
judicial decisions are applicable for the interpretation of public international law as 
‘subsidiary means’. Therefore, they must be understood to be also supplementary means of 
interpretation in the sense of Article 32 VCLT.994 
 
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute is generally accepted as outlining the main sources of 
international law, with 38(1)(a)(b) and (c) being the ‘formal’ sources and the rest the 
‘material’ or ‘quasi-formal’ sources.995 Judicial decisions, mentioned at Article 
38(1)(d) are supposed not to create but to evidence, or indicate the status of 
international law.996 It is this relevance that the Tribunal was hinting at.  
The shortcomings of this equation between ‘subsidiary’ and 
‘supplementary’,997 however, in no way diminish the importance of the case. The 
Tribunal in CCFT v. US interpreted the customary rule on interpretation relating to 
supplementary means, i.e. customary Article 32, through the customary Article 
31(3)(c), on 2 levels: 
i. by using the text of the VCLT, which incorporates the customary rule 
on interpretation, and 
                                                 
994 CCFT v. US, para. 187. 
995 The latter being a term coined by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal 
Sources of International Law’, in Symbolae Verzijl : présentées au Professeur J. H. Verzijl à l’ 
Occasion de son LXX-ième Anniversaire, Jan H. Verzijl and Frederik M. van Asbeck (eds.) (The 
Hague : Nijhoff, 1958), 153-76 at 173. 
996 Schwarzenberger, supra note 534, at 27 et seq. 
997 Whether Article 32 was considered as ‘less important’ than Article 31 was hotly contested in the 
travaux préparatoires of the VCLT and was resolved in favour of the adoption of the term 
‘supplementary’ (for a general overview of the debate see Engelen, supra note 502 Chapter 7, 
especially 321-6). This term was selected in order to emphasize and to more accurately represent the 
true function of Article 32, i.e. making complete the interpretation, either through confirmation or 
clarification, arrived at through Article 31 (ILC, Report of the ILC on the Work of its 18th Session: 
Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, (A/6309/Rev.1), reproduced in YILC (1966), 
Vol. II: 218, at 220, para. 10; at 223, para. 19). On the contrary, in the travaux préparatoires of Article 
38 of the PCIJ Statute, on which Article 38 of the ICJ Statute was based, the term ‘subsidiary’ was 
employed, exactly in order to stress the subordination of judicial decisions to the other sources of 
international law; to demonstrate that it was not on par with the other norm creating sources, but its 
function was more that of providing evidence as to the current status of law. Consequently, the terms 
‘subsidiary’ and ‘supplementary’, functioning in two completely different contexts, do not have the 
identical meaning that the Tribunal claimed. 
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ii. by using the ICJ Statute in order to interpret the term ‘supplementary 
means’ of the customary law Article 32. 
 The EC – Chicken Classification case,998 boasts being one of the very few 
cases, alongside CCFT v. US, to clearly state that judicial decisions can fall under 
Article 32. However, there is one big difference between them. Whereas CCFT v. US 
found that judicial decisions are neither travaux préparatoires nor ‘circumstances of 
conclusion’ of a treaty, thus allowing for a wider discretion as to the decisions that 
could be made reference to,999 the WTO Panel in EC – Chicken Classification 
considered the judicial decisions in question as falling under ‘circumstances of 
conclusion’ of a treaty of Article 32, which, in some cases as we will see infra, might 
create certain temporal restrictions as to the judicial decisions that can be used.  
In more detail, the issue was whether in the interpretation of Heading 02.10 of 
the EC Schedule, the Panel could take into consideration the ECJ judgments in 
Dinter1000 and Gausepohl1001. The Panel felt that this question had to be split in two 
parts: i) whether it was, theoretically,  possible for judgments to be considered under 
Article 32 and ii) whether there were temporal constraints as to what judgments could 
be considered as ‘circumstances of conclusion’ of a treaty.1002  The Panel decided that 
judicial decisions were included in the notion of Article 321003and that “there is no 
temporal limitation on what may qualify as ‘circumstances of conclusion’ under Article 
32 and that ‘relevance’ is the more appropriate criterion”.1004 However, this did not mean 
that there were absolutely no restrictions as to how far temporally distanced a judgment 
could be with respect to the treaty being interpreted, but that Article 32 itself indicates 
that “[any] instrument in question must be temporally proximate to the conclusion of a 
treaty in order for it to be taken into account...under Article 32”.1005 In the end, the Panel 
considered only the Gausepohl and not the Dinter case, not because the latter was 
temporally too far1006 but because it was not ‘relevant’ to the issue at hand.1007  
                                                 
998 European Communities - Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts, Panel Report 
adopted on 30 May 2005, WTO, WT/DS269/R & WT/DS286/R (hereinafter EC – Chicken 
Classification (PR)). 
999 However, always under the proviso that they shed some light to the issues raised in the case. 
1000 Case C-175/82, Dinter v. Hauptzollamt Köln-Deutz (1983), ECR 969. 
1001 Case C-33/92, Fleisch GmbH v. Oberfinanzdirektion Hamburg (1993), ECR I-3047. 
1002 EC – Chicken Classification (PR), para. 7.390. 
1003 Ibid., para. 7.391 and FN 681. 
1004 Id.; and more analytically, para. 7.344. 
1005 Ibid., para. 7.392. 
1006 Although it had been issued in 1983, the Panel thought that it still remained applicable; Ibid., para. 
7.393. 
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In summary, the Panel considered ECJ judgments to fall under Article 32, but 
within the notion of ‘circumstance of conclusion’ of a treaty and not within the non-
defined other supplementary means. Furthermore, it elaborated a set of criteria: i) 
relevancy and ii) temporal proximity of the judgments to the treaty being interpreted. Out 
of these two criteria, the primary one is that of relevancy. Temporal proximity offers a 
threshold, but quite a flexible one, as long as relevancy is satisfied. 
In summation the EC-Chicken Classification case similarly to the CCFT v. US 
case, had to apply customary rules of interpretation.1008 However, instead it focused 
and used the text of the VCLT. As has already been repeated several times this is a 
form of systemic interpretation. Furthermore, the conclusions it came to as to whether 
judicial decisions fall under Article 32 and the criteria it elaborated are all 
manifestations and results of an interpretative process. Unfortunately, however, the 
Panel did not explain the process through which it arrived to these conclusions. 
For similar reasons the Biotech case, as has been analyzed supra when 
interpreting customary Article 31(3)(c) through the use of the text of the VCLT  was 
actually engaged in a process of systemic interpretation. 
All of the aforementioned cases are characteristic in the sense that they not 
only engaged in a systemic interpretation of customary international law, but more 
importantly that the rules they attempted to interpret were the customary rules of 
interpretation themselves. Of course, amongst them CCFT v. US has a special place 
because, apart from the above, it set the bar even higher by applying the customary 
law equivalent of Article 31(3)(c) on two different levels. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
1007 Id. 
1008 By virtue of Article 3(2) DSU. 
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IV. Conclusion 
In this final Chapter the scope of application of the principle of systemic integration 
(customary Article 31(3)(c)) was put to the test. The question put forward was 
whether customary Article 31(3)(c) could be applied in the interpretation not only of 
treaties but of customary international law. Since this is a relatively unexplored field 
this implied that in order to respond to this question another one had to be answered 
first: Whether interpretation of customary international law is even possible. This 
question was tackled from two different fronts. On the one hand, whether it was 
logical to consider interpretation as applicable to unwritten law and on the other hand, 
whether case-law existed to prove this point. Both were answered to the affirmative. 
Not only was the interpretation of customary norms a logical corollary of their status 
qua norms, but several cases had already interpreted customary international law 
With respect to custom, the main focus of academics and international 
judiciary alike has mostly been on the elements evidencing custom and not on other 
related issues, to which interpretation of customary law belongs. Having established 
that such an interpretation is possible, the apposite methods were identified. The 
nature of custom renders the point of a grammatical/textual interpretation almost moot 
(especially since reference to treaties codifying customary norms is not a textual 
interpretation but a systemic one). The same conclusion is arrived at with respect to 
an interpretation based on the intentions of the parties. Consequently, only the 
methods of teleological and the systemic interpretation were found to be relevant for 
the purpose of interpreting customary international law, with the latter being found in 
a multitude of cases indicating that it is perhaps a method tailored to the unique 
characteristics and challenges of international customary law. 
The final question that needs to be addressed is what does ‘interpretation of 
custom’ bring to the table; what does it benefit the judges and the system of 
international law to accept such an interpretation? Before answering this, certain 
points need to be made. Firstly, ‘interpretation of custom’, as was shown in the 
previous analysis, is not something hypothetical the existence of which may depend 
on its general acceptance or not. On the contrary, it is something that flows naturally 
and logically from the fundamental rules upon which the function of the international 
legal system is premised. Since, according to Hart, all terms used in law have “a core 
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of settled application and a fringe or penumbra of uncertainty” and since the most 
prominent tool for alleviating this uncertainty has always been the process of 
interpretation, to deny the existence of ‘interpretation of custom’ would be tantamount 
to recognizing that either customary international law is not ‘law’ or that the 
fundamental rules of the international legal system are inherently flawed and erratic. 
Additionally, ‘interpretation of custom’ does not claim to solve, or even 
propose a solution to the problems relating to the nature and creation of customary 
international law. These are two different realms; ‘interpretation of custom’ deals with 
custom after its coming into existence; for the same reason, in the analysis supra, a 
clear distinction was made between ‘interpretation of custom’ and interpretation of 
acts that constitute practice leading to the formation or identification of custom. 
 Having said that, this does not mean that a more generalized recognition of 
‘interpretation of custom’ may not benefit the international legal system. One need 
only bring to mind the situation with respect to Article 31(3)(c). As demonstrated in 
Part I, it was some sporadic references in recent cases, that ignited a sudden interest 
for this provision and an extensive discussion both on an academic (see for instance, 
the Report of the ILC Study Group) and on a judicial level (the ‘flowering of case-
law’ as stated by Gardiner) and led to the acceptance of Article 31(3)(c) not as a 
panacea but as a useful interpretative tool for combating the fear of fragmentation of 
international law. 
Similarly, an acknowledgment of the validity of ‘interpretation of custom’ 
may lead to a revitalization of the debate surrounding the function and importance of 
this source of international law, but perhaps more importantly, it can contribute to the 
betterment of the international judicial system. If the process of identification of 
custom is clearly separated from that of interpretation, this would be reflected both in 
the pleadings of the parties bringing a claim before international tribunals (be they 
individuals or States) and in the text of the judgments themselves; even more so since 
international judges are more at ease with the process of interpretation than with 
researching practice and opinio juris for the identification of custom. 
Finally and in addition to the above, since, as demonstrated supra, systemic 
interpretation seems to be the method of interpretation most apposite to the special 
nature of customary law, this would further reinforce the unity of the international 
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legal system and reinvigorate this source of international law. If when interpreting 
custom the international judge would have to take into consideration  all ‘relevant 
rules’, or as shown in the Tadic and Nicaragua cases entire areas of international law, 
the scenario of detrimental fragmentation of international law would become all the 
more unlikely.   
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Concluding Remarks 
Throughout the analysis of this thesis the main goal was to provide a coherent and 
complete picture of Article 31(3)(c) and the principle of systemic integration. In order 
to better present the sui generis character of the principle of systemic integration the 
method opted for was focusing on the synthesis and antithesis which characterizes the 
application of the principle of systemic integration. Although a ‘norm’ and a ‘system’ 
are two distinct notions they affect each other, and Article 31(3)(c) is one point of 
convergence. For these reasons, the oscillation between norm and system permeated 
the analysis of this thesis. In Part I the starting point of analysis was the text of the 
provision, whereas in Part II the system of international law took the stage. However, 
both Parts aimed at casting new light on Article 31(3)(c). 
Chapter I examined the wording applied in Article 31(3)(c) and especially the 
meaning of a number of vague terms, such as ‘relevant’, ‘rules’, ‘applicable’ and 
‘parties’. Since this could be construed as interpretation the process prescribed by 
Articles 31 and 32 was followed. The text and context of Article 31(3)(c) was 
analyzed, without, however, revealing a clear meaning. For that reason, the travaux 
préparatoires and the relevant jurisprudence (as supplementary means of 
interpretation) were taken into consideration. It was only through these that a true 
understanding of Article 31(3)(c) was made possible.  
Not only are all norms, irrespective of their source, included in Article 
31(3)(c), but also the way in which ‘relevancy’, ‘applicability’ and ‘parties’ is 
determined is based not on a variety of contradicting criteria but on one overarching 
criterion: the proximity criterion. The analysis of the jurisprudence, both pre-VCLT 
and post-VCLT, revealed that this criterion had four different manifestations: i) 
terminological proximity ii) subject-matter proximity iii) shared signatory parties 
(‘actor’) proximity and iv) temporal proximity. Each and every time a court has 
applied Article 31(3)(c) it has done so through a balanced application of these four 
manifestations of the proximity criterion. 
However, an understanding of Article 31(3)(c) does not merely entail 
identifying the content of the written terms of that provision. What was left unwritten 
is as important as the written elements. Therefore, Chapter II was devoted to an 
analysis of the issue of intertemporal law as it applies within Article 31(3)(c). The 
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discussions in the ILC and the Institut de Droit International demonstrated that the 
topic of intertemporal law was such a complex issue that the solution finally adopted 
was to delete any explicit reference to it. This meant that both a Draft Article 56, 
regulating the issue of intertemporal law, and a draft version of Article 31(3)(c) that 
included intertemporal law references were set aside. However, the discussions within 
the ILC revealed a crucial point with respect to intertemporal law. Irrespective of the 
various solutions proposed, ranging from strict application of the principle of 
contemporaneity to a more dynamic/evolutive interpretation, the general 
understanding of the ILC members was that the intention of the parties was the key 
element to resolving any issue of intertemporality. This conclusion was reinforced by 
the relevant jurisprudence.  
Since therefore any approach to intertemporal law requires a degree of 
flexibility based on the intentions of the parties, a similar approach to Article 31(3)(c) 
is prescribed. The question of whether the term ‘rules of international law’ should be 
interpreted as rules applicable ‘at the time of the conclusion of the treaty’ or ‘at the 
time of the interpretation of a treaty’  does not admit of a single, all-encompassing 
approach. The solution will depend each time on the interpreted treaty and the 
intention of its parties. 
With Chapters I and II the analysis starting with the text of Article 31(3)(c) 
concluded. Part II, in its turn, brought into focus more ‘systemic considerations’ and 
how these may affect or elucidate the understanding and application of Article 
31(3)(c). To this effect, Chapter III examined the notion of conflict of norms and, in 
more detail, the principles of conflict resolution. Despite some controversy as to the 
exact nature of the latter, they were, nevertheless, found to fall within the notion of 
‘rules’ of Article 31(3)(c), as defined already in Chapter I, and to apply in the case of 
conflicting interpretations which are all based on Article 31(3)(c). 
Furthermore, whereas in the context of ‘normative conflict’ the 
aforementioned principles suffer from various limitations, the analysis in Chapter III 
clearly demonstrated that within the process of Article 31(3)(c) these limitations 
vanish. The reason for that is that in ‘normative conflict’ a failure of the principles of 
conflict resolution leads to a dead-end. Within Article 31(3)(c), however, the situation 
is fundamentally different. In the scenario of conflicting interpretations mentioned 
above, the ‘presumption against conflict’ is reversed and becomes a ‘presumption of 
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conflict’. Consequently, the interpreter will first resort to the principles of conflict 
resolution and then to the proximity criterion, as analyzed in Chapter I. Due to this 
two-staged approach, even if the principles of conflict resolution fail to offer a 
solution, the interpreter can still find refuge in the proximity criterion, which will 
never fail to resolve the interpretative issue. 
In the final Chapter the scope of application of the principle of systemic 
integration was put to the test. The issue around which Chapter IV revolved was 
whether international customary law can also be an object of interpretation in a 
fashion similar to conventional law. This Chapter proved that not only is 
interpretation of customary law possible but that it has already taken place in a 
multitude of international judicial decisions, some of which are even considered 
landmark cases. 
Having established that such an interpretation is possible, the apposite 
methods were identified. The very nature of customary international law renders a 
grammatical/textual interpretation almost impossible. As proven in Chapter IV, 
reference to treaties codifying customary law should not be considered as textual 
interpretation, but as systemic. The same conclusion was arrived at with respect to an 
interpretation based on the intentions of the parties. Consequently, only the methods 
of teleological and systemic interpretation were applicable within the context of 
interpretation of customary international law. Out of these two methods, it was 
demonstrated in Chapter IV, that the latter i.e. systemic interpretation, was the method 
best suited to address the complexities and unique problems that the interpretation of 
customary law entailed. 
All the above Chapters offered, each separately, something new in the 
understanding of Article 31(3)(c) and the principle of systemic integration; and all of 
them combined clarified the process that Article 31(3)(c) represents. As a final 
conclusion, according to the author of this thesis, the principle of systemic integration 
integrates the whole of international law in the process of interpretation and allows it, 
as Klabbers said, to achieve “unity in fragmentation”.1009 In this way, the present 
thesis by presenting in a lucid manner the place and function of Article 31(3)(c) 
within both the interpretative process of the VCLT and the system of international law 
                                                 
1009 Klabbers, supra note 345, at 159. 
 241
as a whole conforms with Plato’s metaphor. Since knowledge is the way out of the 
‘cave’, this thesis has striven to release the interpreter (‘the captive’) from the ‘chains’ 
of an incomplete understanding of 31(3)(c), that so far have bound ‘the captive’ and 
forced him to gaze at shadows on the wall, without really comprehending the true 
nature behind them. 
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